



Liberty 2026–2028 Base Wildfire Mitigation Plan_R1



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1. Executive Summary

Instructions¹: In the opening section of the Base WMP, the electrical corporation must provide an executive summary that is no longer than ten pages. The electrical corporation must summarize the primary goal, plan objectives, and framework for the development of the Base WMP for the three-year cycle. The electrical corporation may use a combination of brief narratives and bulleted lists.

Liberty's 2026-2028 Base Wildfire Mitigation Plan ("WMP") identifies Liberty's ongoing efforts to minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfires posed by its electrical lines and equipment. These efforts include implementing preventive strategies for the construction, operation, and maintenance of its electrical lines and equipment, enhancing situational awareness, and making risk-informed decisions to address ignition risk and reduce the risk of events. Liberty is committed to the safety of the customers and communities it serves as it implements a balanced, actionable, and effective wildfire mitigation strategy.

Primary Goal: Consistent with Section 8386(a) of the California Public Utilities Code, the primary goal of Liberty's Base 2026-2028 WMP is to minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfires posed by its electrical lines and equipment by implementing preventive strategies for the construction, operation, and maintenance of its facilities, enhancing situational awareness, and making risk-informed decisions. Liberty's 2026-2028 WMP is a comprehensive portfolio of wildfire mitigation initiatives that build on past successes, key lessons learned and identified areas for improvement across the 2020-2022 and 2023-2025 WMP cycles.

Plan Objectives: Liberty's WMP objectives over the 2026-2028 WMP cycle aim to create a comprehensive and proactive approach to wildfire mitigation activities. Liberty intends to reduce the risk of wildfire caused by utility equipment by implementing its WMP initiatives described in its 2026-2028 WMP. Liberty's WMP objectives include:

- Liberty's grid hardening strategy includes systematically replacing aging and vulnerable infrastructure. The installation of covered conductor to provide enhanced protection against wire-to-wire contact, vegetation contact, animal contact, or contact with other objects, which can be potential ignition sources, is also a key part of the strategy. Pole replacement, tree attachment removal, grey wire replacement, expulsion fuse replacement, and other upgrades to more resilient components improves the system's

¹ Text in orange text boxes are instructions from the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety Final Wildfire Mitigation Plan Guidelines, February 2025.

ability to withstand extreme weather conditions and reduce the likelihood of wildfire incidents.

- Liberty conducts asset inspections, governed by General Order (“GO”) 165 and GO 95, throughout the system to identify safety and reliability conditions that contribute to wildfire risk. Furthermore, beginning in 2026, Liberty plans to add annual drone inspection for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone.
- Liberty is leveraging modern technology such as its Sensitive Relay Profile (“SRP”) program, which will be completed in 2025, and the Sagehen Field Station Microgrid to reduce both ignition risk and PSPS risk for customers. This multi-faceted approach enhances the safety and reliability of the electrical system.
- Liberty performs vegetation management and inspections that exceed the requirements set forth by GO 95, Public Resources Code (“PRC”) §4292 and PRC §4293 to mitigate risk posed by vegetation throughout its service territory. Liberty’s vegetation management program implements a hybrid approach that integrates both cycle-based and condition-based methodologies. This approach combines the consistency of scheduled maintenance with the adaptability of real-time, condition-driven responses. By leveraging advanced technology and data analytics, Liberty enhances traditional maintenance cycles, applies risk-based criteria to prioritize activities, and proactively addresses vegetation conditions that contribute to wildfire risk.
- Liberty has developed a comprehensive situational awareness and forecasting strategy. A key element includes the use of weather models and weather monitoring for forecasting fire danger, PSPS decision making, and adjusting operational procedures according to fire potential indices. Weather station maintenance and calibration helps maintain the integrity of the data used in fire risk modeling and operation planning.
- Through extensive emergency planning and community outreach efforts, Liberty works to prepare the communities it serves for the possibility of PSPS events. These efforts include timely customer notifications, public education campaigns, and coordination with local emergency services so that customers are informed, supported, and prepared to stay safe during power shutoffs.

Plan Framework: Liberty’s Base 2026-2028 WMP builds upon its ongoing approach of managing wildfire and PSPS risk. Liberty has made significant advancements in developing and implementing a risk-based decision-making (“RBDM”) framework to drive wildfire mitigation decisions and strategies that will achieve the plan’s primary goal and objectives. Liberty is enhancing its RBDM framework to minimize overall utility risk. Data-driven decisions, made by subject matter experts, will be informed by predictive modeling combined with observed field

conditions enabling Liberty to prioritize mitigation efforts and allocate resources efficiently across its service territory.

Initial results from Liberty's risk modeling and RBDM framework implementation support Liberty's past WMP decision-making. Specifically, replacing aging and vulnerable infrastructure through its grid hardening WMP initiatives, including poles, fuses, and tree attachments, has provided impactful risk reduction across past WMP cycles and is projected to continue to do so throughout the 2026-2028 WMP cycle. Additionally, Liberty's deployment of its SRP Program in 2024 and 2025 is expected to reduce both wildfire and PSPS risk.

As part of its 2026–2028 Wildfire Mitigation Plan, Liberty is advancing its use of data-driven risk modeling to support strategic planning and mitigation prioritization. Liberty has developed and implemented a comprehensive risk model that quantifies wildfire risk throughout the service area. This model supports Liberty's RBDM framework by providing:

- Baseline and forecasted risk metrics across multiple mitigation initiatives
- Risk scores from the circuit level down to individual spans
- Risk Spend Efficiency ("RSE") evaluations to guide investment decisions

With the model now operational, Liberty is focused on building internal capabilities to analyze and apply these risk outputs to effectively plan and prioritize WMP activities.

2. Responsible Persons

The electrical corporation must list those responsible for executing the WMP,² including:

- Executive-level owner with overall responsibility
- Program owners with responsibility for each of the main components of the plan
- As applicable, general ownership for questions related to or activities described in the WMP.

Electrical corporations may not redact titles, credentials, and components of responsible person(s). This information must be publicly available.

Executive-level owner with overall responsibility

- Name and title: Eric Schwarzrock, President
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Program owners specific to each section of the plan

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Section 2: Responsible Persons

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Section 3: Overview of WMP

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² Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(1).

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Section 5: Risk Methodology and Assessment

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Appendix A: Definitions

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Appendix B: Supporting Documentation for Risk Assessment

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Appendix D: Areas for Continued Improvement

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3. Overview of Base WMP

3.1 Primary Goal

Each electrical corporation must state the primary goal of its Base WMP. The primary goal must be consistent with California Public Utilities Code section 8386(a).³

The primary goal of Liberty's WMP is to minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfires posed by its electrical lines and equipment by implementing preventive strategies for the construction, operation, and maintenance of its facilities, enhancing situational awareness, and making informed decisions.

3.2 Plan Objectives

In this section, the electrical corporation must summarize its plan objectives over the three-year WMP cycle.⁴ Plan objectives are determined by the portfolio of activities proposed in the Base WMP.

Plan objectives must address the electrical corporation's most highly prioritized categories of wildfire risk drivers, as listed in Section 3.4.

Electrical corporations must tie plan objectives to targets (both quantitative and qualitative) and performance metrics.

Liberty's WMP objectives over the 2026-2028 WMP cycle aim to create a comprehensive and proactive approach to wildfire mitigation activities. Liberty is enhancing its risk-based decision-making framework to minimize overall utility risk. Data-driven decisions, made by subject matter experts, will be informed by predictive modeling combined with observed field data enabling Liberty to prioritize mitigation efforts and allocate resources efficiently across its service territory.

Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance: Liberty's grid hardening strategy includes systematically replacing aging and vulnerable infrastructure. The installation of covered conductor to provide enhanced protection against wire-to-wire contact, vegetation contact, animal contact, or contact with other objects which can be potential ignition sources is also a key part of the strategy. Asset inspections, governed by General Order ("GO") 165 and GO 95,

³ "Each electrical corporation shall construct, maintain, and operate its electrical lines and equipment in a manner that will minimize the risk of catastrophic wildfire posed by those electrical lines and equipment." (Pub. Util. Code § 8386(a).)

⁴ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(2).

occur throughout the system, plus an incremental and annual drone inspection within Liberty's HFTD-3 zone, to identify safety and reliability conditions that contribute to wildfire risk. Pole replacement, tree attachment removal, grey wire replacement, expulsion fuse replacement, and other upgrades to more resilient components improves the system's ability to withstand extreme weather conditions and reduce the likelihood of wildfire incidents.

Additionally, Liberty is leveraging modern technology such as its Sensitive Relay Profile ("SRP") program, which will be completed in 2025, and the Sagehen Field Station Microgrid. The deployment of modern technology reduces both ignition risk and PSPS risk for customers. This multi-faceted approach enhances the safety and reliability of the electrical system.

Vegetation Management and Inspections: Liberty performs vegetation management and inspections that exceed the requirements set forth by GO 95, Public Resources Code ("PRC") §4292 and PRC §4293 to mitigate risk posed by vegetation throughout its service territory. Liberty's vegetation management program implements a hybrid approach that integrates both cycle-based and condition-based methodologies. This approach combines the consistency of scheduled maintenance with the adaptability of real-time, condition-driven responses. By leveraging advanced technology and data analytics, Liberty enhances traditional maintenance cycles, applies risk-based criteria to prioritize activities, and proactively addresses vegetation conditions that contribute to wildfire risk.

Situational Awareness and Forecasting: To proactively manage wildfire risk, Liberty has developed a comprehensive situational awareness and forecasting strategy. A key element includes the use of weather models and weather monitoring for forecasting fire danger, PSPS decision making, and adjusting operational procedures according to fire potential indices. Weather station maintenance and calibration helps maintain the integrity of the data used in fire risk modeling and operation planning.

Public Safety Power Shutoff: Liberty may initiate a PSPS when weather conditions significantly increase the risk of wildfire. Through extensive emergency planning and community outreach efforts, Liberty works to prepare the communities it serves for the possibility of PSPS events. These efforts include timely customer notifications, public education campaigns, and coordination with local emergency services so that customers are informed, supported, and prepared to stay safe during power shutoffs.

3.3 Utility Mitigation Activity Tracking IDs

Each electrical corporation must use “Utility Mitigation Activity Tracking IDs” (Tracking IDs) throughout their WMP. Each electrical corporation must implement a tracking system using Tracking IDs, as specified in the applicable Energy Safety Data Guidelines, to tie targets, narratives, initiatives, and activities together throughout its WMP. The electrical corporation must use consistent Tracking IDs in its WMP submission and data submissions. Each Tracking ID must remain consistent across the three-year WMP.

Liberty uses the WMP Initiative Tracking IDs provided in LU Table 3-1.

LU Table 3-1: Liberty WMP Initiative Tracking IDs

WMP Initiative Category	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative ID
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Covered conductor installation	WMP-GDOM-GH-01
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment	WMP-GDOM-GH-02
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements	WMP-GDOM-GH-03
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Transmission pole/tower replacements and reinforcements	WMP-GDOM-GH-04
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Traditional overhead hardening	WMP-GDOM-GH-05
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Emerging grid hardening technology installations and pilot progress	WMP-GDOM-GH-06
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Microgrids	WMP-GDOM-GH-07
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Installation of system automation equipment	WMP-GDOM-GH-08
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Line removal (in HFTD)	WMP-GDOM-GH-09
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Other grid topology improvements to minimize risk of ignitions	WMP-GDOM-GH-10
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Other grid topology improvements to mitigate or reduce PSPS events	WMP-GDOM-GH-11
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Other technologies and systems not listed above:	WMP-GDOM-GH-12
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Tree attachment removals	WMP-GDOM-GH-12a
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Expulsion fuse replacement	WMP-GDOM-GH-12b
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Animal guards	WMP-GDOM-GH-12c
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	CalFIRE exempt hardware	WMP-GDOM-GH-12d
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Open wire/grey wire	WMP-GDOM-GH-12e
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment	WMP-GDOM-AI-01
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Intrusive pole inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-02
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Patrol inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment	WMP-GDOM-AI-03
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Other discretionary inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment: Drone inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-04

WMP Initiative Category	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative ID
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quality assurance / quality control of inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-05
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Substation inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-06
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Equipment maintenance and repair	WMP-GDOM-MR-01
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Equipment settings to reduce wildfire risk	WMP-GDOM-GO-01
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Grid response procedures and notifications	WMP-GDOM-GO-02
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Personnel work procedures and training in conditions of elevated fire risk	WMP-GDOM-GO-03
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Automatic recloser operations	WMP-GDOM-GO-04
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Asset Management and Inspection Enterprise System	WMP-GDOM-GO-05
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Vegetation Management Inspection Program - Detailed	WMP-VM-INSP-01
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Vegetation Management Inspection Program - Patrol	WMP-VM-INSP-02
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Vegetation Management Inspection Program - LiDAR	WMP-VM-INSP-03
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Pole Clearing	WMP-VM-VFM-01
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Wood and Slash Management	WMP-VM-VFM-02
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Substation Defensible Space	WMP-VM-VFM-03
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Fire-Resilient Right-of-Ways	WMP-VM-VFM-04
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Clearance	WMP-VM-VFM-05
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Fall-In Mitigation	WMP-VM-VFM-06
Vegetation Management & Inspections	High-Risk Species	WMP-VM-VFM-07
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Emergency Response Vegetation Management	WMP-VM-VFM-08
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Vegetation Management Enterprise System	WMP-VM-ESG-01
Vegetation Management & Inspections	Quality Assurance and Quality Control	WMP-VM-QAQC-01
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Environmental monitoring systems	WMP-SA-01
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Grid monitoring systems	WMP-SA-02
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Fire detection and alarm systems	WMP-SA-03
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Weather forecasting	WMP-SA-04
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Fire Potential Index	WMP-SA-05
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Ignition likelihood calculation	WMP-SA-06
Situational Awareness & Forecasting	Ignition consequence calculation	WMP-SA-07
Emergency Preparedness	Wildfire and PSPS emergency preparedness plan	WMP-EP-01
Emergency Preparedness	Collaboration and coordination with public safety partners	WMP-EP-02
Emergency Preparedness	Public notification and communication strategy	WMP-EP-03
Emergency Preparedness	Preparedness and planning for service restoration	WMP-EP-04
Emergency Preparedness	Customer support in wildfire and PSPS emergencies	WMP-EP-05
Emergency Preparedness	Learning after wildfire and PSPS events	WMP-EP-06

WMP Initiative Category	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative ID
Community Outreach and Engagement	Public outreach and education awareness for wildfires, PSPS, outages from protective equipment and device settings, and vegetation management	WMP-CO-01
Community Outreach and Engagement	Public engagement in WMP decision-making process	WMP-CO-02
Community Outreach and Engagement	Engagement with AFN populations, local governments, and tribal communities	WMP-CO-03
Community Outreach and Engagement	Collaboration on local wildfire mitigation and planning	WMP-CO-04
Community Outreach and Engagement	Best practice sharing with other electrical corporations	WMP-CO-05

3.4 Prioritized List of Wildfire Risks and Risk Drivers

The electrical corporation must provide a list that identifies and prioritizes all wildfire risks, and drivers for those risks, throughout its service territory.⁵ The electrical corporation must use the format outlined in Table 3-2 below. Additionally, the list must include, at a minimum, the specific risks and risk drivers provided in Table 3-2. The electrical corporation must also add to its list any wildfire risks and risk drivers applicable to its service territory not already provided in the below table. Prioritization within Table 3-2 must be listed from highest priority to lowest priority.

The electrical corporation must also note topographical or climatological risk factors associated with each risk and risk driver.⁶ Topographical and climatological risk factors may include, but are not limited to, elevation, slope, aspect, heat, aridity, humidity, wind, airborne salinity, precipitation (snow, rain, hail, etc.), and lightning. The electrical corporation must include how it determined these topographical and climatological risk factors via narrative (i.e. evaluating short-term/current conditions, long-term/future conditions).

Additionally, the electrical corporation must describe in a narrative accompanying Table 3-2 its basis for prioritizing these risks and risk drivers (e.g., “priority is assigned based on frequency, location with regard to the High Fire Threat District (“HFTD”), and the expected consequence pertaining to the location”). This must also include a description of the timeframes used to evaluate the risks and risk drivers:

Liberty’s prioritized list of wildfire risks and risk drivers is included in Table 3-1. The prioritization of risk drivers is based on comprehensive ignition reporting data from 2014

⁵ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(12).

⁶ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(12)(B).

through 2024, along with outage data from June 2023 to April 2025. Due to the limited amount of ignition data, specifically within Liberty's service area, outage data has been predominantly utilized. This approach provides an assessment and prioritization of risks, leveraging the most reliable and relevant data available.

Liberty's risk platform includes topography, vegetation-based fuels, climatology, demographics, historic fire weather days, live and dead fuel moisture samples, and impact to the population. These variables are quantified so that Liberty will be able to identify and monitor areas where the data indicates that a wildfire event is likely to occur. Section 5.1.1 provides more details regarding Liberty's Risk Based Decision Making Framework.

Topographical Risk Factors:

- Elevation: Higher elevations may experience different weather patterns and vegetation types.
- Slope: Slope can affect likelihood of vegetation contact and steeper slopes can accelerate fire spread.

Climatological Risk Factors:

- Heat: High temperatures can dry out vegetation, increasing fire risk. Excessive heat can impact equipment by increasing likelihood of failures, conductor sagging, and equipment degradation.
- Aridity: Low humidity levels can make vegetation more flammable.
- Humidity: Low humidity can increase the likelihood and consequence of a risk event.
- Wind: Strong winds can rapidly spread fires. Extreme winds can increase likelihood of vegetation contact and equipment/facility failure or damage.

Table 3-1: List of Risks and Risk Drivers to Prioritize

Priority	Risk	Risk Driver	% of ignitions in HFTD	Topographical and Climatological Risk Factors
1	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Connector device	17.65%	Extreme weather, heat, wind
1	Vegetation contact	Fall-in (branch failure)	11.76%	Elevation, slope, wind, extreme weather
1	Vegetation contact	Fall-in (trunk failure)	11.76%	Elevation, slope, wind, extreme weather
1	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Conductor	11.76%	Extreme weather, heat, wind
1	Wire-to-wire contact	Wire-to-wire contact	5.88%	Extreme weather, heat, wind

Priority	Risk	Risk Driver	% of ignitions in HFTD	Topographical and Climatological Risk Factors
1	Vegetation contact	Fall-in (root failure)	0	Elevation, slope, wind, extreme weather
1	Vegetation contact	Blow-in	0	Elevation, slope, wind, extreme weather
1	Vegetation contact	Grow-in	0	Elevation, slope, wind, extreme weather
2	Contact from object	Animal contact	11.76%	N/A
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Other	5.88%	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Anchor/guy	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Capacitor bank	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Cross arm	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Fuse	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Cutout	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Insulator and bushing	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Lightning arrestor	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Pole	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Recloser	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Relay	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Sectionalizer	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Splice	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Switch	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Tap	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Tie wire	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Transformer	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Voltage regulator / booster	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
2	Equipment / facility failure or damage	Unknown	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
3	Unknown	Unknown	11.76%	N/A
3	Contact from object	Unknown	5.88%	Extreme weather, heat, wind
3	Vandalism/ theft	Vandalism / theft	5.88%	N/A
3	Contact from object	Ballon contact	0	Wind
3	Contact from object	Land vehicle contact	0	N/A
3	Contact from object	Aircraft vehicle contact	0	N/A
3	Contact from object	Third-party contact	0	N/A

Priority	Risk	Risk Driver	% of ignitions in HFTD	Topographical and Climatological Risk Factors
3	Contact from object	Other contact from object	0	N/A
3	Contamination	Contamination	0	Extreme weather, heat, wind
3	Protective device operation	Protective device operation	0	N/A
3	Lightning	Lightning	0	Extreme weather
3	Dig-in	Dig-in	0	N/A

3.5 Performance Metrics

In this section, the electrical corporation must list the performance metrics, beyond those required by Energy Safety, that the electrical corporation uses to evaluate the effectiveness of the plan in reducing wildfire and outage program risk.⁷

For each of these self-identified performance metrics, the electrical corporation must provide the following information in tabular form:

- Associated WMP section (self-identified performance metrics can apply to the entire WMP; e.g. number of ignitions, number of acres burned, etc.)
- The assumptions that underlie the use of the metric.

Metrics listed in this section (including each metric's name and values) must match those reported in the applicable quarterly data submissions.

Liberty does not use performance metrics beyond those required by Energy Safety and thus does not provide a Table 3-2. The comprehensive list of performance metrics required by Energy Safety are sufficient to evaluate the effectiveness of Liberty's plan to reduce wildfire and outage program risk.

Table 3-2: Self-Identified Performance Metrics (N/A)

⁷ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(4), (5).

3.6 Projected Expenditures

The electrical corporation must summarize its projected expenditures in thousands of U.S. dollars per year for the activities set forth in its three-year WMP cycle in both tabular and graph form. For tabular form, the electrical corporation must follow the provided format in Table 3-3.


Energy Safety's WMP evaluation, resulting in either approval or denial, is not an approval of, or agreement with, costs listed in the WMP.

In Table 3-3 and Figure 3-1, Liberty provides a summary of its projected expenditures for the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Table 3-3: Summary of Liberty Projected WMP Expenditures, 2026-2028

Year of WMP Cycle	Projected Spend (thousands \$USD)
2026	\$36,473
2027	\$36,194
2028	\$37,086

Figure 3-1: Summary of Liberty Projected WMP Expenditures, 2026-2028



3.7 Climate Change

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it has considered dynamic climate change risks in writing its WMP.⁸ This description must include reference to the electrical corporation's most recent climate vulnerability assessment addressing new or exacerbated risks related to wildfire. This section is limited to two pages.

3.7.1 General Climate Conditions

Liberty's service territory and the greater Lake Tahoe area experiences warm, dry summers that range from an average minimum temperature of 45 degrees Fahrenheit to average maximum temperatures around 80 degrees Fahrenheit. During winters, temperatures reach an average minimum of 20 degrees Fahrenheit and an average maximum of 42 degrees Fahrenheit. Most of the annual precipitation occurs between the months of November through March, with an average of two to four inches of precipitation per month. Summer months typically see one inch or less of precipitation per month. The lowest daily mean relative humidity occurs around September 1, although relative humidity below 20% can occur at almost any time of year.

In Liberty's service territory, wind patterns of significance from a fire weather standpoint occur primarily due to frontal passages and Washoe Zephyr winds. Ahead of frontal passages, winds typically increase out of the west or southwest before shifting to the north and northeast behind the front. Both wind directions can lead to significant fire weather concerns, but west/southwest winds tend to be more problematic due to the potential for down-sloping winds on the east slope of the Sierra. Frontal passages can lead to fire weather concerns at any time of the year where antecedent moisture or snow cover do not preclude the possibility of fire ignition and spread. During summer months, Washoe Zephyr winds may lead to elevated wind speeds that are typically strongest from early afternoon to late evening. Frontal passages can also lead to enhanced Zephyr winds with higher wind speeds than would occur in the absence of a frontal passage.

3.7.2 Climate Change Trends

The 2039 Higher Emission Model forecast predicts more extreme summer temperatures in several areas of Liberty's service territory—Portola and Loyalton areas in the north and the City

⁸ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(3).

of South Lake Tahoe and Markleeville in the south. The Topaz area is forecasted to be most acutely impacted by increasing temperatures.

Warmer and drier conditions increase the risk of wildfires. Mean annual temperatures in Liberty's service territory have increased since 2000, and by 2055 the number of extreme fire danger days is forecast to increase by 37% for summer months and 66% for fall months. Fuel moisture content is expected to decrease as temperatures rise, meaning drier vegetation during fire season. Climate change is expected to impact annual precipitation totals, causing more extreme fluctuations, which may lead to droughts and flooding. Rising temperatures also increase the rate at which snowpack melts, which may also increase the risk of flooding.

In forested parts of Liberty's service territory, climate change is likely to accelerate tree mortality. The 2022 USDA Forest Service Aerial Detection Survey ("ADS") shows there is already significant tree mortality in Liberty's service territory, particularly west of Lake Tahoe. The implications of this for fire behavior potential are not yet completely understood by the fire science community, but such mortality is likely to increase coarse fuel loading which increases the potential for plume dominated fires.

As required by R.18-04-019,⁹ Liberty is currently participating in the system-wide Climate Adaptation Vulnerability Assessment ("CAVA") proceeding. The results of this proceeding and associated assessments may inform future WMP planning years and cycles.

⁹ R.18-04-019. April 26, 2018. Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Strategies and Guidance for Climate Change Adaptation.

4. Overview of the Service Territory

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of its service territory and key characteristics of its electrical infrastructure.¹⁰ This information must provide Energy Safety with an understanding of the physical and technical scope of the electrical corporation's WMP. Sections 4.1-4.3 below provide detailed instructions.

4.1 Service Territory

The electrical corporation must provide a high-level description of its service territory, addressing the following components:¹¹

- Area served (in square miles)
- Number of customers served
- Overview of electrical infrastructure

Table 4-1 provides the required format for presenting the high-level service territory components.

The electrical corporation must also provide one geospatial representative map that shows its service territory (polygons) and the above required components. The electrical corporation must host this map and any geospatial layers on a publicly accessible web application.

Liberty operates electrical infrastructure across 1,482 square miles of service territory, serving approximately 48,000 customers in Mono, Alpine, El Dorado, Placer, Nevada, Sierra, and Plumas counties. The main component of this service area consists of the 1,471 square miles adjacent to Lake Tahoe, from Topaz in the south, to South Lake Tahoe, North Lake Tahoe, and Loyalton. A much smaller section, consisting of 11 square miles, does not connect directly to the rest of the service area and serves only the Portola area in Plumas County.

Liberty's service territory consists mostly of rural communities with a few urban centers. Most residential customers served live in single-family homes, town homes, and duplexes. Terrain varies from flat land in South Lake Tahoe to slopes, ridges, and canyons in the western and northern areas of the service territory, with trees, brush, and timber throughout. Liberty's entire service territory is more than 4,800 feet above sea level. All of these factors present unique challenges to maintaining safe and reliable service.

¹⁰ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (8).


¹¹ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submissions.

Table 4-1 provides high-level service territory statistics and Figure 4-1 is a map of Liberty's service territory and the distribution of customers.

Table 4-1. Liberty Service Territory High-Level Statistics

Characteristic	HFTD Tier 2	HFTD Tier 3	Non-HFTD	Total
Area served (square miles)	922.78	13.17	547.92	1,483.87
Number of customers served	41,713	3,019	3,500	48,232
Overhead transmission lines (circuit miles)	28.41	2.36	2.12	32.89
Overhead distribution lines (circuit miles)	1,259.86	124.73	92.31	1,476.9
Underground transmission lines (circuit miles)	1.3	0	0	1.3
Underground distribution lines (circuit miles)	536.67	10.22	38.38	585.29
Hardened overhead transmission lines (circuit miles)	0	0	0	0
Hardened overhead distribution lines (circuit miles)	43.57	0	0	43.57
Substations (#)	11	1	2	14
Power generation facilities (#)	0	0	0	0
Distribution transformers (#)	7,015	365	581	7,961
Reclosers (#)	39	0	3	42
Poles (#)	21,366	1,737	1,815	24,918
Microgrids (#)	1	0	0	1

Figure 4-1. Liberty Service Territory and Customer Distribution, 2025



4.2 Catastrophic Wildfire History

The electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative summarizing its wildfire history for the past 20 years as recorded by the electrical corporation, CAL FIRE, or other authoritative government sources. For this section, wildfire history must be limited to electrical corporation ignited catastrophic fires (i.e., fires that caused at least one death, damaged over 500 structures, or burned over 5,000 acres). This includes catastrophic wildfire ignitions reported to the CPUC that may be attributable to facilities or equipment owned by the electrical corporation¹² and where the cause of the ignition is still under investigation by the CPUC, CAL FIRE, and/or other authoritative government sources. The electrical corporation must clearly denote those ignitions as still under investigation. In addition, the electrical corporation must provide catastrophic wildfire statistics in the tabular form provided below, including the following key metrics:

- Ignition date
- Fire name
- Official cause (if known)
- Size (acres)
- Number of fatalities
- Number of structures damaged
- Estimated financial loss (U.S. dollars)
- Any lesson(s) learned

Table 4-2 provides the required format and the content for the tabulated historical catastrophic utility-related wildfire statistics.¹³ The electrical corporation must cite to an authoritative government source (e.g., CPUC, CAL FIRE, U.S. Forest Service, or local fire authority) for all data provided to the extent this information is available.

In the past 20 years, Liberty has experienced one catastrophic wildfire in its service territory, the Mountain View Fire in 2020. The cause of ignition for the Mountain View Fire is unknown. Refer to Table 4-2 for statistics on the Mountain View Fire.

¹² CPUC emergency reporting instructions: <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/regulatory-services/safety/emergencyreporting>.

¹³ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

Table 4-2: Liberty Catastrophic Wildfire History¹⁴

Ignition Date	Fire Name	Official Cause	Fire Size (acres)	No. of Fatalities	No. of Structures Destroyed and Damaged	Financial Loss (US\$)	Lessons Learned
11/17/2020	Mountain View Fire	Unknown	20,385	1	80 destroyed	\$184M	Developed new PSPS criteria to account for late season weather conditions that occurred on the day of the fire.

4.3 Frequently Deenergized Circuits

The electrical corporation must populate Table 4-3 and provide a map showing its frequently deenergized circuits.¹⁵ Frequently deenergized circuits are circuits which have had three or more PSPS events per calendar year. The table and map must include frequently deenergized circuits from the previous six calendar years (i.e., circuits that have had three or more PSPS events in at least one of the six previous calendar years).

The table must contain the following; however, relevant information for an entry can be added as applicable:

- Circuit ID Number
- Name of Circuit
- Dates of Outages
- Number of Customers Hours of PPS per Outage
- Measures Taken, or Planned to Be Taken, to Reduce the Need for and Impact of Future PPS of Circuit
- Estimated Annual Decline in PPS Events and PPS Impact on Customers

The map must show the following:

- All circuits listed in Table 4-3, colored or weighted by frequency of PPS
- HFTD Tiers 2 and 3 contour overlay

¹⁴ Source: <https://ready.mono.ca.gov/pages/mountainview-fire>.


¹⁵ Pub. Util. Code, § 8386(c)(8).

Refer to Table 4-3 and Figure 4-2 for the Liberty circuit that fits the criteria of a frequently deenergized circuit defined by the Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety.

Table 4-3: Frequently Deenergized Circuits

Circuit ID	Name of Circuit	Dates of Outages	Number of Customer Hours of PSPS per Outage	Measures Taken, or Planned to Be Taken to Reduce the Need for and Impact of Future PSPS of Circuit	Estimated Annual Decline in PSPS Events and PSPS Impact on Customers
Muller 1296	Muller 1296	11/11/2024, 11/20/2024, and 11/22/2024	10,516.33, 12,350.78, and 9,550.23	Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements, traditional overhead hardening, situational awareness, sectionalizing devices, and Sensitive Relay Profile	33%-50% decline in PSPS events

Figure 4-2: Map of Frequently Deenergized Circuits



5. Risk Methodology and Assessment

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its risk methodology, key input data and assumptions, risk analysis, and risk presentation (i.e., the results of its assessment).¹⁶ This section must provide the information necessary to understand the foundation for the electrical corporation's wildfire mitigation strategy. Sections 5.1- 5.7 below provide detailed instructions.

The electrical corporation does not need to perform each calculation and analysis indicated in Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.6. However, if the electrical corporation does not perform a certain calculation or analysis, it must describe why it does not do so, its current alternative to the calculation or analysis (if applicable), and any plans to incorporate those calculations or analyses into its risk methodology and assessment in the future.

Liberty's Risk-Based Decision Making ("RBDM") Framework leverages advanced tools, technologies, and subject matter expertise to evaluate potential failures in the electrical system, assess wildfire risks, and determine the likelihood of PSPS events. As a utility, Liberty is committed to proactively mitigating these risks to protect the communities it serves.

Liberty's risk methodology and assessment continues to evolve in alignment with industry best practices. Liberty actively collaborates with other utilities and leverages advanced technology platforms to support decision-making for key mitigation strategies, including PPS, Grid Hardening, and Vegetation Management. Liberty also participates in the joint-utility Risk Modeling Working Group, maintains an internal Risk Modeling Working Group, and engages in additional collaborative efforts focused on weather- and wildfire-related risks.

During the 2023–2025 WMP period, Liberty's RBDM Framework incorporated outputs from Technosylva FireSight into Direxyon Portfolio to develop a tool for assessing risk on the system. Liberty remains committed to advancing its RBDM capabilities by further refining the Direxyon Risk Assessment Tool ("DRAT"), enhancing associated business processes, and strengthening its PPS analysis methodologies.

5.1 Methodology

In this section, the electrical corporation must present an overview of its risk calculation approach. This includes a concise narrative explaining key elements of the approach, one or

¹⁶ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (8), (12)-(13), (17)-(18).

more graphics showing the calculation process, and definitions of different risks and risk components.

5.1.1 Overview

The electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative describing its methodology for quantifying its overall utility risk, wildfire risk, and outage program risk (as described in Section 5.2.1 and defined in Appendix A). This methodology will help inform the development of its wildfire mitigation strategy (see Section 6). The electrical corporation must describe the methodology and underlying intent of this risk assessment in no more than five pages, inclusive of all narratives, bullet point lists, and any graphics. The electrical corporation must indicate and describe any industry-recognized standards, best practices, or research used in its methodology.

Liberty's risk assessment framework, models, and processes measure several levels of wildfire, reliability of service, and PSPS risks. This risk model has been developed to aid the decisions and strategies for the future, with the objective of reducing Liberty's overall risk profile. Liberty's risk platform includes the following variables: topography, vegetation-based fuels, climatology, demographics, historic fire weather days, live and dead fuel moisture, and impact to the population. These variables are quantified so that Liberty will be able to identify and monitor areas where the data indicates that a wildfire event is likely to occur.

Liberty's risk assessment objectives include the following:

- Quantify Liberty's risk spatially and temporally across its service territory; with the framework and data inputs described above and Liberty asset data.
- Utilize model outputs to develop wildfire mitigation strategies (outlined in Section 6) that achieve the goals and plan objectives identified in Liberty's WMP.
- Express commonality between operational and overall risk between the WMP sections to analyze similar results from our suite of risk tools to supplement decision-making. Bring operational and planning models into the same suite of risk tools to supplement comparable decision making.
- Establish an RBDM platform that provides data-driven insights for Liberty's decision makers to use as guidance for mitigation strategy.

Liberty collaborates with Technosylva Inc. and Direxyon Technologies to provide a suite of risk assessment tools. Technosylva is an industry recognized provider of wildfire risk solutions with a software package known as Technosylva's Wildfire Analyst ("WFA"). Liberty is utilizing the FireSight application within the WFA to supplement its long-term mitigation planning and the FireRisk application to supplement tactical, short-term planning for operations, situational


awareness, and PSPS decision-making. Additionally, in collaboration with Direxyon, Liberty is developing an asset level risk analysis utilizing data inputs from these products, as well as Liberty's internal asset data and subject matter expert knowledge, to quantify risk at the circuit, segment, and individual asset level.

As Liberty's improved RBDM platform is developed, enhancements to wildfire, asset failure, and PSPS risk models will be continually evaluated through collaboration and review from internal and external sources. Through continued development and enhancements, Liberty aims for its RBDM platform to:

- Quantify wildfire risk at specific locations by measuring the probability and consequence of a fire event occurring;
- Assess the vulnerability of an asset and the risk of a utility caused ignition based on the likelihood and consequence of that asset failing; and
- Assess the likelihood and consequence of a PSPS event being initiated.

The RBDM framework is shown schematically in Figure 5-1.

Figure 5-1: Composition of Overall Utility Risk



5.2 Risk Analysis Framework

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of its risk analysis framework. This includes a summary of key modeling assumptions, input data, and modeling tools used.

At a minimum, the electrical corporation must evaluate the impact of the following factors on the quantification of risk:

- **Equipment/Assets** (*e.g.*, type, age, inspection, maintenance procedures, etc.)
- **Topography** (*e.g.*, elevation, slope, aspect, etc.)
- **Weather** (at a minimum this must include statistically extreme conditions based on weather history and seasonal weather)
- **Vegetation** (*e.g.*, type/class/species/fuel model, canopy height/base height/cover, growth rates, moisture content, inspection, clearance procedures, etc.)
- **Climate change** (*e.g.*, long-term changes in seasonal weather; statistical extreme weather; impact of change on vegetation species, growth, moisture, etc.) at a minimum, this must include adaptations of historical weather data to current and forecasting future climate
- **Social vulnerability** (*e.g.*, AFN, socioeconomic factors, etc.)
- **Physical vulnerability** (*e.g.*, people, structures, critical facilities/infrastructure, etc.)
- **Access capacities** (*e.g.*, limited access/egress, etc.)

5.2.1 Risk and Risk Component Identification

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative and one or more simple graphics describing the framework that defines its overall utility risk. At a minimum, the electrical corporation must define its overall utility risk as the comprehensive risk due to both wildfire risk and reliability risk across its service territory. This includes several likelihood and consequence risk components that are aggregated based on the framework shown in Figure 5-1 below. The following paragraphs define each risk component.

While the overall utility risk framework and associated risk components identified in Section 5.2 are the minimum requirements for determining overall utility risk, the electrical corporation may elect to include additional risk components as needed to better define risk for its service territory. Where the electrical corporation identifies additional terms as part of its risk framework, it must define those terms. The electrical corporation must include a schematic demonstrating its adopted risk framework, including any components beyond minimum requirements.

Overall utility risk is broken down into two individual hazard risks:

- **Wildfire risk:** The total expected annualized impacts from ignitions at a specific location. This considers the likelihood that an ignition will occur, the likelihood the ignition will transition into a wildfire, and the potential consequences—considering hazard intensity, exposure potential, and vulnerability—the wildfire will have for each community it reaches.
- **Outage program risk:** The measure of reliability impacts from wildfire mitigation related outages at a given location.

There are a minimum of eleven intermediate risk components:

- **Wildfire likelihood:** The total anticipated annualized number of fires reaching each spatial location resulting from utility-related ignitions at each location in the electrical corporation service territory. This considers the ignition likelihood and the likelihood that an ignition will transition into a wildfire based on the probabilistic weather conditions in the area.
- **Ignition likelihood:** The total anticipated annualized number of ignitions resulting from electrical corporation-owned assets at each location in the electrical corporation's service territory. This considers probabilistic weather conditions, type and age of equipment, and potential contact of vegetation and other objects with electrical corporation assets. This includes the use of any method used to reduce the likelihood of ignition. For example, the use of protective equipment and device settings (PEDS) to reduce the likelihood of an ignition upon an initiating event.
- **Wildfire consequence:** The total anticipated adverse effects from a wildfire on each community it reaches. This considers the wildfire hazard intensity, the wildfire exposure potential, and the inherent wildfire vulnerabilities of communities at risk (see definitions in the following list).
- **PSPS risk:** The total expected annualized impacts from PSPS at a specific location. This considers two factors: (1) the likelihood a PSPS will be required due to environmental conditions exceeding design conditions, and (2) the potential consequences of the PSPS for each affected community, considering exposure potential and vulnerability.
- **PSPS likelihood:** The likelihood of an electrical corporation requiring a PSPS given a probabilistic set of environmental conditions.
- **PSPS consequence:** The total anticipated adverse effects from a PSPS for a community. This considers the PSPS exposure potential and inherent PSPS vulnerabilities of communities at risk (see definitions in the following list).

- **PEDS outage risk:** The total expected annualized impacts from PEDS enablement at a specific location.
- **PEDS outage likelihood:** The likelihood of an outage occurring while increased sensitivity settings on a protective device are enabled at a specific location given a probabilistic set of environmental conditions.
- **PEDS outage consequence:** The total anticipated adverse effects from an outage occurring while increased sensitivity settings on a protective device are enabled at a specific location, including reliability and associated safety impacts.

There are a minimum of nine fundamental risk components:

- **Equipment caused ignition likelihood:** The likelihood that electrical corporation-owned equipment will cause an ignition either through normal operation (such as arcing) or through failure.
- **Contact from vegetation ignition likelihood:** The likelihood that vegetation will contact electrical corporation-owned equipment and result in an ignition.
- **Contact from object ignition likelihood:** The likelihood that a non-vegetative object (such as a balloon or vehicle) will contact electrical corporation-owned equipment and result in an ignition.
- **Burn likelihood:** The likelihood that a wildfire with an ignition point will burn at a specific location within the service territory based on a probabilistic set of weather profiles, vegetation, and topography.
- **Wildfire hazard intensity:** The potential intensity of a wildfire at a specific location within the service territory given a probabilistic set of weather profiles, vegetation, and topography.
- **Wildfire exposure potential:** The potential physical, social, or economic impact of wildfire on people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, environmental services, local economies, cultural/historical resources, and other high-value assets. These may include direct or indirect impacts, as well as short- and long-term impacts.
- **Wildfire vulnerability:** The susceptibility of people or a community to adverse effects of a wildfire, including all characteristics that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of a wildfire (e.g., AFN customers, Social Vulnerability Index, age of structures, firefighting capacities).
- **PSPS exposure potential:** The potential physical, social, or economic impact of a PSPS event on people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, local economies, and other high-value assets.

- **Vulnerability of community to PSPS (PSPS vulnerability):** The susceptibility of people or a community to adverse effects of a PSPS event, including all characteristics that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of a PSPS event (e.g., high AFN population, poor energy resiliency, low socioeconomics).
- **PEDS outage exposure potential:** The potential physical, social, or economic impact of an outage occurring when PEDS are enabled on people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, local economies, and other high-value assets.
- **PEDS outage vulnerability:** The susceptibility of people or a community to adverse effects of an outage occurring when PEDS are enabled, including all characteristics that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the related adverse effects (e.g., high AFN population, poor energy resiliency, low socioeconomics).

The electrical corporation must adopt these definitions for this section of the WMP. If the electrical corporation considers additional intermediate and fundamental risk components, it must define those components in this section as well.


Within its RBDM framework, overall utility risk score consists of modules for fire risk, asset failure risk, and PSPS risk. At a high level, the fire risk module is comprised of models for fire probability and fire consequence, the asset failure risk module is comprised of models that inform on asset failure probability and consequence, and the PSPS risk module is comprised of the environmental and customer impact factors associated with PSPS events.

Technosylva's WFA, topography, weather, and vegetation modeling are all factored into the fire risk module. The asset failure module includes internal asset data from Liberty's GIS database and is being developed into DRAT to identify the programs and activities that would reduce risk at specific locations in the system, such as covered conductor installation, pole replacements, or additional inspections. The Probability of Fire risk score using these models, aids Liberty in mitigating fire risk at locations in its service territory where the likelihood and potential consequence for a utility ignited fire is highest.

Liberty most recently implemented a PSPS risk module into DRAT to use similar data and methodologies as the asset and fire risk modules. The PSPS risk model consists of models for PSPS likelihood and PSPS consequence to the system, environment, and customer if an event were to occur. Following the development of the PSPS Risk Module in early 2025, the PSPS Risk module has been combined with Liberty's asset and fire modules to produce an overall Utility Risk score.

Liberty's RBDM model framework is shown in Figure 5-2 below. ID numbers correspond to ID numbers in Table 5-5.

Figure 5-2: RBDM Framework



5.2.2 Risk and Risk Components Calculation

The electrical corporation must calculate each risk and risk component defined in Section 5.2.1. Additional requirements for these calculations are located in Appendix B "Calculation of Risk and Risk Components." These are the minimum requirements and are intended to establish the baseline evaluation and reporting of all electrical corporations.

If the electrical corporation includes additional risk components in its calculation, it must report each of those components in its WMP in a similar format. The electrical corporation must list all risk model components it identifies as uncertain and disclose if this uncertainty is assessed using probability distributions, expected values, or percentiles. The electrical corporation must describe how probability distributions are stored and how coherence is maintained. For each uncertain component that is not assessed using probability distributions, the electrical corporation must explain why probability distributions are not used and justify its elected assessment method.

The electrical corporation must provide schematics illustrating the calculation of each risk and risk component as necessary to demonstrate the logical flow from input data to outputs, including separate items for any intermediate calculations. Figure 5-2 provides an example of a calculation schematic for the equipment likelihood of ignition.

The electrical corporation must summarize any differences between its calculation of these risk components and the requirements of these Guidelines. These differences may include any of the following:

- **Additional input parameters** beyond the minimum requirements for a specific risk component
- **Calculations of additional outputs** beyond the minimum requirements for a specific risk component
- **Calculations of additional risk components** defined by the electrical corporation in Section 5.2.1

The process used to combine risk components must be summarized for each relevant risk component. This process must align with the requirements in the most recent CPUC decision governing Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) filings.³⁰ If the electrical corporation uses scaling factors (such as multi-attribute value functions [MAVFs] or representative cost), it must present a table with all relevant information needed to understand this procedure (including each scaling factor used, the value of the scaling factor, how it is utilized, an explanation of its purpose, and a justification for the value chosen). The electrical corporation must organize this discussion into the following two subsections focusing on likelihood and consequence.

5.2.2.1 Likelihood of Risk Event

The electrical corporation must discuss how it calculates the likelihood that its equipment (through normal operations or failure) will result in a wildfire and the likelihood of issuing an outage event. The risk components discussed in this section must include at least the following:

- Ignition likelihood
 - Equipment failure likelihood of ignition
 - Contact from vegetation likelihood of ignition
 - Contact from object likelihood of ignition
- Burn likelihood
- PSPS likelihood
- PEDS outage likelihood

Probability of Asset Failure (“APF”) – Ignition Likelihood: Liberty utilizes Direxyon’s Asset Failure Risk module to identify the probability of failure given specific asset conditions.

Adjustments to APF are based on characteristics of assets or mitigations within Liberty's WMP initiatives, such as conductor type and vegetation interventions. These characteristics act as condition modifiers that are calculated by Direxyon and reflect criteria not accounted for by Technosylva. Condition modifiers are necessary to account for the change of conditions over time due to repairs and mitigation work performed since the point in time when APF was calculated. Put simply, these condition modifiers allow Liberty to forecast risk while accounting for planned mitigation and repair work for up to a 30-year timeline. Assets with an age-based degradation factor are considered the primary driver of the asset failure probability component. Details on specific condition modifiers can be found in Appendix B. To calculate APF with condition modifiers Direxyon utilizes a Weibull distribution with age, material, and other condition modifiers identified by SMEs to quantify a probability score ranging from 1 to 9. As part of planned additions and enhancements, Liberty will include additional asset types to increase the coverage that APF has over its initiatives, rounding out the capability of its AFR module. Refer to Appendix B for further information.

$$\text{Min}((\text{Weibull}(\text{Age: Material})):1) = \text{APF}$$

Condition Modifiers = CMF_[1-8] :

1. Pole Failure
2. Fuse Failure
3. Conductor Type
4. Conductor Cover
5. Tree Attachments
6. Count of Equipment on Pole
7. Tree Density
8. Fall In
9. Grow In
10. SRP Enabled

Probability of Ignition ("POI") – WL: Burn Likelihood: Liberty utilizes the outputs of Technosylva's FireSight modeling tool to estimate the probability of a fire, or POI, starting from an ignition source given fuel, fuel dryness, and wind conditions. FireSight uses the National Fire Danger Rating System to perform this estimate. POI determines the probability that a burning material will create a wildfire that requires suppression. POI ranges on a scale from 0 to 1 and is calculated at various ignition points along Liberty's distribution and transmission circuits.

Probability of Fire – WC: The probability of fire is quantified as the inner product of POI and condition modifiers Direxyon has developed using the calculation below.

To achieve a unitless risk, the Probability of Fire is scaled from 1 to 9 as shown below.

$$Probability\ fire_{scaled} = \min \left(\exp \left(Probability\ of\ Fire * \frac{\ln(10)}{Probability\ of\ fire_{80th\ percentil}} \right), 9 \right)$$

Probability of fire calculates the total number of fire events at the segment level in a given year and is obtained by summing the fire events generated by all assets in the given segment. This process is then repeated by many Monte Carlo iterations, where each iteration represents a different possible future year with different combinations of failure, outages, and ignitions. After completing all iterations, the model calculates the expected annual number of fire events for each segment by averaging the total fire event counts across all iterations. Segment level fire event counts are then summed to determine the total number of fire events at circuit level, and circuit-level counts are further aggregated to obtain the total number of fire events for the entire utility.

Probability of Outage: Direxyon captures data from Liberty’s outage management system of outages of a certain duration and ties them to asset locations given specific cause codes. Using the historical data, DRAT then creates a scenario decision tree to simulate and estimate the probability of an outage occurring. This module is then factored into the Probability of Fire module to estimate when a utility caused fire is produced.

PSPS Likelihood – (“PL”): The likelihood of a PSPS event occurring is driven by environmental factors such as wind gust, relative humidity, and fuel moisture levels. To assess PL, Liberty has defined Wind Gust and Fosberg Fire Weather Index (FFWI) thresholds. These thresholds were established in collaboration with SME’s for PSPS risk modeling. Sensitive Relay Profile (“SRP”), also referred to as PEDS or EPSS, is included in model testing. Thresholds for Wind Gust and FFWI used for modeling PL are provided in LU Table 5-1.

LU Table 5-1: PSPS Thresholds For Circuits with SRP

Circuit Type	Wind Gust (MPH)	FFWI
Without SRP	40	50
With SRP	50	50

PSPS Likelihood is described in the formula below:

$$(Probability\ of\ FFWI > 50 + Wind\ Gust > limit) / 2 = PSPS\ Likelihood$$

Refer to Appendix B for the entirety of the Direxyon report on PSPS Likelihood.

PEDS Outage Likelihood – SRP Outage Likelihood (“SOL”): DRAT computes the likelihood of an outage caused by detection equipment by considering the APF, having a 95th percentile weather event, and the given assets of a circuit. The calculation is shown in the formula below.

$$1 - (1 - \text{Avg APF} * \text{“Probability of 95th Percentile Weather”} ^{\text{Count of Assets}}) = \text{SOL}$$

5.2.2.2 Consequence of Risk Event

The electrical corporation must discuss how it calculates the consequences of a fire originating from its equipment and the consequence of implementing an outage event. The risk components discussed in this section must include at least the following:

- Wildfire consequence
- Wildfire hazard intensity
- Wildfire exposure potential
- Wildfire vulnerability
- PSPS consequence
- PSPS exposure potential
- PSPS vulnerability
- PEDS outage consequence
- PEDS outage exposure potential
- PEDS outage vulnerability

Consequence of Fire or Wildfire Consequence (“WC”): Technosylva’s FireSight application conducts fire simulations with an 8-hour duration, based on a typical first burning period. FireSight produces a set of consequence metrics that quantify various fire impacts. These metrics include potential acres burned, population impacted, number of buildings threatened, and estimated number of buildings destroyed. FireSight is used to conduct modeling, deliver metric outputs, and used to monitor and visualize model results.

Utilizing tools developed by Direxyon, Liberty derives fire consequence utilizing FireSight consequence metrics for Acres Burned, Population Impact, and Number of Buildings Destroyed:¹⁷

- Population Impact: Total population impacted by the simulation footprint.

¹⁷ <https://help.wildfireanalyst.com/wfae-web/data-outputs>

- **Fire Size Potential (Acres Burned):** Total simulation size in acres. The Fire Size Potential represents the actual simulated acreage of a fire based on the local fuels, weather, and terrain starting from an ignition at a specific location and time.
- **Estimated Number of Buildings Destroyed:** Estimated number of buildings destroyed for each simulation, derived using Building Loss Factor (“BLF”) data assigned to each building.

The consequence model outputs do not change based on the assets’ conditions and are considered static. Therefore, condition modifiers are not considered for consequence metrics. Each consequence model output has summarized output metrics that are calculated to include:

- Standard deviation values for all simulations.
- Average values for all simulations.
- Percentiles values for all simulations (0, 20, 40, 50, 60, 80, 90, 95, 98, 100).

Wildfire Hazard Intensity: Intensity of a wildfire is defined as the potential intensity of a wildfire at a specific location within the service territory factoring the probabilistic characteristics of weather profiles, vegetation, and topography at a given point in time. Hazard Intensity is calculated using Technosylva’s WFA modeling to quantify wildfire risk given outputs from surface fire, crown fire, wind, spotting, encroachment, spark modeling, weather, and impact and consequence as detailed in Section 2.4.3, “Equations and Implementation,” of Appendix B-1.

Wildfire Exposure Potential: Exposure potential of a wildfire is defined as the potential impact to people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, environmental services, economies, cultural/historical resources, and other high value assets factoring in indirect, short-term, and long-term impacts. Exposure potential is calculated using values at risk (“VAR”) as underlying inputs to Technosylva’s models that calculate locational risk factors with respect to wildfire hazard. Liberty’s Wildfire Consequence Model quantifies exposure potential as an overall risk score of VAR where “risk” associated with resources and assets, with risk representing the possibility of loss or harm occurring due to wildfire. A detailed description of VAR and its use in Technosylva’s WFA is provided in Section 2.5.5, “Values at Risk,” of the Direxyon Report in Appendix B .

Wildfire Vulnerability: Vulnerability is defined as the resources available to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of a wildfire. Vulnerability is calculated using VAR as underlying inputs to Technosylva’s models that calculate locational risk factors. Wildfire vulnerability is a part of Liberty’s Wildfire Consequence model that quantifies the factors of VAR, such as population count (location), building footprints, and critical facilities. A detailed

description of VAR and its use in Technosylva's WFA is provided in Section 2.5.5, "Values at Risk," of Appendix B-1.

PSPS Consequence – ("PC"): The Multi Attribute Value Framework (MAVF) is comprised of Safety, Reliability, and Financial models. Safety and Financial models are further explained below under PSPS Vulnerability and Financial Modeling, respectively.

$$(Scaled\ PSPS\ Safety\ Consequence + Scaled\ PSPS\ Reliability\ Consequence + Scaled\ PSPS\ Finance\ Consequence) / 3 = SOC$$

The reliability consequence impact of a PSPS event is measured by Customer Minutes Interrupted ("CMI"). Liberty estimates PSPS event duration in a range of 12 to 24 hours and an average of 18 hours. This encompasses the time of the outage itself and the post-event patrol inspections. At this time, the post-event patrol inspections are assumed to be constant for each circuit, regardless of circuit length, during extreme weather conditions. The reliability consequence score is derived from the formula below, more information can be referenced from the Direxyon Report in Appendix B.

$$Customer\ Count * Avg\ PSPS\ Duration\ Minutes = PSPS\ Reliability\ Consequence$$

The consequences making up the MAVF are normalized so that one consequence does not dominate another due to scaling inequalities. These values typically fall between 0 and 1 to produce a balanced and meaningful PSPS Consequence Score.

PSPS Exposure Potential – PSPS Finance Consequence: Financial Consequence impacts of a PSPS event have a derived cost of \$0.17 per CMI and are calculated using the formula below and more information can be referenced from the Direxyon Report in Appendix B.

$$Financial\ Loss\ Per\ CMI * CMI = PSPS\ Financial\ Consequence$$

PSPS Vulnerability – PSPS Safety Consequence: Safety Consequence of PSPS is calculated from the expected number of fatalities, which is determined by the following series of derivations. Liberty uses an estimated Expected Number of Fatalities (EF) at a rate of 1.5×10^{-9} fatalities per 30-minute CMI. More information can be referenced from the Direxyon Report in Appendix B.

$$EF\ per\ CMI * CMI * Weighted\ Customers = PSPS\ Safety\ Consequence$$

$$PSPS\ Safety\ Multiplier * Customer\ Count = Weighted\ Customer$$

$$Iferror((30 * \# Medical\ Baselines) + (30 * \# Critical\ Facilities) + (Other\ Customers) / Customer\ Count, 0) = PSPS\ Safety\ Multiplier$$

PEDS Outage Consequence – SRP Outage Consequence ("SOC"): Through the Multi Attribute Value Framework (MAVF) comprised of Safety, Reliability, and Financial models. Safety and

Financial models are further explained below under SRP Outage Vulnerability and Financial modeling respectively.

$$(Scaled\ SRP\ Outage\ Safety\ Consequence + Scaled\ SRP\ Outage\ Reliability\ Consequence + Scaled\ SRP\ Outage\ Finance\ Consequence) / 3 = SOC$$

The reliability consequence impact of an SRP event is measured from Customer Minutes Interrupted (CMI). Liberty estimates SRP event duration in a range of 3 to 5 hours and an average of 4 hours. This encompasses the time of the outage itself and the post-event patrol inspections. Currently the post-event patrol inspections are assumed to be constant for each circuit, regardless of circuit length, during extreme weather conditions. The reliability consequence score is derived from the formula below and more information can be referenced in the Direxyon Report in Appendix B.

$$Customer\ Count * Avg\ SRP\ Duration\ Minutes = SRP\ Reliability\ Consequence$$

The consequences making up the MAVF are normalized so that one consequence does not dominate another due to scaling inequalities. These values typically fall between 0 and 1 to produce a balanced and meaningful SRP Outage Consequence Score.

PEDS Outage Exposure Potential – SRP Outage Finance Consequence: Financial Consequence impacts of an SRP event have a derived cost of \$0.17 per CMI with a possible of 180 to 300 minutes of CMI which is calculated using the formula below and more information can be referenced in the Direxyon Report in Appendix B.

$$Financial\ Loss\ Per\ CMI * CMI = PSPS\ Financial\ Consequence$$

PEDS Outage Vulnerability – SRP Outage Safety Consequence: Safety Consequence of an outage from SRP is calculated from the expected number of fatalities, which is determined by the following series of derivations.

Liberty uses an estimated Expected Number of Fatalities (EF) at a rate of 1.5×10^{-9} fatalities per 30-minute CMI. More information can be referenced in the Direxyon Report in Appendix B.

$$EF\ per\ CMI * CMI * Weighted\ Customers = SRP\ Safety\ Consequence$$

$$SRP\ Safety\ Multiplier * Customer\ Count = Weighted\ Customer$$

$$Iferror((30 * \# Medical\ Baselines) + (30 * \# Critical\ Facilities) + (Other\ Customers) / Customer\ Count, 0) = SRP\ Safety\ Multiplier$$

5.2.2.3 Risk

The electrical corporation must discuss how it calculates each risk, and the resulting overall utility risk defined in Section 5.2.1. The discussion in this section must include at least the following:

- Overall utility risk
- Wildfire risk
- Outage program risk
- PSPS risk
- PEDS outage reliability risk

Utility Risk (“UR”): Direxion calculates Utility Risk at the circuit level. The Overall Utility Risk is calculated as the sum of Fire Risk and Outage Program Risk as shown below.

$$(Outage\ Program\ Risk + Fire\ Risk) = UR$$

The utility risk model combines Wildfire and Outage program risk, with calculations performed at the circuit level. To make the results comparable and easy to interpret, both fire risk and outage program risk are multiplied by 100. This scaling is done purely for better visualization, ensuring that both components appear clearly and consistently in charts and dashboards.

With these weightings applied, the utility risk at the circuit level is calculated as the sum of the weighted wildfire risk and the weighted outage-program risk (which includes both PSPS and EPSS).

Fire Risk (“WR”): Direxion calculates Fire Risk at the individual asset level, and the cumulative risk at each level, contributing to the overall fire risk. Fire Risk is calculated based on two components: Probability of Fire – WL and Consequence of Fire – WC.

$$Probability\ of\ Fire * Consequence\ of\ Fire = Fire\ Risk$$

PSPS Risk – (“PR”): DRAT computes PSPS at the circuit level and is comprised of the PSPS Likelihood and the PSPS Consequence as shown below.

$$PL * PC = PR$$

SRP Outage Risk (“SOR”): DRAT computes SOR at the circuit level and is comprised of the SOL and the SOC as shown below.

$$SOL * SOC = SOR$$

Outage Program Risk – (“OPR”): The measure of reliability impacts from wildfire mitigation related outages at a given location.

$$(SOR + PR) / 2 = OPR$$

Asset Failure Risk (“AFR”): AFR is derived from the risk scores for Probability of Failure (“APF”) and Consequence of Failure (“ACF”), which are quantified by Direxyon’s modeling tools. AFR allows Liberty to identify those mitigations and programs that will reduce the risk of an asset failing and potentially causing an ignition, as measured in the Probability of Fire (“WL”) model of the Fire Risk (“WR”) module. Liberty’s proprietary asset data is utilized as an input to AFR modeling and is used to calculate current and forecasted risk scores for specific asset or mitigation types, as well as Risk Spend Efficiency (“RSE”) metrics. For example, AFR utilizes historical data from vegetation inspections in various zones adjacent to Liberty’s assets in order to forecast vegetation fall-in and grow-in potential. In doing so, it identifies segments of the service territory that may require a higher inspection frequency based on an increased level of fall-in or grow-in risk. The AFR module can then produce an RSE that will inform the budget forecast for work that will reduce a specified amount of risk to those segments. By comparing analysis for different segments, Liberty can identify locations in its service territory where it makes the most sense to reduce risk given the probability and consequence of a vegetation-related event occurring. AFR is comprised of risk scores for Probability of Failure (“APF”) and Consequence of Failure (“ACF”), as shown in the formula below:

$$ACF * APF = AFR$$

5.2.3 Key Assumptions and Limitations

Because the individual elements of risk assessment are interdependent, the interfaces between the various risk models and initiative activities must be internally consistent. In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must discuss key assumptions, limitations, and data standards for the individual elements of its risk assessment.³¹ This must include the following:

- **Key modeling assumptions** made specific to each model to represent the physical world and to simplify calculations.
- **Data standards**, which must be consistently defined (e.g., weather model predictions at a 30-ft [10-m] height must be converted to the correct height for fire behavior predictions, such as mid-flame wind speeds).
- **Consistency of assumptions and limitations** in each interconnected model, which must be traced from start to finish, with any discrepancies between models discussed.
- **Stability of assumptions in the program**, including historical and projected changes.

- **Monetization of attributes**, if utilized, including (if applicable) the selected value of statistical life, dollar value of injury prevention, and dollar value of reliability risk.

More mature programs regularly monitor and evaluate the scope and validity of modeling assumptions. Monitoring and evaluation categories may include:

- **Adaptation of weather history** to current and forecasted climate conditions.
- **Availability of suppression resources** including type, number of resources, and ease of access to incident location.
- **Height of wind driving fire spread** including any wind adjustment factor calculations.
- **General equipment failure rates** based on historical trends for equipment type, equipment age, overdue maintenance, and any wind speed functional dependences.
- **General vegetation contact rates** based on historical trends for vegetation species, vegetation height, and environmental factors such as wind speed functional dependences.
- **Height of electrical equipment** in the service territory.
- **Stability of the atmosphere** and resulting calculation of near-surface winds.
- **Vegetative fuels** including models that account for fuel management activities by other land managers (e.g., thinning, prescribed burns).
- **Combination of risk components and weighting of attributes** and resulting impacts.
- **Wind load capacity for electrical equipment** in the service territory.
- **Number, extent, and type of community assets at risk** in the service territory.
- **Proxies for estimating impact on customers and communities** in the service territory.
- **Extent, distribution, and characteristics of vulnerable populations** in the service territory.

The electrical corporation must document each assumption in Table 5-1. The electrical corporation must summarize assumptions made within models in accordance with the model documentation requirements in Appendix B.

The primary risk modeling assumptions and limitations are provided in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Primary Risk Modeling Assumptions and Limitations

Assumption	Justification	Limitation	Applicable Models
The physical framework development is based on an idealized situation in steady state spread, which may not fit some extreme behavior of fires.	The model is semi-empirical and as a result does not capture all possible wildfire scenarios.	The model may not represent unique weather cases.	Wildfire Spread Model
Fuels are assumed to be continuous and uniform for the scale of the input (typically between 10-to-30-meter (m) resolution)	This is the highest resolution data available across the service territory, and the standard for fuels mapping for fire agencies and IOUs in the US.	Real fuels are more granular and thus not captured by the fire spread modeling.	Wildfire Spread Model
Fire characteristics at a point considers only the conditions at that point (point-functional model). This means that there are certain non-local phenomena like: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase of ROS due to a concave front. • Fire interaction between different parts of the same fire or a different one. 	Point functional models are much faster to solve than non-local ones.	Several non-local effects like radiation concentration from different parts of the front are not considered.	Wildfire Spread Model
Fire spread is assumed to be elliptical although there are several variations such as double ellipse, oval, egg-shape, etc.	Fire perimeters obtained in constant wind and slope conditions are known to have a pseudo elliptical shape. The difference between existing fire shape models is small and it is not clear	This approach only captures a macroscopic shape of the perimeter.	Wildfire Spread Model

Assumption	Justification	Limitation	Applicable Models
	which one is the correct one.		
Weather is given hourly and is assumed to remain constant during that time. There is no interpolation in time to compute evolution of weather between hours.	Computing sub hourly wind speeds is expensive and not the standard among fire agencies or IOUs. Sub hourly data is not readily available.	Winds change more rapidly than at the hour level and thus are not captured by the fire spread model.	Wildfire Spread Model
Reliability of weather inputs in the mid-range forecast (2 to 5 days)	Weather forecasts become less accurate the further out in time you model, however WRF models are proven to be very accurate in reflecting past weather scenarios and predicting future short-term weather scenarios.	Fire spread models are impacted due to imperfect weather.	Wildfire Spread Model
Fire is not coupled with the atmosphere in any way. This may seem like a major limitation in the model as wind is a main contribution to fire spread and at present many models (especially physical ones) try to couple wind and fire.	It is not technically feasible to run millions of simulations considering the coupling effect given current science and technology. Empirical and semiempirical models have been developed using an average wind speed as an input, so it is not clear that considering more granular wind at the front is advisable or performs less.	Fire atmosphere interactions are not captured.	Wildfire Spread Model
Fire is assumed to be fully developed. Fire	Fire acceleration only affects the initial time of the fire expansion and its	Models are not valid for short duration fires.	Wildfire Spread Model

Assumption	Justification	Limitation	Applicable Models
acceleration, flashover, or decay is not considered.	effect on an 8-hour simulation may not be too significant.		
Atmospheric instability, which may have a deep impact on ROS (beer 1991), is not considered in the model.	Capturing atmospheric instability is challenging with the present forecast available.	There is a significant range of fire behavior that may not be considered in the model.	Wildfire Spread Model
Gusts are not considered in the model.	Gust duration is highly unpredictable and that could affect the fire very differently.	Fire behavior at a lower scale is not expected to follow a simple symmetrical behavior with respect to wind and slope.	Wildfire Spread Model
No interaction between slope and wind other than creating an effective or equivalent wind. This means that fire is assumed to have an elliptical shape no matter the alignment of wind and slope.	The slope-wind effect is known to be significantly symmetrical in fires under control conditions. There are not many nonphysical models that describe the wind-slope effect in a non-symmetrical way.	Fire behavior at a lower scale is not expected to follow a simple symmetrical behavior with respect to wind and slope.	Wildfire Spread Model
Fuel array description of the vegetation may not perfectly describe fuel characteristics.	There are no perfect fuel datasets available at the territory scale. However, additional custom fuel models have been developed and used to reflect more accurate spread in WUI, agricultural and timber areas.	Fuel characteristics are not captured perfectly by the fire spread model.	Wildfire Spread Model
Spotting is only considered in surface fires.	Calculating crown spotting would require having an accurate tree	Wildfire spread for crown fires is impacted.	Wildfire Spread Model

Assumption	Justification	Limitation	Applicable Models
	inventory (height, species, width, etc.).		
Asset Risk Condition Modifier weights are projected based on manufacturer, historical, and scientific data.	To project the condition of an asset in the future, the condition must be modified to account for work performed on the system to calculate risk.	Condition modifiers may not accurately portray the projected risk.	Probability of Failure (APF) Condition Modifiers influence POI or POF Weibull for Asset Failure
POI should be scaled on the same scale as the other models.	To make the risk interpretable, the POI is scaled from 1 to 9.	There's no logical threshold between 1, 2 and 3.	Consequence of Failure (ACF) Probability of Fire (POF)
Conductor risk factors are equivalent.	There is not sufficient knowledge to accurately weight the conductor risk factors.	It is considered that the material is equivalent in risk to length of span, even if it's not.	Probability of Failure (APF)
Conductor does not have a degradation factor.	Lack of information on the present number of splices on the network, age of conductor, and failure model.	The conductor will not degrade over time in the model.	Probability of Failure (APF)
Projected Vegetation work orders are based on past work orders.	Using historical work order information has been effective in estimating accurate work volume .	The model will mimic what was done in the past, which may not be accurate.	Probability of Failure (APF)
Degradation of vegetation uses data outside of Liberty's available data.	The model simulates growth of vegetation.	Vegetation Degradation is based on scientific research and not historical data.	Probability of Failure (APF)

Assumption	Justification	Limitation	Applicable Models
The decision trees may suggest interventions that would not be typically done in the field.	Over time, Liberty will fine tune the decision trees based on usage of the tool.	Until the model is validated the decision tree output are subject to SME review.	Probability of Failure (APF)
Deterministic methods can pinpoint the exact time of asset failure.	Direxyon uses Monte Carlo Simulation Methodology.	Asset failures are inherently unpredictable in real-world situations.	Asset Failure Risk (AFR)
Deterministic methods can estimate cost.	Direxyon uses Monte Carlo Simulation Methodology.	Costs are inherently unpredictable in real-world situations.	Asset Failure Risk (AFR)
Restoration time is a factor of PSPS Consequence	Repair times can vary, and future work will analyze a method for solving this component	Post PSPS/SRP event restoration time is not accounted for.	PSPS Consequence (PC)
Entire circuits are de-energized during PSPS/SRP Outage Events	It may be possible to isolate or shutdown parts of a circuit	This simplification may overestimate the impact of these events.	PSPS Risk (PR)
Environmental factors remain constant over time	DRAT does not consider environmental or climatic changes	Potential long-term shifts in wind behavior or FFWI due to climate change are not considered.	PSPS Risk (PR)
A uniform random distribution is assumed for the secondary conductor asset type	DRAT recognizes a uniform distribution of Tree Attachments between 5 and 50	Actuality of Tree Attachments in the Liberty's system maybe statistically incorrect.	Asset Failure Risk (AFR)

5.3 Risk Scenarios

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of the scenarios to be used in its risk analysis in Section 5.2. These must include at least the following:

- **Design basis scenarios** that will inform the electrical corporation's long-term wildfire mitigation initiatives and planning.
- **Extreme-event scenarios** that may inform the electrical corporation's decisions to provide added safety margin and robustness.

The risk scenarios described in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 below are the minimum scenarios the electrical corporation must assess in its wildfire risk and outage program risk analysis. The electrical corporation must also describe and justify any additional scenarios it evaluates.

Each scenario must consider:

- **Local relevance:** Heterogeneous conditions (*e.g.*, assets, equipment, topography, vegetation, weather) that vary over the landscape of the electrical corporation's service territory at a level sufficiently granular to permit understanding of the risk at a specific location or for a specific circuit segment. For example, statistical wind loads must be calculated based on wind gusts considering the impact of nearby topographic and environmental features, such as hills, canyons, and valleys.
- **Statistical relevance:** Percentiles used in risk scenario selection must consider the statistical history of occurrence and must be designed to describe a reasonable return interval/probability of occurrence. For example, designing to a wind load with a 10,000-year return interval may not be desirable as most conductors in the service territory would be expected to fail (*i.e.*, the scenario does not help discern which areas are at elevated risk).

5.3.1 Design Basis Scenarios

Fundamental to any risk assessment is the selection of one or more relevant design basis scenarios (design scenarios). These scenarios will inform long-term initiative activities and planning. In this section, the electrical corporation must identify the design scenarios it has prioritized from a comprehensive set of possible scenarios. The scenarios identified must be based on the unique wildfire risk and reliability risk characteristics of the electrical corporation's service territory and achieve the primary goal and stated plan objectives of its WMP. At a minimum, the following design scenarios representing statistically relevant weather, and vegetative conditions must be considered throughout the service territory.

For wind loading on electrical equipment, the electrical corporation must use at least four statistically relevant design conditions. It must calculate wind loading based on locally relevant 3-second wind gusts over a 30-year wind speed history during fire season in its service territory. The conditions are the following:

- **Wind Load Condition 1: Baseline:** The baseline wind load condition the electrical corporation uses in design, construction, and maintenance relative to GO 95, Rule 31.1.
- **Wind Load Condition 2: Very High:** 95th-percentile wind gusts based on maximum daily values over the 30-year history. This corresponds to a probability of exceedance of 5 percent on an annual basis (i.e., 20-year return interval) and is intended to capture annual high winds observed in the region (e.g., Santa Ana winds).
- **Wind Load Condition 3: Extreme:** Wind gusts with a probability of exceedance of 5 percent over the three-year WMP cycle (i.e., 60-year return interval).
- **Wind Load Condition 4: Credible Worst Case:** Wind gusts with a probability of exceedance of 1 percent over the three-year WMP cycle (i.e., 300-year return interval).

The data and/or models the electrical corporation uses to establish locally relevant wind gusts for these design conditions must be documented in accordance with the weather analysis requirements described in Appendix B.

For weather conditions used in calculating fire behavior, the electrical corporation must use probabilistic scenarios based on a 30-year history of fire weather. This approach must consider a range of wind speeds, directions, and fuel moistures that are representative of historic conditions. In addition, the electrical corporation must discuss how this weather history is adapted to align with current and forecasted climate conditions. The electrical corporation must consider the following two conditions:

- **Weather Condition 1: Anticipated Conditions:** The statistical weather analysis is limited to fire seasons expected to be the most relevant to the next three years of the WMP cycle.
- **Weather Condition 2: Long-Term Conditions:** The statistical weather analysis is representative of fire seasons covering the full 30-year history.

The electrical corporation must state how it defines “fire weather” and “fire season” for the calculations of these probabilistic scenarios.

One possible approach to the statistical weather analysis for fire behavior is Monte- Carlo simulation of synthetic fire seasons in accordance with approaches presented by the United States Forest Service.¹⁸ However, the electrical corporation must justify the selection of locally relevant data for use in this approach (i.e., Remote Automated Weather Systems data or historic weather reanalysis must be locally relevant). The data and/or models the electrical corporation uses to establish locally relevant weather data for these designs must be documented in accordance with the weather analysis requirements described in Appendix B.

For vegetative conditions not including short-term moisture content, the electrical corporation must use design scenarios including the current and forecasted vegetative type and coverage. The conditions it must consider include the following:

- **Vegetation Condition 1: Existing Fuel Load:** The wildfire hazard must be evaluated with the existing fuel load within the service territory, including existing burn scars and fuel treatments that reduce the near-term fire hazard.
- **Vegetation Condition 2: Short-Term Forecasted Fuel Load:** The wildfire hazard must be evaluated considering the changes in expected fuel load over the three-year Base WMP cycle. At a minimum, this must include regrowth of previously burned and treated areas.
- **Vegetation Condition 3: Long-Term Extreme Fuel Load:** The wildfire hazard must be evaluated considering the long-term potential changes in fuels throughout the service territory. This must include, at a minimum, regrowth of previously burned and treated areas and changes in predominant fuel types.

The data and/or models the electrical corporation uses to establish locally relevant fuel loads for these designs must be documented in accordance with the vegetation requirements described in Appendix B.

The electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative on the design basis scenarios used in its risk analysis. If the electrical corporation includes additional design scenarios, it must describe these scenarios and their purpose in the analysis. In addition, the electrical corporation must provide a table summarizing the following information:

¹⁸ M. A. Finney, I. C. Grenfell, C. W. McHugh, R. C. Seli, D. Trethewey, R. D. Stratton, and S. Brittain, 2011, "A Method for Ensemble Wildland Fire Simulation," *Environmental Modeling & Assessment* 16(2):153–167.

M. A. Finney, C. W. McHugh, I. C. Grenfell, K. L. Riley, and K. C. Short, 2011, "A Simulation of Probabilistic Wildfire Risk Components for the Continental United States," *Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment* 25:973–1000.

- Identification of each design basis scenario (e.g., Scenario 1, Scenario 2)
- Components of each scenario (e.g., Weather Condition 1, Vegetation Condition 1)
- Purpose of each scenario

Technosylva’s model considers weather, fire risk/consequence and population risk/consequence. Additionally, Liberty considers asset, budget, and labor scenarios as a part of the Direxion Risk Assessment Tool (“DRAT”).

Table 5-2 summarizes the design basis scenarios utilized in Technosylva’s WFA suite. Refer to Appendix B for more detail regarding Technosylva design scenarios.

Table 5-2: Liberty Summary of Design Basis Scenarios

Scenario ID	Design Scenario	Purpose
WLC1	Wind Load	Baseline wind load used in design, construction, and maintenance.
WLC2	Wind Load	95th percentile wind gusts based on maximum daily values over a 30-year history.
WLC3	Wind Load	Wind gusts with a probability of exceedance of five percent over the three-year WMP cycle (i.e. 60-year return interval)
WLC4	Wind Load	Wind gusts with a probability of exceedance of one percent over the three-year WMP cycle (i.e. 300-year return interval).
WLC5	Wind Load	WFA models wind speeds to identify at what point a specific transmission or distribution circuit may fail in windy conditions. The results are based on three-hour aggregated probabilities based on the maximum wind gust during that three-hour period.
WC1	Weather Condition	Anticipated weather conditions over the next three years. This is based on historical weather days that best represents the days when weather and fuel conditions can lead to increased risk of ignition.
WC2	Weather Condition	Long-term conditions. Technosylva has calculated the historical weather days that best represent the days when weather and fuel conditions can lead to increased risk of ignition based on their Weather Research and Forecast (WRF) Model. WRF is calculated annually to capture new days

Scenario ID	Design Scenario	Purpose
		that should be incorporated into the historical weather days to account for changing conditions in locations.
VC1	Vegetation Condition	Modeling of current vegetation conditions to identify where current vegetation fuels risk.
VC2	Vegetation Condition	Modeling of projected 2025 vegetation conditions to identify potential mid-range vegetation fuels risk.
VC3	Vegetation Condition	Modeling of projected 2030 vegetation conditions to identify potential long-range vegetation fuels risk.

5.3.2 Extreme-Event/High Uncertainty Scenarios

In this section, the electrical corporation must identify extreme-event/high-uncertainty scenarios that it considers in its risk analysis. These generally include the following types of scenarios:

- Longer-term scenarios with higher uncertainty (e.g., climate change impacts, population migrations, extended drought)
- Multi-hazard scenarios (e.g., ignition from another source during a PSPS)
- High-consequence but low-likelihood (“Black Swan”) events (e.g., acts of terrorism, 10,000-year weather)
- While the primary risk analysis is intended to be based on the design scenarios discussed in Section 5.3.1, the potential for high consequences from extreme events may provide additional insight into the mitigation prioritization described in Section 6. The electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative on the extreme-event scenarios used in its risk analysis. The electrical corporation must describe these scenarios, their purpose in the analysis, and identify the modeling method used (e.g. power law distribution). In addition, the electrical corporation must provide a table summarizing the following information:
 - Identification of each extreme-event risk scenario (e.g., Scenario 1, Scenario 2)
 - Components of each scenario (e.g., Weather Condition 1, Vegetation Condition 1)
 - Purpose of the scenario

Liberty's RBDM platform quantifies fire risk and asset failure risk using the design basis scenarios described in Section 5.2.2.3. Liberty is assessing the ability of FireSight to account for extreme or high uncertainty scenarios. Refer to Table 5-3.

Table 5-3: Liberty Summary of Extreme-Event Scenarios

Scenario ID	Extreme-Event Scenario	Purpose
ES1	Climate Change 1 Weather Condition 2 Vegetation Condition 3	Impact of climate change on long-term weather and vegetation conditions that impact fire behavior.

5.4 Summary of Risk Models

In this section, the electrical corporation must summarize the calculation approach for each risk and risk component identified in Section 5.2.1. This documentation is intended to provide a quick summary of the models used. The electrical corporation must provide the following information:

- Identification (ID): Unique shorthand identifier for the risk or risk component.
- Risk component: Unique full identifier for the risk or risk component.
- Design scenario(s): Reference to design scenarios evaluated with the model to calculate the risk or risk component. These must be defined in Section 8.3.
- Key inputs: List of key inputs used to evaluate the risk or risk component. These can be in summary form (e.g., the electrical corporation may list "equipment properties" rather than listing out equipment age, maintenance history, etc.).
- Sources of data inputs: List of sources for each input parameter. These must include data sources (such as LANDFIRE) and modeling results (such as wind predictions) as relevant to the calculation of the risk or risk component. If the inputs come from multiple sources, each source should be on a new line.
- Key output results: List of outputs calculated for the risk or risk component.
- Units: List of the units associated with the key outputs.

The electrical corporation must provide a summary of each model in Appendix B.

Figure 5-3 provides a visual overview of the data inputs to various models and the outputs of DRAT.

Figure 5-3: Direxyon Risk Assessment Tool Data Flow




Table 5-5 summarizes the utility risk models. The design scenarios noted in Table 5-4 are explained in Section 5.2.

Table 5-4: Summary of Fire Risk Model and PSPS Risk Model

Fire Risk Model

ID	Risk Component	Design Scenario(s)	Key Inputs	Source of Inputs (Data and/or Models)	Key Outputs	Units
UR	Utility Risk	Previous modeling scenarios	Wildfire Risk PSPS Risk Asset Failure Risk	Previous modeling steps	Utility Risk	Risk score between 0-1
WR	Wildfire Risk	WC1, WC2, VC1, VC2, VC3, WLC5	Wildfire Likelihood Wildfire Consequence	Previous modeling steps	Fire Risk Score 0-81	Risk score between 0-1
WC	Wildfire Consequence	WC1, WC2, WLC5	Population Impact Impacted structures Acres burned Spatial/Temporal ignition patterns	WFA Conditional Fire Risk WFA Expected Fire Risk	Fire Size Potential, Buildings Threatened/Destroyed, Population Impacts	Risk score between 0-1
WL	Wildfire Likelihood	WC1, WC2, VC1, VC2, VC3, WLC5	Probability of Outage (“POU”) Probability of Ignition (“POI”) Probability of Failure (“POF”)	Previous modeling steps	Probability of wildfire caused by electrical equipment	0-1 probability
AFR	Asset Failure Risk	VC1, VC2	Probability of Failure Consequence of Failure	Previous modeling steps	Asset Failure Risk	Risk score between 0-1

ID	Risk Component	Design Scenario(s)	Key Inputs	Source of Inputs (Data and/or Models)	Key Outputs	Units
APF	Probability of Failure	VC1, VC2	Utility Asset Data Outage Data Condition Modifiers	GIS System OMS	Asset Probability of Failure Score	0-1 probability
ACF	Consequence of Failure	No design scenario	Fire Consequence Metrics Community Resilience Probability of Ignition	Technosylva WFA	Asset Consequence of Failure Score	Risk score between 0-1

PSPS Risk Model

ID	Risk Component	Design Scenario(s)	Key Inputs	Source of Inputs (Data and/or Models)	Key Outputs	Units
PR	PSPS Risk	WC1	PSPS Consequence PSPS Likelihood	Previous modeling steps	PSPS Risk	Risk score between 0-1
PC	PSPS Consequence	WC1	Outage duration Customer count by circuit	Customer records	PSPS Consequence Risk	Risk score between 0-1
PL	PSPS Likelihood	WC1, WLC3	PSPS thresholds relative to weather conditions SRP Availability	Gridded hourly weather data	PSPS Likelihood Risk	0-1 probability
OPR	Outage Program Risk	No design scenario	PSPS Risk SRP Outage Risk	Previous modeling steps	Outage Program Risk	Risk score between 0-1
SOR	SRP Outage Risk	No design scenario	SRP Outage Likelihood SRP Outage Consequence	Previous modeling steps	SRP Outage Risk	Risk score between 0-1
SOL	SRP Outage Likelihood	WC1, WLC3	Technosylva WFA Asset Failure Risk	Asset Failure Risk Technosylva	SRP Outage Likelihood	0-1 probability
SOC	SRP Outage Consequence	No design scenario	Outage duration Customer count driven by circuit	Customer records	SRP Outage Consequence	Risk score between 0-1

5.5 Risk Analysis Results and Presentation

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must present a high-level overview of the risks calculated using the approaches discussed in Section 5.2 for the scenarios discussed in Section 5.3.

The risk presentation must include the following:

- Summary of electrical corporation-identified high fire risk areas in the service territory.
- Geospatial map of the top risk areas within the High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) (*i.e.*, areas that the electrical corporation has deemed at high risk from wildfire independent of HFTD designation).
- Narrative discussion of proposed updates to the HFTD.
- Tabular summary of top risk-contributing circuits across the service territory.
- Tabular summary of key metrics across the service territory.

The following subsections expand on the requirements for each of these.

5.5.1 Top Risk Areas within the HFRA

In this section, the electrical corporation must identify top risk areas within its self-identified HFRA, compare these areas to the CPUC's current HFTD, and discuss how it plans to submit its proposed changes to the CPUC for review.¹⁹

5.5.1.1 Geospatial Maps of Top-Risk Areas within the HFRA

The electrical corporation must evaluate the outputs from its risk modeling to identify top risk areas within its HFRA (independent of where they fall with respect to the HFTD). The electrical corporation must provide geospatial maps of these areas in accordance with the mapping requirements in the WMP Process Guidelines and Appendix C.

The maps must fulfill the following requirements:

- **Risk levels:** Levels must be selected to show at least three distinct levels, with the values based on the following:
 - Top 5 percent of overall utility risk values in the HFRA

¹⁹ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(17).

- Top 5 to 10 percent of overall utility risk values in the HFRA
 - Top 10 to 15 percent of overall utility risk values in HFRA
 - Top 15 to 20 percent of overall utility risk values in the HFRA
 - Bottom 80 percent of overall utility risk values in the HFRA
- **Colormap:** The colormap of the risk levels must meet accessibility requirements (recommended colormap is Viridis)
 - **County lines:** The map must include county lines as a geospatial reference
 - **HFTD tiers:** The map must show a comparison with existing HFTD Tiers 2 and 3 regions.

Figure 5-4 is a map of utility fire risk in California counties, and Figure 5-5 is an analogous map with Tier 2 and Tier 3 high fire threat district polygons.

Figure 5-4: Liberty Fire Risk Map with County Borders





Figure 5-5: Liberty Fire Risk Map with HFTD Polygons



5.5.1.2 Proposed Updates to the HFTD

In this section, the electrical corporation must discuss the differences between the electrical corporation-identified top-risk areas within the HFRA and the existing CPUC-approved HFTD.³⁶ The HFRA must be comprised of areas identified by the electrical corporations that its risk analysis indicates are at a higher risk than indicated in the current HFTD. Any proposed changes to the HFTD must be mapped in accordance with the requirements in the previous sub-section.

This discussion at a minimum must include:

- A discussion of how the electrical corporation analyzed additional areas in HFRA compared to HFTD.
- What criteria electrical corporations used to incorporate additional areas into the HFRA.
- Associated mitigation changes expected, as applicable.
- A description of the electrical corporation's process for submitting proposed changes to the HFTD to the CPUC, if such changes are desired.

Currently, Liberty does not have any proposed updates to the CPUC-defined HFTD areas. In the CPUC-approved HFTD risk maps, most of Liberty's service territory is designated as Tier 2, with a single Tier 3 designation in the Meyers circuits in the South Lake Tahoe area. Liberty's current risk modeling identifies some circuits as having higher risk than this Tier 3 area when the consequence of fires (structures impacted, acres burned) are quantitatively calculated and assessed.

Although Liberty does not currently propose updates to the CPUC-approved HFTD areas, Liberty intends to actively participate in future rulemakings addressing HFTD mapping and will provide input at that time. In accordance with CPUC requirements, if Liberty identifies areas in its service territory that should be added to or removed from the HFTD, Liberty will submit those proposed modifications to the CPUC via a petition for modification to D.17-12-024. This petition for modification would, at a minimum, provide a unique identifier for each area proposed for modification, define the area's geographic boundaries, and present rationale for why Liberty believes the modification is warranted.

5.5.2 Top Risk-Contributing Circuits/Segments/Spans

The electrical corporation must provide a summary table showing the highest-risk circuits, segments, or spans²⁰ within its service territory. The table should include the following information about each circuit:

- **Circuit, Segment, or Span ID:** Unique identifier for the circuit, segment, or span
- **Overall utility risk scores:** Numerical value for each risk
- **Top risk contributors:** The risk components that lead to the high risk on the circuit

The electrical corporation must rank its circuits, segments, or spans by circuit-mile-weighted overall utility risk score and identify each circuit, segment, or span that significantly contributes to risk. A circuit/segment/span significantly contributes to risk if it:

1. Individually contributes more than 1 percent of the total overall utility risk; or
2. Is in the top 5 percent of highest risk circuits/segments/spans when all circuits/segments/spans are ranked individually from highest to lowest risk.

The electrical corporation must include each circuit, segment, or span that significantly contributes to risk in Table 5-5.²¹ If this table is longer than two pages once populated, the electrical corporation must append the table.

Table 5-5 provides Liberty's top risk-contributing circuits given these circuits make up at least 1% of the total overall utility risk. Liberty's risk scores have been quantitatively computed in DRAT in collaboration with Direxyon, Technosylva, and Liberty's Subject Matter Experts ("SMEs").

Table 5-5: Liberty Top-Risk Circuits

Utility Risk Rank	Circuit ID	Wildfire Risk	Primary Overhead Miles	Top Risk Contributors	Version of Risk Model used
1	MEY3400	0.41634	54.1	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1

²⁰ For the section, the electrical corporation may use either circuits, segments, or spans, whichever is more appropriate considering the granularity of its risk model(s).

²¹ This table is a summary of information provided in the applicable data submission. As such, information included in this table must align with the data submission.

Utility Risk Rank	Circuit ID	Wildfire Risk	Primary Overhead Miles	Top Risk Contributors	Version of Risk Model used
2	MEY3300	0.22674	52.6	Age of Assets Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
3	MEY3500	0.11497	27.2	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
4	STL3101	0.09903	15.5	Age of Assets Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
5	GLS7400	0.09179	32.7	Age of Assets Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
6	POR3200	0.08568	20.8	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
7	TAH7300	0.08378	56.7	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
8	SRB51	0.07379	6.8	Age of Assets	Drat Phase 3.1
9	TPZ1202	0.07070	54.6	Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
10	MEY3200	0.06778	21.5	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
11	MEY3100	0.04943	17.5	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
12	CAL2501	0.04179	4.6	Age of Assets Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
13	MULLER1296	0.03670	43.6	Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
14	STL3501	0.02913	13.8	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1
15	SQV8200	0.02824	5.0	Expulsion Fuses Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
16	POR3100	0.02815	13.3	Age of Assets	Drat Phase 3.1
17	T608	0.02678	17.3	Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1

Utility Risk Rank	Circuit ID	Wildfire Risk	Primary Overhead Miles	Top Risk Contributors	Version of Risk Model used
18	KBH5200	0.02172	23.3	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation	Drat Phase 3.1
19	TAH5201	0.01780	21.1	Age of Assets Expulsion Fuses	Drat Phase 3.1

5.6 Quality Assurance and Control

The electrical corporation must document the procedures it uses to confirm that the data collected and processed for its risk assessment are accurate and comprehensive.³⁹ This includes but is not limited to model, sensor, inspection, and risk event data used as part of the electrical corporation's WMP program. In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must describe the following:

- **Independent review:** Role of independent third-party review in the data and model quality assurance.
- **Model controls, design, and review:** Overview of the quality controls in place on electrical corporation risk models and sub-models.

5.6.1 Independent Review

The electrical corporation must report on its procedures for independent review of data collected (e.g., through sensors or inspections) and generated (e.g., through risk models and software) to support decision making. In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide the following:

- **Independent reviews:** The electrical corporation's procedures for conducting independent reviews of data collection and risk models.
- **Additional review triggers:** The electrical corporation's internal procedures to identify when a third-party review is required beyond the routinely scheduled reviews.
- **Results, recommendations, and disposition:** The results and recommendations from the electrical corporation's most recent independent review of its data collection and risk models. This includes the electrical corporation's disposition of each comment.
- **Routine review schedule:** The electrical corporation's routine review schedule.

The electrical corporation must enter each accepted recommendation from independent review into its action tracking system for resolution (assignment of responsibility, development

of technical plan, schedule for development and deployment, etc.) in accordance with the requirements discussed in Section 8.

Liberty performs internal reviews of the data used in risk modeling and provides the data to vendors as risk model inputs. Additionally, Liberty reviews all WMP data provided as part of its quarterly data reporting to Energy Safety. Below is a list of data used in risk modeling and a description of the independent review process:

- Liberty outage data:** Liberty currently uses Schneider ADMS as its outage management system (“OMS”) to collect outage data. Liberty engineers review and validate outage data based on cause codes, dispatch remarks, outage times, restoration times and restoration steps provided from OMS to present accurate outage data. Liberty uses the data collected to document where outages occur, the outage cause, and the impact to customers. Liberty uses outage data to gain an understanding of how Liberty’s system is performing, to collect SAIDI/SAIFI metrics, and to perform risk analysis. Liberty subject matter experts and managers review data and refine it to improve its effectiveness for these uses. For example, Liberty attempts to minimize outage data that has an unknown cause by training field staff who collect data in the field and through post-processing freeform text fields.
- Liberty ignition data:** Liberty tracks and records ignitions through its Fulcrum system. The information in Liberty’s ignition database includes ignition causes and investigation results per observations in the field in correlation with local fire municipalities. Dependent on specific factors related to the ignition, Liberty may supply the information from Liberty’s ignition database to CAL FIRE or other fire municipalities upon request for additional review.
- Operations data:** Liberty’s asset inspection results are independently reviewed through its Asset Inspection QA/QC Program detailed in Section 8.5. Additionally, Liberty SMEs and data analysts review inspection data, work order data, and repair data prior to each quarterly data submission to Energy Safety and as necessary to support operations. This review includes data pipeline quality checks.
- Vegetation data:** Liberty’s vegetation data is independently reviewed as detailed in Section 9.
- Technosylva wildfire risk modeling outputs:** In addition to historical reviews, Technosylva improves the accuracy and performance of the published fire models to better adjust results to observed fire behavior. This includes a better definition of the fuel types, improved forecast of live fuel moisture content, modifications to the crown fire modelling initialization scheme, and automatic fire adjustment based on data

assimilation techniques using a rate of spread (“ROS”) adjustment factor. In addition, Technosylva has implemented more than 20 additional fuel models into the WFA platform to enhance accuracy and address known limitations of published fire models. These improvements include crown fire analysis, ember and spotting, urban / non-burnable area encroachment, and consequence and impact quantification. It is important to note that improvement of the fire modeling platform of choice necessitates not only improvements in mathematical algorithms but substantial improvements in the accuracy and resolution of input data sources. These work in concert to enhance the modeling and outputs to match observed and expected fire behavior. A robust operationalization of fire models requires constant and on-going research, testing, validation and implementation of both models and data sources.

- **Direxyon Risk Assessment Tool (“DRAT”):** Liberty SMEs collaborate with the Data Science consultant Direxyon to design, build, test, and enhance the DRAT platform utilizing industry and technical knowledge. Although Liberty’s development of DRAT is unique and owned by Liberty, Direxyon has industry knowledge as they work in conjunction with other utilities in the United States and Canada to solve risk scoring across multiple facets. Additionally, Direxyon conducts research from published papers and industry experts regarding fire weather, equipment reliability, and other risk components in correlation with Liberty SMEs.
- **CloudFire risk modeling outputs:** Inputs to Liberty’s risk modeling work with Reax are obtained from industry-standard data sources, many of which are developed by the Federal government. Such inputs are widely used for wildfire spread and risk modeling. Examples of industry standard data sources that are used as inputs include Real Time Mesoscale Analysis (“RTMA”) data, LANDFIRE fuel data, and the Microsoft US Building footprints dataset.²² These datasets are developed and validated by other experts upstream of Liberty’s risk modeling process. The underlying wildfire spread model used in Liberty’s risk modeling work (ELMFIRE) with CloudFire has been published in the peer reviewed archival journal Fire Safety Journal.²³ Being an open-source model hosted from a publicly accessible GitHub repository,²⁴ the model itself is transparent and available for inspection by others. ELMFIRE is documented at <https://elmfire.io> where a user’s guide, technical reference, tutorials, and verification plus validation test cases are available. ELMFIRE has been used to forecast the spread of most large fires in the

²² <https://www.nco.ncep.noaa.gov/pmb/products/rtma/>; <https://landfire.gov>; <https://github.com/microsoft/USBuildingFootprints>.

²³ <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.firesaf.2013.08.014>.

²⁴ <https://github.com/lautenberger/elmfire>.

Continental US in real time for the last six fire seasons.²⁵ Along with Near Term Fire Behavior (“NTFB”) and Fire Spread Probability (“FSPro”), ELMFIRE is one of the three operational fire spread models used by the Federal Government to inform fire resource allocation decisions and is funded to do so through 2027. As such, its predictive capabilities and limitations are known, including a retrospective assessment from the previous fire seasons.²⁶

- **Annual WMP Independent Evaluation:** As part of the OEIS WMP process, Liberty selects an Independent Evaluator (“IE”) to review and assess its level of compliance with its WMP. This independent evaluation process requires Liberty to provide all requested data related to its prior year’s WMP initiatives for independent review and verification.

As Liberty’s risk modeling process continues to mature and develop, Liberty will consider establishing additional robust internal and external review procedures over its risk modeling data collected and generated. Considerations will include processes for initiating independent third-party reviews, additional review triggers such as large updates to data inputs and alterations to the model framework, assessing and incorporating results from said reviews as needed and developing routine review schedules (*i.e.*, annual review). Once the initial wildfire risk model implementation is complete, procedures Liberty expects to apply for the following model validation activities include the following:

- **Technosylva independent review:** Ongoing fire model validations are performed both internally and during operational scenarios in California in collaboration with CAL FIRE. Technosylva assessed the performance of fire spread models for initial attack incidents (either surface or crown) currently used in operational environments in California through the analysis of the rate of spread (ROS) of 1,853 wildfires. The work has been published in the International Journal of Wildland Fire.²⁷ The paper states that the fire spread model’s performance for California is in line with previous studies developed in other regions and the models are accurate enough to be used in real-time operations to assess initial attack fires. Technosylva identified how some environmental variables may bias the ROS predictions, especially in timber areas where the Scott and Burgan (2005) fuel models underestimated ROS. New improvements in the fuel families and crown fire spread models have further improved the accuracy and performance of the fire models to better adjust the results to observed fire behavior.

²⁵ <https://pyrecast.org>.

²⁶ <https://elmfire.io/validation.html>.

²⁷ <https://www.publish.csiro.au/WF/WF22128>.

- Direxyon independent review:** The vendor solution uses data from different sources such as GIS and Technosylva model outputs. While these data inputs are not validated by Direxyon, the required fallback logics for missing value imputation and the other required data transformation by Direxyon are confirmed with Liberty in advance. Direxyon Results and Dashboard module generates a large quantity of raw and aggregated data through Monte-Carlo simulation. The Results interface (also known as the Audit screen) offers a full set of features to search through the raw data generated via simulation. This interface is at the center of Direxyon’s “Glass-Box” approach as users can find the complete details of any asset characteristic during any simulation or simulation period. This interface is primarily used to validate the models’ mechanics or share with third-party auditors. The user can validate why a specific value is calculated for the asset.
- Liberty internal review:** Liberty continues to maintain an internal Risk Focus Group to review wildfire risk data and model outputs and to work with its wildfire risk modeling consultants to validate results throughout the iteration of the model and framework.
- Data input review:** Prior to providing data to Direxyon, Liberty performs review of all data manually and utilizing database validation. Manual review is conducted in correlation with operational sources for correctness of work completed, empty fields, and aggregated correctness. Database validation checks refers to ensuring the data does not have duplicates, ambiguities, or format discrepancies.
- Model reviews:** Liberty has undergone heavy development of its risk modeling efforts and recognizes that its review processes are immature. For example, Outage Program Risk and PSPS Risk are outputs developed for the 2026-2028 WMP and need a thorough review and validation to be considered fully useful to risk based decision making. As mentioned in Section 5.7 Risk Assessment ID RA2 the addition of a focused internal resource to thoroughly validate outputs and generate outputs is necessary for this time-consuming process. By working closely with Direxyon and Liberty SMEs validation of model characteristics will ensure alignment with Liberty’s processes are present in the model’s entirety.

5.6.2 Model Controls, Design, and Review

An electrical corporation’s risk modeling approaches are complex, with several layers of interaction between models and sub-models. If these models are designed as a single unit, it can be difficult to evaluate the propagation of small changes in assumptions or inputs through the models. The requirements in this section are designed to facilitate the review of models by

the stakeholders and Energy Safety, and to allow for more comprehensive retrospective analysis of failures in the system.

The electrical corporations must report on its risk modeling software's model controls, design, and review in the following areas:

- **Modularization:** The electrical corporation must report on the degree to which its software architecture is sufficiently modular to track and control changes and enhancements over time. At a minimum, the electrical corporation must report if it has separate modules to evaluate each of the following:
 - Weather analysis
 - Fire behavior analysis
 - Seasonal vegetation analysis
 - Equipment failure
 - Exposure and vulnerability analysis
- **Reanalysis:** The electrical corporation must describe its capability to provide the results of its risk model based on the operational version of the software (including code and data) on a specific historic day.
- **Version control:** The electrical corporation must report on how it conforms to industry standard practices in version controlling its risk model and sub-models. At a minimum, the electrical corporation is expected to report on:
 - Models and software version controls aligned with industry standard programs, procedures, and protocols
 - Version control of model input data, including geospatial data layers
 - Procedures for updating technical, verification, and validation documentation.

By having modules for weather, fire, assets, PSPS, and other risk factors, Liberty has developed the ability to examine risk at a granular level for each of the aforementioned categories. Technosylva, Direxyon, and Liberty SMEs develop risk modeling efforts to meet industry standards.

Weather Analysis: Weather analysis and forecasting are outsourced and managed by CloudFire. CloudFire monitors national weather forecasting models for temperature and wind speeds specific to Liberty's service territory and informs Liberty's wildfire and operations personnel of changing conditions and possible exceedance of PSPS thresholds by PSPS zone. Moving forward, as Liberty develops its PSPS Risk Assessment, weather analysis and forecasting will be

produced by Technosylva's WFA and WRF modeling for Liberty's service territory. The outputs of these models supplement Liberty's wildfire and operational decision-making preceding and during events with changing conditions and possible exceedance of PSPS thresholds be PSPS zone. The weather analytics module produces metrics, where certain thresholds are met or exceeded, can trigger the decision to initiate a PSPS event for given weather conditions.

Fire Behavior Analysis: Technosylva's WFA model composes Liberty's Fire Behavior Analysis where WRF (as explained above) and key fire metrics are output based on the characteristics of the service territory. WFA calculates fire size potential, fire behavior index, rate of spread and flame length to encompass Liberty's Fire Behavior Analysis model. From the outputs of this model, Liberty quantifies the risk across its service territory to enable decision-making for maintenance and mitigation programs to perform that will quantify to a lower risk of asset failure and utility-caused ignitions.

Seasonal Vegetation Analysis: DRAT incorporates vegetation as a separate asset type to construct Liberty's Seasonal Vegetation Analysis. Liberty does not account for mitigation of vegetation on a seasonal basis specifically for fire season because its service territory experiences harsh winters. However, risk analysis specifically accounts for ignition risk as a part of the quantified risk score for vegetation. With the ability to individually look at vegetation risk, Liberty quantifies its risk score to identify maintenance and mitigation programs that will lower the risk of system failure, or a utility-caused outage due to vegetation-caused reasons. Having a model that quantifies risk with respect to the consequence of an ignition separately from an outage is important to output a risk score that is helpful for Liberty's SAIFI/SAIDI metrics throughout a given year and not just in fire season. As such, Liberty's vegetation risk model is not geared toward wildfires because of the amount of high wind events occurring outside of fire season.

Equipment Failure: DRAT incorporates multiple asset types pertaining to the electrical system encompassing Liberty's Equipment Failure module of its RBDM platform. From the Overall Utility Risk and Composite Risk score described in Section 5.2.2.3, the asset failure risk, fire risk, and PSPS risk can be individually analyzed so that maintenance and mitigation programs can be assessed given the separate scores of an electrical outage or a utility-caused ignition to account for SAIDI/SAIFI metrics throughout a given year and not just in fire season.

Exposure and Vulnerability Analysis: Analysis of Exposure and Vulnerability is established by Technosylva's WFA modeling and is affiliated with Liberty's consequence metrics, as explained in Section 5.2.2.2. By utilizing DRAT, Liberty has the ability to quantify risk for asset failure consequence and fire risk.

Reanalysis: Inside the Direxyon tool, simulations that have been run are saved and remain available in the platform with the ability to be viewed or updated given input data updates or historical use cases that need to be revisited. In cases when modeling updates have been made, Liberty can use new or old data to obtain outputs from the updated models. Direxyon has made many of the model variables available so that scenarios with given weightings can be run in comparison.

Version Controls: Version controls for the Direxyon Risk Assessment Tool include:

- Model simulations are not deleted, and each simulation contains the output dataset.
- Model versions can be retrieved for given points in time.
- Input data is manually organized by time of upload and is accessible in the model for outputs given a point in time.
- Direxyon adheres to ISO 27001 and SOC2 Type2, with additional influences from NIST.
 - Yearly audits for compliance are maintained since 2020.
- Direxyon is certified under ISO 9001 given quality management practices.
- Direxyon utilizes Git as a version control utility.
- As a part of Direxyon's version deployments, feature notes are published to identify updates as part of each build.

5.7 Risk Assessment Improvement Plan

improvement. In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of its plan to improve both programmatic and technical aspects of its risk assessment in at least four key areas:

- **Risk assessment methodology**: Wildfire and PSPS risk assessment methodology and its documentation, including both quantitative and qualitative approaches.
- **Design basis**: Justification of design basis scenarios used to evaluate the risk and its documentation.
- **Risk presentation**: Presentation of risk to stakeholders, including dashboards and statistical assessments.
- **Risk event tracking**: Tracking and reconstruction of risk events and integration of lessons learned.

The overview must consist of the following information, in tabulated format:

- **Key area**: One of the four key areas identified above
- **Title of proposed improvement**: Brief heading or subject of the improvement

- **Type of improvement:** Technical or programmatic
- **Anticipated benefit:** Summary of anticipated benefit and any other impacts of the proposed improvement
- **Timeframe and key milestones:** Total timeframe for undertaking the proposed improvement and any key milestones

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide a concise narrative of its proposed improvement plan (maximum of five pages per improvement) summarizing::

- **Problem statement:** Description of the current state of the problem to be addressed
- **Planned improvement:** Discussion of the planned improvement, including any new/novel strategies to be developed and the timeline for their completion
- **Anticipated benefit:** Detailed description of the anticipated benefit and any other impacts of the proposed improvement
- **Region prioritization (where relevant):** Reference to risk-informed analysis (*e.g.*, local validation of weather forecasts in the HFTD) demonstrating that high-risk areas are being prioritized for continued improvement
- **Supporting documentation (as necessary)**

Liberty has made continual advancements in its RBDM framework. Through many iterations throughout the development, Liberty has continued to improve upon its probabilistic and consequence modeling capabilities to encompass the WMP guidelines. As a part of this WMP, Liberty is now looking to enhance these capabilities by establishing clear roles and responsibilities, and to establish clear and documented processes to continually evaluate, improve, and produce better risk modeling results. This includes finetuning its business processes for the consumption and analysis of the data as well as look for opportunities to tune the technical capabilities through validation and review of the tools it has developed.

Goal: Develop and continually improve, both programmatically and technically, the risk assessment tool to implement risk-based decision making into the business planning and operations processes.

RA-1 through RA-5, Continuous Improvement:

Problem Statement: While Liberty has developed the risk assessment tool and begun to produce and evaluate the results, it's important that Liberty establish a programmatic and repeatable documented process to enable continued and structured improvement.

Planned Improvement: The following five, RA-1 through RA-5, actions will be implemented as part of this WMP to further formalize and establish continued improvement controls to the risk assessment tool and the subsequent results.

Anticipated Benefits: Improved results will allow Liberty to make more informed business, design, and operational decisions based on risk.

- RA-1, Data Quality and Data Input: Establish a process to continually test data quality and data input to improve the results of the tool. This is a programmatic improvement to continually test and improve the data. Data will be tested annually, or more frequently, and the first test will be performed in 2026.
- RA-2, Risk Assessment Methodology: Establish a process to continually test the risk modeling methodology and benchmark with peer utilities. Include wildfire and PSPS risk assessment documentation, including both quantitative and qualitative approaches. This is a programmatic improvement to continually improve the risk calculations and model. The methodology will be tested annually, or more frequently, and the first test will be performed in 2026.
- RA-3, Evaluate and Improve Results: Establish a feedback loop with subject matter experts to continually test and improve the results of the risk tool. This should include presentation of risk, including dashboards and assessments. This is a programmatic improvement to continually improve the results of the risk assessment tool. The results, including the top-risk circuits list, will be tested annually, or more frequently, and the first test will be in 2026.
- RA-4, Risk Event Tracking and Testing: Establish a process to track and reconstruct risk events for the purpose of integrating lessons learned and improvement. This is a programmatic improvement to continually improve the results of the risk assessment tool. Liberty will track and reconstruct a minimum of three events to integrate lessons learned. The first three events will be reconstructed and tested in 2026.
- RA-5, Use the Results to Inform Decision Making and Design Basis: Establish a cadence to present and deliver the results with business planners and operators to be incorporated into the decision-making and design process. This should include justification for design basis scenarios. This is a programmatic improvement to advance risk-based decision making. The risk assessment results will be produced annually, or

more frequently, so Liberty can better inform the WMP Updates, including the 2027 Update, and subsequent Updates and Base Plan submittals.

RA-6 through RA-7, Immediate Improvement:

Problem Statement: Liberty is a small utility with limited resources, however, to more notably drive improvement with the risk assessment tool, a dedicated resource, with clear roles and responsibilities is necessary.

Planned Improvement: A resource will be onboarded and assigned the role of lead risk analyst to accelerate the improvement of Liberty's risk assessment tool.

Anticipated Benefits: Dedicating an employee to focus on and execute continual improvement actions will lead to better tool and subsequent results.

- RA-6, Establish Clear Roles and Responsibility to Drive Improvement: Assign a dedicated resource the responsibility of improving and delivering risk-based results for better decision making. Place an emphasis on data quality, methodology, and subject matter expert and industry tested results. This is a programmatic improvement to advance the tool and accelerate the utilization of risk-based decision making. Liberty will onboard the dedicate resource by Q2 2026 with an established role and responsibilities. Further, to ensure continued improvement, Liberty will finalize a documented procedure that compliments the continuous improvement portion of this Risk Assessment Improvement Plan by Q3 2026.

Problem Statement: Liberty's outage and PSPS risk results need improvement.

Planned Improvement: Liberty plans to action the items above to improve the outage and PSPS risk results.

Anticipated Benefits: Improved outage and PSPS results will improve the quality of the overall utility risk results. Improved results will allow for more informed business, design, and operational decision making. When the results are trusted by the subject matter experts, the program and tool will build acceptance and advance the associated risk mitigation.

- RA-7, Evaluate and Improve the Outage Risk Results: Evaluate and improve the calculation and scaling of outage risk including, but not limited to:
 - Correction and recalibration of the third-party risk model;

- Evaluation of current scaling and weighting of various consequence metrics for both wildfire and outage program risks, including discussion of the validity of current methods and changes made based on that evaluation;
- Migration to summation of wildfire and outage risk scores, as opposed to averaging, based on more accurate and proper scaling of the two risk scores;
- Coordination with other electrical corporations to determine methodology for scaling and weighting of risk metrics;

This is a technical improvement to improve the outage and PSPS risk results. These improvements will be complete so the updated results can be included in the 2027 WMP Update.

Table 5-6: Liberty Utility Risk Assessment Improvement Plan

Key Risk Assessment Area	Proposed Improvement	Type of Improvement	Expected Value Add	Timeframe and Key Milestones
RA-1, Data Quality and Data Input	Establish a process to continually test data quality and data input to improve the results of the tool	Programmatic and technical	This is a programmatic and technical improvement to continually test and improve the data	Data will be tested annually, or more frequently, and the first test will be performed in 2026
RA-2, Risk Assessment Methodology	Establish a process to continually test the risk modeling methodology and benchmark with peer utilities. Include wildfire and PSPS risk assessment documentation, including both quantitative and qualitative approaches	Programmatic and technical	This is a programmatic and technical improvement to continually improve the risk calculations and model	The methodology will be tested annually, or more frequently, and the first test will be performed in 2026
RA-3, Evaluate and Improve Results	Establish a feedback loop with subject matter experts to continually test and improve the results of the risk tool. This should include presentation of risk, including dashboards and assessments	Programmatic and technical	This is a programmatic and technical improvement to continually improve the results of the risk assessment tool	The results, including the top-risk circuits list, will be tested annually, or more frequently, and the first test will be in 2026
RA-4, Risk Event Tracking and Testing	Establish a process to track and reconstruct risk events for the purpose of integrating lessons learned and improvement	Programmatic and technical	This is a programmatic and technical improvement to continually improve the results of the risk assessment tool	Liberty will track and reconstruct a minimum of three events to integrate lessons learned. The first three events will be reconstructed and tested in 2026
RA-5, Use the Results to Inform Decision Making and Design Basis	Establish a cadence to present and deliver the results with business planners and operators to be incorporated into the decision-making and design process. This should include justification for design basis scenarios	Programmatic	This is a programmatic improvement to advance risk-based decision making	The risk assessment results will be produced annually, or more frequently, so Liberty can better inform the WMP Updates, including the 2027 Update, and subsequent Updates and Base Plan submittals

RA-6, Establish Clear Roles and Responsibility to Drive Improvement	Assign a dedicated resource the responsibility of improving and delivering risk-based results for better decision making. Place an emphasis on data quality, methodology, and subject matter expert and industry tested results	Programmatic	Dedicating an employee to focus on and execute continual improvement actions will lead to a better tool and subsequent results	Liberty will onboard the dedicate resource by Q2 2026 with an established role and responsibilities. Further, to ensure continued improvement, Liberty will finalize a documented procedure that compliments the continuous improvement portion of this Risk Assessment Improvement Plan by Q3 2026
RA-7, Evaluate and Improve the Outage Risk Results	Evaluate and improve the calculation and scaling of outage risk including, but not limited to, the items included in RN-LU-26-01	Technical	Improved outage and PSPS results will improve the quality of the overall utility risk results. Improved results will allow for more informed business, design, and operational decision making. When the results are trusted by the subject matter experts, the program and tool will build acceptance and advance the associated risk mitigation	These improvements will be complete so the updated results can be included in the 2027 WMP Update

6. Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of the risk evaluation processes that inform its selection of a portfolio of initiative activities, as well as its overall wildfire mitigation strategy.⁴⁰ The electrical corporation's processes and strategy must be designed to achieve maximum feasible risk reduction⁴¹ and meet the goal(s) and plan objectives stated in Sections 3.1–3.2. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 below provide detailed instructions.

6.1 Risk Evaluation


6.1.1 Approach

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative of its risk evaluation approach, based on the risk analysis outcomes presented in Section 5. This narrative helps inform the development of a wildfire mitigation strategy that meets the goal(s) and plan objectives stated in Sections 3.1–3.2. The electrical corporation must indicate and describe in the narrative whether its risk evaluation approach meets or uses any industry-recognized standards (e.g., ISO 31000), best practices, and/or research.

The electrical corporation must describe the risk evaluation approach in a maximum of two pages, inclusive of all narratives, bullet point lists, and any graphics.

Liberty has developed and adopted its RBDM framework as explained in Section 5 by utilizing DRAT to output all its categorized risk metrics. Liberty is capable of evaluating its risk from the system wide to the individual asset level of granularity. Through the development of DRAT, Liberty has built out modules for Asset Failure, Fire, and PSPS risks to include risk spend efficiency and risk reduction forecasting that allows for risk analysis to supplement its mitigation priorities. Liberty is implementing the utilization of these metrics to inform future work planning. Refer to Figure 6-1 for Liberty process flow of risk identification and analysis.

Figure 6-1: Risk Identification and Analysis Process Flow



6.1.2 Risk-Informed Prioritization

In making decisions involving risk mitigation, the electrical corporation must identify and evaluate where it can make investments and take actions to reduce its overall utility risk. The electrical corporation must develop a prioritization list based on overall utility risk.

In this section, the electrical corporation must:

- Describe how it selects circuit segments of its service territory at risk from wildfire for potential initiative activities, including, at a minimum, the following:
 - o Geographic scale used in prioritization (i.e., regional, circuit, circuit segment, span, asset)
 - o Statistical approach used to select prioritized areas (e.g., circuit segments in top 20 percent for risk, circuit segments in top 20 percent for consequences)
 - o Feasibility constraints (e.g., limitations on data resolution, jurisdictional considerations, accessibility)

Present a list that identifies, describes, and prioritizes circuit segments of its service territory at risk from wildfire for potential initiative activities based solely on overall utility risk, including the associated risk drivers. Associated risk drivers must be ranked in order of most impactful to risk.

With the new risk model recently completed, Liberty will develop internal capabilities to analyze risk outputs at the circuit segment level. This analysis will be based on mitigation and project activities for prioritization throughout the 2026-2028 WMP Cycle. DRAT is used to quantify risk metrics at the circuit level for the multiple risk modules Liberty has developed. These modules establish baseline risk metrics, risk spend efficiency for mitigations, and forecast future risk metrics. By evaluating fire risk, outage program risk, and overall utility risk, Liberty can identify and prioritize mitigation activities based on their calculated risk reduction and cost-effectiveness. Liberty has identified the circuits contributing greater than or equal to 1% of Overall Utility Risk in Table 6-1 based on the methodology described in Section 5.2.1.

Liberty faces feasibility constraints that can impact the planning and execution of mitigation activities. These include complex permitting processes and environmental conditions that limit access to project areas. Despite its relatively small service territory, Liberty must coordinate with a wide array of jurisdictional agencies including two U.S. Forest Service Regions, four National Forests, State land, Caltrans, the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, and various other local, state and federal agencies. This jurisdictional complexity contributes to a lengthy and resource-intensive permitting process.

Much of Liberty's service territory is situated within the Sierra Nevada Mountain Range, encompassing rugged, mountainous terrain that presents significant operational and logistical challenges. The region features steep slopes, dense forests, high elevations, and remote areas with limited or no road access, often requiring specialized equipment or aerial support to reach infrastructure assets. Additionally, the region is prone to severe winter weather, which significantly shortens the annual work window for mitigation activities. Snow accumulation and icy conditions during the winter months limit accessibility and constrain the volume of work that can be completed each year. These geographic and climatic factors must be carefully considered in the planning and execution of wildfire mitigation and system reliability efforts.

Table 6-1: Circuit Prioritization List Based on Overall Utility Risk

Priority	Circuit	Length (miles)	Wildfire Risk	Percent of Overall Fire Risk	Associated Risk Drivers
1	MEY3400	54.1	0.41634	23%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation
2	MEY3300	52.6	0.22674	13%	Age of Assets Expulsion Fuses
3	MEY3500	27.2	0.11497	6%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation
4	STL3101	15.5	0.09903	6%	Age of Assets Vegetation
5	GLS7400	32.7	0.09179	5%	Age of Assets Expulsion Fuses
6	POR3200	20.8	0.08568	5%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses
7	TAH7300	56.7	0.08378	5%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses
8	SRB51	6.8	0.07379	4%	Age of Assets
9	TPZ1202	54.6	0.07070	4%	Expulsion Fuses
10	MEY3200	21.5	0.06778	4%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation
11	MEY3100	17.5	0.04943	3%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation
12	CAL2501	4.6	0.04179	2%	Age of Assets Vegetation
13	MULLER1296	43.6	0.03670	2%	Expulsion Fuses
14	STL3501	13.8	0.02913	2%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses

Priority	Circuit	Length (miles)	Wildfire Risk	Percent of Overall Fire Risk	Associated Risk Drivers
15	SQV8200	5.0	0.02824	2%	Expulsion Fuses Vegetation
16	POR3100	13.3	0.02815	2%	Age of Assets
17	T608	17.3	0.02678	2%	Vegetation
18	KBH5200	23.3	0.02172	1%	Age of Assets Tree Attachments Expulsion Fuses Vegetation
19	TAH5201	21.1	0.01780	1%	Age of Assets Expulsion Fuses

6.1.3 Activity Selection Process

After the electrical corporation creates a list of top-risk contributing circuits/segments/spans (Section 5.5.2) and prioritized circuit segments based on overall utility risk (Section 6.1.2), the electrical corporation must then identify potential mitigation strategies. It must also evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of each strategy at different scales of application (e.g., circuit, circuit segment, system-wide). In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide the basis for its decisions regarding which initiative activities to pursue.

The electrical corporation must consider appropriate initiative activities depending on the local conditions, physical setting, and the risk components that create the high-risk conditions. There may be a wide variety of potential initiative activities, such as:

- Engineering changes to grid design
- Discretionary inspection and/or maintenance of existing assets
- Vegetation clearances beyond minimum regulatory requirements
- Alternative operational policies, practices, and procedures
- Improved emergency planning and coordination

The electrical corporation must also evaluate mitigating risk through a portfolio of combined multiple initiative activities.

The electrical corporation is expected to use its procedures discussed in Section 5 to:

- Develop potential initiative activities approaches to address each risk

- Characterize the potential initiative activities to provide internal decision makers with information required to support decision making (e.g., costs, material availability), including an assessment of uncertainties.
- Document the results of the evaluation

The electrical corporation must develop a proposed schedule for implementing each initiative activities and proposed metrics to monitor implementation and effectiveness of the initiative activities. The following subsections provide specific requirements.²⁸

6.1.3.1 Identifying and Evaluating Initiative Activities

The electrical corporation must describe how it identifies and evaluates options for mitigating wildfire and outage program risk at various analytical scales, consistent with the CPUC guidelines associated with the Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework (RDF) established in the RDF Proceeding.²⁹ The electrical corporation must present the risk mitigation identification procedure it plans on using during the course of the three years filed in the Base WMP. If the electrical corporation is required to submit a RAMP filing to the CPUC, the risk mitigation procedure provided must be consistent with either its most recent RAMP filing or its upcoming RAMP filing. The electrical corporation must describe the following:

- The procedures for identifying and evaluating initiative activities (comparable to Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework, row 26³⁰), including the use of risk buy-down estimates (e.g., risk-spend efficiency) and evaluating the benefits and drawbacks of mitigations.
- To the extent possible, multiple potential locally relevant initiative activities that address local wildfire risk drivers (see Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework, row 29).³¹

²⁸ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

²⁹ The CPUC initially adopted its Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework in D.18-12-014 (see S-MAP, step 3, rows 15–25), <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M250/K281/250281848.pdf>. The CPUC updated its Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework in December 2022 in D.22-12-027, <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M500/K014/500014668.PDF>. This Decision changed the risk evaluation framework from Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) to Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).

³⁰ Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework, Appendix A to D.22-12-027, California Public Utilities Commission, December 2022 at A-16: <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M500/K043/500043720.PDF>.

³¹ Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework, Appendix A to D.22-12-027, California Public Utilities Commission, December 2022 at A-20: <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M500/K043/500043720.PDF>.

- The approach the electrical corporation uses to characterize uncertainties and how the electrical corporation's evaluation and decision-making process incorporates these uncertainties (see Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework, rows 29 and 30).³²
- Two or more potential initiative activities or initiative portfolios for each risk driver included in the list of prioritized circuit segments (Table 6-1 in Section 6.1.2), including the following information:

- o The initiatives and activities

- o Expected risk reduction and impact on individual risk components

- o Where mitigations can be feasibly deployed in combination, the electrical corporation must compare these portfolios of mitigations (e.g., covered conductor, vegetation management, asset inspections, and protective device and equipment settings vs undergrounding, secondary hardening, and asset inspections).

- o Estimated implementation costs

- o Where mitigations can be feasibly deployed in combination, the utility must compare these portfolios of mitigations (e.g., covered conductor, vegetation management, and protective device and equipment settings versus undergrounding and secondary hardening).

- o Relevant uncertainties and associated potential impacts, including solutions on how to reduce the potential impacts

- o Implementation schedule

- How the electrical corporation uses multi-attribute value functions (MAVFs), cost-benefit analysis (CBA), and/or other specific risk factors (as identified in relevant CPUC Decisions) in evaluating different mitigation alternatives.
- How the electrical corporation defines different aspects of risk considerations, including: Risk Attitude, Risk Tolerance, Uncertainty, and Tail Risk in its risk mitigation strategies.³³

- o Must break out each by safety and reliability (PSPS and PEDS), as applicable

³² Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework, Appendix A to D.22-12-027, California Public Utilities Commission, December 2022 at A-20 to: <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M500/K043/500043720.PDF>.

³³ Ordering Paragraph 4, D.22-12-027 at 65.

o Must include a discussion of how each aspect impacts mitigation selection and prioritization.

Liberty identifies and evaluates initiative activities through a structured, risk-based decision-making process that incorporates quantitative modeling, subject matter expertise, and operational feasibility. Initiative activities are selected based on their risk spend efficiency, contribution to reducing overall utility risk, and their impact on the likelihood and consequence of wildfire or PSPS events. To identify potential mitigations, Liberty leverages outputs from the DRAT tool, historical incident data, asset condition assessments, and geospatial risk modeling. Input from the Operations, Engineering and Planning, and Vegetation Management departments further informs the selection of locally relevant mitigation strategies.

Liberty incorporates uncertainty into its evaluation process by identifying data limitations and engaging subject matter experts to validate assumptions. DRAT performs Monte Carlo Simulations to conduct stochastic modeling, incorporating random variables and uncertainty parameters to generate a range of possible outcomes based on probabilistic inputs. This allows Liberty to assess the variability associated with each mitigation strategy.

In evaluating mitigation alternatives, Liberty considers cost-benefit analysis, construction complexity, reliability implications, and long-term maintenance requirements. While Liberty, as a Small and Multi-Jurisdictional Utility (SMJU), is not required to submit a RAMP filing or develop a formal MAVF or MARS framework, it does incorporate multi-attribute value function (MAVF) principles into its broader risk-based decision-making framework to identify and prioritize high-impact mitigations

Liberty defines different aspects of risk considerations as follows:

- Risk Attitude: Liberty adopts a risk-averse posture, prioritizing mitigations that address high-consequence, low-likelihood events.
- Risk Tolerance: Liberty maintains a low tolerance for wildfire-related risk by implementing its wildfire mitigation strategy across all parts of the system.
- Uncertainty: Liberty accounts for uncertainty through conservative assumptions, sensitivity analyses, and scenario modeling.
- Tail Risk: Liberty evaluates worst-case scenarios to implement mitigation strategies that address low-probability but high-impact events.

Liberty provides initiative activities for each risk driver included in the list of prioritized circuits (Table 6-1 in Section 6.1.2) in LU Table 6-1.

LU Table 6-1: Initiative Activities for Risk Drivers of Prioritized Circuits

Activity	Wildfire Risk Reduction	Estimated Cost	Impacts	Implementation Schedule
Pole Replacement	14%	\$15,000,000	Refer to Section 8	Refer to Section 8
Tree Attachment Removal	2%	\$3,490,000	Refer to Section 8	Refer to Section 8
Fuse Replacements	8%	\$6,000,000	Refer to Section 8	Refer to Section 8
Vegetation Work	2%	\$36,000,000	Refer to Section 9	Refer to Section 9

6.1.3.2 Initiative Activity Prioritization

The electrical corporation must seek to implement the best integrated portfolio of initiative activities using its project prioritization framework to meet its plan objectives, optimize its resources, and maximize risk reduction. Objectives may be based on quantified risk assessment results (see Section 5), or other values prioritized by the electrical corporation or broader stakeholder groups (e.g., Tribal interests, environmental protection, public perception, resilience, cost). The electrical corporation must do the following:

- Evaluate its potential initiative activities. This evaluation will yield a prioritized list of initiatives. The objective is for the electrical corporation to identify the preferable initiatives for specific geographical areas. (Comparable to Risk Based Decision-making Framework, rows 12 and 29).⁴⁸
- Identify the best initiative activities for all geographical areas at a location-specific level to create a portfolio of projects expected to provide maximal benefits within known limitations and constraints. (Comparable to Risk Based Decision-making Framework, rows 12 and 29).⁴⁹ Explain when subject matter expertise is used as a part of initiative selection, including the process used by subject matter experts (SMEs) to provide their judgement.
- Explain how the electrical corporation is optimizing its resources to maximize risk reduction. Describe how the proposed initiative activities are an efficient use of electrical corporation resources and focus on achieving the greatest risk reduction with the most efficient use of funds and workforce resources.
- Discuss the interrelationships between different initiative activities, in terms of how initiative activities influence and impact implementation and respective effectiveness for risk reduction, and how the electrical corporation evaluates trade-offs between initiative activities.

- The electrical corporation must describe how it prioritizes initiative activities to reduce both wildfire and PSPS risk. This discussion must include the following:
- A high-level schematic showing the procedures and evaluation criteria used to evaluate potential initiative activities. At a minimum, the schematic must demonstrate the roles of quantitative risk assessment, resource allocation, evaluation of other plan objectives (e.g., cost, timing) identified by the electrical corporation, and SME judgment. Where specific local factors, which vary across the service territory, are considered in the decision-making process (e.g., the primary risk driver in a region is legacy equipment), they must be indicated in the schematic. The electrical corporation must explain why those local conditions are part of the decision process (i.e., there should not be simply one box in the schematic that is labeled “local conditions,” which is then connected to the rest of the process).
- Summary description (no more than five pages) of the procedures and evaluation criteria for prioritizing initiative activities, including the three minimum requirements listed above in this section.

Liberty develops its integrated portfolio of initiative activities through a structured project prioritization framework designed to meet WMP objectives, optimize resources, and maximize wildfire and PSPS risk reduction. This framework incorporates quantitative risk modeling, subject matter expertise, and location-specific constraints to ensure that mitigation activities are both effective and feasible. Liberty will evaluate initiative activities using a combination of DRAT outputs for risk spend efficiency and quantified risk reduction, cost-benefit analysis, construction complexity and feasibility, and maintenance and reliability implications to produce a prioritized list of initiatives.

Liberty is developing its location specific initiative selection process by considering associated risk drivers for each prioritized circuit, accessibility and permitting constraints, and seasonal work windows. Subject matter experts (“SMEs”) play a critical role in this process. SMEs review DRAT outputs, validate assumptions, and apply operational knowledge to refine initiative selection. Their input is especially valuable in areas where data is limited or where local conditions significantly influence risk. Liberty optimizes its resources by leveraging multi-benefit projects that address multiple risk drivers within a localized area. Initiative trade-offs can be assessed using DRAT outputs, SME input, and cost-effectiveness to determine the appropriate combination of mitigation for each area. Liberty is advancing its initiative activity selection processes to prioritize activities that reduce both wildfire and PSPS risk. This will be accomplished by targeting high-risk circuits identified through DRAT analysis and evaluating the impact of each activity on wildfire and PSPS risk.

6.1.3.3 Initiative Activity Scheduling

The electrical corporation must report on its schedule for implementing its portfolio of initiative activities. The electrical corporation must describe its preliminary schedules for each initiative and its iterative processes for modifying initiative activities (Section 6.1.3.1).

Initiative activities may require several years to implement. For example, relocating transmission or distribution capabilities from overhead to underground may require substantial time and resources. Since initiative activities are undertaken in high-risk regions, the electrical corporation may need interim initiative activities to mitigate risk while working to implement long-term strategies. Some examples of interim initiative activities include more frequent inspections, fire detection and monitoring activities, and PSPS usage. If the electrical corporation's initiative activities require more than one year to implement, the electrical corporation must evaluate the need for interim initiative activities, as discussed in Section 6.2.2.

In its WMP submission, the electrical corporation must provide a summary description of the procedures it uses in developing and deploying initiative activities. This discussion must include the following:

- How the electrical corporation schedules initiative activities.
- How the electrical corporation incorporates the amount of time it takes to implement the initiative activities when determining initiative effectiveness and prioritization. This must include evaluations of cumulative risk exposure while the initiative is being implemented, as well as interim initiatives.
- How the electrical corporation evaluates whether an interim initiative activity is needed and, if so, how an interim initiative activity is selected (see Section 6.2.2).
- How the electrical corporation monitors its progress toward its targets within known limitations and constraints. This should include descriptions of mechanisms for detecting when an activity is off track and for bringing it back on track.
- How the electrical corporation measures the effectiveness of initiative activities (e.g., tracking the number of PEDS deenergizations that had the potential to ignite a wildfire due to observed damage/contact prior to re-energization). The mitigation initiative sections of these Guidelines (Sections 8-12) include specific requirements for each initiative activities.

Initiative activities are scheduled using a multi-year planning horizon that aligns with Liberty's three-year WMP cycle. Projects are sequenced based on risk prioritization, feasibility and permitting timelines, workforce and contractor availability, and seasonal access constraints.

Liberty uses internal project management tools to track timelines, dependencies, and resource allocation across initiatives.

6.1.3.4 Key Stakeholders for Decision-Making

In this section, the electrical corporation must identify all key stakeholder groups that are part of the decision-making process for developing and prioritizing initiative activities. Table 6-2 provides an example of the required information and format. At a minimum, the electrical corporation must do the following:

- Identify each key stakeholder group (*e.g.*, electrical corporation executive leadership, the public, state/county public safety partners).
- Identify the decision-making role of each stakeholder group (*e.g.*, decision-maker, consulted, informed).
- Identify method of engagement (*e.g.*, meeting, workshop, written comments).
- Identify engagement methods that describe how it communicates decisions to key stakeholders.
- Identify what type of mitigation initiative activity (i.e. system hardening, vegetation management) the stakeholder is engaged with.
- Identify the level of engagement (i.e. local, tribal, federal) for mitigation initiative activities for any projects that are within stakeholder jurisdictions.

As part of Liberty’s internal Risk Working Group, engagements are made weekly for low-level actions, analysis, and decision-making. For higher level communications, quarterly sessions are held to discuss budgets, decision-making, and progress of WMP initiatives and risk indicators. Liberty engages with its Public Safety Partners (“PSPs”) to strengthen relationships and coordinate emergency action plans. To communicate with Liberty’s customers, an ad campaign through various news and social outlets runs monthly May through October.

Liberty provides its key stakeholder groups that are part of the WMP decision-making process in Table 6-2.

Table 6-2: Liberty Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities in the Decision-Making Process

Stakeholder	Stakeholder Point of Contact	Electrical Corporation Point of Contact	Stakeholder Role	Engagement Methods	Activity	Level of Engagement Activity
Liberty Executive Leadership	Chief Executive Officer; Chief Transformation Officer	Liberty President	Informed; Consulted; Decision-maker	Quarterly Meetings; Emails; Phone Calls	All WMP activities	Local; State; Federal; Tribal
County	County Supervisor	Senior Manager, Customer Solutions; Emergency Manager	Informed	Meetings, exercises, workshops	System hardening; vegetation management; emergency preparedness	Local
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency	Special Projects Manager; Associate Environmental Specialist; Forester	Manager, Vegetation Management; Environmental Specialist	Decision-maker; consulted	Planning and prioritizing all WF mitigations	System hardening; vegetation management	Local
Sheriff's Department	Sherriff; Office of Emergency Services	Manager, Emergency Management	informed; decision-maker	Meetings, exercises, workshops	Emergency preparedness	Local
Cal Fire	Battalion Chief; Assistant Chief	Fire Protection Specialist; System Forester; Manager, Emergency Management	Informed; Consulted; Decision-maker	Meetings, Emails, Phone Calls, Exercises	Vegetation management, emergency preparedness; community outreach	Local, State
California Tahoe Conservancy	Public Land Management Specialist, Associate Environmental Planner	Manager, Vegetation Management; Environmental Specialist	Decision-maker; consulted	Meetings, Emails, Phone Calls	System hardening; vegetation management	Local, State
California State Parks	Senior Environmental Scientist, California State Parks - Sierra District	Manager, Vegetation Management; Environmental Specialist	Decision-maker; consulted	Meetings, Emails, Phone Calls	System hardening; vegetation management	Local, State
City	City Manager	Senior Manager, Customer Solutions; Emergency Manager	Informed; Consulted; Decision-maker	Meetings, Emails, Phone Calls	System hardening, vegetation management, emergency preparedness, community outreach	Local
US Forest Service	Recreation Management Specialist, Lands and Special Uses	Manager, Vegetation Management; Environmental Specialist	Decision-maker; consulted	Meetings, Emails, Phone Calls, Operating Plans	System hardening; vegetation management	Local, Federal

Stakeholder	Stakeholder Point of Contact	Electrical Corporation Point of Contact	Stakeholder Role	Engagement Methods	Activity	Level of Engagement Activity
Cal Trans	District Permit Engineer	Manager, Vegetation Management; Manager, Lands	Decision-maker; consulted	Meetings, Emails	System hardening; vegetation management	Local, State
Fire Department	Fire Chief	Fire Protection Specialist; Manager, Emergency Management; System Forester	Decision-maker; informed; consulted	Meetings; Emails, Exercises	Vegetation management, emergency preparedness; community outreach	Local
Public; customers	Varies; Manager, Communications	Varies	Informed	Workshops, outreach events, bill inserts, social media	System hardening, vegetation management, emergency preparedness	Local
Washoe Tribe	Emergency Manager, California Tribal Historic Preservation Officer	Key Account Manager, Emergency Manager, Environmental Specialist	Decision-maker, Consulted, Informed	Meetings, Email, Phone Call	Emergency preparedness, community outreach, cultural consultation and monitoring	Tribal
Key Accounts; Critical Facilities	Varies	Key Account Manager; Sr. Manager Customer Solutions	Informed; Consulted	Meetings, Emails, Phone Call	System hardening, vegetation management, emergency preparedness, community outreach	Local
Bureau of Land Management	Sierra Front Office - Assistant Field Manager	Environmental Specialist	Decision-maker; consulted	Meetings, Emails, Phone Calls	System hardening, vegetation management	Federal
NV Energy	Emergency Manager; Principal Meteorologist	Manager, Emergency Management; Sr. Manager, Wildfire Prevention	Decision-maker; consulted; informed		Emergency preparedness	Local
Community Based Organizations	Varies	Key Account Manager; Sr. Manager Customer Solutions	Informed; Consulted	workshops, outreach events, meetings, emails, phone calls	Emergency preparedness, community outreach	Local

6.2 Wildfire Mitigation Strategy

Each electrical corporation must provide an overview of its proposed wildfire mitigation strategies based on the evaluation process identified in Section 6.1.³⁴

6.2.1 Anticipated Risk Reduction

In this section, the electrical corporation must present an overview of the expected risk reduction of its wildfire mitigation initiative activities. The electrical corporation must provide:


- Projected overall risk reduction
- Projected risk reduction on highest-risk circuits over the three-year WMP cycle

6.2.1.1 Projected Overall Risk Reduction

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a figure showing the projected overall utility risk in its service territory as a function of time, assuming the electrical corporation meets the planned timeline for implementing the initiatives. The figure is expected to cover at least 10 years, consistent with the electrical corporation's submitted ten-year plan. If the electrical corporation proposes risk reduction strategies for a duration longer than ten years, this figure must show that corresponding time frame.

Refer to Figure 6-2.

Figure 6-2: Projected Overall Service Territory Wildfire Risk



³⁴ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(3).

6.2.1.2 Risk Impact of Mitigation Initiatives

The electrical corporation must calculate the overall expected effectiveness for risk reduction of each of its initiative activities. The overall expected effectiveness is the expected percentage for the average amount of risk reduced by the initiative activity. This must be calculated for overall utility risk, being a summation for wildfire risk and outage program risk, as well as wildfire risk and outage program risk respectively.

The electrical corporation must provide the cost benefit score, broken out by overall utility risk, wildfire risk, and outage program risk. The score should be calculated for the activity overall based on overall average initiative effectiveness and average unit costs.

The electrical corporation must calculate the expected % HFRA covered for each of its initiative activity targets over the WMP cycle. The expected % HFRA covered is the percentage of HFRA being worked on by the given initiative from the first year of the Base plan to the last year of the Base plan. This could include the number of circuit miles or the number of assets. For example:

For covered conductor installations, the expected installations from Jan. 1, 2026, through Dec. 31, 2028 = 600 circuit miles

The total number of miles within the HFRA = 4,250 circuit miles

The expected % HFRA covered for the covered conductor installations initiative from 2026 to 2028 is:

$$\frac{\text{units of initiative}}{\text{units within HFRA}} \times 100$$

$$\frac{600}{4.250} \times 100 = 14.12\%$$

The electrical corporation must calculate the expected % risk reduction of each of its initiative activity targets over the WMP cycle. The expected % risk reduction is the expected percentage risk reduction for the last day for Base WMP implementation compared to the first day for Base WMP implementation. For example:

For protective devices and sensitivity settings, the risk on Jan. 1, 2026 = 2.59×10^{-1}

After meeting its planned initiative activity targets for protective devices and sensitivity settings, the risk on Jan. 1, 2026 = 1.29×10^{-1}

The expected % risk impact for the protective devices and sensitivity settings initiative in 2026 is:

$$\frac{\text{risk before} - \text{risk after}}{\text{risk before}} \times 100$$

$$\frac{2.59 \times 10^{-1} - 1.29 \times 10^{-1}}{2.59 \times 10^{-1}} \times 100 = 50\%$$

The expected % risk reduction numbers must be reported for each planned mitigation initiative activity, when required, in the specific mitigation initiative sections of Sections 8-12 (see example tables in these Sections). Table 6-3 provides an example of a summary of reporting on the risk reduction of initiative activities.

The electrical corporation must also provide a step-by-step calculation showing how it derived the values provided below, similar to the examples shown above.

Refer to Table 6-3. Liberty has calculated its risk reduction % and cost benefit scores using the methodology prescribed by the WMP Guidelines. The expected % risk reduction is calculated as the formula below per each initiative activity:

$$\% \text{ Expected risk Reduction} = ((\text{risk before} - \text{risk after}) / \text{risk before}) * 100$$

Cost Benefit Score is calculated as the formula below per each initiative activity:

$$\text{Cost Benefit} = (\% \text{ Expected risk Reduction}) / [(\text{Total Budget}) / \$1,000,000]$$

% HFTD Covered is calculated as the formula below per each initiative activity:

$$\% \text{HFTD Covered} = (\text{units of initiative} / \text{units in HFTD}) * 100$$

Liberty designates its entire service territory as a HFRA; therefore, 100% of its wildfire mitigation initiatives are considered to occur within HFRA zones.

Table 6-3: Risk Impact Activities

Activity	Activity ID#	Activity Effectiveness – Overall Risk	Activity Effectiveness – Wildfire Risk	Activity Effectiveness – Outage Program Risk	Cost-Benefit Score – Overall Risk	Cost-Benefit Score – Wildfire Risk	Cost-Benefit Score – Outage Program Risk	% HFTD Covered	% HFTD/HFRA Covered	Expected % Risk Reduction	Model used to Calculate Risk Impact
Grid monitoring systems	WMP-SA-02	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	100.0%	100.0%	Not Calculated	DRAT 3.1
Equipment settings to reduce wildfire risk	WMP-GDOM-GO-01	Not Calculated	50.00%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	125000.00	Not Calculated	100.0%	100.0%	4.67%	DRAT 3.1
Expulsion fuse replacement	WMP-GDOM-GH-12b	Not Calculated	39.67%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	10083.59	Not Calculated	47.6%	44.4%	8.11%	DRAT 3.1
Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements	WMP-GDOM-GH-03	Not Calculated	95.00%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	13157.89474	Not Calculated	6.4%	6.0%	14.11%	DRAT 3.1
Open wire/grey wire	WMP-GDOM-GH-12e	Not Calculated	78.72%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	732879.92	Not Calculated	100.0%	100.0%	0.89%	DRAT 3.1
Vegetation Management Inspection Program - Detailed	WMP-VM-INSP-01	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100.0%	100.0%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment	WMP-GDOM-GH-02	Not Calculated	99.00%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	0.0%	0.0%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Wood and Slash Management	WMP-VM-VFM-02	Not Calculated	50.00%	Not Calculated	48607.64	48607.64	Not Calculated	35.4%	32.9%	2.82%	DRAT 3.1
Quality Assurance and Quality Control	WMP-VM-QAQC-01	Not Calculated	30.59%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	6902.62	Not Calculated	36.0%	36.0%	Non-significant	DRAT 3.1
Covered conductor installation	WMP-GDOM-GH-01	Not Calculated	50.00%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	4139456.83	Not Calculated	1.7%	1.6%	2.00%	DRAT 3.1
Clearance	WMP-VM-VFM-05	Not Calculated	50.00%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	14.92	Not Calculated	100.0%	100.0%	1.91%	DRAT 3.1
Fall-In Mitigation	WMP-VM-VFM-06	Not Calculated	50.00%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	3505.35	Not Calculated	100.0%	100.0%	2.63%	DRAT 3.1
Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment	WMP-GDOM-AI-01	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	63.7%	60.5%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Tree attachment removals	WMP-GDOM-GH-12a	Not Calculated	78.72%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	24303.82	Not Calculated	9.9%	9.4%	2.00%	DRAT 3.1
Vegetation Inspection - LiDAR and Patrol	WMP-VM-INSP-03 and WMP-VM-INSP-02	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100.0%	100.0%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Pole Clearing	WMP-VM-VFM-01	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100.0%	100.0%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Patrol inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment	WMP-GDOM-AI-03	Not Calculated	40.50%	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	239.23	Not Calculated	100.0%	100.0%	Non-significant	DRAT 3.1
Fire-Resilient Right-of-Ways	WMP-VM-VFM-04	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100.0%	100.0%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Intrusive pole inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-02	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	37.5%	37.1%	0%	DRAT 3.1
Other discretionary asset inspections: Drone inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-04	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7.4%	6.9%	0%	DRAT 3.1

6.2.1.3 Projected Risk Reduction on Highest-Risk Circuits Over the Three-Year WMP Cycle

The objective of the service territory risk reduction summary is to provide an integrated view of wildfire risk reduction across the electrical corporation's service territory. The electrical corporation must provide the following information:

- Tabular summary of numeric risk reduction for each high-risk circuit within the top 20-percent of overall utility risk, showing risk levels before and after the implementation of initiative activities. This must include the same circuits, segments, or span IDs presented in Section 5.5.2. The table must include the following information for each circuit:
 - **Circuit, Segment, or Span ID:** Unique identifier for the circuit, segment, or span.
 - If there are multiple initiatives per ID, each must be listed separately, using an extender to provide a unique identifier
 - **Overall Utility Risk:** Numerical value for the overall utility risk before and after each mitigation initiative.
 - **Mitigation initiatives by implementation year:** Mitigation initiatives the electrical corporation plans to apply to the circuit in each year of the WMP cycle.

Refer to Table 6-4.

Table 6-4: Summary of Risk Reduction for Top Circuits

Circuit	Initial Overall Utility Risk	2026 Activities	2026 Overall Utility Risk	2027 Activities	2027 Overall Utility Risk	2028 Activities	2028 Overall Activity Risk
MEY3400	0.41634	Grid hardening, including covered conductor, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.276422827	Grid hardening, including covered conductor, VM, detailed inspections, drone inspections	0.242141255	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.264261792
MEY3300	0.22674	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections, drone inspections	0.22160897	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.228553699	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.226864837
MEY3500	0.11497	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.107040511	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections, drone inspections	0.093108001	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.099084865
STL3101	0.09903	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.063062266	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.068990902	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.051644738
GLS7400	0.09179	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.085974941	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.092069884	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.102498009
POR3200	0.08568	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.058914071	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.060096347	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.06375483
TAH7300	0.08378	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.067612893	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.05935865	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.064144813
SRB51	0.07379	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.092946245	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.096819662	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.088051573
TPZ1202	0.07070	Grid hardening, VM, Detailed Inspections	0.080044281	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.060782536	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.063262071
MEY3200	0.06778	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.045046621	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.063872601	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections, drone inspections	0.064989067
MEY3100	0.04943	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.046784302	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.042189226	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.047203324

Circuit	Initial Overall Utility Risk	2026 Activities	2026 Overall Utility Risk	2027 Activities	2027 Overall Utility Risk	2028 Activities	2028 Overall Activity Risk
CAL2501	0.04179	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.024843762	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.031354323	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.030309535
MULLER1296	0.03670	Grid hardening, including covered conductor, VM, detailed inspections	0.02608772	Grid hardening, including covered conductor, VM, patrol inspections	0.027208018	Grid hardening, including covered conductor, VM, patrol inspections	0.025093398
STL3501	0.02913	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.029884326	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.035679245	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.02165858
SQV8200	0.02824	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.02345075	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.024807767	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.017320508
POR3100	0.02815	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.030840861	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.025383148	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.020278375
T608	0.02678	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.030524744	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.022029942	Grid hardening, VM, detailed inspections	0.036364816
KBH5200	0.02172	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.013496083	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.018947845	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.016107157
TAH5201	0.01780	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.020839808	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.022669714	Grid hardening, VM, patrol inspections	0.020697852

6.2.2 Interim Mitigation Initiatives

For each initiative activity that will require more than one year to implement,⁵⁴ the electrical corporation must evaluate the need for interim initiative activities that will reduce risk until the primary or permanent initiative activity is in place. In this section of its WMP, the electrical corporation must provide a description of the following:

- The electrical corporation's procedures for evaluating the need for interim risk reduction
- The electrical corporation's procedures for determining which interim mitigation initiative(s) to implement
- The electrical corporation's characterization of each interim risk management/reduction action and evaluation of its specific capabilities to reduce risks, including:
 - Potential consequences of risk event(s) addressed by the improvement/mitigation
 - Frequency of occurrence of the risk event(s) addressed by the improvement/mitigation
- The electrical corporation's procedures for evaluating and implementing any changes in initiative effectiveness and prioritization based on time for implementation and use of interim initiative activities, including:
 - The cumulative risk exposure of its initiative activity portfolio, accounting for the time value of risk as part of initiative comparisons.

Each interim initiative activity planned by the electrical corporation for implementation on high-risk circuits must be listed as an initiative activity in Sections 8 – 12. In addition, the electrical corporation must discuss interim initiative activities in the relevant mitigation initiative sections of the WMP and include the activities in the related target tables.

Liberty's primary interim mitigation is the implementation of the Sensitive Relay Profile program throughout its system which will be complete by the end of 2025. Moving forward, Liberty will analyze interim mitigation strategies as a part of its RBDM mitigation selection process outlined in 6.1.3.

7. Public Safety Power Shutoff

In this section,³⁵ the electrical corporation must provide an overview narrative of planned initiative actions to reduce the impacts of PSPS events.³⁶ Impacts include:

- Duration
- Frequency
- Scope – number of customers

The narrative must summarize how the electrical corporation will reduce the need for, and impact of, future PSPS implementation on circuits that have been frequently deenergized, as listed in Table 4-3 in Section 4.3.

Furthermore, the narrative should describe any lessons learned for PSPS events occurring since the electrical corporation's last WMP submission and overall impacts to mitigation methodology in terms of reducing PSPS events in the future:

Liberty may temporarily turn off power in parts of its service territory during extreme weather conditions to prevent electric infrastructure from becoming a potential source of ignition. Liberty utilizes PSPS as a mitigation of last resort to keep its customers and communities safe because Liberty understands that losing power is disruptive for its customers.

Efforts to reduce the impacts of PSPS events focus on distribution pole replacements and reinforcements, traditional overhead hardening, enhanced situational awareness, protective equipment and device settings, and sectionalizing devices. These efforts include Liberty's Muller 1296 circuit, identified in Table 4-3.

To reduce the impact of PSPS events, Liberty practices enhanced situational awareness. Enhanced situational awareness is triggered when weather models are forecasting extreme weather conditions indicating a potential PSPS event. When this occurs, additional research into specific PSPS zones are conducted to narrow down the location, scope, and duration of the period of concern and area of impact. Once the area of impact and period of concern are identified, increased monitoring of weather stations in the affected area is conducted. This can include creating custom reports generated by the incoming weather station data, setting alarms to be alerted to any exceedance of trigger values, and activating thirty second interval weather station data reporting. Increased monitoring of weather stations provides the ability to compare actual observations with the forecasted conditions so that PSPS decisions are based

³⁵ Annual information included in the following section must align with the applicable data submission.

³⁶ Pub. Util. Code, § 8386(c)(8).

on real-time weather data. As the period of concern approaches, personnel will be staged to report back observed conditions in the field such as the presence of blowing debris or precipitation. Field personnel will also use anemometers to take additional wind speed measurements within the area of concern.

Liberty also utilizes protective equipment device settings, including Sensitive Relay Profile (“SRP”) based on fire weather conditions, throughout the fire season to respond to changing conditions. The onset of fire season is generally determined using fuel moisture data and energy release component (“ERC”) calculations. When ERC percentiles are between 60% and 80%, circuits will be placed into Fire Mode ON, which disables automatic reclosing. As fire danger increases, circuits will be placed into Extreme Fire Mode ON, which enables SRP settings.

The use of SRP in combination with enhanced situational awareness can reduce PSPS impacts during periods of elevated fire danger that fall below de-energization criteria. Prior to the implementation of SRP, when forecasted conditions approach but do not exceed PSPS thresholds, PSPS may still be initiated due to uncertainty and need to mitigate wildfire risk. SRP introduces an additional layer of operational flexibility by enabling circuits to remain energized under elevated risk conditions, while maintaining fire risk mitigation. When combined with enhanced situational awareness, such as real-time weather data, field observations, and predictive analytics, Liberty can better assess evolving conditions. This approach allows for more informed, real-time decision-making, potentially delaying or avoiding PSPS events when actual conditions do not warrant them. Ultimately, this strategy reflects a more adaptive, data-driven, and risk-informed approach that reduces unnecessary customer impacts while continuing to prioritize public safety.

Weather conditions monitored to determine the need to enable SRP or initiate PSPS include National Fire Danger Rating System indices, National Weather Service products, and other Fire Potential Indices including:

- Fuel moisture;
- Relative humidity;
- Wind Gust;
- High Wind Warning;
- Red Flag Warning;
- Energy Release Component;
- Fosberg Fire Weather Index;
- Severe Fire Danger Index; and

- Composite Risk Index (see Section 10.6).

Sectionalizing devices are used, when possible, to reduce the number of customers impacted during a PSPS event. Sectionalizing is considered as an alternative to de-energization where an alternate source downstream of the determined area of impact can safely feed the remaining portion of the circuit that does not reside within the PSPS zone. Devices can also be used to sectionalize portions of a circuit where ignition risk is highest while maintaining power to upstream customers. Additionally, sectionalizing devices are used to re-energize circuits in phases during the restoration process. This can reduce the duration for some customers while patrols continue, or necessary repairs are being made to other portions of the circuit.

Liberty initiated PSPS de-energization three times throughout the 2023-2025 WMP cycle, with all three de-energizations occurring in November of 2024. Following each event, Liberty conducted after-action reviews (“AARs”) with company leadership and the Incident Management Team (“IMT”). Both PSPS exercise and event AARs are documented in Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (“HSEEP”) format. Liberty documented de-energization lessons learned and improvement items from the PSPS events that occurred in its service territory in 2024 in LU Table 7-1.

LU Table 7-1: Lessons Learned from Liberty PPS Events

Observation	Corrective Action	Status of Corrective Action
Medical Baseline (MBL) customer tags on meters needed to be updated.	Perform field audit of all MBL meters on the system to confirm proper tags are in place.	To be completed as of 12/31/2025
Improved communication is needed between regulatory liaisons and other members of the IMT to record event information more efficiently, such as customer impact counts and communications with Public Safety Partners (“PSPs”).	Improvements to the incident tracking spreadsheet.	Completed
Improved logistics are needed to support the Washoe CRC location, which is relatively remote. More affordable options for lunch items at the CRC and more timely transport and distribution of	Put contracts in place with vendors for CRC lunches. Stage repair materials in Liberty’s CONEX boxes for use in the Walker and Coleville areas.	Completed

Observation	Corrective Action	Status of Corrective Action
repair supplies to the Walker and Coleville areas are needed.		
During 2024 PSPS events, Liberty's Community Outreach team took responsibility for notifying PSPs, community officials, and key accounts instead of the PSP liaison, who has multiple duties.	Officially assign PSP notification responsibility to the community outreach team.	Completed

8. Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance

Each electrical corporation's WMP must include plans for grid design, operations, and maintenance programmatic areas:³⁷

8.1 Targets

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide qualitative and quantitative targets for each year of this three-year cycle. The electrical corporation must provide at least one qualitative or quantitative target for the following initiatives:

- Grid Design and System Hardening (Section 8.2)
- Asset Inspections (Section 8.3)
- Equipment Maintenance and Repair (Section 8.4)
- Work Orders (Section 8.6)
- Grid Operations and Procedures (Section 8.7)
- Workforce Planning (Section 8.8)

Quantitative targets are required for Quality Assurance (QA) and Quality Control (QC). See Section 8.5, for detailed quantitative target requirements for QA and QC. Reporting of QA and QC quantitative targets is only required in section 8.5.

8.1.1 Qualitative Targets

The electrical corporation must provide qualitative targets for its three-year plan for implementing and improving its grid design, operations, and maintenance,³⁸ including the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs ("Previous Tracking ID"), if applicable.
- A target completion date.
- Reference(s) to the WMP section(s) or appendix, including page numbers, where the details of the target(s) are documented and substantiated.

Refer to Table 8-1.

³⁷ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (10), (14).

³⁸ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

8.1.2 Quantitative Targets

The electrical corporation must list all quantitative targets it will use to track progress on its grid design, operations, and maintenance in its three-year plan, broken out by each year of the WMP cycle. Electrical corporations will show progress toward completing quantitative targets in subsequent reports, including data submissions and WMP Updates.³⁹ For each target, the electrical corporation must provide the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs (“Previous Tracking ID”), if applicable.
- Projected targets and totals for each of the three years of the WMP cycle and relevant units for the targets.
- For inspections, quarterly targets for [Year 1] of the WMP cycle, yearly % of HFRA coverage, and totals for projected year targets.⁴⁰
- The expected % risk reduction for each of the three years of the WMP cycle.⁴¹

The electrical corporation’s quantitative targets must provide enough detail to effectively inform efforts to improve the performance of the electrical corporation’s grid design, operations, and maintenance initiatives. Each initiative activity must have distinct, trackable targets associated with the activity, even if the electrical corporation tracks targets internally with activities combined. Only inspection-related activities are required to have quarterly targets, with all other activities only requiring end of year total targets. At its discretion, the electrical corporation may provide further granularity as available.

Refer to Table 8-1.

³⁹ Annual information included in this section must align with applicable data submission.

⁴⁰ Guidelines for WMP Update will provide additional instructions on future quarterly rolling target reporting.

⁴¹ The expected % risk reduction is the expected percentage risk reduction per year, as described in Section 6.2.1.2.

Table 8-1: Liberty Grid Design, Operation and Maintenance Targets by Year, 2026-2028⁴²

WMP Initiative Category	Quantitative or Qualitative Target	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative Tracking ID	Target Unit	2026 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2026	% Planned in HFRA for 2026	% Risk Reduction for 2026	2027 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2027	% Planned in HFRA in 2027	% Risk Reduction for 2027	2028 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2028	% HFRA planned in 2028	% Risk Reduction for 2028	Three- Year Total	Section; Page Number
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Covered conductor installation	WMP-GDOM-GH-01	Circuit miles	3.9	100%	100%	2.51%	3.5	100%	100%	3.47%	3.7	100%	100%	2.0%	11.1	8.2.1; pp.122-124
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment	WMP-GDOM-GH-02	Circuit miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.2.2; pp. 124-125
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements ⁴³	WMP-GDOM-GH-03	Poles	400	100%	100%	13.29%	400	100%	100%	16.21%	400	100%	100%	12.77%	1,200	8.2.3; pp. 125-126
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Traditional overhead hardening	WMP-GDOM-GH-05	Circuit miles	1.1	100%	100%	Not calculated	1.1	100%	100%	Not calculated	1.1	100%	100%	Not calculated	3.3	8.2.5; pp. 126-128
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Emerging grid hardening technology installations and pilot progress	WMP-GDOM-GH-06	No target unit identified	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.2.6; p. 128
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Microgrids	WMP-GDOM-GH-07	Microgrids	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.2.7; pp. 129
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Installation of system automation equipment	WMP-GDOM-GH-08	Automatic Reclosers	0; initiative is complete	0	0	0	0; initiative is complete	0	0	0	0; initiative is complete	0	0	0	0	8.2.8; p. 129-130
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Line removal (in HFTD)	WMP-GDOM-GH-09	Circuit miles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.2.9; p. 130

⁴² WMP initiatives with qualitative targets have N/A values for % Planned in HFTD/HFRA columns because those targets are not directed to specific locations.

⁴³ Liberty does not have a separate WMP initiative for transmission pole and tower replacements. Liberty captures pole replacements on its transmission system within WMP-GDOM-03.

WMP Initiative Category	Quantitative or Qualitative Target	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative Tracking ID	Target Unit	2026 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2026	% Planned in HFRA for 2026	% Risk Reduction for 2026	2027 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2027	% Planned in HFRA in 2027	% Risk Reduction for 2027	2028 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2028	% HFRA planned in 2028	% Risk Reduction for 2028	Three- Year Total	Section; Page Number
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Other technologies and systems not listed above:	WMP-GDOM-GH-12 ⁴⁴	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.2.12; pp. 131-134
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Tree attachment removals	WMP-GDOM-GH-12a	Tree attachments	60	100%	100%	1.46%	60	100%	100%	3.19%	60	100%	100%	1.33%	180	8.2.12.1; pp. 131
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Expulsion fuse replacement	WMP-GDOM-GH-12b	Expulsion fuses	500	100%	100%	6.17%	500	100%	100%	6.59%	500	100%	100%	11.39%	1,500	8.2.12.2; pp. 132
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Animal guards	WMP-GDOM-GH-12c	Animal guards	0; initiative is complete	0	0	0	0; initiative is complete	0	0	0	0; initiative is complete	0	0	0	0	8.2.12.3; p. 133
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Open wire/grey wire	WMP-GDOM-GH-12e	Circuit miles	5.2	100%	100%	0.08%	5.2	100%	100%	3.11%	5.2	100%	100%	0.89%	15.6	8.2.12.5; pp. 133-134
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment ⁴⁵	WMP-GDOM-AI-01	Circuit miles	207	97%	100%	0	198.5	99%	100%	0	219.5	85%	100%	0	625	8.3.1; pp. 137-138
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Intrusive pole inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-02	Poles	2031	98%	100%	0	2389	97%	100%	0	2860	88%	100%	0	7,280	8.3.2; pp. 138-139
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Patrol inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment ⁴⁶	WMP-GDOM-AI-03	Circuit miles	553.4	93%	100%	0	568.8	93%	100%	0	542.8	96%	100%	0	1,665	8.3.3; p. 139

⁴⁴ Refer to WMP initiatives WMP-GDOM-GH-12a, WMP-GDOM-GH-12b, WMP-GDOM-GH-12c, WMP-GDOM-GH-12e for relevant information related to these initiatives. WMP initiative WMP-GDOM-12 does not have a specified target as it is a combination of the aforementioned initiatives and therefore values in this row are N/A.

⁴⁵ Liberty does not have a separate program for transmission inspections. Liberty has approximately 75 miles of 60kV lines and 19 miles of 120kV lines that are included in the distribution inspection program.

⁴⁶ Liberty does not have a separate program for transmission inspections. Liberty has approximately 75 miles of 60kV lines and 19 miles of 120kV lines that are included in the distribution inspection program.

WMP Initiative Category	Quantitative or Qualitative Target	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative Tracking ID	Target Unit	2026 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2026	% Planned in HFRA for 2026	% Risk Reduction for 2026	2027 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2027	% Planned in HFRA in 2027	% Risk Reduction for 2027	2028 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2028	% HFRA planned in 2028	% Risk Reduction for 2028	Three- Year Total	Section; Page Number
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Other discretionary inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment: Drone inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-04	Circuit miles (primary and secondary)	127	100%	100%	0	127	100%	100%	0	127	100%	100%	0	381	8.3.4; p. 140-142
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Quality assurance / quality control of inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-05	% of detailed inspections	12%	TBD – based on QA/QC sample	100%	0	12%	TBD – based on QA/QC sample	100%	0	12%	TBD – based on QA/QC sample	100%	0	12%	8.5; pp. 152-158
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Substation inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-06	Substations	44	100%	100%	0	44	100%	100%	0	44	100%	100%	0	132	8.3.5; p.142
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Qualitative	Equipment Maintenance and Repair	WMP-GDOM-MR-01	Utilization of Asset Tracking Application	All Asset Inspections and Repairs recorded in Asset Tracking	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	All Asset Inspections and Repairs recorded in Asset Tracking	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	All Asset Inspections and Repairs recorded in Asset Tracking	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	All Asset Inspections and Repairs recorded in Asset Tracking	8.4; p.143-151
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Quantitative	Equipment settings to reduce wildfire risk	WMP-GDOM-GO-01	# of circuits with SRP	Complete - SRP implemented on 100% of Liberty circuits	100%	100%	5.03%	Complete - SRP implemented on 100% of Liberty circuits	100%	100%	3.18%	Complete - SRP implemented on 100% of Liberty circuits	100%	100%	5.75%	Complete – SRP implemented on 100% of Liberty circuits	8.7.1; pp. 162-164
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance – Grid Operations and Procedures	Qualitative	Equipment settings to reduce wildfire risk	WMP-GDOM-GO-01	SRP circuit settings	Review settings of 1/3 of SRP circuits	83%	100%	Not calculated	Review settings of 1/3 of SRP circuits	83%	100%	Not calculated	Review settings of 1/3 of SRP circuits	83%	100%	Not calculated	Review of all SRP circuits	8.7.1; pp. 158-160

WMP Initiative Category	Quantitative or Qualitative Target	WMP Initiative Activity	WMP Initiative Tracking ID	Target Unit	2026 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2026	% Planned in HFRA for 2026	% Risk Reduction for 2026	2027 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2027	% Planned in HFRA in 2027	% Risk Reduction for 2027	2028 Target / Status	% Planned in HFTD for 2028	% HFRA planned in 2028	% Risk Reduction for 2028	Three- Year Total	Section; Page Number
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Qualitative	Work Orders	WMP-GDOM-AI	Complete all work orders within specified timeframe according to priority level	No new past due work orders from inspections	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	No new past due work orders from inspections	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	No past due work orders	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	No past due work orders	8.6; pp. 155-157
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Qualitative	Workforce Planning	WMP-GDOM-AI	Inspector Training Program – Standards for Development	Approval and adoption of Standards for Inspector Development	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	Implement Inspector Training Program	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	All new inspectors complete Inspector Training Program	N/A	N/A	Not calculated	All new inspectors complete Inspector Training Program	8.7.4; pp.163-166

8.2 Grid Design and System Hardening

In this section the electrical corporation must discuss how it is designing its system to reduce overall utility risk and what it is doing to strengthen its distribution, transmission, and substation infrastructure to reduce the risk of utility-related ignitions resulting in catastrophic wildfires.⁴⁷

The electrical corporation is required to discuss grid design and system hardening for each of the following individual initiative activities:

1. Covered conductor installation
2. Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment
3. Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements
4. Transmission pole/tower replacements and reinforcements
5. Traditional overhead hardening
6. Emerging grid hardening technology installations and pilots
7. Microgrids
8. Installation of system automation equipment
9. Line removal (in the HFTD)
10. Other grid topology improvements to minimize risk of ignitions
11. Other grid topology improvements to mitigate or reduce PSPS events
12. Other technologies and systems not listed above
13. Status updates on additional technologies being piloted

In Sections 8.2.1 – 8.2.13, the electrical corporation must provide a narrative including the following information for each grid design and system hardening initiative activity:

- **Tracking ID.**
- **Overview of the activity:** A brief description of the activity including reference to related objectives and targets. Additionally, the overview must identify whether the activity is a program, project, pilot, or study.
- **Impact of the activity on wildfire risk.**

o The expected percent wildfire risk reduction/effectiveness, with level of granularity included, (e.g., service territory, HFTD, circuit segment, etc.) for the activity, including an explanation of the calculation, a list of assumptions, and justifications for each

⁴⁷ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (6), (14)-(15).

assumption. A risk reduction/effectiveness of 100% means no risk remains after the electrical corporation completes the activity.

- o A trend analysis showing how implementation of the activity has reduced risk over time for each relevant risk and/or risk driver (e.g. vegetation contact for covered conductor installation).

- o A discussion of how the activity impacts the likelihood and consequence of ignitions.

- **Impact of the activity on outage program risk.**

- o The expected percent reliability risk reduction/effectiveness for the activity, including an explanation of the calculation, a list of assumptions, and justifications for each assumption. A risk reduction/effectiveness of 100% means no risk remains after the electrical corporation completes the activity.

- o A discussion of how the electrical corporation considers and evaluates the hardened status of upstream circuits/segments/spans to determine the impact of the activity on reliability risk.

- o A discussion of how the activity impacts the likelihood and consequence of outage program events, including whether an area would still be subject to PSPS events after the electrical corporation completes the activity.

- o A discussion of how the activity impacts overall reliability, including how trends are being observed. This must include evaluation of number of outages occurring, the duration for those outages, and the number of customers affected during those outages.

- **Updates to the activity:**

- o A list of the changes the electrical corporation made to the activity since its last WMP submission.

- o Justification for each of the changes, including references to lessons learned.

- o A list of planned future improvements and/or updates to the activity, including a timeline for implementation.

- o As applicable, a discussion of the status of any undergrounding work plans and progress, as required by Public Utilities Code section 8388.5(f)(2).

- **Compatible initiatives:**

o A list of initiatives the electrical corporation uses in combination with the activity to increase risk reduction effectiveness, including the section number and a link to the corresponding WMP section.

If the electrical corporation does not undertake one or more of the 13 initiative activities listed above, the electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative for each activity, explaining why it does not undertake that initiative activity.

8.2.1 Covered Conductor Installation

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-01

Overview of Activity: Since 2020, Liberty has implemented covered conductor installations as a key wildfire mitigation and system hardening strategy. Covered conductor, which features a protective insulation layer over the wire, is used to reduce the risk of ignition from vegetation contact, wire slap during wind events, and wildlife interference. Unlike traditional bare wire, covered conductor adds a layer of defense against fault conditions in high-risk environments.

This initiative is primarily deployed in High Fire Threat Districts (“HFTDs”) where terrain, vegetation density, or other physical constraints limit the feasibility of alternative hardening strategies such as wider crossarms, intersect poles, or undergrounding. In these areas, covered conductor offers a practical and effective mitigation approach that can be deployed more rapidly and with fewer environmental or permitting constraints.

Projects like Fallen Leaf Lake exemplify this strategy in action—where access limitations, dense tree cover, and legacy infrastructure create elevated wildfire and reliability risk. Covered conductor installations help address both concerns simultaneously by reducing ignition potential and improving service continuity during adverse weather.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: While this initiative is relatively expensive, it yields strong results to reduce fire risk where it is installed. The probability of an electrical fire originating from a conductor is significantly influenced by whether the conductor is bare wire or covered conductor. When a conductor is covered, it is assumed that the Probability of Ignition (POI) calculated by Technosylva is reduced to account for the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy. For bare conductors, the electrical fire probability remains equal to the POI provided by Technosylva. For covered conductor, the POI is reduced by 50% based on the assumed effectiveness of the activity.

Additional parameters impacting the conductor failure model which contributes to fire risk are adjusted to account for effectiveness of covered conductor based on failure causes. These reduction factors reflect how covered conductor protects against different failure modes.

Cause-specific reductions in the model:

- 'Corrosion': 60% reduction in corrosion-related failures
 - Significant reduction, as coverings provide a barrier against moisture and corrosive elements.
- 'Lightning': 20% reduction in lightning-related failures
 - Minor reduction, as coverings provide limited protection against lightning strikes.
- 'Mechanical': 10% reduction in mechanical failures
 - Minimal reduction, as coverings offer little protection against mechanical stresses.
- 'Animal': 70% reduction in animal-related failures
 - Large reduction, as covering prevents faults due to animal contact.
- Vegetation: 75% reduction in tree-related failures
 - Large reduction, as covering prevents faults due to vegetation contact.
- 'Unknown': 40% reduction in unknown causes
 - Moderate reduction for general causes.

These values align with industry understanding that covered conductors primarily reduce corrosion and contact-related failures but offer less protection against mechanical stresses.

Refer to Table 6-3 for the impact of Covered Conductor on wildfire risk.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: The reduction in conductor failures attributed to covered conductor would also have a beneficial impact on outage program risk. Over the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, the use of covered conductor is projected to reduce outage program risk scores by an average of 2.0% compared to scenarios without its implementation.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty continues to strategically deploy covered conductor installations where it provides the greatest wildfire risk reduction benefit and where other system hardening methods are not practical. This includes ongoing evaluation of terrain, vegetation clearance limitations, system age, and historical reliability trends to prioritize deployment locations.

To date, Liberty has completed approximately 30 miles of covered conductor installations across its service territory. The initiative remains a targeted and data-informed approach within Liberty's broader WMP and is planned to continue as part of the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, with additional miles under evaluation for future implementation.

Compatible Initiatives: Distribution Pole Replacements (WMP-GDOM-GH-03), Section 8.2.3; Traditional Overhead Hardening (WMP-GDOM-GH-05), Section 8.2.5; Detailed Asset Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-01), Section 8.3.1; Intrusive Pole Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-02), Section 8.3.2.

8.2.2 Undergrounding of Electric Lines and/or Equipment

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-02

Overview of Activity: Undergrounding electric lines is one method Liberty considers for wildfire mitigation and system hardening. Liberty evaluates undergrounding on a case-by-case basis, typically alongside covered conductor and traditional overhead rebuild options. While undergrounding can eliminate certain wildfire ignition risks, it often presents higher costs and greater construction complexity, particularly in Liberty’s mountainous, heavily forested service territory.

Project costs can vary widely. In areas requiring conversion of secondary and customer service lines, undergrounding may cost over three times more than a comparable covered conductor project. Where fewer service impacts exist, the cost may be lower, but still generally exceeds that of overhead alternatives.

In addition, winter weather and terrain present reliability and maintenance challenges—such as snow-covered vaults, water intrusion, and extended outage restoration times. Other considerations include opportunities to connect to existing underground infrastructure and the relative system importance of a given line segment.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: When a conductor is underground, it is assumed that the Probability of Ignition (POI) calculated by Technosylva is reduced to account for the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy. For undergrounding, the POI is reduced by 99% based on the assumed effectiveness of the activity. Although very effective at reducing the POI, the risk spend efficiency of the initiative is very low compared to other activities.

Refer to Table 6-3 for the impact of Undergrounding on wildfire risk.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Underground failures generally take longer to repair. This is especially true during winters in the Lake Tahoe Basin where annual snowfall can average between 15-25 feet at lake level and more at higher elevations. In addition to the cost, complexity of construction in the service territory, and low RSE values, the potential outage impact to customers is another important factor when considering this activity. In the current model, only the frequency of risk events is considered. The model should be further developed

for more accuracy and consideration of the full range consequences. Over the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, undergrounding is not projected to have an impact on outage program risk.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty continues to apply undergrounding selectively, focusing on locations where it aligns with wildfire mitigation goals and presents a reasonable balance of affordability, constructability, and long-term reliability. Undergrounding remains a useful option in certain scenarios but is typically not the most commonly implemented approach due to the factors outlined above.

Compatible Initiatives: Covered Conductor Installation (WMP-GDOM-GH-01), Section 8.2.1; Traditional Overhead Hardening (WMP-GDOM-GH-05), Section 8.2.5.

8.2.3 Distribution Pole Replacements and Reinforcements

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-03

Overview of Activity: Liberty conducts pole replacements and reinforcements to minimize the risk of faults due to pole and associated hardware failure and to maintain system reliability. Poles are identified for replacement or repair through routine patrol and detailed inspections performed in accordance with G.O. 165, drone inspections, as well as through Liberty’s Intrusive Pole Inspection Program, which identifies poles with internal decay or other structural issues.

In addition to condition-based replacements, Liberty proactively replaces poles as part of wildfire mitigation projects, including covered conductor installations and traditional overhead hardening. Poles damaged by storms, fires, or other external events are also replaced as needed to maintain safe and reliable operations.

Pole replacement is a high risk-spend efficiency activity due to its relatively low cost and its ability to reduce ignition potential from pole or hardware failures, leaning, or downed lines—particularly in high fire threat areas.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Over the 2026-2028 WMP cycle, Distribution Pole Replacements and Reinforcements are estimated to reduce system overall utility risk by 10.4%. An analysis of Liberty’s highest risk circuits (Table 5-6) identified age of assets as a primary risk driver for all listed circuits. As poles approach their estimated service life, the likelihood of failure, and consequent wildfire risk, increases. Proactively replacing poles, identified by asset inspections and through scheduled upgrades, is effective at reducing wildfire risk.

Refer to Table 6-3 for the impact of Pole Replacements on wildfire risk.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Liberty has not calculated impacts on outage program risk scores at the initiative level; however, the reduction in pole failures attributed to pole replacement would also have a beneficial impact on outage program risk.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty continues to implement an active pole replacement program, with a strong focus on poles identified through inspections and as part of broader system hardening effort. On average, approximately 350 poles are replaced each year due to condition issues identified through detailed or intrusive inspections. This work supports Liberty's wildfire mitigation goals by addressing structural risks across the system, particularly in high fire threat areas. Pole replacement remains a high-priority, high-impact activity due to its efficiency and broad applicability across various project types.

Compatible Initiatives: Covered Conductor Installation (WMP-GDOM-GH-01), Section 8.2.1; Traditional Overhead Hardening (WMP-GDOM-05), Section 8.2.5; Detailed Asset Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-01), Section 8.3.1; Intrusive Pole Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-02), Section 8.3.2.

8.2.4 Transmission Pole/Tower Replacements and Reinforcements

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-04

Liberty does not have a separate WMP initiative for transmission pole and tower replacements. Liberty treats its transmission poles the same as its distribution poles. Transmission poles are inspected, replaced, and repaired in the same manner as primary distribution poles. The poles being replaced or repaired on these lines are included in the pole replacement program discussed in Section 8.2.3.

8.2.5 Traditional Overhead Hardening

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-05

Overview of Activity: Liberty uses traditional overhead hardening to support both wildfire risk reduction and system reliability improvements. This activity involves replacing aging infrastructure with new components that meet current standards and are better suited to withstand extreme weather conditions.

Traditional overhead hardening typically includes installation of stronger poles, modern conductor, shorter spans, increased phase spacing, reduced sag, and hardware upgrades such as brackets, crossarms, insulators, fuses, and arrestors. Where applicable, CAL FIRE-exempt hardware is also used to further reduce ignition potential.

This approach is often deployed in areas with adequate vegetation clearance or less dense forest cover, where covered conductor or undergrounding may not be necessary. It offers a cost-effective, scalable means of improving system resilience and safety while aligning with asset renewal needs.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Liberty did not simulate a scenario in its risk model for traditional overhead hardening. Initiatives associated with this activity, such as pole replacements, expulsion fuse replacements, open wire/grey wire replacement, and tree attachment removal, were assessed individually. With Liberty's risk model now operational, projects can be analyzed with multiple initiatives at the circuit/circuit segment level to calculate impact of traditional overhead hardening projects on wildfire risk.

Over the 2023-2025 WMP Cycle, Liberty has focused efforts on traditional overhead hardening which has demonstrated a downward trend in the number of events that could lead to an ignition. Without having ignition data for the system, reliability data is used to calculate decrease in likelihood of an ignition event using interruptions as a proxy for ignitions. This demonstrates a 54% reduction in events that could lead to an ignition. Figure 8-1 below provides Liberty's System Average Interruption Frequency Index ("SAIFI") improvement for circuits where traditional overhead hardening projects have been completed.

Figure 8-1: SAIDI and SAIFI Improvement from System Hardening



Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: As described above, reliability improvements attributed to traditional overhead hardening projects would also have a beneficial impact on outage program risk.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty continues to target specific areas for traditional overhead hardening based on wildfire risk, reliability concerns, and infrastructure condition. To date, Liberty has completed approximately ten miles of traditional overhead hardening across its service territory.

During the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, Liberty plans to focus efforts in the Topaz area, which is subject to high winds and has experienced a history of forced outages. While the main Topaz 1261 circuit has already been rebuilt with covered conductor, several tap lines and lateral sections feeding from that backbone are scheduled for traditional overhead hardening.

Traditional overhead hardening remains a cost-effective and versatile approach, particularly in areas where forest density or terrain constraints make covered conductor or undergrounding less feasible.

Compatible Initiatives: Distribution Pole Replacements (WMP-GDOM-GH-03), Section 8.2.3; Expulsion Fuse Replacements (WMP-GDOM-GH-12b); Section 8.2.12.2; Open Wire/Grey Wire (WMP-GDOM-GH-12e), Section 8.2.12.5.

8.2.6 Emerging Grid Hardening Technology Installations and Pilot Progress

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-06

Liberty keeps in close contact with other utilities, vendors, and consultants familiar with wildfire mitigation through working groups, conferences, and periodic meetings. Through these channels, Liberty identifies emerging technologies worthy of pursuit. For instance, Liberty planned to implement its Sensitive Relay Profile (“SRP”) Program across 100% of its service territory throughout the 2023-2025 WMP cycle. Liberty considered this an emerging technology in the beginning of the 2023-2025 WMP cycle and then starting in 2024, Liberty began capturing SRP implementation in its grid operations WMP initiative: Equipment Settings to Reduce Wildfire Risk (WMP-GDOM-GO-01). Liberty reports on another emerging grid hardening technology that it considered, High-Impedance Fault Detection (“HIFD”), in its response to ACI LU-25U-08, but determined that it is not going to pursue this technology at this time due to the uncertainty of its effectiveness in reducing wildfire risk. Liberty is not currently piloting additional grid hardening technologies and at this time does not have new emerging technologies to report in its 2026-2028 WMP.

8.2.7 Microgrids

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-07

Overview of Activity: Liberty considers the use of microgrids as an alternative in all applicable projects and has experienced success with Liberty's Sagehen microgrid. By allowing for the de-energization or removal of distribution lines, a microgrid can reduce wildfire risk and eliminate the possibility of infrastructure ignition events on lines that are removed or taken out of service. While microgrids can provide for the elimination of distribution lines, they typically require some distribution from the microgrid to customers. Microgrids can be a reliable local power source that can eliminate the need to invest in replacing major sections of a distribution line. Thus, in areas that have long spans of distribution primary that feeds a concentrated and small load, microgrids can be a cost-effective alternative.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Liberty does not have any planned microgrids for the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on wildfire risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Liberty does not have any planned microgrids for the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on outage program risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Updates to the Activity: At this time, Liberty does not have any planned microgrids during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle. Liberty will continue to assess microgrids and line removals as an option in the future.

Compatible Initiatives: Line Removal (WMP-GDOM-GH-09), Section 8.2.9.

8.2.8 Installation of System Automation Equipment

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-08

Overview of Activity: Liberty installs reclosers to help with sectionalization, opportunities for distribution automation, and opportunities for grid topology improvement to reduce the size and number of customers affected by faults on the system. Reclosers also help Liberty more quickly identify and restore power to affected customers. As part of Liberty's SRP Program, which utilizes protection settings to reduce the duration of fault currents that lead to ignition risk, Liberty installs additional reclosers on selected lines to help with sectionalization and line coverage from the protection relays.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Liberty does not have any planned recloser installations for the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on wildfire risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Liberty does not have any planned recloser installations for the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on outage program risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty will continue to assess the installation of automatic reclosers to support sectionalization.

Compatible Initiatives: Equipment Settings to Reduce Wildfire Risk (WMP-GDOM-GO-01), Section 8.7.1.

8.2.9 Line Removal (in HFTD)

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-09

Overview of Activity: Line removal eliminates the risk of infrastructure caused ignitions in the area where a line is removed. The installation of microgrids is the primary initiative that allows for the removal of distribution lines.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Liberty does not have any planned line removals throughout the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on wildfire risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Liberty does not have any planned line removals throughout the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on outage program risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Updates to the Activity: At this time, Liberty does not have any planned line removals during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle. Liberty will continue to assess microgrids and line removal as an option in the future.

Compatible Initiatives: Microgrids (WMP-GDOM-GH-07), Section 8.2.7.

8.2.10 Other Grid Topology Improvements to Minimize Risk of Ignitions

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-10

Liberty does not undertake this WMP initiative at this time.

8.2.11 Other Grid Topology Improvements to Mitigate or Reduce PSPS Events

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-11

Liberty does not undertake this WMP initiative at this time.

8.2.12 Other Technologies Not Listed Above

8.2.12.1 Tree Attachment Removals

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-12a

Overview of Activity: Liberty removes electrical conductors that are attached to trees and resets the lines to new utility poles with updated hardware and clearances. These removals reduce wildfire ignition risk by eliminating the potential for conductor-tree contact, which can lead to faults, arcing, or fire during wind events or tree movement. As part of this activity, Liberty installs new poles, wire, and associated equipment that meet current construction and clearance standards, often including insulated conductor or covered conductor where appropriate.

This initiative supports both wildfire risk reduction and infrastructure modernization, especially in areas where historical tree attachments were used due to access limitations or legacy construction practices.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Tree attachment removals currently appear to have minimal impact on network risk. This may be due to the assumed random age range of 5 to 50 years, which could underestimate the actual risk associated with older attachments. The risk associated with tree attachments is likely exponential over time. Running longer simulations could provide more insight into how this risk evolves. There is limited available data for secondary conductors, which may constrain the accuracy of related risk assessments.

Refer to Table 6-3 for the impact of Tree Attachment Removals on wildfire risk.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Over the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, tree attachment removal is not projected to have an impact on outage program risk.

Updates to the Activity: Historically, Liberty's tree attachment removals were largely customer-driven, with projects initiated in response to requests from property owners or developers. As a result, volumes varied significantly across past WMP cycles. In recent years, Liberty has improved its ability to identify, track, and prioritize tree attachments across its service territory through inspection programs and GIS data enhancements. This has allowed Liberty to initiate

proactive removals, helping to offset fluctuations in customer demand and improve wildfire mitigation coverage. Going forward, this initiative will remain an important tool in addressing legacy risks on a targeted basis.

Compatible Initiatives: Detailed Asset Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-01), Section 8.2.5.

8.2.12.2 Expulsion Fuse Replacements

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-12b

Overview of Activity: As part of its wildfire mitigation strategy, Liberty is actively replacing traditional expulsion fuses with engineered fault current limiting fuses that generate significantly less energy during fault events. Unlike expulsion fuses, which can emit hot gases and particles capable of igniting nearby vegetation, engineered fuses are designed to limit energy release, reducing the risk of ignition in high fire threat areas.

Liberty has established a long-term goal of eliminating all expulsion fuses from its electric system, prioritizing replacements based on fire risk, fault history, and proximity to vegetation.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Expulsion fuse replacement yields positive results when modeling its effect on wildfire risk and demonstrates a high risk spend efficiency when compared to other initiatives.

Refer to Table 6-3 for the impact of Expulsion Fuse Replacements on wildfire risk.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Over the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, expulsion fuse replacement is projected to reduce outage program risk scores by an average of 10.6% compared to scenarios without its implementation.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty continues to incorporate expulsion fuse replacements into planned hardening projects, reactive maintenance, and targeted system reviews. Fuse replacements are often bundled with pole replacements and traditional overhead rebuilds and other wildfire mitigation efforts to maximize cost efficiency and operational impact. This initiative remains a focused priority, particularly in Tier 2 and Tier 3 High Fire Threat Districts, where reducing fault energy is critical to mitigating ignition risk.

Compatible Initiatives: Traditional Overhead Hardening (WMP-GDOM-05), Section 8.2.5; Detailed Asset Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-01), Section 8.3.1.

8.2.12.3 Animal Guards

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-12c

Overview of Activity This initiative focuses on reducing wildfire ignition risk by installing insulating animal guards—specifically, custom-fitted “Green Jackets”—on exposed substation equipment. These jackets are field-measured and custom-designed for each application, ensuring coverage of energized components where animals or foreign objects could otherwise make contact. Once installed, the guards effectively eliminate exposed energized surfaces, minimizing the chance of animal-caused faults or equipment flashovers that could result in fire or outages. This initiative targets substations located in or near High Fire Threat Districts where wildlife intrusion is a known risk.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: Liberty does not have any planned animal guard installations throughout the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on wildfire risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Liberty does not have any planned animal guard installations throughout the 2026-2028 WMP cycle and therefore does not have the impact of this activity on outage program risk during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty has made substantial progress completing this initiative, with all identified high-priority substations either already outfitted or scheduled for installation in 2025. The animal guarding program is expected to be completed by the end of 2025, with no further installations planned for the 2026–2028 WMP cycle unless new substations or risk conditions emerge.

Compatible Initiatives: Substation Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-06), Section 8.3.5.

8.2.12.4 CalFIRE Exempt Hardware

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-12d

Liberty does not undertake this WMP initiative at this time.

8.2.12.5 Open Wire / Grey Wire

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GH-12e

Overview of Activity: This initiative targets the replacement of legacy open wire and grey service wire with modern service conductor that meets current design and insulation standards. Older service wire types may have deteriorated insulation or lack preferred clearance and support, increasing the risk of arcing, faults, or contact with vegetation or structures. By

replacing this service wire, Liberty reduces the risk of ignition and service interruptions, particularly in wildland-urban interface areas where homes and vegetation are in close proximity to overhead infrastructure.

Impact of the Activity on Wildfire Risk: There is currently limited data available for evaluating this initiative. Due to the absence of detailed information on the type of secondary conductor throughout the system, a placeholder was used based on subject matter expert input. It is assumed that 25% of the network consists of grey wire.

Refer to Table 6-3 for the impact of Open Wire/Grey Wire on wildfire risk.

Impact of the Activity on Outage Program Risk: Over the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, open wire/grey wire replacement is not projected to have an impact on outage program risk.

Updates to the Activity: Liberty continues to replace open and grey service wire as part of planned construction, hardening projects, and reactive maintenance. This work is typically bundled with broader overhead upgrades or performed when asset inspections identify conductor types requiring replacement. The initiative is ongoing, with replacements prioritized in high fire threat areas and locations with visible wire degradation or clearance issues.

Compatible Initiatives: Traditional Overhead Hardening (WMP-GDOM-05), Section 8.2.5; Detailed Asset Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-01), Section 8.3.1.

8.2.13 Status Updates on Additional Technologies Being Piloted

Liberty is not pursuing additional emerging technology pilots as part of this WMP cycle. At this time, Liberty is prioritizing its efforts and resources on high-impact wildfire mitigation initiatives that have demonstrated effectiveness and strong risk-spend efficiency, such as covered conductor installation, pole replacement, and overhead system hardening. Focusing on these proven strategies can allow Liberty to maximize near-term wildfire risk reduction and maintain operational efficiency while continuing to assess the feasibility of emerging technologies for future WMP cycles. That said, Liberty will continue to monitor for emerging technologies through vendor and utility events and publications.

8.3 Asset Inspections

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its procedures for inspecting its assets.⁴⁸

The electrical corporation must first summarize details regarding its asset inspections in Table 8-2. The table must include the following:

- **Type of inspection:** i.e., distribution, transmission, or substation.
- **Inspection program name:** Identify various inspection programs within the electrical corporation.
- **Frequency or trigger:** Identify the frequency or triggers, such as inputs from the risk model. Indicate differences in frequency or trigger by HTFD Tier, if applicable.
- **Method of inspection:** Identify the methods used to perform the inspection (e.g., patrol, detailed, aerial, climbing, and LiDAR).
- **Governing standards and operating procedures:** Identify the initiative construction standards and the electrical corporation's procedures for addressing them, and other internal protocols for work described.
- **% of HFRA and HFTD Covered Annually by Inspection Type:** Determine the percentage of either circuit mileage or number of assets covered annually by the inspection type within the HFRA and HFTD.
- **Find Rate:** Identify the find rate of level 1, 2, and 3 conditions over the three calendar years prior to the base WMP submission. The find rate must be expressed as the percentage of inspections resulting in findings and identify the inspection unit.
- **Clarifying information:** Provide electrical corporation-specific risk informed triggers used for asset inspections and electrical corporation-specific definitions of the different methods of inspection.

Liberty summarizes details regarding its asset inspections in Table 8-2.

⁴⁸ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(10).

Table 8-2: Liberty Asset Inspection Frequency, Method and Criteria

Type ⁴⁹	Inspection Activity (Program)	Frequency or Trigger (Note 1)	Method of Inspection (Note 2)	Governing Standards & Operating Procedures	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2026, Q1	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2026, Q2	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2026, Q3	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2026, Q4	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2027, Q1	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2027, Q2	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2027, Q3	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2027, Q4	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2028, Q1	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2028, Q2	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2028, Q3	Cumulative Quarterly Target 2028, Q4	% of HFRA and HFTD Covered Annually by Inspection Type	Condition Find Rate Level 1	Condition Find Rate Level 2	Condition Find Rate Level 3
Distribution	Detailed Inspections	5-year cycle for OH; 3-year cycle for UG	Ground	G.O. 165	20 circuit miles	50 circuit miles	150 circuit miles	207 circuit miles	20 circuit miles	50 circuit miles	150 circuit miles	198.5 circuit miles	20 circuit miles	50 circuit miles	150 circuit miles	219.5 circuit miles	20%	0.03% (Assets)	7.75% (Assets)	30.1% (Assets)
Distribution	Intrusive Pole Inspections	10-year cycle	Ground	G.O. 165	0 poles	0 poles	2,031 poles	2,031 poles	0 poles	0 poles	2,389 poles	2,389 poles	0 poles	0 poles	2,860 poles	2,860 poles	10%	Level findings not applicable for this type of inspection	Level findings not applicable for this type of inspection	Level findings not applicable for this type of inspection
Distribution	Patrol Inspections	Annually	Ground and Aerial	G.O. 165	200 circuit miles	553.4 circuit miles	553.4 circuit miles	553.4 circuit miles	200 circuit miles	568.8 circuit miles	568.8 circuit miles	568.8 circuit miles	200 circuit miles	542.8 circuit miles	542.8 circuit miles	542.8 circuit miles	80%	0.02% (Assets)	0.12% (Assets)	0.04% (Assets)
Distribution	Other Discretionary Inspections: Drone inspections	Annually for HFTD 3	Drone	G.O. 165	0 circuit miles	0 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	0 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	0 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	127 circuit miles	7%	TBD	TBD	TBD
Substation	Substation Inspections	Quarterly	Ground	G.O. 174	10 substations	22 substations	34 substations	44 substations	10 substations	22 substations	34 substations	44 substations	10 substations	22 substations	34 substations	44 substations	100%	Level findings not applicable for this type of inspection	Level findings not applicable for this type of inspection	Level findings not applicable for this type of inspection

Note 1: The electrical corporation must provide electrical corporation-specific risk-informed triggers used for asset inspections.

Note 2: The electrical corporation must provide electrical corporation-specific definitions of the different methods of inspection.

⁴⁹ Liberty does not have a separate program for transmission inspections. Liberty has approximately 75 miles of 60kV lines and 19 miles of 120kV lines that are included in the distribution inspection program.

8.3.1 Detailed Inspections of Distribution Electric Lines and Equipment

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-AI-01

8.3.1.1 Process

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of the individual asset inspection program, including inspection criteria and the various inspection methods used for each inspection program.

Include relevant visuals and graphics depicting the workflow and decision-making process the electrical corporation uses for the inspection program.

Detailed inspections of distribution and transmission lines and equipment are performed in accordance with General Order (“G.O.”) 165 guidelines to mitigate the risk of equipment failure by identifying aging and deteriorating equipment in the field. When a qualified electrical worker (“QEW”) identifies an issue in the field that needs remediation or repair, work orders are generated to address the issue. As equipment failure can lead to electrical system faults and has the potential to cause ignition events, Liberty’s detailed inspection programs play a vital role in reducing risk. Liberty inspects approximately 20% of its system annually, which results in the entire system being inspected every five years before starting the cycle again. As this program has a set schedule to maintain compliance, there is currently no risk analysis performed for regional prioritization.

8.3.1.2 Frequency or Trigger

In this section, the electrical corporation must identify the frequency (including how frequency may differ by HFTD Tier or other risk designation[s]) or triggers used in the inspection program, such as inputs from the risk model.

If the inspection program is schedule-based, the electrical corporation must explain how it uses risk prioritization in the scheduling of the inspection program to target high-risk areas. If the electrical corporation does not use risk prioritization in the scheduling of the inspection program, it must explain why.

Asset inspection frequency follows the requirements set forth in G.O. 165 and G.O. 174, including the following for detailed inspections:

1. Detailed inspections of overhead poles, devices, and conductors are conducted on a five-year schedule.

2. Detailed inspections of underground structures and devices are conducted on a three-year schedule.
3. Detailed inspections of padmount devices are conducted on a five-year schedule.

8.3.1.3 Accomplishments, Roadblocks and Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must discuss:

- How the electrical corporation measures success for the inspection program (excluding routine inspections).
- Roadblocks the electrical corporation has encountered while implementing the inspection program and how the electrical corporation has addressed the roadblocks.
- Changes/updates to the inspection program since the last WMP submission, including known future plans (beyond the current year) and new/novel strategies the electrical corporation may implement in the next 5 years, including references to and strategies from pilot projects and research.

Liberty measures the success of its asset inspection programs by performing inspections in accordance with G.O. 165 and G.O. 174 guidelines to mitigate the risk of equipment failure by identifying aging and deteriorating equipment in the field. Liberty does not have roadblocks or other updates to this WMP initiative at this time.

8.3.2 Intrusive Pole Inspections

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-AI-02

8.3.2.1 Process

Intrusive pole inspections are a G.O. 165 mandated program for the testing and treatment of wood poles that begin to deteriorate and degrade over time. Poles that are thoroughly inspected and/or proactively treated to extend the service life of the asset significantly reduce safety risk to the system and public. In addition to extending the life of existing poles, the program also helps to identify those assets that need to be replaced before they fail. The intrusive pole inspection program tests the integrity of wood poles both visually and through internal examination of the poles to identify damage, decay, and approximate shell thickness. A report identifies poles that pass inspection as well as those that need to be replaced or need remediation, such as c-truss or treatment application. This program can reduce replacement costs, extend the life of poles, and increase the safety and reliability of the overall system.

8.3.2.2 Frequency or Trigger

Asset inspection frequency follows the requirements set forth in G.O. 165 and G.O. 174, including that wood poles over 15 years old must have intrusive pole inspections done a maximum of every ten years. Intrusive pole inspections are currently performed throughout Liberty's service territory annually on a 10-year cycle.

8.3.2.3 Accomplishments, Roadblocks and Updates

Liberty measures the success of its asset inspection programs by performing inspections in accordance with G.O. 165 and G.O. 174 guidelines to mitigate the risk of equipment failure by identifying aging and deteriorating equipment in the field. Liberty does not have roadblocks or other updates to this WMP initiative at this time.

8.3.3 Patrol Inspections of Distribution Electric Lines and Equipment

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-AI-03

8.3.3.1 Process

Patrol inspections are performed throughout Liberty's service territory in accordance with the schedules outlined in G.O. 165. Patrol inspections are conducted annually except for circuits undergoing a detailed inspection in the same year. During patrol inspections, a QEW patrols the electric system looking for issues with overhead structures or obvious hazards that impact the safety and reliability of the system.

8.3.3.2 Frequency or Trigger

Asset inspection frequency follows the requirements set forth in G.O. 165 and G.O. 174, including that patrol inspections are conducted annually except for circuits undergoing a detailed inspection in the same year.

8.3.3.3 Accomplishments, Roadblocks and Updates

Liberty measures the success of its asset inspection programs by performing inspections in accordance with G.O. 165 and G.O. 174 guidelines to mitigate the risk of equipment failure by identifying aging and deteriorating equipment in the field. Liberty does not have roadblocks or other updates to this WMP initiative at this time.

8.3.4 Other Discretionary Inspections of Distribution Electric Lines and Equipment: Drone inspections

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-AI-04

8.3.4.1 Process

Beginning in 2026, Liberty plans to add annual drone inspection for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone. HFTD-3 is designated by the California Public Utility Commission as having extreme wildfire risk. This incremental detailed drone inspection program is intended to proactively identify Level 1, 2, and 3 conditions, as defined by General Order 95. There are approximately 127 miles of transmission and distribution circuits, including approximately 1,682 poles, in Liberty's HFTD-3 zone.

8.3.4.2 Frequency or Trigger

This incremental drone inspection program will be performed annually for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone. In 2026, Liberty plans to complete the inspections by the end of quarter three. For 2027 and 2028, Liberty plans to complete these inspections by the end of quarter two further ahead of peak fire season.

8.3.4.3 Accomplishments, Roadblocks and Updates

Throughout the 2023-2025 WMP cycle, Liberty piloted other discretionary asset inspections including infrared inspections, LiDAR inspections, and drone inspections. Below are updates on each technology and pilot:

- **Infrared inspections:** Utilizing an experienced third-party vendor, Liberty completed 0.1 miles of drone infrared inspections on its transmission assets. The inspections were performed on and around transmission riser poles. Liberty selected these assets to identify hot spots on the potheads, arrestors, connections and other associated hardware at the riser locations. Liberty selected to pilot infrared with these assets because Liberty subject matter experts had experience with ground based infrared inspection with these types of assets making for better comparison between ground and air-based results. The infrared pilot identified zero thermal or visual anomalies during the inspection. Overall, the drone was able to inspect the assets, including detection for hot spots. The criteria for the pilot were qualitative and focused on understanding how a drone can perform the inspection and if the drone can produce results equal to or better than ground-based inspection.

- Drone inspections: Liberty piloted the use of drones for demand response inspection including 1.4 miles of inspection on the various distribution and sub-transmission circuits, including the Tahoe City 7300, Truckee 7202, and the T609 line. The drone was piloted by Liberty's inspector. Liberty identified benefits for drone inspections for outage management due to hazardous winter conditions including affected infrastructure in avalanche zones. In winter conditions, avalanche hazards often prevent qualified staff from accessing these remote locations to inspect facilities prior to re-energization. The ability to use a drone in these situations expedites either the restoration efforts or identifying hazardous conditions that are causing the issue which allows Liberty to properly plan repair work. Liberty also piloted the use of drones to perform 2.2 miles of detailed inspection on the Washoe 201 circuit. The inspection was performed by Liberty's inspector and primarily focused on the qualitative capability and efficiency of the drone. The inspector was able to effectively perform the inspection utilizing the drone. Liberty sought to determine if drones could reasonably perform detailed inspection and demand response, including for hard to access areas, providing for better visual angles and more efficient inspection. The criteria was qualitative, and sought to determine if the drone could produce results equal to or better than ground-based inspection according to Liberty's subject matter experts.
- LiDAR inspections: Utilizing a fixed-wing aircraft, Liberty performed a LiDAR inspection of its entire system in 2024, with a focus on gaining increased visibility and data for mapping tree attachments and secondary wires. The data acquired from the LiDAR inspection was used to update the inventory of tree attachments in Liberty's GIS. The data captured was also uploaded into the Direxion Risk Assessment Tool, described in Section 5, to assess risk impacts from tree attachment removal and open wire/grey wire secondary removal initiatives. While quality data was acquired, the fixed-wing aircraft was unable to capture all tree attachments and secondary conductors primarily due to heavy tree canopy in portions of the territory. Liberty has been cautious to expand its drone infrared inspection program as Liberty wanted to ensure healthy maturation and prudence of drone inspection service capabilities and efficiencies. That said, after performing these pilots and speaking with drone inspection service vendors as well as other utilities performing drone inspections, Liberty plans to add annual drone inspection for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone beginning in 2026. Liberty plans to evaluate infrared detection as part of the full-service agreement with the selected vendor. As discussed in Section 5, Risk Methodology and Assessment, Liberty will continue to mature its risk assessment program. Throughout this plan period, Liberty will continue to evaluate if this incremental drone inspection

should focus only on the HFTD-3 zone, or other assets based on the results of risk assessments. Liberty has spoken with drone inspection service vendors as well as other utilities performing drone inspections. In October of 2025, a request for information for drone inspection services was sent to nearly two-dozen drone inspection vendors. Liberty requested the drone service to include thermal detection capabilities. Liberty plans to identify and partner with a full-service drone inspection entity beginning in 2026.

Liberty does not have roadblocks or other updates to this WMP initiative at this time.

8.3.5 Substation Inspections

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-AI-06

8.3.5.1 Process

Liberty conducts its substation inspections in accordance with its current G.O. 174 Substation Inspection Plan. Per Liberty's substation inspection program provides inspections should be completed on a quarterly basis for 10 of Liberty's 12 substations. Hobart Mills and Stampede Substations will be inspected annually in quarter two or three as weather permits. Substation inspections can identify issues before they become serious problems. This includes inspection of batteries, DC circuitry, relays, and breakers to ensure proper fault identification and clearing. It also includes inspection of assets such as transformers and regulators to proactively address concerns to reduce the likelihood of failure.

8.3.5.2 Frequency or Trigger

Liberty conducts its substation inspections in accordance with its current G.O. 174 Substation Inspection Plan. Most Liberty substations that are accessible year-round are inspected on a quarterly basis. Substations that are not accessible for normal daily operations are inspected on an annual basis.

8.3.5.3 Accomplishments, Roadblocks and Updates

Liberty measures the success of its asset inspection programs by performing inspections in accordance with G.O. 165 and G.O. 174 guidelines to mitigate the risk of equipment failure by identifying aging and deteriorating equipment in the field. Liberty does not have roadblocks or other updates to this WMP initiative at this time.

8.4 Equipment Maintenance and Repair

In this section, in addition to the information described above regarding distribution, transmission, and substation inspections, the electrical corporation must provide a brief narrative of maintenance programs.⁵⁰ As a narrative, the electrical corporation must include its strategy for maintenance, such as whether the electrical corporation replaces or upgrades facilities/equipment proactively (for example, an electrical corporation may monitor dissolved gases in its transformers to detect potential transformer failures to alert engineering and maintenance personnel or component lifecycle management) or if it runs its facilities/equipment to failure. The narrative must include, at minimum, the following types of equipment:

1. Capacitors
2. Circuit breakers
3. Connectors, including hotline clamps
4. Conductor, including covered conductor
5. Fuses, including expulsion fuses
6. Distribution pole
7. Lightning arrestors
8. Reclosers
9. Splices
10. Transmission poles/towers
11. Transformers
12. Non-exempt⁵¹ equipment
13. Pre-GO 95 legacy equipment
14. Other equipment not listed

For equipment types 12 – 14 above, the electrical corporation must include sub-categories for each relevant equipment type. For each equipment type, the electrical corporation must include sections for the following information:

- **Condition monitoring:** a description of how the electrical corporation monitors the condition of the equipment (e.g., human visual inspection, automated visual inspection, human sensor readings, automated sensor readings).

⁵⁰ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (10).

⁵¹ “Non-exempt” in this instance pertaining to equipment that must comply with clearances specified within Public Resource Code (PRC) § 4292 and PRC § 4293.

- **Maintenance strategy:** identification and brief description of the maintenance strategy (e.g. reactive, preventative, predictive, reliability-centered).
- **Replacement/repair condition:** a description of how equipment is identified for repair or replacement (e.g., time interval, inspection finding, sensor reading, predictive maintenance, data analytics, machine learning).
- **Timeframe for remediation:** a list of possible conditions and findings, including the priority level and associated timeframes for remediation of each.
- **Failure rate:** the number of total failures attributed to the given equipment type in the HFTD and HFRA⁵² during the three calendar years prior to the base WMP submission, broken out by distribution, transmission, and substation. The failure rate must include the likelihood of failure based on the ratio of number of failures to the number of total assets in-field within the HFTD/HFRA for the equipment type.
- **Ignition rate:** the total number of CPUC-reportable ignitions attributed to the equipment type in the HFTD and HFRA during the 10 calendar years prior to the base WMP submission, broken out by distribution, transmission, and substation. The ignition rate must include evaluation of the likelihood that an equipment failure will propagate into an ignition based on the ratio of the number of failures to the number of ignitions attributed to the equipment type.
- **Failure and ignition causes:** A narrative describing root cause analyses performed for failures and associated CPUC ignitions within the HFTD and HFRA, including any lessons learned and solutions implemented to decrease ignition rates.

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-MR-01

Overview of the Activity: The following describes Liberty's maintenance programs for the specified types of equipment:

8.4.1 Equipment Condition Monitoring, Maintenance Strategies, Replacement/Repair Condition, and Timeframe for Remediation

- Capacitors:
 - Condition monitoring: Human Visual Inspection during patrol and detailed inspections. Thermal hot spot or visual from drone inspections.

⁵² Equipment that falls in both the HFTD and HFRA should not be counted twice. The number of failures should include all equipment that is in the HFTD Tier 2 and 3 and all equipment that is in the utility defined HFRA beyond the HFTD.

- Maintenance strategy: Reliability-centered. Maintenance is performed on distribution capacitor banks on an as-needed basis when concerns are identified. Maintenance follows applicable manufacturer's guidelines. If components are failed, they are replaced.
- Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. Failed capacitors are replaced per engineered documentation and a pole loading calculation is completed for all pole replacements, in compliance with G.O. 95. standards and capacitors are commissioned per manufacturer's recommendation by a QEW.
- Timeframe for remediation: No priority level is assigned to this. Critical infrastructure is prioritized and executed as engineered documentation and equipment availability allow. Non-critical infrastructure is evaluated by engineering to determine the system need and scheduled as part of the annual capital planning or removed from the system and time and resources allow.
- Circuit breakers:
 - Condition monitoring: Substation circuit breakers are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 174 process.
 - Maintenance strategy: Preventative maintenance is performed as necessary in accordance with the particular breaker's operation manual. Oil circuit breakers ("OCB") have been targeted for replacement throughout Liberty's system.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. Circuit breakers are primarily identified for replacement or repair based on visual and functional inspection results. Additional factors such as asset age, operation count, or manufacturer recommendations may also be considered. Oil circuit breakers may be prioritized for earlier replacement due to elevated operational and environmental risks.
 - Timeframe for remediation: Identified replacements or repairs are prioritized based on risk and system considerations.
- Connectors:
 - Condition monitoring: Connectors are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker.
 - Maintenance strategy: Visually inspect during G.O. 165 annual Patrols and Detailed Inspections for preventative and predictive replacement. Visual from drone inspection. Reactive replacements made due to quality issues when found.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. Connectors found to be defective or inappropriate for the specific installation are scheduled for

replacement immediately. Excessive connectors in a span of wire are also identified, scheduled, and replaced as resources allow.

- Timeframe for remediation: Liberty follows G.O. 95 Rule 18 requirements, which establishes the following timelines for remediation:
 - Level 1: Take action immediately, either by fully repairing the condition, or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying the condition to a lower priority.
 - Level 2: Take action to correct within specified time period (fully repair, or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying the condition to a lower priority). Time period for correction to be determined at the time of identification by a qualified company representative, but not to exceed: (1) six months for nonconformances that create a fire risk located in Tier 3 of the High Fire-Threat District; (2) 12 months for nonconformances that create a fire risk located in Tier 2 of the High Fire-Threat District; (3) 12 months for nonconformances that compromise worker safety; and (4) 59 months for all other Level 2 nonconformances.
 - Level 3: Take action (re-inspect, re-evaluate, or repair) as appropriate.
- Conductor, including covered conductor: Liberty acknowledges that covered conductor has some unique failure characteristics which other conductor types do not. These additional inspection items have been added and are logged in Liberty's asset tracker system, Asset Tracker, to ensure potential failure points are identified and addressed in a timely manner.
 - Condition monitoring: Visual Inspection. Conductor is inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker.
 - Maintenance strategy: Reactive, preventative.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Damaged conductor(s) are identified and ranked on severity before being scheduled for repair/replacement.
 - Timeframe for remediation: Liberty follows G.O. 95 Rule 18 requirements, which establishes the timelines for remediation identified in the Connector's equipment bullet above.
- Fuses, including expulsion fuses: Refer to Section 8.2.12.2.
 - Condition monitoring: Visual inspection. Fuses, including expulsion fuses, are inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker.

- Maintenance strategy: Reactive, reliability-centered.
- Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. Blown T-link fuses are replaced with ELF fuses for transformer protection. Damaged porcelain fuse cutouts are also identified, logged and a follow-up work order is generated for scheduled replacement.
- Timeframe for remediation: Failures are replaced immediately. Planned system upgrade for T-link replacements with ELF fuses are scheduled annually.
- Distribution poles:
 - Condition monitoring: Distribution poles are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker. Per G.O. 165 guidelines, Liberty performs three types of inspection:
 - *Intrusive pole inspections:* Liberty has adopted a 10-year intrusive pole inspection cycle exceeding that of G.O. 165 requirements. This inspection is defined as one involving movement of soil, taking samples for analysis, and/or using more sophisticated diagnostic tools beyond visual inspections or instrument reading. Poles found to fail this inspection are referred to engineering for replacement.
 - *Detailed inspections:* Liberty maintains a five-year cycle for OH and pad mounted equipment inspections and three-year cycle for UG inspections in accordance with G.O. 165. Detailed inspections are defined as one where individual pieces of equipment and structures are carefully examined, visually and through use of routine diagnostic test, as appropriate, and (if practical and if useful information can be so gathered) opened, and the condition of each rated and recorded.
 - *Patrols:* Liberty maintains a five-year cycle for system patrols which include all assets not being detail inspected in a given year. Patrol inspections are defined as a simple visual inspection, of applicable utility equipment and structures, that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out in the course of other company business. Any equipment identified as needing repairs or replacement based on a QEW's assessment is identified and a follow-up work order is generated with timeline for replacement or repair based on G.O. 165 guidelines. A pole loading calculation is completed for all pole replacements, in compliance with G.O. 95.

- Maintenance strategy: Preventative, reliability-centered.
- Replacement/repair condition: Inspection finding. Using methods described above in condition monitoring, poles are identified for replacement, prioritized and scheduled annually as part of the Liberty Capital plan.
- Timeframe for remediation: Liberty follows G.O. 95 Rule 18 requirements, which establishes the timelines for remediation identified in the Connectors equipment bullet above.
- Lighting arrestors:
 - Condition monitoring: Lightning arrestors are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker. Visual from drone inspections.
 - Maintenance strategy: Reactive, reliability-centered. Lightning arrestors are replaced if found in a failed state during inspection or routine work. Liberty currently does not include CalFire compliant lightning arrestors as part of their construction standards. Pole clearing is performed in compliance with Public Resources Code section 4292 as described in section 9.4 of this document.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings.
 - Timeframe for remediation: Arrestors are placed immediately following identification of failure.
- Reclosers:
 - Condition monitoring: Reclosers are visually inspected regularly during G.O. 165 inspections and during normal operations. Thermal hot spot detection or visual from drone inspection.
 - Maintenance strategy: Reactive. Liberty addresses recloser issues as they arise. In addition, Sensitive Relay Profile ("SRP") settings for reclosers are re-evaluated on a three-year cycle.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Issues are reported to Liberty's substation department and are scheduled for maintenance and repair. Liberty recently completed replacement of all oil filled reclosers with vacuum type reclosers.
 - Timeframe for remediation: Recloser issues are addressed as soon as possible once identified. Liberty does not maintain a formal timeline for remediation. Prioritization is based on criticality of the affected circuit and operational impact.

- Splices:
 - Condition monitoring: Splices are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process. Visual from drone inspection.
 - Maintenance strategy: Reactive, reliability-centered.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. Defective splices are identified during inspections, partial power calls or outages.
 - Timeframe for remediation: Defective splices are repaired or replaced immediately upon identification of the issue.
- Transmission poles/towers: Similar to distribution poles, transmission poles are inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker. Per G.O. 165 guidelines, Liberty performs the same three types of inspection for transmission poles as it performs for distribution poles.
 - Condition monitoring: Transmission poles are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker. Per G.O. 165 guidelines, Liberty performs three types of inspection:
 - *Intrusive pole inspections:* Liberty has adopted a 10-year intrusive pole inspection cycle exceeding that of G.O. 165 requirements. This inspection is defined as one involving movement of soil, taking samples for analysis, and/or using more sophisticated diagnostic tools beyond visual inspections or instrument reading. Poles found to fail this inspection are sent to engineering for replacement.
 - *Detailed inspections:* Liberty maintains a five-year cycle for OH and padmounted equipment inspections and three-year cycle for UG inspections in accordance with G.O. 165. Detailed inspections are defined as one where individual pieces of equipment and structures are carefully examined, visually and through use of routine diagnostic test, as appropriate, and (if practical and if useful information can be so gathered) opened, and the condition of each rated and recorded.
 - *Patrols:* Liberty maintains a five-year cycle for system patrols which include all assets not being detail inspected in a given year. Patrol inspections are defined as a simple visual inspection, of applicable utility equipment and structures, that is designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out in the course of other company business. Any equipment identified as needing

repairs or replacement based on a QEW's assessment is identified and a follow-up work order is generated with timeline for replacement or repair based on G.O. 165 guidelines. A pole loading calculation is completed for all pole replacements, in compliance with G.O. 95.

- Maintenance strategy: Preventative, reliability-centered.
- Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. Using methods described above in condition monitoring, poles are identified for replacement, prioritized and scheduled annually as part of the Liberty Capital plan.
- Timeframe for remediation: Liberty follows G.O. 95 Rule 18 requirements, which establishes the timelines for remediation identified in the Connectors equipment bullet above.
- Transformers:
 - Condition monitoring: Transformers are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 for OH or G.O. 174 for Substations. Thermal hot spot detection or visual from drone inspections. Results are logged in Asset Tracker.
 - Maintenance strategy: Preventative. Substation transformers are sampled for Dissolved Gas Analysis ("DGA") by exception (e.g., if the substation team feels a transformer should be tested due to a differential lockout). These substation transformers are inspected as part of Liberty's G.O. 174 process. Any maintenance or repair is completed in accordance with the transformer manufacturer's recommendations.
 - Replacement/repair condition: Inspection findings. If transformers are identified as needing maintenance, repair or replacement, a work order is generated, and the work is scheduled to be replaced based on resource and equipment availability.
 - Timeframe for remediation: Liberty follows G.O. 95 Rule 18 requirements, which establishes the timelines for remediation identified in the Connectors equipment bullet above.
- Non-exempt equipment, pre-GO 95 legacy equipment, and other equipment not listed:
To the extent Liberty has this equipment, maintenance protocols are the same as listed above for the specified type of equipment.
 - Condition monitoring: Non-exempt equipment, pre-GO 95 legacy equipment, and other equipment not listed are visually inspected regularly as part of Liberty's G.O. 165 process and logged in Asset Tracker.

- Maintenance strategy: Reactive, reliability-centered.
- Replacement/repair condition: Replaced/repared as needed.
- Timeframe for remediation: Liberty follows G.O. 95 Rule 18 requirements, which establishes the timelines for remediation identified in the Connectors equipment bullet above.

8.4.2 Equipment Failure Rate, Ignition Rate, and Failure/Ignition Cause Analyses

Failure rate: Liberty's outage management system records equipment failures but does not currently record failures by equipment type. Additionally, Liberty does not have an exact count of all listed assets, such as connectors or splices, in the field. Using the available data, including all equipment failures and all inventoried assets, the likelihood of failure is 0.84% for all equipment types.

Ignition rate: Liberty performs investigations of all ignitions. In the past ten years, there have been five ignitions attributed to equipment failures. All of these ignitions have been on the distribution system.

The likelihood that an equipment failure will propagate into an ignition, based on the ratio of the number of failures to the number of ignitions, is 1.03% for all equipment types. Ignition rate is calculated using outage and ignition data for the three years preceding the base WMP submission.

The likelihood of an equipment failure and an ignition occurring is equal to 0.01%.

$$\text{Failure and Ignition} = 0.008397078 * 0.010273973 = 0.00008627$$

Failure and ignition cause analyses: Liberty captures and reviews all known equipment failures and CPUC-reportable ignition causes. In recent years, the number of such instances has been minimal and not statistically significant enough to warrant additional resources or programmatic changes. At this time, there are no identifiable trends requiring remediation, and the existing maintenance and monitoring processes remain appropriate and effective for Liberty's current risk profile.

8.5 Quality Assurance and Quality Control

8.5.1 Overview, Objectives, and Targets

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of each of its quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) programs for grid design, asset inspections and maintenance.⁵³ This overview must include the following for each program:

- Initiative/activity being audited (each initiative/activity name must correspond to an initiative/activity described in Sections 8.2 through 8.4)
- Tracking ID from Table 8-1 or 8-2.
- Quality program type (QA or QC).
- Objective of each QA and QC program.

At a minimum, Table 8-3 must include the following types of activities: new construction, corrective repair work, asset inspections (as described in Section 8.3), and any additional asset maintenance. The electrical corporation must also provide the following tabular information for each QA and QC program:

- Initiative/activity being audited (each initiative/activity name must correspond to an initiative/activity described in Sections 8.2 through 8.4)
- Type of audit (e.g. desktop or field)
- Population⁵⁴/sample unit
- Population size for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle
- Sample size for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP Cycle
- Percent of sample in the HFTD for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle
- Confidence level and Margin of Error (MOE)
- Target pass rate for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle

⁵³ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(10), (22).

⁵⁴ In this section, a population may be the number of circuit miles inspected, the number of assets inspected, etc.

At a minimum, Table 8-4 must include the following types of activities: new construction, corrective repair work, asset inspections (as described in Section 8.3), and any additional asset maintenance.

Liberty provides information on its grid hardening and asset inspection QA and QC programs in Table 8-3 and Table 8-4.

Table 8-3: Grid Hardening and Asset Inspection QA and QC Program Objectives

Initiative/Activity Being Audited	Tracking ID	Quality Program Type	Objective of the Quality Program
New construction in Grid Hardening WMP initiatives (<i>i.e.</i> , Covered Conductor Installation)	(<i>i.e.</i> , WMP-GDOM-GH-01)	Post-construction inspections	Confirm new construction meets applicable standards. New construction follows Liberty's construction standards and best practices in construction.
Detailed Asset Inspections	WMP-GDOM-AI-01	QC	Confirm that the inspection and corrective action process for existing electric distribution and transmission assets are conducted, and documented in an accurate and effective manner. Inspections are performed on all assets at the time of construction, while conducting G.O. 165 and G.O. 174 mandated patrols and detailed inspections and in compliance with Liberty's OQ/QC 3 rd party validation process to ensure accuracy is being met and constructions process are following the standards.
Equipment Settings to Reduce Wildfire Risk	WMP-GDOM-GO-01	QA/QC	Relay settings are peer reviewed before being issued to the field. In-service settings are reviewed on a three-year cycle.

Table 8-4: Grid Hardening and Asset Inspection QA and QC Activity Targets

Initiative/ Activity Being Audited	Type of Audit	Population/ Sample Unit	2026: Population Size	2026: Sample Size	2027: Population Size	2027: Sample Size	2028: Population Size	2028: Sample Size	Percent of Sample in the HFTD	Confidence level / MOE	2026: Pass Rate Target	2027: Pass Rate Target	2028: Pass Rate Target
Detailed Asset Inspections	Field	Detailed asset inspections	All detailed inspections completed in 2026	12%	All detailed inspections completed in 2027	12%	All detailed inspections completed in 2027	12%	100%	95/10	90%	90%	90%
New construction in Grid Hardening WMP initiatives (<i>i.e.</i> , Covered Conductor Installation)	Field	Completed new construction	All new construction completed in 2026	100% of new construction completed by contractors and 10% of new construction completed by Liberty	All new construction completed in 2027	100% of new construction completed by contractors and 10% of new construction completed by Liberty	All new construction completed in 2028	100% of new construction completed by contractors and 10% of new construction completed by Liberty	100%	Unknown – population and sample sizes vary year to year	95%	95%	95%

8.5.2 QA and QC Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list the applicable procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used for each grid design, operation, and maintenance QA and QC program listed in Table 8-3.

For asset inspections accuracy sampling, Liberty utilizes its Asset Inspection Quality Assurance/Quality Control Program implemented in 2023. This method validates newly constructed and previously inspected assets meet construction and industry standards. This work is performed in accordance with the established program and conducted in the third quarter of each year. Any work found to not be to standard is scheduled for repair and re-inspected upon completion.

For new construction, Liberty has a set of standards used to ensure both internally scheduled construction and customer based new business is meeting Liberty's stringent guidelines which meet or exceed industry standards and regulatory compliance standards for the State of California.

LU Table 8-1: QA/QC Procedures

Document Name and ID	Version	Effective Date
Asset Inspection QA-QC 2023 Final	1.1	5/23/24
Underground Electric Standards	02	11/2027
Overhead Electric Standards	01	09/2019

8.5.3 Sampling Plan

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it determines the sample for each QA and QC program listed in Table 8-4. This must include how HFTD tier or other risk designations affect the sampling plan, and how the electrical corporation ensures samples are representative of the population.

Quality Control inspections are completed through statistical sampling and appropriate sample sizes to gauge acceptable quality levels ("AQL") and conformance levels ("CL") based on the selected margin of error ("MoE"). The procedure includes personnel qualification requirements, sampling methodology, sample size by priority, process assessment (QA), results evaluation (QC), description of post inspection verification (i.e., desktop review, field review), and types of QC inspections (i.e., overhead poles, devices and conductors, underground structures and

devices, padmount devices, intrusive pole inspections). HFTD tier does not affect the sampling plan. Liberty uses industry-accepted protocols/calculations to determine statistically valid sample sizes of work types that are to be reviewed. Figure 8-1 provides an example of how the statistically valid sample sizes are determined.

Figure 8-2: Liberty Asset Inspection QA/QC Program Sample Size Calculation Example

Sample Size Calculation Example

Common Confidence Levels:

CL	Z-Score
99%	2.576
95%	1.96
90%	1.645

Standard Deviation (Std Dev): Remains Constant

Margin of Error (MoE): Can Vary 1-10%

Population Size:

Sample - Underlying Calculations:

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{[Z\text{-Score}^2 \times \text{Standard Deviation} \times (1 - \text{Standard Deviation}) / \text{Margin of Error}^2]}{[(Z\text{-Score}^2 \times \text{Standard Deviation} \times (1 - \text{Standard Deviation}) / \text{Margin of Error}^2 \times \text{Population Size}) + 1]}$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = [2.576^2 \times 0.5 \times (1 - 0.5) / 0.05^2] / [(2.576^2 \times 0.5 \times (1 - 0.5) / 0.05^2 \times 2500) + 1]$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = 663.578 / 1.2654$$

Sample Size =

8.5.4 Pass Rate Calculation

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it calculates pass rates. This description must include:

- The sample unit that generates the pass rate for each QA and QC program (e.g., for detailed distribution inspections, the sample unit that generates the pass rate may be a single inspection that passes or fails a QC audit).
- The pass and failure criteria for each activity/initiative listed in table 8-3, including a discussion of any weighted contributions to the pass rate.

Liberty employs internal and external processes as part of its overall QA/QC strategy:

- *Internal:* A post inspection documentation review, or desktop review, is performed by Liberty to assess if all required information has been submitted by the assigned Inspector. Liberty also conducts a post inspection validation review, or field review, on an as-needed basis to confirm all QC inspections are being performed as described in the specification.

- *External:* QC inspections shall be conducted on transmission and distribution facilities to provide reasonable assurance of reliable, high-quality, and safe operation of the electric facilities. Overhead facilities shall meet the requirements of G.O. 95 and underground facilities shall meet the requirements of G.O. 128.

Third party quality control field inspections are performed by appropriately trained and qualified entities whose function and organizational reporting is independent of the electric operations organization. A statistically valid sample of the assets inspected shall be re-inspected by a third party, using QEWS. Liberty provides its asset inspection QA/QC program sample sizes and units in LU Table 8-2.

LU Table 8-2: Liberty Asset Inspection QA/QC Program Sample Size and Units

Inspection Type	Cycle	Total Circuit Miles	Total Units	Annual Circuit Miles	Annual Units	Statistical Sampling		
						CL/MoE	%	Annual Sample Units
OH Poles, Devices, and Conductors	5-year	707	Units N/A	142	Units N/A	95/10	12%	17 miles
Intrusive Pole	10-year	N/A	24,700	N/A	2,470	99/7	1%	34 poles
Substations	Quarterly	N/A	12	N/A	42	Does not apply	5%	2 substations

8.5.5 Other Metrics

In this section, the electrical corporation must list metrics used by the electrical corporation to evaluate the effectiveness of its QA and QC programs and procedures (e.g. audit pass rates, outage rate within 6 months of inspection attributed to equipment condition or failure, new construction rework rate).

Liberty does not use additional metrics outside of what is discussed in Section 8.5.4 to evaluate the effectiveness of its QA and QC programs and procedures.

8.5.6 Documentation of Findings

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it documents its QA and QC findings and incorporates lessons learned from those findings into corrective actions, trainings, and procedures. This must include a description of how the electrical corporation accounts for

and documents the following when improving its inspections and maintenance QA and QC processes:

- The number of inspections reviewed.
- The number of new issues identified.
- The number of repairs with a shortened deadline.
- The number of repairs with a longer deadline.
- The number of recommended repairs cancelled.

QA/QC findings are documented through established inspection/re-inspection procedures using Fulcrum, Liberty's asset tracking system. Once sampling has been identified for a specific initiative as part of this procedure and new event is created in Fulcrum for each asset. The assigned Inspector will go to each location to validate the work was completed per standards and Engineered documentation and fill out the information in Fulcrum, take pictures of the structure being re-inspected and complete the new event checklist including the name of the Inspector, date of re-inspection and a pass or fail status is entered. Items found to not be satisfactory are then identified by a red pin within Fulcrum and a work order is created in SAP for follow-up corrective work. Following the corrective work, the asset is re-inspected again following the same procedure until a status of pass is accomplished. All repairs are treated as urgent and scheduled in a timely manner.

8.5.7 Changes to QA and QC Since Last WMP and Planned Improvements

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe:

- A list of changes the electrical corporation made to its QA and QC procedure(s) since its last WMP submission.
- Justification for each of the changes including references to lessons learned as applicable.
- A list of planned future improvements and/ or updates to QA and QC procedure(s) including a timeline for implementation.

Liberty has not made changes to its asset inspection QA and QC procedures since its last WMP submission.

8.6 Work Orders

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of the procedures it uses to manage its open work orders resulting from inspections that prescribe asset management activities.⁵⁵ This overview must include a brief narrative that provides:

- Reference to procedures documenting the work order process. The electrical corporation must provide a summary of these procedures or provide a copy in the supporting documents location on its website.
- A description of the plan for correcting any past due work orders (i.e., open work orders that have passed remediation deadlines), if applicable including the estimated date past due work orders in HFTD will be completed.
- A description of how work orders are prioritized based on risk.
- A description of procedures the electrical corporation uses for monitoring and/or reinspecting open work orders.
- A discussion of how past trends of open work orders have informed the electrical corporation's current procedures and prioritization for addressing work orders. This must include analysis of the following:
 - o Types of findings within the backlog
 - o Equipment types for the findings within the backlog
 - o Reinspection frequency for findings
 - o Outcomes of reinspection, including changes to prioritization or expected due dates
 - o Prioritization level within the backlog⁵⁶

In addition, each electrical corporation must provide an aging report for work orders past due.⁵⁷

Liberty utilizes Fulcrum to track its asset inspections and resulting work orders. Fulcrum includes both desktop and mobile application functions and allows Liberty to track, organize and report on asset management activities. Through Fulcrum, Liberty tracks the status (*i.e.*, pass/fail) and asset information for each asset inspected. Additionally, there are specified condition codes and priority levels (*i.e.*, Levels 1, 2, 3 per G.O. 165 and non-G.O. infractions) for each type of failed condition and fields for completed work. Additional information about

⁵⁵ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(10), (14).

⁵⁶ ECs must include the associated GO 95 Rule 18 level. If the EC uses a different prioritization level system, this must be included in addition to the GO 95 levels, with an explanation as to why the EC is using a different system.

⁵⁷ A past due work order is any work order that remains open beyond the shorter of two timeframes: the one required by the electrical corporation, or the one required by GO 95.

assets (e.g., grey wire service, fuse type, open wire secondary, etc.) are also inventoried during detailed inspections. The data that is recorded in Fulcrum is uploaded into Liberty's GIS database for mapping and WMP reporting.

How work orders are prioritized based on risk: Liberty assigns priority codes based on G.O. 165 Table 18, Level 1, 2, or 3 for each maintenance or capital work order. This is tracked in the Fulcrum application.

Plan for eliminating any backlog of work orders (i.e., open work orders that have passed remediation deadlines), if applicable: Liberty's plan is to achieve a cadence of inspections and repairs that creates zero past due work orders. Liberty has instituted a new inspection schedule to distribute detailed asset inspections equally over the five-year inspection cycle. Liberty has also created a Repairs Tracker Power BI Dashboard to monitor open work orders and their due dates as inspections are completed.

The Repairs Tracker Dashboard is a self-service analytics tool used by General Foreman to accomplish Liberty's plan of zero past due work orders. General Foremen observe trends in open work orders and assign packets based on locations with work coming due. Open and past due work order metrics are also calculated in Liberty's SQL database and reported to executive leadership for monthly oversight.

Plan for eliminating any backlog of work orders (i.e., open work orders that have passed remediation deadlines), if applicable: Liberty provides aging reports for work orders past due in Table 8-5 and Table 8-6.

Table 8-5: Number of Past Due Asset Work Orders Categorized by Age

HFTD Area	0-30 Days	31-90 Days	91-180 Days	181+ Days
Non-HFTD	14	5	0	23
HFTD Tier 2	32	29	9	333
HFTD Tier 3	0	9	8	20

Table 8-6: Number of Past Due Asset Work Orders Categorized by Age for Priority Levels⁵⁸

Priority Level	0-30 Days	31-90 Days	91-180 Days	181+ Days
Priority 1	0	0	0	0
Priority 2	46	43	17	376
Priority 3	0	0	0	0

⁵⁸ Priority levels as defined by GO 95 Rule 18.

Trends with respect to open work orders: Priority level 2 failures requiring pole replacement make up 30% of the planned action. The remaining work orders call for clearance, crossarm replacements, insulator replacements, or transformer replacements. Poles make up 75% of assets in the tracker while the remaining 25% are padmount/underground transformers and switches.

Liberty currently has some Priority 2 and 3 work orders that are past due, but expects to have zero past due work orders beginning in 2026. In 2020, Liberty performed detailed inspections on its entire system. This system inventory created the strongest trend in open work orders. In addition to closing past due work orders, Liberty has prioritized closing Level 3 work orders in 2025 before they contribute to the number of past due work orders.

Priority 3 work orders coming due will be closed through repairs in the field or reinspected as part of the detailed inspection cycle. Priority 3 work orders require high voltage signs, repaired ground molding, pole tags, or guy guards/anchors tightened. In 2025 Liberty expects to repair 75% of the Level 3 work orders coming due and reinspect 25%, with a 10% delta possible for assets discovered to need replacement upon reinspection. These assets will have to undergo planning and design before replacement.

8.7 Grid Operations and Procedures

8.7.1 Equipment Settings to Reduce Wildfire Risk

In this section, the electrical corporation must discuss the ways in which it operates its system to reduce wildfire risk.⁵⁹ The equipment settings discussion must include the following:

- PEDS
- Automatic recloser settings
- Settings of other emerging technologies (e.g., rapid earth fault current limiters)
- For each of the above, the electrical corporation must provide a narrative that includes the following, as applicable:
 - Settings used to reduce wildfire risk.
 - Analysis of reliability/safety impacts for settings the electrical corporation uses. This must include the following:
 - o Analysis of the most impacted circuits, including how the electrical corporation determined which circuits were most impacted.
 - o The total number of outages that have occurred on the most impacted circuits when settings were enabled.
 - o The cumulative customer-minutes associated with outages on the most impacted circuits.
 - o How the electrical corporation has worked to alleviate future reliability/safety impacts along the most impacted circuits.
 - o Deenergization protocols must consider impact on critical first responders, health and communication infrastructure, and medical baseline customers.⁶⁰
- The impacts via tabular data for the top ten most impacted circuits from the previous three years:
 - Criteria for when the electrical corporation enables the settings.
 - Operational procedures for when the settings are enabled, including monitoring for re-energization.
 - The number of circuit miles capable of these settings, including the percentage of circuit miles in the HFTD and HFRA covered by these settings.

⁵⁹ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (6), (14).

⁶⁰ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(6)(A),(B),(C)

- The percentage of time settings were enabled for the past three years based on the amount of times enablement criteria thresholds were met and led to activation, and the associated number of circuit miles encompassed by activation at that time.
- An estimate of the effectiveness of the settings for reducing wildfire risk, including the calculation used for determining the effectiveness, a list of assumptions, and justification for these assumptions. The estimate must also include the number of ignitions that still occurred while sensitivity settings were enabled.

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GO-01

Liberty implemented its SRP program in 2024 to use fast trip settings and add more fault indicators to reduce wildfire risk during high fire threat days. Fast trips are a means to trip the circuit faster at the substation breaker/recloser or line recloser device, which reduces the energy released at the fault location and greatly reduces the time to clear the fault. Historically, Liberty performed collaborative studies with the University of Nevada, Reno (“UNR”) Electrical Engineering Department, to determine the appropriate fast trip settings. Now that the initial implementation phase is complete, Liberty will start reviewing a third of the circuits every three years to ensure that the settings remain optimized to reduce wildfire risk. Liberty will continue to evaluate opportunities to install additional line reclosers to better sectionalize and have protective devices closer to the fault locations.

Analysis of reliability/safety impacts for fast trip settings: Refer to Liberty’s response to ACI LU-25U-07 for Liberty’s analysis of the reliability impacts of its SRP Program throughout the 2023-2025 WMP cycle. There are no safety impacts to using fast tripping that Liberty is aware of.

Criteria for when Liberty enables fast trip settings: Liberty works with weather and fire science experts to assist in making decisions regarding the enabling of fast trip settings. Liberty management will take all pertinent data into consideration before implementing a settings change for wildfire mitigation with the understanding of the possible effects on reliability to its customers.

Operational procedures for when fast trip settings are enabled: Personnel performing line patrols while fast trip settings are implemented are instructed to patrol all overhead lines, including lateral lines, because the device will trip faster than a fuse can be operated. The enhanced use of fault indicators should help to locate the fault area more quickly.

Estimate of the effectiveness of fast trip settings: Although Liberty does not have sufficient operational data at this point to quantitatively define the effectiveness of fast trip settings, no

ignition events have occurred on circuits with fast tripping enabled. Liberty monitors and shares information with other utilities that are deploying similar approaches.

Liberty shows the most impacted circuits from its SRP Program implementation in 2024 in Table 8-7.

Table 8-7: Top Impacted Circuits from SRP Program in 2024

Circuit/Circuit Segment ID	Circuit/Circuit Segment Name	Circuit/Circuit Segment Length (overhead circuit miles)	Number of Outages in Past Three Years	Cumulative Outage Duration	Cumulative Number of Customers Impacted by Outages
MEY3300	Meyers 3300	52.6	1	128.58	19

8.7.2 Grid Response Procedures and Notifications

The electrical corporation must provide a narrative on operational procedures it uses to respond to faults, ignitions, or other issues detected on its grid that may result in a wildfire including how the electrical corporation:

- Locates the issues.
- Prioritizes the issues, including how operational models inform potential prioritization based on risk.
- Notifies relevant personnel and suppression resources to respond to issues.
- Minimizes/optimizes response times to issues.

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GO-02

Locating issues: Many issues requiring grid response procedures are located with the assistance of customer calls during an outage or witnessing an abnormal event (e.g., loud bang, flash, arcing, etc.). Fault indicators and operated fuses also help to direct personnel to the right location. On a larger scale, recloser or breaker trips can indicate issues downstream of that device.

Prioritization of issues: Liberty prioritizes issues requiring grid response procedures by:

- Safety to the public and employees
- Wildfire risk
- Critical customer impact
- Customer count

Notifications to relevant personnel and suppression resources: Liberty will call System Control to quickly de-energize a circuit if deemed an immediate safety or wildfire risk. Liberty will call emergency services (*i.e.*, 911) for suppression resources if personnel onsite are unable to suppress immediately.

Minimizing and optimizing response time: Liberty dispatch operations tracks the location of personnel in the field so that they can be more efficiently sent to the location of the issue.

8.7.3 Personnel Work Procedures and Training in Conditions of Elevated Fire Risk

The electrical corporation must provide a narrative on the following:

- The electrical corporation's procedures that designate what type of work the electrical corporation allows (or does not allow) personnel to perform during operating conditions of different levels of wildfire risk, including:
 - o What the electrical corporation allows (or does not allow) during each level of risk.
 - o How the electrical corporation defines each level of wildfire risk.
 - o How the electrical corporation trains its personnel on those procedures.
 - o How it notifies personnel when conditions change, warranting implementation of those procedures.
- The electrical corporation's procedures for deployment of firefighting staff and equipment (e.g., fire suppression engines, hoses, water tenders, etc.) to worksites for site-specific fire prevention and ignition mitigation during on-site work.

Tracking ID: WMP-GDOM-GO-03

Liberty has designated the type of work activities that may be performed in its service territory under certain Fire Potential Index ("FPI") Operating Conditions (*e.g.*, low, moderate, high, very high, and extreme or Red Flag Warning condition). As conditions increase in severity, activities that present an increased risk of ignition have additional mitigation requirements. Where risk cannot be mitigated, work activity will cease. Work procedures and proper training help mitigate the risk of an ignition while performing at-risk activities that are necessary to maintain and operate the Liberty electric system.

The following summarizes the work activity guidelines for each of Liberty's Operating Conditions:

- *Low Fire Risk:* As determined by the Wildfire Prevention Department, Low or “Normal” Fire Risk is defined as periods during which the potential for wildfires and associated ignition risks are low but may sometimes still exist within Tier 2 or 3 of the HFTD. Some O&M activities may have stipulations and additional fire mitigation activities may be required. The Low Fire Risk status is the default operational state and the FPI is indicated as “Blue.”
- *Moderate Fire Risk:* As determined by the Wildfire Prevention Department, Moderate Fire Risk is defined as periods during which the potential for wildfires and associated ignition risks are not elevated but still exist within Tier 2 or 3 of the HFTD. Some O&M activities may have stipulations and additional fire mitigation activities may be required. The FPI is indicated as “Green.”
- *High Fire Risk:* As determined by the Wildfire Prevention Department, High Fire Risk is defined as periods of increasing risk of wildfires and associated ignition risks within Tier 2 or 3 of the HFTD. Many O&M activities have stipulations and additional fire mitigation activities are sometimes required. The High Fire Risk status is indicated as “Yellow.”
- *Very High Fire Risk:* As determined by the Wildfire Prevention Department, Very High Fire Risk is defined as periods of increasing risk of wildfires and associated ignition risks within Tier 2 or 3 of the HFTD. Many O&M activities have stipulations and additional fire mitigation activities are required. The Very High Fire Risk status is indicated as “Orange.”
- *Extreme Fire Risk:* As determined by the Wildfire Prevention Department, Extreme Fire Risk is defined as periods of significant risk of wildfires and the associated ignition risks within Tier 2 or 3 of the HFTD. All O&M activities have stipulations, and significant fire mitigation activities are required. Most overhead work activities will cease, except where not performing the work would create a greater risk than performing the work. In cases where at-risk work needs to be performed, a Liberty Fire Safety Monitor or Leader is assigned, and additional mitigation steps are implemented. The Extreme Fire Risk status is indicated as “Red.”

The safety of Liberty’s customers, personnel, and cooperating agencies are considered during the development and subsequent refinements of Liberty’s work procedures and training. Liberty’s Fire Prevention Plan (“FPP”) requires that employees, contractors, and consultants who conduct activities in the wildland areas of the service territory receive this training on an annual basis. The training includes definitions of at-risk work, wildland areas, FPI, and a matrix that can be used to determine the minimum fire prevention requirements for at-risk activities. Information is also provided related to working on or adjacent to wildland fires, reporting wildland fires, and guidance for taking fire suppression action.

Liberty has refined and updated its FPI Operating Conditions since 2020 and plans to continue to conduct training on fire prevention and emergency actions at any ignition found. Liberty will continue refining procedures designed to prevent ignitions from Liberty equipment or activities throughout our service area. Liberty's Wildfire Prevention Division continues to explore other opportunities to improve FPI Operating Conditions and safety training processes to train personnel to be prepared to work in elevated fire risk conditions. Procedures and training are reviewed annually, and feedback from attendees, other IOUs/agencies, and from public safety partners is incorporated into future training.

Liberty has a fire weather dashboard that provides seven-day forecasts for multiple zones and regions within the service territory for FPI and PSPS weather thresholds. The forecast is updated every six hours and can be accessed 24 hours per day. Liberty crews follow the FPP operating procedures based on current conditions. Additionally, Liberty's wildfire mitigation team conducts weekly meetings during fire season to discuss current and forecast fire weather conditions and communicates the weekly forecast to all operations field crews. In 2023, Liberty developed a safety tailboard application that automatically populates the current FPI forecast and FPP operating conditions based on crew location, thereby enhancing situational awareness, and supporting adherence to operating restrictions in the areas where crews are deployed.

Liberty's Fire Prevention Plan describes work restrictions for certain at-risk activities based on FPI conditions. Depending on the FPI fire risk rating, some activities will require the designation of a Fire Safety Monitor or a Fire Safety Leader.

- *Fire Safety Monitor*: Designated field supervisor or crew member responsible for fire safety requirement oversight during Elevated Fire Risk working conditions.
- *Fire Safety Leader*: Designated field supervisor or crew member who has a dedicated role for fire safety requirement oversight during Extreme Fire Risk working conditions.

Additionally, Liberty's field crews are equipped with fire prevention and suppression tools throughout all areas of the service territory.

8.7.4 Workforce Planning

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of personnel, including qualifications, and training practices, related to workers in roles associated with asset inspections, grid hardening, and risk event inspection.⁶¹

⁶¹ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(16), (19).

Liberty provides its asset inspections, grid hardening and risk event inspection workforce qualifications and training practices in LU Table 8-3.

LU Table 8-3: Liberty Workforce Planning, Asset Inspections, Grid Hardening and Risk Event Inspection

Worker Title	Minimum Qualifications	Training Practices
Inspector Foreman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman lineman • Minimum two years journeyman lineman experience • Class A Driver's License • Expert knowledge of G.O. 95 and company's construction standards. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fulcrum application and database training • On the job training of company standards and G.O. 95
Inspector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman lineman • Minimum one year journeyman lineman experience • Class A Driver's License • General knowledge of G.O. 95 and company's construction standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fulcrum application and database training • On the job training of company standards and G.O. 95
Qualified Electrical Worker ("QEW")	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman lineman • Minimum one-year journeyman lineman experience • Class A Driver's License • General knowledge of G.O. 95 and Liberty's construction standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fulcrum application and database training • On the job training of company standards and G.O. 95
Lineman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman lineman • Class A Driver's license 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the job training of company standards and G.O. 95 • On the job training of covered conductor
Lineman Working Foreman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman lineman • Minimum two years' experience as Journeyman Lineman • Class A Driver's license 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the job training of company standards and G.O. 95 • Hendrix training of covered conductor installation (ACS and Tree Wire)

Worker Title	Minimum Qualifications	Training Practices
Engineer IV	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must possess a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering or an equivalent engineering degree from an accredited four-year college or university • Must hold PE certification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SEL, GIS, CAD, OCalc, Quadra, OSI PI, Aspen Oneliner
Capital Administrator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Associates or Bachelor's degree in Construction Administration, Accounting or a related field or a minimum of three years of technical experience with a utility or other related field • Working knowledge of accounting, project management and construction management practices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great Plains Job Cost Training, FERC Code Training, SOX Policy Training, Capital Expenditure Policy Training, Excel Training
Project Manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Associates or Bachelor's degree in Project Management, Construction Administration, Engineering in a related field or a PMP certification and a minimum of five years of technical experience with a utility or other related field. Must have a demonstrated working knowledge of project management and construction management practices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PM Basics, Capital Expenditure Policy Training, Great Plains training, MS Project, Excel Training, Electrical Distribution 101, OH & UG Const Training
Substation Electrician	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must have successfully completed the Electrician Apprentice training program or equivalent • Must be qualified to perform switching 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the job training of substation equipment maintenance and replacement • On the job training of PZM application
Substation Electrician Foreman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman Electrician • Minimum two years' experience as journeyman electrician • Must be qualified to perform switching. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the job training of substation equipment maintenance and replacement • On the job training of PZM application

Worker Title	Minimum Qualifications	Training Practices
Job Facilitator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Journeyman lineman • Minimum two years' experience as journeyman lineman • Class A Driver's License 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On the job training of company standards and G.O. 95 • On the job training of covered conductor installation (ACS and Tree Wire) • On the job training of internal QA/QC process • Fulcrum application and database training

9. Vegetation Management and Inspections

Each electrical corporation's WMP must include plans for vegetation management.⁶²

9.1 Targets

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide qualitative and quantitative targets for vegetation management and inspections for each year of the three-year WMP cycle. The electrical corporation must provide at least one qualitative or quantitative target for the following initiatives:

- Wood and Slash Management (Section 9.5)
- Defensible Space (Section 9.6)
- Integrated Vegetation Management (Section 9.7)
- Workforce Planning (Section 9.13)

Quantitative targets are required for vegetation management inspections and pole clearing; see Section 9.1.2, below, for detailed requirements.

Quantitative targets are required for QA and QC. See Section 9.11.1 for detailed quantitative target requirements for QA and QC. Reporting of QA and QC quantitative targets is only required in section 9.11

9.1.1 Qualitative Targets

The electrical corporation must provide qualitative targets for implementing and improving its vegetation management and inspections,⁶³ including the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) and activity/activities in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs ("Previous Tracking ID"), if applicable.
- A completion date for when the electrical corporation will achieve the qualitative target.
- Reference(s) to the WMP section(s) or appendix, including page numbers, where the details of the target(s) are documented and substantiated.

Refer to Table 9-1 and Table 9-2.

⁶² Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (9).

⁶³ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

9.1.2 Quantitative Targets

The electrical corporation must provide quantitative targets it will use to track progress on its vegetation management and inspections for the three years of the Base WMP.⁶⁴ Every inspection activity program described in Section 9.2 must have at least one quantitative target. Targets for inspection activities (programs) of overhead electrical assets must use circuit miles as the unit. Pole clearing performed in compliance with Public Resources Code section 4292 must have a quantitative target. The electrical corporation may define additional pole clearing targets (e.g., pole clearing performing in the Local Responsibility Area). For each quantitative target, the electrical corporation must provide the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) and activity/activities in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs (“Previous Tracking ID”), if applicable.
- Projected targets and totals for each of the three years of the WMP cycle, e.g., [Year 1] end of year total, [Year 2] total, and [Year 3] total, three-year total and the associated units for the targets.
- For inspections and pole clearing targets in Table 9-2, cumulative quarterly targets for each year of the WMP cycle,⁶⁵ and the percentage of total overhead circuit miles in the HFTD covered by the [Year 1] target (e.g., 100 circuit miles of patrol inspections in [Year 1] divided by 300 overhead circuit miles in the HFTD equals 33 percent coverage).
- The expected % risk reduction for each of the three years of the WMP cycle.⁶⁵
- The timeline in which clearance and removal work prescribed by the inspection program will be completed (inspections and pole clearing only).

Refer to Table 9-1 and Table 9-2.

⁶⁴ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

⁶⁵ The expected % risk reduction is the expected percentage risk reduction per year, as described in Section 6.2.1.2.

Table 9-1: Liberty Vegetation Management Targets by Year (Non-inspection Targets)

Initiative	Quantitative or Qualitative	Activity (Tracking ID)	Target Unit	2026 Target/Status	x% Risk Impact 2026	2027 Target/Status	x% Risk Impact 2027	2028 Target/Status	x% Risk Impact 2028	Three-Year Total	Section; Page Number
Integrated Vegetation Management	Qualitative	Maintain Tree Line USA (WMP-VM-VFM-04)	N/A	Complete by December 31, 2026	N/A	Complete by December 31, 2027	N/A	Complete by December 31, 2028	N/A	N/A	9.7; pp. 191-193
Workforce Planning	Qualitative	Liberty will continue to report annually on its recruitment, retention, and training of vegetation management and inspection personnel (WMP-VM-WFP-01)	N/A	Complete by December 31, 2026	N/A	Complete by December 31, 2027	N/A	Complete by December 31, 2028	N/A	N/A	9.13; pp. 215-217
Wood and Slash Management	Quantitative	WMP-VM-VFM-02	Acres	280	4.04%	280	0.70%	280	0.70%	840	9.5; pp. 187-189
Substation Defensible Space	Quantitative	WMP-VM-VFM-03	Substation inspections	12	0.0%	12	0.0%	12	0.0%	36	9.6; pp. 189-193
Clearance	Quantitative	WMP-VM-VFM-05	Circuit miles	700	2.96%	700	3.34%	700	1.91%	2,100	9.3; pp.183-185
Fall-In Mitigation	Quantitative	WMP-VM-VFM-06	Circuit miles	220	4.36%	220	2.06%	220	1.38%	660	9.3; pp. 183-185

Table 9-2: Liberty Vegetation Management Inspections and Pole Clearing Targets by Year

Activity (Program)	Tracking ID	Target Unit	Cumulative (Cml.) Quarterly Target 2026, Q1	Cml. Quarterly Target 2026, Q2	Cml. Quarterly Target 2026, Q3	Cml. Quarterly Target 2026, Q4	Cml. Quarterly Target 2027, Q1	Cml. Quarterly Target 2027, Q2	Cml. Quarterly Target 2027, Q3	Cml. Quarterly Target 2027, Q4	Cml. Quarterly Target 2028, Q1	Cml. Quarterly Target 2028, Q2	Cml. Quarterly Target 2028, Q3	Cml. Quarterly Target 2028, Q4	% HFTD Covered in 2026 ⁱ	% Risk Reduction 2026	% Risk Reduction 2027	% Risk Reduction 2028	Three-Year Total	Activity Timeline Target	Section; Page Number
Vegetation Management Inspection Program - Detailed	WMP-VM-INSP-01	Circuit miles	45	110	175	233 ⁶⁶	45	110	175	233	45	110	175	233	33%	0	0	0	700	365 days	9.2.1; pp. 175-180
Vegetation Management Program - LiDAR	WMP-VM-INSP-03	Circuit miles	0	0	700	700	0	0	700	700	0	0	700	700	100%	0	0	0	2,100	Approx. 90 days for acquisition to data delivery	9.2.3; pp.181-183
Pole Clearing – PRC 4292 Required	WMP-VM-VFM-01-R	Poles	0	1,500	3,000	4,500	0	1,500	3,000	4,500	0	1,500	3,000	4,500	100%	0	0	0	13,500	Approx. 150 days	9.4; pp.185-187
Pole Clearing – Discretionary	WMP-VM-VFM-01-D	Poles	0	133	266	400	0	133	266	400	0	133	266	400	100%	0	0	0	1,200	Approx. 150 days	9.4; pp.185-187

⁶⁶ The cumulative annual target is rounded.

9.2 Vegetation Management Inspections

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its vegetation management inspection activities (programs) for overhead electrical assets. This section must not include pole clearing activities or vegetation management around substations; see Section 9.4 for pole clearing and Section 9.6 for vegetation management around substations.

The electrical corporation must first summarize details regarding its vegetation management inspections for overhead electrical assets in Table 9-3. The table must include the following:

- **Type of inspection:** distribution or transmission
- **Inspection program name:** Identify various inspection activities (programs) within the electrical corporation (e.g., routine, enhanced vegetation, off-cycle)
- **Area inspected:** Identify the area that the inspection activity (program) covers (e.g., territory wide, HFTD only, Areas of Concern, etc.)
- **Frequency:** Identify the frequency of the inspection (e.g., annual, quarterly, three-year cycle)

The electrical corporation must then provide a narrative overview of each vegetation inspection activity (program) identified in Table 9-3. Section 9.2.1. provides instructions for the overviews. The sections must be numbered Section 9.2.1 to Section 9.2.n (i.e., each vegetation inspection activity [program] is detailed in its own section) with the name of the inspection activity (program) as the section title. The electrical corporation must include inspection activities (programs) it is discontinuing, has discontinued since the last WMP submission, or has consolidated into another activity (program), and explain why it is discontinuing or has discontinued the activity (program).

Liberty summarizes the details regarding its vegetation management inspection activities (programs) in Table 9-3.

Table 9-3: Vegetation Management Inspection Frequency, Method, and Criteria

Inspection Type	Inspection Activity (Program)	Area Inspected	Frequency
Transmission and Distribution	Vegetation Management Program - LiDAR	Territory	Annual
Transmission and Distribution	Vegetation Management Program – Detailed	Territory	Three-year cycle
Transmission and Distribution	Vegetation Management Program – Patrol	Territory	As needed

9.2.1 Vegetation Management Inspection Program – Detailed Inspections

9.2.1.1 Overview and Area Inspected

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of the inspection program. This overview must describe where the electrical corporation performs the inspection programs (e.g., territory-wide, HFTD only, Areas of Concern, etc.).

Detailed inspections are ground-based inspections performed territory-wide on a three-year cycle to prescribe pruning and removal of vegetation as a safeguard against grow-ins or fall-ins and to comply with required laws and regulations.

9.2.1.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a list of the procedures, including the version(s) and effective date(s), for the inspection program.

Refer to LU Table 9-1.

LU Table 9-1: Vegetation Management Detailed Inspection Procedures

Document Name and ID	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	3	4/10/2025
Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03)	1	4/8/2021
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	2	2/28/2025
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	2	6/3/2022
Vegetation Management Notification and Refusal Resolution Policy (VM-06)	1	1/1/2024
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	1	8/25/2023

9.2.1.3 Clearance

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how clearances are determined and prescribed through this inspection program (e.g., GO 95 Table 1, GO 95 Appendix E, ANSI A-300, etc.). As applicable, the electrical corporation must describe how it differently prescribes clearances to high-risk species of vegetation.

Liberty prescribes vegetation management work during detailed inspections for conditions that meet the following criteria:

Regulation Clearance Distance (RCD) – Clearance distance between conductors and vegetation that is mandated by regulations.

Maintenance Action Threshold (MAT) – Clearance distance that triggers the work scheduling process to prevent vegetation from encroaching into the RCD. The MAT is based on the RCD with a safety margin multiplier of 1.5 ($MAT = RCD * 1.5$).

Maintenance Clearance Distance (MCD) – Clearance distance to be achieved at time of work. Minimum clearances based on GO 95, Rule 35, Appendix E.

LU Table 9-2: Radial Clearance Requirements PRC 4293; GO 95, HFTD (Case 14)

Voltage	Regulation Clearance Distance ("RCD")	Maintenance Action Threshold ("MAT")	Maintenance Clearance Distance ("MCD")
12kV - 25kV	4'	6'	12'-15'
60kV	4'	6'	12'-15'
120kV	10'	15'	30-35'

LU Table 9-3: Radial Clearance Requirements; GO 95, Rule 35, Non-HFTD (Case 13)

Voltage	Regulation Clearance Distance ("RCD")	Maintenance Action Threshold ("MAT")	Maintenance Clearance Distance ("MCD")
12kV - 25kV	1.5'	6'	12'-15'
60kV	1.5'	6'	12'-15'
120kV	1.7'	15'	30-35'

Note: MAT and MCD for Non-HFTD are the same as those in the HFTD.

In addition to the above clearances, Liberty shall prescribe mitigation of vegetation encroachments on circuits or portions of circuits energized operating at 750 volts or less such as

open wire secondary, coated triplex or quadruplex cable (including service drops), and guy wires:

- *Open Wire Secondary:* Trees scheduled for pruning for open wire secondary will be inventoried based on tree growth characteristics to avoid tree line contact with conductors.
- *Coated Aerial Cable:* Trees scheduled for pruning will be identified as showing evidence of strain or abrasion with wires.
- *Guy and Support Wires:* Trees scheduled for pruning will be for strain or abrasion and to avoid vegetation in contact with guy or support wires above the guy strain insulator.

9.2.1.4 Fall-in Mitigation

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it identifies fall-in risks, such as hazard trees, during the inspection (e.g., Level 1, Level 2, etc.). As applicable, the electrical corporation must describe how it differently prescribes removal of high-risk species of vegetation.

The following details Liberty's risk assessment levels, work priority levels, and mitigation actions.

Levels of Assessment: Identification of trees that pose a high risk of failure are typically performed by completing the following levels of assessment:

- *Level 1:* A Limited Visual Tree Risk Assessment, per ANSI A300 (Part 9) Tree Risk Assessment, and in accordance with Liberty's Hazard Tree Management Plan. This is accomplished by conducting an assessment from one side of the tree (side nearest the electric facilities) and can be ground-based, vehicle-based, or aerial-based, as appropriate for the site conditions, type of infrastructure, and tree population being considered. A Level 1 assessment focuses on identifying obvious tree defects that are observable from the side of the tree nearest the electric facilities. If a condition of concern is identified during the Level 1 assessment, recommendations are developed regarding possible mitigation. If the Level 1 assessment cannot sufficiently determine the severity of the condition, a Level 2 assessment is conducted.
- *Level 2:* A Basic Tree Risk Assessment of an individual tree and its surrounding site. A Level 2 assessment may include walking completely around the tree—looking at the site, buttress roots, trunk, and branches. Many trees that pose a potential risk to electric facilities are located on private property and beyond the edge of the utility easement of right-of-way, which may restrict access. Severe terrain or other obstacles may also

prevent access. As such, there may be limited opportunity or ingress to do a 360-degree assessment of an individual tree.

Structural and site conditions that indicate a possible hazardous condition and could pose a risk to electric facilities are listed below in LU Table 9-4 and LU Table 9-5. These are considered when performing a tree risk assessment.

LU Table 9-4: Hazard Tree Attributes

Hazard Tree Attributes
Basal wound
Bleeding or resinous
Bulges and/or swellings
Cankers, including bleeding & gall rust
Cavities
Codominant or multiple stems from base or higher on trunk
Conks indicating heart rot, root rot, sap rot or canker rot
Cracks including shear
Dead branches and/or top
Dieback of twigs and/or branches
Embedded wires or cables
Excessive lean toward electrical facilities or excessive bow
Fire damage
Foliage – off color, flagging or loss
Hazard beam
History of limb failure(s) on tree
Included bark
Insect activity such as frass from termites, bark beetles or carpenter ants
Lightning damage
Live crown ration below 30%
Mistletoe – dwarf or broad-leaf
Nesting holes – birds, mammals, insects
Past poor pruning practices
Roots injured, exposed, undermined, or uplifted
Seam
Species failure patterns
Unnatural or structurally unsound canopy weight distribution
Weak, unsound branch attachments

LU Table 9-5: Vegetation Management Site Attributes

Site Attributes
Areas known to be affected by introduced tree pathogens
Areas of recent clearing/new edge
Change in drainage
Change in grade
Construction – including trenching, paving or road construction
Cultural disturbance to landscape – natural or unnatural
Diseased center – dead tree in middle and dying trees around it
High stand density with single species composition
High winds (fire watch)
History of failure(s) at site
History of repeated outages on circuit
Fire damage
Recent thinning or logging
Slope (by grade or percentage)
Soils prone to slides
Specific conditions like high winds
Storm damage

9.2.1.5 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how the inspection program is scheduled. This must include the frequency (e.g., annual, quarterly, three-year cycle) and/or triggers (e.g., severe weather events, risk model outputs) of the inspection program. It must also identify how the frequency and/or trigger might differ by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

If the inspection program is based on a fixed frequency (e.g., annual, three-year cycle), the electrical corporation must explain how it uses risk prioritization in the scheduling of the inspection program to target high-risk areas). If the electrical corporation does not use risk prioritization in the scheduling of the inspection program, it must explain why.

Liberty performs detailed inspections to comply with applicable regulations and governing standards. Detailed inspections are intended to be implemented on a three-year maintenance cycle schedule. Liberty maintains a three-year detailed inspection cycle schedule and creates the annual work plan based off the current cycle year of the three-year cycle. Detailed inspection cycles may vary to account for vegetation growth rates, site characteristics, environmental conditions, or other factors that can affect the timing of corrective actions.

Liberty may implement patrol inspections, as needed, to address vegetation conditions that arise off-cycle on a given circuit or portions of circuits (see Section 9.2.2).

9.2.1.6 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must discuss changes/updates to the inspection program since its last WMP submission, including known future plans (beyond the current year) and new/novel strategies the electrical corporation may implement in the next five years (e.g., references to and strategies from pilot projects and research). The electrical corporation must include lessons learned as applicable.

Liberty has not made any changes to its Vegetation Management Inspection Program – Detailed Inspections since its last WMP submission.

9.2.2 Vegetation Management Inspection Program – Patrol Inspections

9.2.2.1 Overview and Area Inspected

Liberty conducts patrol inspections, as needed, based on environmental conditions or other factors. Liberty may perform additional hazard tree inspections, as needed, to address tree mortality or after major storms, high wind events, or fires. The need for these inspections is determined based on the severity of the event and the resulting possibility of damaged trees.

9.2.2.2 Procedures

See Section 9.2.1.2.

9.2.2.3 Clearance

Patrol inspections are implemented to identify evident fall-in risk to overhead distribution and transmission conductors in response to environmental factors. Vegetation identified during patrol inspections that is within regulated clearance distances (“RCD”) or beginning to encroach the RCD will be prescribed vegetation management work to achieve the necessary maintenance clearance distance (“MCD”). See Section 9.2.1.3.

9.2.2.4 Fall-in Mitigation

See Section 9.2.1.4.

9.2.2.5 Scheduling

Liberty performs patrol inspections to locate and remove obvious hazard trees. These inspections are performed on an as-needed basis on specific circuits or line segments and are triggered by known local conditions, vegetation health data derived from LiDAR inspections, vegetation conditions reported by the public or line-operations, or storm, wildfire or other events that can bring changes to normal vegetation conditions.

9.2.2.6 Updates

Liberty has not made any changes to its Vegetation Management Inspection Program – Patrol Inspections since the last WMP submission and no updates are anticipated.

9.2.3 Vegetation Management Inspection Program – LiDAR Inspections

9.2.3.1 Overview and Area Inspected

Remote sensing technology such as Light Detection and Ranging (“LiDAR”) has been established by the industry as an effective inspection method to measure vegetation to conductor distances, tree height, and proximity to overhead lines. System-wide LiDAR inspections of vegetation along overhead transmission and distribution lines are completed on an annual basis to assess compliance with applicable vegetation to conductor clearance regulations and identify any vegetation concerns.

9.2.3.2 Procedures

Refer to LU Table 9-6.

LU Table 9-6: Vegetation Management LiDAR Inspection Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	Process	2	6/3/2022
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	Process	1	8/25/2023

9.2.3.3 Clearance

LiDAR inspections are performed to identify vegetation to conductor clearances and to conform to required laws and regulations. Liberty conducts a grow-in analysis from LiDAR data to categorize vegetation detections into grow-in zones based on the distances to conductors and voltages. Refer to LU Table 9-7. Vegetation identified within Liberty’s maintenance action

thresholds (“MAT”) through LiDAR inspections is prescribed vegetation management work (see LU Table 9-2, Radial Clearance Requirements PRC 4293; GO 95, HFTD (Case 14) in Section 9.2.1.3). Liberty implements an increased MAT of 8-feet in some regions with predominantly fast-growing tree species. Vegetation identified through LiDAR inspections within the adjusted MAT on these circuits are mitigated accordingly.

LU Table 9-7: Vegetation Grow-In Zones, LiDAR Grow-In Analysis

Category	12kV - 25kV	60kV	120kV
Grow-In Zone 1	0 - 1.5 feet	0 - 1.5 feet	0 - 4 feet
Grow-In Zone 2	1.5 – 4 feet	1.5 – 4 feet	4 - 10 feet
Grow-In Zone 3	4 – 6 feet	4 – 6 feet	10 - 15 feet
Grow-In Zone 4	6 – 12 feet	6 – 12 feet	15 - 30 feet

9.2.3.4 Fall-in Mitigation

Liberty conducts a fall-in analysis from LiDAR data to categorize vegetation detections into fall-in zones based on tree height and distance to conductors to use as a tool in determining strike potential during ground-based inspections. Refer to LU Table 9-8.

LU Table 9-8: Vegetation Fall-In Zone Categories, LiDAR Fall-In Analysis

Zone Category	Criteria
Fall-In Zone 1	Overstrike over 6 feet
Fall-In Zone 2	Strike/overstrike less than 6 feet
Fall-In Zone 3	Fall within 6 feet of wire

Liberty also identifies vegetation overhanging transmission lines operating at 60kV and 120kV through LiDAR analysis and prescribes vegetation management to avoid fall-in risk from vegetation overhanging transmission lines.

9.2.3.5 Scheduling

Liberty performs LiDAR inspections of vegetation around electrical infrastructure on an annual basis. LiDAR inspections are typically scheduled in the summer after the initial vegetation growing season and to avoid interference from weather, snowpack, and air conditions to increase effectiveness of remote sensing technology.

9.2.3.6 Updates

Liberty has not made any changes to its Vegetation Management Inspection Program – LiDAR Inspections since its last WMP submission.

9.3 Pruning and Removal

9.3.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of the subsequent pruning, removal, and other vegetation management activities that are performed as a result of inspections.

In the pruning and removal section, Liberty provides information on its Vegetation Management Clearance initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-05), and Fall-in Mitigation initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-06). Liberty's VM Program is designed to improve the reliability of Liberty's Transmission and Distribution systems and to comply with regulatory requirements established in CPUC G.O. 95, California PRC, and Title 14 CCR by establishing maintenance and inspection procedures. Additionally, Liberty has developed a Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03) for the purpose of identifying, documenting, and mitigating trees that are located within the utility strike zone and are expected to pose a risk to electric facilities based on the tree's observed structural condition and site considerations. The plan includes an overview of tree risk associated with electric lines and equipment, inspection types, risk assessment levels, work priority levels, and mitigation actions.

9.3.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a list of the procedures, including the version(s) and effective date(s), for subsequent pruning, removal, and other vegetation management activities that are performed as a result of inspections.

Refer to LU Table 9-9.

LU Table 9-9: Vegetation Management Pruning and Removal Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03)	Plan	1	4/8/2021
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	Process	2	2/28/2025
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	Process	2	6/3/2022
Vegetation Management Notification and Refusal Resolution Policy (VM-06)	Process	1	1/1/2024

9.3.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how subsequent pruning, removal, and other vegetation management activities that are performed as a result of inspections are scheduled. This must include the timeline(s) in which clearance and removal work prescribed by an inspection program will be completed and how the timeline differs by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

Clearance (WMP-VM-VFM-05):

Liberty maintains clearance around its entire overhead distribution and transmission electrical infrastructure on an annual basis. Liberty mitigates vegetation encroachments identified by LiDAR inspections (described Section 9.2.3) within maintenance action thresholds (“MAT”) before the next fire season after inspections.

Additionally, Liberty performs clearance work identified by ground-based inspections (described in Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2) such as clearance on secondary lines and vegetation found within the MAT.

Fall-in Mitigation (WMP-VM-VFM-06):

Liberty conducts vegetation maintenance to prevent fall-ins to electrical infrastructure annually for hazard trees identified by ground-based inspections (described in Sections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2). Liberty determines its annual fall-in mitigation work on circuits based off the current cycle year of the detailed three-year inspection cycle and patrol inspections that are implemented on an as needed basis. Liberty sequences fall-in mitigation to occur after circuit inspections, notifications, and permitting are completed and within established mitigation timelines determined by tree and site characteristics throughout the work year (See Section 9.12.1 for mitigation timelines).

9.3.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must discuss changes/updates to pruning and removal activities since the last WMP submission, including known future plans (beyond the current year) and new/novel strategies the electrical corporation may implement in the next five years (e.g., references to and strategies from pilot projects and research). The electrical corporation must include lessons learned as applicable.

Liberty has not made any changes to its pruning and removal activities since its last WMP submission.

9.4 Pole Clearing

9.4.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of pole clearing, including:

- Pole clearing performed in compliance with Public Resources Code section 4292
- Pole clearing outside the requirements of Public Resources Code section 4292 (e.g., pole clearing performed outside of the State Responsibility Area).

In the pole clearing section, Liberty provides information on its Vegetation Management Pole Clearing initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-01). Liberty owns approximately 23,000 wood poles that support distribution and transmission facilities. Most of Liberty's service territory is located on land that is under the jurisdiction of the State of California or the federal government for fire protection services. Liberty conducts pole clearing in State ("SRA") and Federal Responsibility Areas ("FRA").

Pole clearing activities are performed in both SRA and FRA and are categorized as follows:

PRC 4292 Requirements (SRA):

Liberty clears approximately 4,500 poles annually located within SRA in accordance with Public Resources Code (PRC) Section 4292. These poles are subject to mandatory vegetation clearance requirements around poles supporting electrical equipment, such as transformers and fuses, to reduce ignition risk. Clearing includes removal of flammable material within a 10-foot radius and up to 8 feet vertically from the ground.

Discretionary Pole Clearing (FRA, Non-PRC 4292):

Liberty clears approximately 400 poles annually located within FRA. While these poles are not subject to PRC 4292 requirements, Liberty performs discretionary pole clearing in these areas

to proactively reduce wildfire risk and maintain defensible space around electrical infrastructure.

9.4.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list applicable electrical corporation procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used to execute pole clearing.

Refer to LU Table 9-10.

LU Table 9-10: Vegetation Management Pole Clearing Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	Process	2	2/28/2025
Vegetation Management Notification and Refusal Resolution Policy (VM-06)	Process	1	1/1/2024
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	Process	1	8/25/2023

9.4.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how pole clearing is scheduled. This must include how the schedule is affected by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

The majority of Liberty's service area exists in Tier 2 or Tier 3 designated HFTD. As such, Liberty treats all pole clearing activities as high-priority wildfire mitigation work. Generally, pole clearing work occurs from April through July.

Scheduling is influenced by seasonal access and fire risk. Pole clearing typically begins in lower elevation areas earlier in the season, as these areas are most accessible and subject to drier fuel conditions earlier, while higher elevation terrain holds winter snowpack. As access conditions improve, crews shift to the Tahoe Basin and other high-elevation areas during late spring and summer months, prioritizing poles within Tier 3 HFTD first.

Poles identified through the QC process requiring re-work are re-cleared as needed throughout the fire season. Liberty conducts QC inspections of poles cleared under the initiative, including a sample of at least 12% of all poles cleared annually. As part of this methodology, Liberty prioritizes poles located in Tier 3 HFTD and performs increased QC inspections in these areas as scheduling and resources allow.

9.4.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe changes to pole clearing since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Discuss any planned improvements or updates to pole clearing and the timeline for implementation.

Liberty has not made any changes to its pole clearing initiative since its last WMP submission.

9.5 Wood and Slash Management

9.5.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of how it manages all downed wood and slash generated from vegetation management activities.

In the wood and slash management section, Liberty provides information on its Vegetation Management Wood and Slash Management initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-02). Liberty recognizes the need for additional efforts to reduce accumulation of woody debris that can ignite or contribute to fire spread and intensity. Liberty has implemented a Fuel Management Program as a precautionary measure, where feasible, to reduce wildfire risks by removing wood and treating brush and slash after vegetation maintenance is performed. Additional treatments that reduce surface fuels from previous activities and those that further reduce fuel loads are also implemented.

Liberty's Wood and Slash Management Specifications:

All limbs and brush less than 12 inches in diameter shall be treated to minimize the accumulation of surface fuels at the work location. All limbs, brush and debris located within 100 feet of equipment accessible roads shall be chipped and broadcasted or chipped and hauled off-site. When brush and limbs cannot be chipped and broadcasted or chipped and hauled off-site, the clean-up method may be lop-and-scatter or otherwise specified. Broadcasted chip depths shall not exceed four inches from the ground surface. Lopped and scattered debris shall not exceed depths of 18 inches from the ground surface. Liberty shall have the right to determine other disposal means or slash treatment methods.

Where possible and requested by the property owner Liberty will dispose of large woody biomass generated by VM activities. When the clean-up method is 100% removal, the contractor shall be responsible for the treatment and disposal of all woody debris.

Wood and Slash Management Acres Treated Methodology:

Liberty's annual tree removal program averages approximately 3,350 trees, with about 51% (1,709 trees) requiring wood management. To estimate its annual acreage target, Liberty uses two methods:

- Residential areas: Based on lot size, up to 0.25 acres per parcel.
- Cross-country areas: Calculated using an average span length of 186 feet and a 30-foot right-of-way width, equating to 0.12 acres per span treated.

Liberty's overhead electric system is roughly split between roadside/residential (52%) and cross-country environments (48%). Using historical wood management data and factoring in accessibility, terrain, and other variables, Liberty sets an annual treatment target of approximately 280 acres.

Acres treated are tracked based on completed work orders where the cleanup method includes either 100% removal or cutting wood into firewood lengths and leaving it onsite at the landowner's request. For small parcels, up to 0.25 acres, the entire lot size is counted toward the target. For larger parcels, Liberty calculates acres treated using the total power line span length multiplied by a 30 ft. wide right of way, then divided by the number of square feet per acre (43,560). For example, a large parcel with power lines that span a total length of 726 ft. would be calculated as: $(726 * 30) / 43,560 = 0.5$ acres treated.

Liberty also calculates acres treated from partnership-based projects, such as mastication, forest thinning, or other fuel reduction activities performed by its crews, toward the annual target. Refer to Section 9.8 on VM partnerships.

9.5.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list applicable electrical corporation procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used to manage wood and slash.

Refer to LU Table 9-11.

LU Table 9-11: Vegetation Management Wood and Slash Management Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	Process	2	2/28/2025

9.5.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how wood and slash management is scheduled. This must include how the schedule is affected by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

Wood and slash management activities are a component of tree pruning and removal work and take place after vegetation has been pruned or removed. Liberty coordinates with its vendors for wood and slash management to take place at time of tree pruning or removal operations to the extent feasible.

9.5.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe changes to wood and slash management since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Discuss any planned improvements or updates to pole clearing and the timeline for implementation.

Since its last WMP submission, Liberty updated its wood and slash management specifications to increase treatment of vegetation debris generated from tree pruning and removal activities from 4 inches and less to 12 inches and less. This update resulted in increased vegetation debris being chipped across the service territory.

9.6 Defensible Space

9.6.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its action taken to reduce wildfire risk to substations, generation facilities, and other electrical facilities in accordance with Public Resources Code section 4291, other defensible space codes and regulations, or in exceedance of these requirements.

In the defensible space section, Liberty provides information on its Substation Defensible Space initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-03). Liberty performs routine inspections, vegetation management, and other maintenance activities for 12 substations. Control methods include manual, mechanical, and chemical methods. Work occurs at regular intervals to maintain accessibility,

safety, and adherence to all appropriate governmental regulations and Liberty policies. Herbicides, insecticides, and rodenticides are specified in and are to be applied as per the Pest Control Recommendations (“PCRs”), the Pest Control Advisor (“PCA”) and pesticide container labels. The PCA will provide recommendations based on the ability to meet program objectives and minimize negative impacts to the community and environment.

Herbicide applications and vegetation management activities will occur under the direction of the PCA. Additional cycle visits may be required for sites that do not receive herbicide applications.

- *Facility Interiors:* Substations are to be kept free of vegetation and debris by performing routine maintenance, which includes weed, vegetation, and debris removal prior to and in conjunction with herbicide treatments.
- *Facility Perimeters:* Routine maintenance includes weed and vegetation removal prior to and in conjunction with herbicide treatments. This includes a minimum five foot (5') wide clearance, measured horizontal, along the outside of the perimeter fence and a minimum height clearance of 10 feet above ground level along the outside of the perimeter fence.

9.6.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list applicable electrical corporation procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used to create and maintain defensible space.

Refer to LU Table 9-12.

LU Table 9-12: Vegetation Management Defensible Space Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	Process	1	8/25/2023

9.6.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how creation and maintenance of defensible space are scheduled. This must include how the schedule is affected by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

A minimum of 12 substation inspections will occur each year. Generally, two site visits will occur per facility, per year. Herbicide applications and vegetation management activities will occur under the direction of the PCA. The first cycle visit will occur any time between October 1

and December 31 each year. The second cycle will occur any time between June 1 and September 30 each year.

9.6.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe changes to how it creates or maintains defensible space since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Discuss any planned improvements or updates to pole clearing and the timeline for implementation.

Liberty has not made any changes to its substation defensible space initiative since its last WMP submission.


9.7 Integrated Vegetation Management

9.7.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its actions taken for activities not covered in previous sections and are performed in accordance with Integrated Vegetation Management principles. This may include, but is not limited to, the following activities: the strategic use of herbicides, growth regulators, or other chemical controls; tree-replacement programs; promotion of native shrubs; prescribed fire; or other fuel treatment activities.

In the integrated vegetation management section, Liberty provides information on its Fire-Resilient Rights-of-Way initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-04). Liberty continues to work with the National Forests on enhanced right-of-way maintenance projects, to target encroaching and hazardous trees and to preventatively remove incompatible tree species from the right-of-way. The enhanced maintenance projects reduce future maintenance entries, protect infrastructure, increase fire-resiliency and are the initial step of the integrated vegetation management (“IVM”) program. Refer to Figure 9-1. Liberty’s provides details on the partnership to implement this work in section 9.8.1.

Figure 9-1: Liberty Utilities Forest Resilience Corridor Specifications



The Liberty IVM program continues to be developed with the intent of promoting a stable, low growing community of compatible shrub species. Liberty VM staff and contractors are trained to identify and collect data to document native and culturally significant shrub species.

Liberty also implements an annual tree-replacement program that launched in June 2022, with the intent of distributing compatible plant species, in conjunction with the Arbor Day Foundation.

9.7.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list applicable electrical corporation procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used for integrated vegetation management.

Refer to LU Table 9-13.

LU Table 9-13: Vegetation Management IVM Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03)	Plan	1	4/8/2021
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	Process	2	2/28/2025
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	Process	2	6/3/2022
Vegetation Management Notification and Refusal Resolution Policy (VM-06)	Process	1	1/1/2024
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	Process	1	8/25/2023

9.7.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how integrated vegetation management activities are scheduled. This must include how the schedule is affected by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

Due to work specifications, seasonality, and requirements of implementing enhanced right-of-way work on Federal Lands, scheduling is dynamic and coordinated with all applicable stakeholders. Liberty attempts to align fire-resilient rights-of-way projects that overlap with planned system rebuilds, detailed inspections, and routine maintenance work wherever feasible.

9.7.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe changes to its integrated vegetation management activities since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Discuss any planned improvements or updates to integrated vegetation management and the timeline for implementation.

Liberty is developing a Right-of-Way Management Plan as part of its IVM Program. The purpose is to implement a long-term plan to manage ground level vegetation by defining action thresholds to implement work to reduce fuel loads, future line-clearance maintenance needs, promote biodiversity through compatible species management, and maintain accessibility to poles and equipment. Liberty is planning to integrate this plan with detailed inspections and vegetation maintenance work conducted on its circuits once every three years on National Forest Lands where enhanced right-of-way work has occurred beginning in 2026.

Liberty achieved Tree Line USA Recognition in 2025. Liberty plans to maintain its Tree Line USA holding as part of its IVM Program development and maturation.

9.8 Partnerships

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide information on its partnerships with other entities in vegetation management. This may include partnerships with government agencies, non-profit organizations, or coalitions, such as Regional Forest and Fire Capacity Program grantees and local forest collaboratives.⁶⁷ For this section, “partnership” is defined as the combining of resources, expertise, and efforts to accomplish agreed upon objectives related to wildfire risk reduction achieved through vegetation management. The electrical corporation must provide the following summary information in table format for current partnerships and future partnerships the electrical corporation plans to enter during the three years of the WMP cycle:

- Names of all agencies, organizations, or coalitions in the partnership.
- Vegetation management activities performed pursuant to or under the partnership (e.g., thinning, prescribed fire, mastication, invasive plant removal, woody debris management, etc.).
- The objective of the activities performed pursuant to or under the partnership .
- Electrical corporation’s role in the coordination or partnership (e.g., funding, labor, landowner, etc.).
- Anticipated accomplishments of partnership projects during the three years of the WMP cycle, including work done by the electrical corporation and work done by the partnering agency/organization (e.g. number of acres treated, number of trees planted, number of personnel trained, etc.).

The electrical corporation must also provide a narrative overview of, in order: 1) each current and future vegetation management partnership identified in Table 9-3 and 2) vegetation management partnerships it is discontinuing or has discontinued since the last WMP submission and explain why it is discontinuing or has discontinued the vegetation management partnership. Section 9.8.1. provides instructions for the overviews. The sections must be numbered Section 9.8.1 to Section 9.8.n (i.e., each vegetation management partnership is detailed in its own section) with the names of the partnering agencies or organizations as the section title.

⁶⁷ Regional Forest and Fire Capacity Program (<https://www.conservation.ca.gov/dlrp/grant-programs/Pages/Regional-Forest-and-Fire-Capacity-Program.aspx>)

For information on Liberty's partnerships in Vegetation Management, refer to Table 9-4.

Table 9-4: Liberty Partnerships in Vegetation Management

Partnering Agency/Org.	Activities	Objectives	Liberty Role	Anticipated Accomplishments
National Forest Foundation and Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit	Implementation of the Forest Resilience Corridor Project on National Forest Land adjacent to Liberty electrical infrastructure.	Forest Resiliency Corridors, ROWs	Liberty provides funding and in-kind contributions for project work. Liberty is a key stakeholder and involved in the planning and implementation process.	1,138 acres along 28 miles of overhead powerlines on National Forest Land treated.
Arbor Day Foundation	Coordinate Tree Replacement Program in Liberty's service territory	Tree Replacement Program	Client	5,000 compatible plants distributed since the project began in 2022. Maintain Tree Line USA recognition.
Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District	Mastication, chipping, fuels removal, pole grubbing, fire standby, community outreach	Fuel Management, Asset Protection	Client	Implement fuel reduction projects and provide fire standby services to exempt PAL or other restricted operations during fire season.
Truckee Fire Protection District	Fuel management, forest thinning, community outreach.	Fuel reduction and wildfire mitigation work in Truckee Fire Protection jurisdiction and Liberty service area overlap.	Liberty develops specifications and implements fuels and thinning work around powerlines within Truckee Fire Protection District project footprints. Liberty has participated in joint utility and fire agency collaboration and	Continue collaboration on additional joint projects in the Truckee area.

Partnering Agency/Org.	Activities	Objectives	Liberty Role	Anticipated Accomplishments
			ordinance review as a result of this partnership.	
Local Fire, Forestry, Resource Conservation, and Special Interest Groups	Coordination of fuels reduction and wildfire mitigation efforts; knowledge sharing	Wildfire risk reduction.	Participates in weekly meetings with representatives from agencies and organizations invested in wildfire mitigation efforts in the Tahoe Basin. Liberty may implement work based on feedback or to meet mutual objectives of stakeholders.	Leverage opportunities to implement joint projects aimed at mitigating wildfire risk.

9.8.1 VM Partnership with National Forest Foundation and the Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit

9.8.1.1 Overview

The Liberty Utilities Resilience Corridors Project Decision Memo was signed into effect by the US Forest Service in 2019. The multi-year project involves implementation of enhanced fuel treatments along Liberty’s electrical infrastructure on National Forest Land. Liberty entered into a Master Partnership Agreement with the National Forest Foundation (“NFF”) to establish a framework of cooperation and to clarify respective roles and responsibilities in the planning, preparation, and implementation of forest and fuels treatments on land managed by the US Forest Service (“FS”).

9.8.1.2 Partnership History

Liberty established the partnership agreement with the NFF in 2022. Liberty provides funding to the NFF to provide project preparation and administration for this work on behalf of the FS Lake Tahoe Basin Management Unit (“LTBMU”). Liberty also supports the project by providing in-kind contributions including vegetation treatments in the utility corridor, hazard tree mitigation, and surveys in project areas. Liberty works closely with the NFF and the LTBMU to plan, coordinate, and implement resilience corridor work. At the end of 2024 approximately

415 acres of forest land has been treated along 12 miles of Liberty electrical infrastructure through this partnership.

9.8.1.3 Future Projects

Coordination among the partnership is ongoing to implement Zone 1 and 2 treatments within project areas. Liberty plans to leverage this partnership to explore opportunities to implement Zone 3 treatments for the project.

9.8.2 VM Partnership with Arbor Day Foundation

9.8.2.1 Overview

Liberty works with the Arbor Day Foundation to implement its tree replacement program. Liberty provides the Arbor Day Foundation funding for coordinating tree inventory, logistics for method of delivery of trees, support in planning Arbor Day celebrations, marketing tools, a participant survey, and a web-portal used to track program metrics.

9.8.2.2 Partnership History

Liberty began working with the Arbor Day Foundation in 2022 to implement its tree replacement program annually. In 2024, Liberty coordinated with the Arbor Day Foundation to plan a tree give away event as an Arbor Day Celebration.

9.8.2.3 Future Projects

Coordination in this partnership is ongoing, and Liberty plans to offer its tree replacement program annually.

9.8.3 VM Partnership with Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District

9.8.3.1 Overview

Liberty entered into a Master Services Agreement with Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District (“TMFPD”) to conduct vegetation management of ground fuels around Liberty electrical infrastructure, provide qualified stand-by resources as requested when Liberty is engaged in activities during high fire risk conditions, suppression response to fires potentially impacting Liberty infrastructure, and provide staff to represent Liberty and TMFPD interests during community outreach.

9.8.3.2 Partnership History

Liberty established its partnership with TMFPD in 2024.

9.8.3.3 Future Projects

Liberty and TMFPD are currently in the process of planning fuel mitigation projects and other support as needed.

9.8.4 VM Partnership with Truckee Fire Protection District

9.8.4.1 Overview

Truckee Fire Protection District ('TFPD') is a public agency responsible for fire suppression and fire prevention services of 125 square miles in Truckee, California, overlapping portions of Liberty's service territory. The partnership involves collaboration in fuel reduction work, joint utility and fire agency collaboration, and cross training opportunities.

9.8.4.2 Partnership History

Liberty began collaborating with TFPD in 2023 to implement two phases of a roadside fuel break along approximately 15 miles of Liberty distribution lines. Liberty coordinated with TFPD to develop specifications and implement work near the electrical infrastructure and in the utility right-of-way to meet the objectives of the project. TFPD assisted with right of entry agreements with landowners and implemented the work outside of the utility right-of-way. The project was completed in 2024.

In 2024 Liberty and TMFP collaborated with other electric utilities in the jurisdiction to engage on utility vegetation management practices and efforts towards fuel reduction and wildfire prevention within the shared area.

9.8.4.3 Future Projects

This partnership is ongoing. Liberty and TFPD are in process of planning additional joint effort fuel treatments around electrical infrastructure. Liberty and TFPD are also looking into cross training to further enhance knowledge of utility practices and wildfire prevention between the two organizations.

9.8.5 VM Partnership with Local Fire, Forestry, Resource Conservation, and Special Interest Groups

9.8.5.1 Overview

Liberty is active in local special interest groups invested in wildfire mitigation and risk reduction in the service territory. This partnership involves workshopping with various agencies and organization on mutual goals and objectives, industry developments, local priorities, and opportunities for joint project implementation. Representatives from Federal, State, local government agencies, electric utilities, and non-profit organizations invested in wildfire mitigation make up this partnership.

9.8.5.2 Partnership History

Liberty began participating in weekly meetings in this partnership in 2022. This partnership is ongoing, and Liberty continues to meet weekly with South Lake Tahoe Fire, Lake Valley Fire, California Tahoe Conservancy, Tahoe Resource Conservation Group, the US Forest Service, and others to discuss ongoing work. Liberty also participates in other ad hoc special interest groups as needed to cooperate on mutual efforts. These ad hoc committees have helped establish other working partnerships such as with Truckee Fire Protection District.

9.8.5.3 Future Projects

This partnership is ongoing, and Liberty will continue to seek opportunities for collaboration with its agency and local partners to implement additional vegetation management work that meets mutual objectives.

9.9 Activities Based on Weather Conditions

9.9.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of planning and execution of operational changes to address wildfire risk associated with weather conditions such as pruning or removal, executed based on and in advance of a Red Flag Warning or other forecasted weather conditions that indicates an elevated fire threat in terms of ignition likelihood and wildfire potential.

Liberty actively monitors weather forecasts during fire season to prepare for elevated fire risks and Red Flag Warnings. The Fire Prevention Plan outlines restricted operating procedures for high-risk weather conditions. If fire weather thresholds are met within the service territory, Liberty will implement necessary modified operations. Additionally, Liberty tracks Project

Activity Level (PAL) ratings, as determined by the US Forest Service, to adjust vegetation management activities on Federal lands.

9.9.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list applicable electrical corporation procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used for activities based on weather conditions.

Refer to LU Table 9-14.

LU Table 9-14: Vegetation Management Procedures for Activities Based on Weather Conditions

Document Name and ID	Version	Effective Date
Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03)	1	4/8/2021
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	2	6/3/2022
Fire Prevention Plan	1	10/9/2020

9.9.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how activities based on weather conditions are scheduled (or triggered). This must include how the schedule is affected by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

Activities are triggered by continuous monitoring of weather conditions and forecasts, including Liberty's Fire Potential Index ("FPI") across the service territory. When the FPI is forecasted to reach high, very high, or extreme ratings during fire season, it triggers modified operating procedures. Liberty initiates its Fire Prevention Plan, which includes restricted operating procedures for high-risk weather conditions. If weather conditions meet specific fire risk thresholds within the service territory, Liberty promptly implements modified operations. Additionally, Liberty uses Project Activity Level ("PAL") ratings from the US Forest Service to adjust vegetation management activities on Federal lands and modifies daily work schedules accordingly.

9.9.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe changes to its activities based on weather conditions since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Discuss any planned improvements or updates to pole clearing and the timeline for implementation.

Liberty has not made changes to its vegetation management activities based on weather conditions since its last WMP submission.

9.10 Post-Fire Service Restoration

9.10.1 Overview

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of vegetation management activities during post-fire service restoration.

In the post-fire service restoration section, Liberty provides information on its Emergency Response Vegetation Management initiative (WMP-VM-VFM-08). Liberty will conduct patrol inspections described in Section 9.2.2.

Assessments that occur during active restoration of electrical infrastructure and ongoing fire suppression are conducted to identify and mitigate significantly damaged trees exhibiting 50% or more crown loss, severe trunk damage or scorching, and are an immediate or critical risk to restoration efforts or the repaired infrastructure.

9.10.2 Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list applicable electrical corporation procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used for post-fire service restoration vegetation management.

Refer to LU Table 9-15.

LU Table 9-15: Procedures for Post-Fire Restoration

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03)	Plan	1	4/8/2021
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	Process	2	2/28/2025
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	Process	2	6/3/2022
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	Process	1	8/25/2023

9.10.3 Scheduling

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how post-fire service restoration vegetation management are scheduled (or triggered). This must include how the schedule is affected by HFTD tier or other risk designation.

Post-fire vegetation management work is triggered when vegetation and site conditions around Liberty infrastructure are damaged due to wildfire.

9.10.4 Updates

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe changes to post-fire service restoration vegetation management since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Discuss any planned improvements or updates to pole clearing and the timeline for implementation.

Liberty has not made any changes to its vegetation management activities for Post-Fire Service Restoration since its last WMP submission.

9.11 Quality Assurance and Quality Control

9.11.1 Overview, Objectives, and Targets

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of each of its quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) programs for vegetation management. This overview must include the following for each program:

- Initiative/activity being audited (each initiative/activity name must correspond to an initiative/activity described in Sections 9.2 through 9.9)
- Tracking ID from Table 9-1 or 9-2.
- Quality program type (QA or QC).
- Objective of the quality program.
- The electrical corporation must also provide the following tabular information for each QA and QC program:
 - Initiative/activity being audited (each initiative/activity name must correspond to an initiative/activity described in Sections 9.2 through 9.9)
 - Population/sample unit

- Population⁶⁸ size for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle
- Sample size for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle
- Percent of sample in the HFTD for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle
- Confidence level and MOE
- Target pass rate for each audited initiative/activity for each year of the three-year WMP cycle

In the quality assurance and quality control (QA/QC) section, Liberty provides information on its Vegetation Management QA/QC initiative (WMP-VM-QAQC-01). Refer to Table 9-5 and Table 9-6.

Liberty's QA/QC Program is applicable to both vegetation inspections and vegetation management work conducted on private, federal, and state agency land. The QA/QC Program provides VM program oversight to provide reasonable assurance that vegetation inspection and maintenance work is being effectively performed.

The QA/QC Program is aligned with Liberty's Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04) which outlines strategies for performing quality control inspections on the yearly workload. This is completed through statistical sampling and appropriate sample sizes to gauge acceptable quality levels ("AQL") and conformance levels ("CL") based on the selected margin of error ("MoE"). The procedure includes personnel qualification requirements, sampling methodology, sample size by priority, process assessment ("QA"), results evaluation ("QC"), description of post work verification (i.e., desktop review, field review), and types of QC inspections (i.e., pre-inspections, tree pruning and removal, hazard trees, pole brushing, reporting accuracy, inventory reconciliation).

Additionally, Compliance Audits are performed by appropriately trained and qualified entities whose function, and organizational reporting is independent of the VM organization. Compliance Audits are performed to monitor the effectiveness of the Liberty VM program. Program effectiveness is measured by field sampling a statistically valid number of locations to provide an objective Compliance Rate.

⁶⁸ In this section, a population may be the number of circuit miles inspected, the number of poles cleared, trees prescribed work, etc.

Liberty employs both internal and external processes as part of its overall QA/QC strategy:

- *Internal:* A post work documentation review, or desktop review, is performed by Liberty in order to access if all required information has been submitted by the vendor. This review is also used to determine if the invoices are accurate. The review is completed on 100% of submitted invoices. Liberty also conducts a post work validation review, or field review, to assess adherence to work specifications, industry standards, and regulatory requirements.
- *External:* QC inspections are performed by qualified vendors. These QC inspections include work that has been completed in the following categories:
 - Tree Pruning and Removal
 - Detailed Inspections
 - Hazard Tree Work
 - Pole Clearing
- *External:* Compliance Audits are performed by qualified vendors. A Compliance Audit is a statistically valid field review of overhead distribution and transmission lines for adherence to regulation clearance requirements. A statistically valid sample size of spans is randomized for selection of the Compliance Audits and the tree population size at each sample location is recorded to determine the compliance and conformance rate.

Table 9-5: Vegetation Management QA and QC Program Objectives

Initiative/Activity Being Audited	Tracking ID	Quality Program Type	Objective of the Quality Program
Completed Tree Work	WMP-VM-VFM-05	QC	To provide reasonable assurance that Tree Work is being completed as prescribed and in compliance with applicable regulations
Detailed Inspections	WMP-VM-INSP-01	QC	To provide reasonable assurance that Detailed Inspections are being performed as scheduled
Hazard Tree Work	WMP-VM-VFM-06	QC	To provide reasonable assurance that Hazard Tree Work is being completed as prescribed and in compliance with applicable regulations
Pole Clearing	WMP-VM-VFM-01	QC	To provide reasonable assurance that Pole Clearing Work is being completed as prescribed and in compliance with applicable regulations
Compliance with minimum clearance requirements	WMP-VM-VFM-01	Compliance Audit	To provide reasonable assurance that minimum clearance requirements are being maintained

Table 9-6: Vegetation Management QA and QC Activity Targets

Initiative/ Activity Being Audited	Population /Sample Unit	2026 Population Size	2026 Sample Size	2026 % of Sample in HFTD	2027 Population Size	2027 Sample Size	2027 % of Sample in HFTD	2028: Population Size	2028 Sample Size	2028 % of Sample in HFTD	Confidence level / MOE	2026 Pass Rate Target	2027 Pass Rate Target	2028 Pass Rate Target
Completed Tree Work	Annual Circuit Miles	700 Miles	228 Miles	100%	700 Miles	228 Miles	100%	700 Miles	228 Miles	100%	99/7	95%	95%	95%
Detailed Inspections	Annual Circuit Miles	233 Miles	76 Miles	100%	233 Miles	76 Miles	100%	233 Miles	76 Miles	100%	99/7 ⁶⁹	95%	95%	95%
Hazard Tree Work	Annual Hazard Trees	6,000 Trees	597 Trees	100%	6,000 Trees	597 Trees	100%	6,000 Trees	597 Trees	100%	99/5	95%	95%	95%
Pole Clearing	Annual Poles	4,900 Poles	584 Poles	100%	4,900 Poles	584 Poles	100%	4,900 Poles	584 Poles	100%	99/5	92%	92%	92%
Compliance Audit	Circuit Miles	700 Miles	40 Miles	100%	700 Miles	40 Miles	100%	700 Miles	40 Miles	100%	95/3	99%	99%	99%

⁶⁹ Due to the small number of units in this category, the sample size was based on the 3-year plan. 700 miles over the 3-year period (233 miles per year) at a CL of 99 and MoE of 7 results in 228 miles during that 3-year period or 76 miles annually. .

9.11.2 QA/QC Procedures

In this section, the electrical corporation must list the applicable procedure(s), including the version(s) and effective date(s), used for each vegetation management QA and QC program listed in Table 9-20.

Refer to LU Table 9-16.

LU Table 9-16: Vegetation Management QA/QC Procedures

Document Name and ID	Type	Version	Effective Date
Vegetation Management Plan (VM-02)	Plan	3	4/10/2025
Hazard Tree Management Plan (VM-03)	Plan	1	4/8/2021
Post Work Verification Procedure (VM-04)	Process	2	2/28/2025
Vegetation Threat Procedure (VM-05)	Process	2	6/3/2022
Vegetation Management Inspection Manual (VM-07)	Process	1	8/25/2023

9.11.3 Sample Sizes

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it determines the sample for each QA and QC program listed in Table 9-4. This must include how HFTD tier or other risk designations affect the sampling plan, and how the electrical corporation ensures samples are representative of the population.

Liberty treats its entire service territory as an HFRA. There are no other variables used that affect the sampling plan. Liberty provides information regarding its VM QA/QC Program sample size and units below in LU Table 9-17 and Figure 9-2.

LU Table 9-17: Vegetation Management QA/QC Sample Size

Work Type	Category	Annual Circuit Miles	Annual Hazard Trees	Annual Poles	Statistical Sampling		
					CL/MoE	%	Units
Completed Tree Work	Transmission and Distribution	700	-	-	99/7	33	228 Miles
Detailed Inspections	Transmission and Distribution	233	-	-	99/7 ⁷⁰	33	76 Miles
Hazard Tree Work	Transmission and Distribution	-	6,000	-	99/5	10	597 Trees
Pole Clearing	Transmission and Distribution	-	-	4,900	99/5	12	584 Poles
Compliance Audit	Transmission and Distribution	700	-	-	95/3 ⁷¹	6	40 Miles

Figure 9-2: Vegetation Management QC Sample Size Calculation Example

Sample Size Calculation Example

Common Confidence Levels:

CL	Z-Score
99%	2.576
95%	1.96
90%	1.645

Standard Deviation (Std Dev): Remains ConstantMargin of Error (MoE): Can Vary 1-10%Population Size:

Sample - Underlying Calculations:

$$\text{Sample Size} = \frac{[\text{Z-Score}^2 \times \text{Standard Deviation} \times (1 - \text{Standard Deviation}) / \text{Margin of Error}^2]}{[(\text{Z-Score}^2 \times \text{Standard Deviation} \times (1 - \text{Standard Deviation}) / \text{Margin of Error}^2 \times \text{Population Size}) + 1]}$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = [2.576^2 \times 0.5 \times (1 - 0.5) / 0.05^2] / [(2.576^2 \times 0.5 \times (1 - 0.5) / 0.05^2 \times 2500) + 1]$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = 663.578 / 1.2654$$

$$\text{Sample Size} = \boxed{524}$$

Figure 9-3: Compliance Audit Sample Size Calculation

Compliance Audit Sample Size Calculation				
Inputs				
CL	Z-Score	Std Dev	MoE	Population
95%	1.96	99%	3%	700
Results				
40	6%			

9.11.4 Pass Rate Calculations

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it calculates pass rates. This description must include:

- The sample unit that generates the pass rate for each QA and QC program (e.g., for pole clearing, the sample unit that generates the pass rate may be a single pole that passes or fails a QC audit).
- The pass and failure criteria for each program listed in Table 9-20. List each criterion and discuss any weighted contributions to the pass rate.

Liberty uses the sample units in LU Table 9-18 to establish the pass rate for each Work Type.

LU Table 9-18: Pass Rate Sample Units

Work Type	Category	Sample Unit
Completed Tree Work	Transmission and Distribution	Single Tree
Detailed Inspections	Transmission and Distribution	Single Tree
Hazard Tree Work	Transmission and Distribution	Single Tree
Pole Clearing	Transmission and Distribution	Single Pole

⁷⁰ Due to the small number of units, in this category, the sample size was based on the 3-year plan. 700 miles over the 3-year period (233 miles per year) at a CL of 99 and MoE of 7 results in 228 miles during that 3-year period or 76 miles annually.

⁷¹ The sample size selection methodology for the Compliance Audit varies from the sample size selection methodology for QC inspections. A 95% CL, 3% MoE, and 99% Std Dev (historical rate of compliance) was used for the Compliance Audit.

Liberty uses the criteria in LU Table 9-19, LU Table 9-20, LU Table 9-21, and LU Table 9-22 when evaluating pass rates for each Work Type. The pass rates are averaged for all conditions evaluated.

LU Table 9-19: Completed Tree Work Criteria

Conditions Evaluated	Category
Work Performed as Prescribed	Pass / Fail
Maintenance Clearance Distance Achieved	Pass / Fail
Will Hold Until Next Inspection	Pass / Fail
Potential Hazard Remains	Pass / Fail
Site Clean	Pass / Fail
ANSI Pruning Applied	Pass / Fail
Other Trees Affected	Pass / Fail
Site Condition Stable	Pass / Fail

LU Table 9-20: VM Detailed Inspections Criteria

Conditions Evaluated	Category
Location Information Correct	Pass / Fail
Species Correct	Pass / Fail
Quantity Correct	Pass / Fail
Work Type Noted	Pass / Fail
Tree Health Noted	Pass / Fail
Priority Noted	Pass / Fail
Project Type Noted	Pass / Fail
Clean Up Method Noted	Pass / Fail
Quantity of Non-Listed Trees	Pass / Fail

LU Table 9-21: Hazard Tree Work Criteria

Conditions Evaluated	Category
Work Performed as Prescribed	Pass / Fail
Potential Hazard Remains	Pass / Fail
Site Clean	Pass / Fail
Other Trees Affected	Pass / Fail
Site Condition Stable	Pass / Fail

LU Table 9-22: Pole Clearing Criteria

Conditions Evaluated	Category
Location Information Correct	Pass / Fail
Subject Pole	Pass / Fail
Pole Clearing Tag	Pass / Fail
PRC 4292 Radial Clearance	Pass / Fail
PRC 4292 Vertical Clearance 0-8ft	Pass / Fail
PRC 4292 Vertical Clearance >8ft	Pass / Fail
ANSI Pruning Applied	Pass / Fail
Site Clean	Pass / Fail

Compliance Audit Pass Rate Criteria:

The number of trees found within regulated clearance distance during the compliance audit is measured against the total population of trees within the sample to determine the compliance rate. Population is defined as the count of trees that have been pruned and/or are expected to encroach regulation clearance distance within 3 years within each span evaluated from the sample size. Trees within Regulated Clearance Distance is defined as the count of trees within regulated clearance distances (4' for 12kv - 60kv, 10' for 120kv) within the evaluated sample.

9.11.5 Other Metrics

In this section, the electrical corporation must list and describe the metrics used by the electrical corporation, other than pass rate, to evaluate the effectiveness of its QA and QC programs and procedures (e.g., find rate, rework rate, outage rate within 6 months of inspection attributed to vegetation contact, etc.).

As described in Section 9.11.1, Liberty uses the results of the external Compliance Audit as a metric to provide reasonable assurance that work is being completed as assigned and/or prescribed and in compliance with applicable regulations.

9.11.6 Documentation of Findings

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it documents its QA and QC findings and incorporates lessons learned from those findings into corrective actions, trainings, and procedures.

Liberty reviews QC reports and assigns rework where applicable. Typically, Liberty will provide corrective actions to its vendors where rework is needed and conduct tailboards with vegetation crews in the field to review QC findings and work towards improvements. Liberty also reviews overall scores for each QC component and provides scores and areas for improvement to its vegetation contractors annually.

9.11.7 Changes to QA/QC Since Last WMP and Planned Improvements

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe:

- A list of changes the electrical corporation made to its QA and QC procedure(s) since its last WMP submission.
- Justification for each of the changes including references to lessons learned as applicable.
- A list of planned future improvements and/or updates to QA and QC procedure(s) including a timeline for implementation.

In its 2024 WMP Update, Liberty provided information on its Compliance Audit procedure (formerly called QA Inspections). Liberty has updated the naming of this QC program component to Compliance Audit for consistency within the industry.

Liberty is currently not planning any updates to its QA/QC program.

9.12 Work Orders

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of how it manages its work orders resulting from vegetation management inspections that prescribe vegetation management activities. This overview must include the following under these headers:

9.12.1 Priority Assignment

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how work orders are assigned priority, including the initiative timeline for each priority level/group.

Procedures documenting work order process: Liberty implements several plans and procedures that provide guidance for action thresholds for creation and completion of work

orders for vegetation management work: VM-02 Vegetation Management Plan, VM-03 Hazard Tree Management Plan, VM-05 Vegetation Threats Procedure, and VM-07 Inspection Manual.

How work orders are prioritized based on risk: During inspections, trees and vegetation identified as requiring work for the current maintenance cycle are assigned a work order with a priority condition based on the observed field conditions at time of inspection. VM-05, Vegetation Threat Procedure, describes the criteria for assigned work order priority and mitigation timelines:

Potential Tree or Limb Failures

- *Priority 1 Conditions:* Any observed tree, or parts thereof, that is failing or expected to imminently fail and contact electric facilities or any observed tree, or parts thereof, where it appears that contact has occurred with electric facilities.
 - *P1 Mitigation:* Clear the threat within 24 hours.
- *Priority 2 Conditions:* Any observed tree, or parts thereof, that is not a Priority 1 condition but is likely to fail and impact electric facilities prior to issuing a planned maintenance work order (failure may be expected within 6 months).
 - *P2 Mitigation:* Clear the threat within 30 days.
- *Priority 3 Conditions:* Any observed tree, or parts thereof, that is not a Priority 1 or Priority 2 condition but there is a probability of failure and contact with electric facilities within two years.
 - *P3 Mitigation:* Add to the tree inventory for creating and scheduling a planned maintenance work order. The threat shall be reassessed or mitigated within nine months.
- *Priority 4 Conditions:* Any observed tree, or parts thereof, that is not considered a Priority 1, Priority 2, or Priority 3 condition, is currently stable, may be in decline or defective, but is not expected to fail and contact electric facilities.

Potential Tree Growth Encroachments

- *Priority 1 Conditions:* Any observed vegetation condition, resulting from tree growth or tree sway, where it appears that contact has occurred with electrical facilities.
 - *P1 Mitigation:* Clear to the MCD within 24 hours.
- *Priority 2 Conditions:* Any observed vegetation condition, resulting from tree growth, that is not a Priority 1 but is within the Regulation Clearance Distance
 - *P2 Mitigation:* Clear to the MCD within 30 days.

- **Priority 3 Conditions:** Any observed vegetation condition, resulting from tree growth, that is not a Priority 1 or Priority 2 condition but requires work prior to the next inspection (12 to 18-months) to maintain the Regulation Clearance Distance
 - **P3 Mitigation:** Clear to the MCD no later than nine-months from initial inspection.

9.12.2 Backlog Elimination

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe the plan for eliminating work order backlogs (i.e., open work orders that have passed initiative timelines), if applicable.

Liberty does not have a backlog of vegetation management work orders.

9.12.3 Trends

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe of trends with respect to open work orders and:

- An aging report for work orders past due (i.e., work orders that were not completed within the electrical corporation's assigned initiative timelines per priority level/group described in Section 9.11.1) (Table 9-5 and Table 9-6 provides the required format).

Liberty completes work orders based on timelines described in Section 9.12.1. There is no backlog of past due work orders. Refer to Table 9-7 and Table 9-8.

Table 9-7: Number of Past Due Vegetation Management Work Orders Categorized by Age and HFTD Tier

HFTD Area	0-30 Days	31-90 Days	91-180 Days	181+ Days
Non-HFTD	0	0	0	0
HFTD Tier 2	0	0	0	0
HFTD Tier 3	0	0	0	0

Table 9-8: Number of Past Due Vegetation Management Work Orders Categorized by Age and Priority Levels

HFTD Area	0-30 Days	31-90 Days	91-180 Days	181+ Days
Priority 1	0	0	0	0
Priority 2	0	0	0	0
Priority 3	0	0	0	0

9.13 Workforce Planning

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of vegetation management and inspections personnel.

The electrical corporation must:

- List all worker titles relevant to vegetation management and inspections including, but not limited to, titles related to inspecting, auditing, and tree crews.
- List and describe minimum qualifications for each worker title with an emphasis on qualifications relevant to vegetation management.

o The electrical corporation must note if workers with title hold any certifications, such as being an International Society of Arboriculture Certified Arborist or a California-licensed Registered Professional Forester.

Refer to Table 9-9.

Table 9-9: Vegetation Management Qualifications and Training

Worker Title	Minimum Qualifications for Target Role	Applicable Certifications	# of Electrical Corporation Employees with Min Quals	# of Electrical Corporation Employees with Applicable Certifications	# of Contracted Employees with Min Quals	# of Contracted Employees with Applicable Certifications	Total # of Employees	Reference to Electrical Corporation Training/Qualification Programs
Supervisor, Vegetation Management	Five years' experience in utility arboriculture; Bachelor's degree or equivalent	ISA Certified Arborist or Registered Professional Forester, ISA Utility Specialist	1	1	0	0	1	No formal training program required for this position.
System Arborist/Forester	Three years' experience in utility arboriculture; Bachelor's degree or equivalent	ISA Certified Arborist or Registered Professional Forester, ISA Utility Specialist	4	4	0	0	4	No formal training program required for this position.
Supervisor, Utility Forester	Three years' experience in utility arboriculture	ISA Certified Arborist or Registered Professional Forester	0	0	1	1	1	No formal training program required for this position.
Utility Forester I	Less than one year experience in utility arboriculture	None	0	0	0	0	0	No formal training program required for this position.
Utility Forester II	One year experience in utility arboriculture	None	0	0	0	0	0	No formal training program required for this position.
Utility Forester III	Two years' experience in utility arboricultural	ISA Certified Arborist or Registered Professional Forester	0	0	1	1	1	No formal training program required for this position.
Utility Forester IV	Three years' experience in utility arboriculture	ISA Certified Arborist or Registered Professional Forester	0	0	0	0	0	No formal training program required for this position.
Utility Forester V	Five years' experience in utility arboriculture	ISA Certified Arborist, ISA Certified Utility Specialist or Registered Professional Forester	0	0	5	5	5	No formal training program required for this position.
Vegetation Coordinator	One year experience in utility arboriculture	None	0	0	1	1	1	No formal training program required for this position.
Tree Crew Supervisor	18 months experience as Line Clearance Certified Tree Worker	ISA Certified Arborist, EHAP, CPR + First Aid, OSHA 10, OSHA 30, CTSP	0	0	5	2 ISA Certified Arborist, 5 EHAP, CPR + First Aid; 1 OSHA 10, OSHA 30, CTSP	5	No formal training program required for this position.
Line Clearance Certified Tree Worker	18 months experience as Apprentice Line Clearance Certified Tree Worker	EHAP, CPR + First Aid, OSHA 10, OSHA 30, OSHA 40	0	0	12	12 EHAP, CPR + First Aid; 2 OSHA 10; 1 OSHA 30, OSHA 40	12	No formal training program required for this position.
Apprentice Line Clearance Certified Tree Worker	Two years' experience as a Groundperson	EHAP, CPR + First Aid, OSHA 10, CTSP	0	0	11	11 EHAP, CPR + First Aid; 1 OSHA 10; 1 CTSP	11	No formal training program required for this position.
Equipment Operator	Commercial Driver's License	EHAP, CPR + First Aid	0	0	2	2	2	No formal training program required for this position.
Groundperson/Flagger	Related training and on the job experience	EHAP, CPR + First Aid	0	0	15	15	15	No formal training program required for this position.

Note: Personnel and certificate holder numbers may fluctuate.

9.13.1 Recruitment

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it recruits vegetation management and inspections personnel, including any relevant partnerships with colleges or universities.

Liberty requires employees within the VM Department to hold professional credentials and to complete ongoing training necessary to maintain applicable certifications. Being a Certified Arborist by the International Society of Arboriculture (“ISA”) with three years of relevant experience is the minimum requirement to be employed by Liberty as a System Arborist or System Forester. Additional training and credentials beyond the minimum are encouraged to further the professional development of employees and to provide a well-trained, motivated workforce.

Liberty’s internal vegetation management personnel provide monitoring, oversight, and evaluation of vegetation inspections and maintenance projects. Liberty VM staff operate in high-level program and project management roles to implement the vegetation management program. Liberty’s VM employees are mentors and provide continued leadership to vegetation management contractors to bring alignment with the overall goals and objectives of the program.

Liberty has been proactive in acquiring and developing trained internal VM staff and has used historical data to assess the number of Liberty employees necessary to implement the VM program. Liberty has been successful in recruiting qualified personnel for its vegetation management positions. Liberty employs a very qualified workforce with a high concentration of advanced credentials (see LU Table 9-23).

LU Table 9-23: Liberty VM Credentials or Certifications

Credential or Certification Type	Liberty Internal VM Full-Time Employees with Credentials	
	Number	Percentage
ISA Certified Arborist	6	86%
ISA Tree Risk Assessment Qualification	5	71%
ISA Certified Utility Specialist	6	86%
ISA Board Certified Master Arborist	1	14%
ISA Prescription Pruning Qualification	1	14%
Certified Tree Safety Professional	1	14%
Utility Vegetation Management Professional Certificate	1	14%
PMI Project Management Professional	1	14%

Liberty's contract specifications describe minimum requirements for contract personnel. Liberty reviews contract personnel qualifications to remain in compliance with the stated requirements and works with vendors to assign personnel to appropriate tasks. This process is applied consistently throughout the Liberty service territory.

9.14 Training and Retention

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe how it trains its vegetation management and inspection personnel, including any requirements for continued/refresher education and programs to improve worker qualifications.

Liberty continually seeks opportunities to host field trainings, benchmarking, and tailboards on utility arboriculture topics among VM groups to align on industry practices and obtain continuing education units ("CEU") to keep professional certifications in good standing. Depending on the subject and learning objectives, training will be developed by a combination of Liberty's highly qualified utility arborists and consultants who are subject matter experts in specific fields within utility vegetation management. Specific opportunities include both standard and specialized learning opportunities including:

- Electrical hazard awareness training
- Internal and external peer-to-peer training and knowledge sharing
- Liberty-specific plant identification training for IVM program development
- Industry standards and best practices training for utility VM operations

Liberty has also developed online training modules for onboarding new vegetation management employees and contractors. Liberty is in the process of planning and development of additional modules to expand its training program.

Vegetation inspections worker qualifications: Minimum qualifications for worker titles listed in Table 9-31 establish personnel that are proficient in providing vegetation inspections on Liberty's system. Personnel performing vegetation inspections on Liberty's system must demonstrate the required level of competence, gained through technical training, work experience, and professional credentials, set in place by minimum qualifications for each worker title. Liberty's VM inspection contractors employ their own training programs to provide Liberty with a qualified workforce for its system.

Vegetation Management projects worker qualifications: Minimum qualifications for worker titles listed in Table 9-31 verify that personnel are proficient in providing the work required for vegetation management projects along Liberty's system. Personnel performing tree work for

vegetation management projects must demonstrate the required level of competence, gained through technical training and work experience, set in place by minimum qualifications for each worker title. Liberty's line-clearance tree contractors employ their own training programs to meet minimum qualifications of qualified workforce for Liberty's system.

10. Situational Awareness and Forecasting

Each electrical corporation's WMP must include plans for situational awareness:⁷²

10.1 Targets

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide qualitative and quantitative targets for each year of this three-year cycle. The electrical corporation must provide at least one qualitative and quantitative target for the following initiatives:

- Environmental Monitoring Systems (Section 10.2)
- Grid Monitoring Systems (Section 10.3)
- Ignition Detection Systems (Section 10.4)
- Weather Forecasting (Section 10.5)
- Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration (Section 10.5.5)

10.1.1 Qualitative Targets

The electrical corporation must provide qualitative targets for its three-year plan for implementing and improving its situational awareness and forecasting,⁷³ including the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs ("Previous Tracking ID"), if applicable.
- A completion date for when the electrical corporation will achieve the target.
- Reference(s) to the WMP section(s) or appendix, including page numbers, where the details of the target(s) are documented and substantiated.

Refer to Table 10-1.

10.1.2 Quantitative Targets

The electrical corporation must list all quantitative targets it will use to track progress on its situational awareness and forecasting in its three-year plan, broken out by each year of the WMP cycle. Electrical corporations must show progress toward completing quantitative targets

⁷² Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(2)-(5).

⁷³ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

in subsequent reports, including data submissions and WMP Updates.⁷⁴ For each target, the electrical corporation must provide the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs (“Previous Tracking ID”), if applicable.
- Projected targets and totals for each of the three years of the WMP cycle, e.g., [Year 1] end of year total, [Year 2] total, and [Year 3] total, three-year total and the associated units for the targets.
- The expected % risk reduction⁷⁵ for each of the three years of the WMP cycle.

The electrical corporation’s targets must provide enough detail to effectively inform efforts to improve the performance of the electrical corporation’s situational awareness and forecasting initiatives.

Refer to Table 10-1.

⁷⁴ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

⁷⁵ The expected % risk reduction is the expected percentage risk reduction per year, as described in Section 6.2.1.2.

Table 10-1: Situational Awareness WMP Initiative Targets

WMP Initiative Category	Initiative	Activity (Tracking ID #)	Quantitative or Qualitative Target	Target Unit	2026 End of Year Total / Completion Date	% Risk Reduction for 2026	2027 Total / Status	% Risk Reduction for 2027	2028 Total / Status	% Risk Reduction for 2028	Three-Year Total	Section; Page Number
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Environmental monitoring systems	Fuel Moisture Sampling (WMP-SA-01)	Quantitative	Fuel sampling locations monitored	5	Not calculated	5	Not calculated	5	Not calculated	15	10.2.1; pp. 223-226
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Environmental monitoring systems	Fuel Moisture Sampling (WMP-SA-01)	Qualitative	Use field collected fuel moisture samples to supplement automated ERC percentiles	Complete December 31, 2026	Not calculated	Complete December 31, 2027	Not calculated	Complete December 31, 2028	Not calculated	Complete	10.2.1; pp. 223-226
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Grid monitoring systems	WMP-SA-02	Quantitative	Fault Indicators Installed	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	10.3.1; pp. 230-232
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Grid monitoring systems	WMP-SA-02	Qualitative	Sensitive Earth Fault (SEF) protection module study	Complete December 31, 2026	Not calculated	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	ACI: LU-25U-08
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Ignition Detection Systems	WMP-SA-03	Quantitative	Wildfire Cameras Sponsored	8	Not calculated	8	Not calculated	8	Not calculated	24	10.4.1; pp. 234-236
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Ignition Detection Systems	WMP-SA-03	Qualitative	Finalize Agreement with UNR for wildfire camera sponsorship	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	Not calculated	Complete	10.4.1; pp. 234-236
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Weather forecasting	WMP-SA-04	Quantitative	Percent of weather stations in service	80%	Not calculated	80%	Not calculated	80%	Not calculated	80%	10.2.1; pp. 223-226 10.5.5; pp. 240-241
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Weather forecasting	WMP-SA-04	Qualitative	Maintain fire weather dashboard functionality	Complete December 31, 2026	Not calculated	Complete December 31, 2027	Not calculated	Complete December 31, 2028	Not calculated	Complete	10.5.1; pp. 237-239
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration	Weather Station Inspections (WMP-SA-01)	Quantitative	Weather Stations Inspected	39	Not calculated	39	Not calculated	39	Not calculated	117	10.5.5; pp. 240-241
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration	Weather Station Health (WMP-SA-01)	Qualitative	Conduct necessary repairs and updates to maintain weather station network health	Complete December 31, 2026	Not calculated	Complete December 31, 2027	Not calculated	Complete December 31, 2028	Not calculated	Complete	10.5.5; pp. 240-241

10.2 Environmental Monitoring Systems

Tracking ID: WMP-SA-01

10.2.1 Existing Systems, Technologies, and Procedures

The electrical corporation must report on the environmental monitoring systems and related technologies and procedures currently in use, highlighting any improvements made since the last WMP submission. The electrical corporation must discuss systems, technologies, and procedures related to the reporting of the following:

- Current weather conditions:
 - o Air temperature
 - o Relative humidity
 - o Wind velocity (speed and direction)
- Fuel characteristics:
 - o Seasonal trends in fuel moisture

Each system must be summarized in Table 10-2. The electrical corporation must provide the following additional information for each system in the accompanying narrative:

- Generalized location of the system / locations measured by the system (e.g., HTFD, entire service territory)
- Integration with the broader electrical corporation's system
- How measurements from the system are verified
- Frequency of maintenance
- For intermittent systems (e.g., aerial imagery, line patrols), what triggers collection. This should include flow charts and equations as appropriate.
- For calculated quantities, how raw measurements are converted into calculated quantities. This should include flow charts and equations as appropriate.

Liberty utilizes a network of weather stations and fuel moisture sampling locations to monitor environmental conditions within its service territory. These systems provide critical real-time data on weather variables such as temperature, humidity, and wind speed, as well as fuel moisture levels. This information is essential for assessing risks and validating weather forecasts, which supports the safe operation of the electric grid during extreme weather events. Liberty provides information on its Environmental Monitoring Systems in Table 10-2.

Table 10-2: Liberty Environmental Monitoring Systems


System	Measurement/ Observation	Frequency	Purpose and Integration
Weather stations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Temperature (°F) • Dew Point (%) • Wind Speed (mph) • Wind Direction • Wind Gust (mph) • Wind Gust Direction • Latest Rain (inches) • Fuel Moisture (%) • Soil Moisture (%) • Soil Temperature (°F) 	6 observations per hour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve weather forecasts with observed weather station data • Configure alerts • Generate reports
Remote sensing fuel moisture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fuel Moisture (%) 	6 observations per hour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Calculate fuel moisture content
Remote sensing soil moisture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Soil Moisture (%) 	6 observations per hour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Calculate soil moisture content
Fuel moisture field sampling	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Live woody (%) • 1,000 hour (%) • Live fuel moisture by predominant species 	1 per week	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Calculate Energy Release Component • Fire behavior calculations

Liberty's weather station network consists of 39 weather stations (see Figure 10-1) that are distributed throughout the entire service territory. In addition to Liberty's weather stations, there are RAWS and NWS weather stations within the service territory that are monitored. Liberty's weather station data are uploaded to MesoWest for integration into Liberty's risk models developed by Technosylva. Weather station measurements are also made available to the public at <https://liberty.westernweathergroup.com/>

Weather stations are integrated into Liberty's fire weather dashboard where forecasted weather is plotted with weather station observations to evaluate how well models are performing. This provides accurate measurements to validate the accuracy of models used to determine the scope of PSPS events. During PSPS events, the weather station data are used as a tool when determining timing of PSPS stages for areas under consideration for PSPS.

Maintenance and calibration of weather stations, described in Section 10.5.5, is performed on an annual basis to perform any necessary repairs or updates.


Figure 10-1: Liberty's Weather Station Network Coverage



Seasonal variations in fuel moisture conditions are tracked through a combination of analytical methods and field-based fuel moisture sampling. Observed and forecasted Energy Release Component (ERC) percentiles from the USFS Wildland Fire Assessment System (WFAS) are used to monitor intermediate to long-term fuel dryness. This data is generated from Remote Automated Weather Station (RAWS) observations and the National Weather Service (NWS) National Digital Forecast Database (NDFD). WFAS data is supplemented with in-situ fuel moisture sampling at five locations within Liberty's service territory. This sampling targets values that are challenging to accurately calculate from weather observations, including 1,000-hour dead fuel moisture, live woody fuel moisture, and foliar moisture content. Liberty provides details of its fuel moisture sampling sites in Figure 10-2. These readings are used to calculate ERC percentiles and inform fire behavior calculations when adverse weather conditions are forecast. Liberty provides the process for converting fuel moisture samples into calculated ERC


percentiles in Figure 10-3.⁷⁶ Additionally, the fuel moisture samples serve as a reference point to validate the automated WFAS ERC percentiles.

Figure 10-2: Liberty Fuel Moisture Sampling Site Details



⁷⁶ https://www.fs.usda.gov/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr082/psw_gtr082.pdf, p.12.

Figure 10-3: ERC Calculations from Fuel Moisture Sampling



10.2.2 Evaluation and Selection of New Systems


The electrical corporation must describe how it evaluates the need for additional environmental monitoring systems. This description must include:

- How the electrical corporation evaluates the impact of new systems on reducing risk (e.g., expected quantitative improvement in weather forecasting).
- How the electrical corporation evaluates the efficacy of new technologies.

These descriptions must include flow charts as appropriate.

When evaluating the need for additional monitoring systems, Liberty will follow the process outlined below in Figure 10-4.

Figure 10-4: Evaluation of New Systems



1. Identify Objectives

- Define Goals: Establish the primary objectives for implementing new systems.
- Stakeholder Input: Gather input from key stakeholders to understand their needs and expectations.

2. Assess Current Capabilities

- Inventory Existing Systems: Review and document the capabilities of current environmental monitoring systems.
- Identify Gaps: Determine any deficiencies or areas where current systems fall short.
- If deficiencies are identified, proceed. If not, the evaluation is complete.

3. Evaluate Potential Solutions

- Research Technologies: Investigate available technologies and solutions that could address identified gaps.
- Cost-Benefit Analysis: Perform a cost-benefit analysis to evaluate the financial and operational impacts of potential solutions.
- If potential solutions are identified, proceed. If not, the evaluation is complete.

4. Assessment

- Impact Analysis: Assess how new systems can achieve identified objectives.

- If potential solutions could meet objectives, proceed. If not, the evaluation is complete.
5. Testing
- Implement Pilot Programs: Conduct pilot tests of selected technologies to evaluate their performance in real-world conditions.
 - Collect Data: Gather data on the effectiveness and reliability of the new systems during the pilot phase.
 - If the testing is successful, proceed. If not, the evaluation is complete.
6. Review and Decision-Making
- Analyze Results: Review data collected from pilot tests to determine the efficacy of the new systems.
 - Stakeholder Review: Present findings to stakeholders for feedback and approval.
7. Implementation
- Develop Implementation Plan: Create a detailed plan for the full-scale implementation of successful systems.
 - Training and Support: Provide training and support to ensure smooth integration of new systems into existing operations.

10.2.3 Planned Improvements

The electrical corporation must describe its planned improvements for its environmental monitoring systems.⁷⁷ This must include any plans for the following:

- Expansion of existing systems
- Establishment of new systems

Liberty does not currently have plans for expansion of existing systems or establishment of new system.

10.2.4 Evaluating Activities

The electrical corporation must describe its procedures for the ongoing evaluation of the efficacy of its environmental monitoring activity (program).

Liberty maintains a focus on reliable and accurate environmental monitoring systems to support wildfire mitigation and operational decision-making. The annual weather station maintenance and calibration program is designed to maintain the reliability and accuracy of the

⁷⁷ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

weather monitoring network. In addition, Liberty collaborates with third-party experts and consultants to evaluate the effectiveness of its weather stations, fuel moisture sampling methods, and weather forecasting accuracy. These reviews help identify opportunities to enhance the overall quality and impact of environmental monitoring activities.

10.3 Grid Monitoring Systems

The electrical corporation must describe its systems and procedures used to monitor the operational conditions of its equipment.⁷⁸ These observations should inform the electrical corporation's near-real-time risk assessment. The electrical corporation must document:

- Existing systems, technologies, and procedures
- Procedure used to evaluate the need for additional systems
- Implementation schedule for any planned additional systems
- How the efficacy of systems for reducing risk are monitored

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.:

Tracking ID: WMP-SA-02

10.3.1 Existing Systems, Technologies, and Procedures

The electrical corporation must report on the grid system monitoring systems and related technologies and procedures currently in use, highlighting any improvements made since the last WMP submission. At a minimum, the electrical corporation must discuss systems, technologies, and procedures related to the detection of:

- Faults (e.g., fault anticipators, rapid earth fault current limiters, etc.)
- Failures
- Recloser operations
- Each system must be summarized in Table 10-3 below. The electrical corporation must provide the following information for each system in the accompanying narrative:
 - Location of the system / locations measured by the system.
 - Integration with the broader electrical corporation's system.
 - How measurements from the system are verified.
 - For intermittent systems (e.g., aerial imagery, line patrols), description of what triggers collection. This must include flow charts and equations where appropriate.

⁷⁸ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(3), (6), (22).

- For calculated quantities, how raw measurements are converted to calculated quantities. This must include flow charts and equations where appropriate.

Liberty includes the installation of fault indicators as part of its Fast Trip or SRP Program. Fault indicators expedite power restoration during an outage by helping line crews locate the fault. Liberty has installed the majority of fault indicators on taps off the main line, which enables line crews to focus their restoration efforts by driving along the main line to see if fault indicators have lit up. This helps line crews avoid patrolling unnecessary sections of the line and makes restoration efforts more efficient when there is less sunlight. Liberty provides information on its Grid Monitoring System in Table 10-3.

Liberty's substations are equipped with a variety of protective relays and monitoring equipment that enable remote visibility and control. While Liberty has implemented SEL-651RA controllers at most recloser locations to capture real-time SCADA data, fault event data, and Sequence of Events Recorder ("SER") data, similar capabilities exist at substations. Substation protective relays—such as those manufactured by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (SEL)—are also integrated into Liberty's SCADA system.

These substation relays are configured to send operational and fault-related data to engineering staff through SEL's AcSELerator TEAM platform. When a relay detects and logs an event, the system automatically notifies Liberty engineers via email, allowing for timely review and response. This process supports Liberty's situational awareness and enables the engineering team to identify potential mis-operations.

When system operators observe abnormal behavior or suspect mis-operation at a substation, a formal engineering review is conducted. The team analyzes relay event records, fault waveforms, and SER data to determine root cause. Based on the analysis, a corrective action plan is developed, which may include adjustments to relay settings, maintenance scheduling, or system configuration changes.

Table 10-3: Liberty Grid Monitoring Systems

System	Measurement/ Observation	Frequency	Purpose and Integration
Fault indicators	Line tripped or Line not tripped	Varies based on trip events	Expedite response and location of tripped lines
Recloser Controllers	Real-time SCADA data, fault event data, SER data	Continuous	Provide real-time visibility into recloser operations, fault detection, and event logging. Majority integrated with SCADA for system-wide situational awareness and control.
Substation Protective Relays	SCADA data, fault event records, Sequence of Events (“SER”) logs	Continuous	Enable monitoring and diagnostics of substation events. Relay-triggered events automatically notify engineers via ArcSEerator TEAM. Supports root cause analysis and corrective action planning.

10.3.2 Evaluation and Selection of New Systems

The electrical corporation must describe how it evaluates the need for additional grid operation monitoring systems. This description must include:

- How the electrical corporation evaluates the impact of new systems on reducing risk (e.g., expected reduction in ignitions from failures, expected reduction in failures).
- How the electrical corporation evaluates the efficacy of new technologies.

These descriptions must include flow charts where appropriate.

When evaluating the need for additional monitoring systems, Liberty will follow the process outlined in Section 10.2.2. Also refer to Liberty’s response to ACI LU-25U-08 in Appendix D.

10.3.3 Planned Improvements

The electrical corporation must describe its planned improvements in its grid operation monitoring systems. This must include any plans for the following:

- Expansion of existing systems
- Establishment of new systems.

Liberty plans to continue to install fault indicators on circuits included in its SRP Program, which is scheduled to be completed by December 31, 2025.

10.3.4 Evaluating Initiative Activities

The electrical corporation must describe its procedures for the ongoing evaluation of the efficacy of its grid operation monitoring program.

Liberty engineers are automatically notified of relay-triggered events through AcSElerator TEAM, which sends event data via email when protective devices such as SEL-651RA controllers operate. This ensures that the engineering team is immediately aware of system disturbances and can begin timely evaluation.

When system operators suspect a possible mis-operation, a detailed review is initiated by the engineering team. This review involves analyzing event records, fault data, and SER logs to determine the root cause of the issue. Based on the findings, engineers develop a corrective action plan, which may include updating relay settings, refining logic schemes, or conducting additional field inspections.

10.4 Ignition Detection Systems

The electrical corporation must describe its systems, technologies, and procedures used to detect ignitions within its service territory and gauge ignition size and growth rates.⁷⁹

The electrical corporation must document the following:

- Existing ignition detection sensors and systems
- Evaluation and selection of new ignition detection systems
- Planned integration of new ignition detection technologies
- Identify venues for routine sharing of the following:
 - o Evaluation of strengths and limitations of new technology
 - o Case studies/ lessons learned regarding new ignition detection systems and new ignition detection technologies

⁷⁹ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(3).

- o Lessons learned

- Monitoring of initiative improvements

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate .

Tracking ID: WMP-SA-03

10.4.1 Existing Ignition Detection Systems

The electrical corporation must report on the sensors and systems, technologies, and procedures for ignition detection that are currently in use, highlighting any improvements made since the last WMP submission. At a minimum, the electrical corporation must document the deployment of each of the following:

- Early fire detection including, for example:

- o Satellite infrared imagery
- o High-definition video
- o Infrared cameras

- Fire growth potential software

The electrical corporation must summarize each system in Table 10-4 below. It must provide the following additional information for each system in an accompanying narrative:

- General location of detection sensors (e.g., HFTD or entire service territory)
- Resiliency of sensor communication pathways
- Integration of sensor data into machine learning or AI software
- Role of sensor data in risk response
- False positives filtering
- Time between detection and confirmation
- Security measures for network-based sensors

Liberty utilizes ALERTWest, PyreCast, and Technosylva to enhance its wildfire ignition detection capabilities. These systems are integral to Liberty's comprehensive approach to wildfire risk management, providing early detection, accurate forecasting, and effective response strategies. Liberty provides information on its existing ignition detection systems in Table 10-4.

Table 10-4: Fire Detection Systems Currently Deployed


Detection System	Capabilities	Companion Technologies	Contribution to Fire Detection and Confirmation
Video Cameras (ALERTWest)	AI wildfire detection	None	Confirmed detections will generate alerts to assist in quicker response and suppression times.
Fire growth potential software (PyreCast)	Forecasts for active fires, risk, and fire weather	Satellite-based heat detection, weather models, weather station data	By combining satellite-based detection, predictive modeling, and weather forecast integration, PyreCast offers a comprehensive tool for fire detection and confirmation, enhancing wildfire situational awareness and response strategies.
Fire growth potential software (Technosylva Wildfire Analyst)	Wildfire spread predictions	FireRisk, FireSight	The ability to simulate fire spread under forecast weather conditions helps identify areas at greatest risk, supporting proactive planning and mitigation efforts.

Video cameras are strategically deployed across Liberty’s service territory. The sensors and communication pathways for these video cameras are owned by the service provider (University of Nevada, Reno, or Alert Wildfire). Communication networks are designed to be highly resilient to provide continuous data transmission, even under adverse weather conditions or during power outages. This resilience is crucial for maintaining real-time monitoring capabilities. The video cameras are part of the larger Alert West network and use AI to help detect smoke from wildfires. The camera system is continuously monitored at an operations center where review all new AI detections immediately. Technicians suppress any false detections and generate alerts around confirmed positive detections to assist in quicker response and suppression times.

Fire growth potential software, provided by PyreCast, is deployed across Liberty’s entire service territory. This software leverages multiple data sources to model the spread of active and hypothetical fires, using satellite-based heat detection and predictive algorithms to forecast fire behavior over multiple days. PyreCast plays a crucial role in Liberty's risk response strategy. The software provides forecasts of active fires, modeling their spread over three days. It also simulates the spread of hypothetical fires under forecast weather conditions, identifying areas at greatest risk. This information is vital for planning and executing Public Safety Power Shutoff (“PSPS”) events.

Technosylva's Wildfire Analyst Enterprise software is deployed across the entire service territory, extending beyond Liberty's territory, to enhance wildfire risk management. This cloud-based solution integrates multiple data sources, including real-time tracking, detection, and advanced weather prediction models, to forecast wildfire behavior over several days. Wildfire Analyst Enterprise plays a crucial role in operational decision-making by providing on-demand wildfire spread predictions for active incidents and hypothetical scenarios. The software's ability to simulate fire spread under forecast weather conditions helps identify areas at greatest risk, supporting proactive planning and mitigation efforts. The full extent of wildfire risk modeling performed in Wildfire Analyst is illustrated in Figure 10-5.

Figure 10-5: Wildfire Analyst Extent



10.4.2 Evaluation and Selection of New Detection Systems

The electrical corporation must describe how it evaluates the need for additional ignition detection technologies. This description must include:

- How the electrical corporation evaluates the impact on new detection technologies on reducing and improving detection and response times.
- How the electrical corporation evaluates the efficacy of new technologies.
- The electrical corporation's budgeting process for new detection system purchases.

When evaluating the need for additional ignition detection technologies, Liberty will follow the process outlined in Section 10.2.2.

10.4.3 Planned Integration of New Ignition Detection Systems

The electrical corporation must provide an implementation schedule for new ignition detection and alarm system technologies. This must include any plans for the following:

- Integration of new systems into existing physical infrastructure
- Integration of new systems into existing data analysis
- Increases in budgets and staffing to support new systems

Liberty does not currently have any plans to implement new ignition detection systems

10.4.4 Evaluating Initiative Activities

The electrical corporation must describe its procedures for the ongoing evaluation of the efficacy of its fire detection systems.

Liberty internal subject matter experts (“SMEs”) evaluate the efficacy of its fire detection systems through knowledge transfer and benchmarking with other utilities, and consultation with fire science experts and fire detection system service providers.

10.5 Weather Forecasting

The electrical corporation must describe its systems and procedures used to forecast weather within its service territory.⁸⁰ These forecasts must inform the electrical corporation’s near-real-time-risk assessment and PSPS decision-making processes. The electrical corporation must document the following:

- Its existing modeling approach
- The known limitations of its existing approach
- Implementation schedule for any planned changes to the system
- How the efficacy of systems for reducing risk are monitored

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.

Tracking ID: WMP-SA-04

10.5.1 Existing Modeling Approach

At a minimum, the electrical corporation must discuss the following components of weather forecasting:

⁸⁰ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(3).

- **Data assimilation** from environmental monitoring systems within the electrical corporation service territory
- **Ensemble forecasting** with control forecast and perturbations
- **Model inputs**, including, for example:

- o Land cover / land use type
- o Local topography

- **Model outputs**, including, for example:

- o Air temperature
- o Barometric pressure
- o Relative humidity
- o Wind velocity (speed and direction)
- o Solar radiation
- o Rainfall duration and amount

- **Separate modules** (e.g., local weather analysis and local vegetation analysis)
- **Subject matter expert (SME) assessment of forecasts**
- **Spatial granularity of forecasts**, including:

- o Horizontal resolution
- o Vertical resolution

- **Time horizon** of the weather forecast throughout the service territory

The electrical corporation must highlight improvements made to the electrical corporation's weather forecasting since the last WMP submission.

The electrical corporation must also provide documentation of its modeling approach pertaining to its weather forecasting system in accordance with the requirements in Appendix B.

Liberty contracts with a consultant to maintain its web-based fire weather dashboard at tahofireweather.com/ and to provide detailed weather forecasts. During fire season, forecasts are provided weekly for the entire service territory with a focus on any specific areas of interest where heightened fire danger may exist. Liberty's weather forecasting strategy relies on data from multiple operational weather models developed by meteorological

organizations. These models provide a range of spatial resolution and forecast duration. The models used at Liberty include:

- High Resolution Rapid Refresh (“HRRR”):⁸¹ 3 km spatial resolution, 48-hr forecast duration, four cycles per day.
- North American Mesoscale (“NAM”) forecast system:⁸² 12 km spatial resolution, 84-hr forecast duration, four cycles per day.
- NAM CONUS nest:⁸³ 3 km spatial resolution, 60-hr forecast duration, 4 cycles per day.
- Global Forecast System:⁸⁴ 0.125° (approximately 13 km) and 0.25° (approximately 26 km) spatial resolution, 16-day forecast duration, 4 cycles per day
- European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (“ECMWF”) HRES:⁸⁵ 0.1° (approximately 11 km) spatial resolution, 10-day forecast duration, 2 cycles per day
- National Blend of Models (“NBM”):⁸⁶ 2.5 km spatial resolution, 11-day forecast duration, 4 cycles per day

The primary outputs that are used for short term fire-weather forecasting include wind gust, sustained wind speed, relative humidity, and temperature. Derived quantities such as Fosberg Fire Weather Index, Hot Dry Windy index, and fuel bed ignition probability are also monitored. Key quantities are summarized as timeseries plots for each PSPS zone and updated 4 times daily.

10.5.2 Known Limitations of Existing Approach

The electrical corporation must describe any known limitations of its existing modeling approach resulting from assumptions, data availability, and computational resources. It must discuss the impact of these limitations on the modeling outputs.

The primary limitation of the existing approach is the accuracy of wind gust forecasts more than two days in the future. Of the three long-range models being used (GFS, ECMWF, and NBM),

⁸¹ <https://rapidrefresh.noaa.gov/hrrr/>

⁸² <https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/metadata/landing-page/bin/iso?id=gov.noaa.ncdc:C00630>

⁸³ <https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/metadata/landing-page/bin/iso?id=gov.noaa.ncdc:C00630>

⁸⁴ <https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/products/weather-climate-models/global-forecast>

⁸⁵ <https://www.ecmwf.int/en/forecasts/datasets/set-i>

⁸⁶ <https://blend.mdl.nws.noaa.gov/>

the ECMWF model generally provides more accurate wind gust forecasts than the GFS and NBM.

10.5.3 Planned Improvements

The electrical corporation must describe its planned improvements in its weather forecasting systems. This must include any plans for the following:

- Increase in model validation
- Increase in spatial granularity
- Decrease in limitations by removal of assumptions
- Increase in input data quality
- Increase in related frequency

Liberty does not currently have any planned improvements in its weather forecasting systems.

10.5.4 Evaluating Initiative Activities

The electrical corporation must describe its procedures for the ongoing evaluation of the efficacy of its weather forecasting program.

Liberty relies on the expertise of its consultants to evaluate the efficacy of its weather forecasting program. Additionally, input is received from internal stakeholders to verify that the forecasted weather information meets the needs and expectations of the users.

10.5.5 Weather Station Maintenance and Calibration

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a narrative describing maintenance and calibration and risk impacts due to weather station inoperability. The narrative should be no more than one page and include the following:

- Acceptable percentage of weather station outages as defined by the electric corporation.
- Justification for how reduced coverage does/does not impact risk to PSPS decision making and any methods to reduce those impacts.
- Any limitations to conducting annual maintenance and calibrations (such as staffing, training, terrain, access, etc.).

- o This must include the number of incomplete maintenance or calibration events for weather stations in the last calendar year.

- A description of what efforts are in place to ensure acceptable levels of weather station coverage throughout the electric corporation's service territory.

Liberty's annual weather station maintenance and calibration program is designed to maintain the reliability and accuracy of its weather monitoring network. A Liberty contractor conducts comprehensive maintenance once per year on all 39 weather stations distributed throughout the service territory. This includes repairing or replacing any damaged equipment, calibrating sensors to maintain precise measurements, and performing necessary software updates. By proactively maintaining and calibrating these stations, Liberty maintains acceptable levels of weather station coverage. This delivers consistent and accurate real-time weather data for risk assessment, PSPS decision making, and operational planning during extreme weather events.

Liberty's vendor analyzes data from weekly health checks on its weather stations to determine if each station is online and communicating with the network or if any repairs or updates are needed. If a station is flagged and is not fixable, an incident is submitted and added to the fix list. This means the station needs a visit for parts replacement or further troubleshooting. An incident will also be submitted if the station frequently misses communications, meaning it checks in and collects data but is unhealthy for more than 30-40% of the time.

Weekly health check sensor fields and voltages pulled include:

- Wind Direction Max (Latest Observation)
- Wind Speed MPH Max (Latest Observation)
- QCError Wind Speed (abnormal reading flagged quantity)
- QCError Wind Direction (abnormal reading flagged quantity)
- Temperature Max, Min, Avg (Latest Observation)
- QCError Temperature (abnormal reading flagged quantity)
- QCError RH (abnormal reading flagged quantity)
- Soil Moisture; if applicable (Latest Observation)
- Soil Temperature; if applicable (Latest Observation)
- Fuel Moisture Max, Min; if applicable (Latest Observation)
- Daily Precipitation (Latest Observation)
- Seasonal Precipitation (Latest Observation)
- Min Battery Voltage
- QC Battery Voltage (abnormal reading flagged quantity)
- Report of unhealthy stations

Due to its small territory size and the availability of additional data being monitored from RAWS and NWS weather stations, Liberty has set an acceptable percentage of weather station outages at approximately 20% or no more than 8 weather stations out of service.

10.6 Fire Potential Index

The electrical corporation must describe its process for calculating its fire potential index (“FPI”) or a similar a landscape-scale index used as a proxy for assessing real-time risk of a wildfire under current and forecasted weather conditions.⁸⁷ The electrical corporation’s description must include the following:

- Its existing calculation approach and how its FPI is used in its operations.
- The known limitations of its existing approach.
- Implementation schedule for any planned changes to the system.

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.:

Tracking ID: WMP-SA-05

10.6.1 Existing Calculation Approach and Use

The electrical corporation must describe:

- How it calculates its own FPI or if uses an external source, such as the United States Geological Survey.⁸⁸
- Assumptions in calculations and justification for each assumption.
- How it uses its or an FPI in its operations.

Additionally, if the electrical corporation calculates its own FPI, it must provide tabular information regarding the features of its FPI. Table 10-5 provides a template for the required information.

Liberty uses multiple fire weather indices for fire threat awareness and operational decision-making. These include Energy Release Component, Severe Fire Danger Index, and Composite Risk Index. Each one is provided in Liberty’s fire weather dashboard as a seven-day fire potential forecast for 49 geographic zones within the service territory. The fire weather dashboard is automatically refreshed every 6 hours (00:30, 06:30, 12:30, and 18:30 MDT).

Energy Release Component

Liberty uses Energy Release Component (“ERC”) to help determine the beginning of fire season and when to disable reclosing settings on circuits to mitigate wildfire risk. Once the ERC

⁸⁷ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(3).

⁸⁸ United States Geological Survey Fire Danger Map and Data Products Web Page (accessed Oct. 27, 2022): <https://firedanger.cr.usgs.gov/viewer/index.html>.

percentile is between 60 and 80, Liberty will put circuits into 'Fire Mode' to disable reclosing settings. The circuits will remain in Fire Mode throughout the fire season until the fire risk is determined to be low, at which point the circuits can be returned to normal settings. Liberty uses both external sources as well as internal ERC calculations which are described in Section 10.2.1.

Severe Fire Danger Index

Liberty uses Severe Fire Danger Index ("SFDI") ratings in its Fire Prevention Plan for daily operating procedures by zone. SFDI forecasts are communicated to field staff to inform operational decisions when work restrictions are in place due to fire risk.

SFDI is also used to help determine when to enable SRP Fast Trip settings on circuits to mitigate wildfire risk. When SFDI is "Severe", Liberty will put circuits into 'Extreme Fire Mode' to enable Fast Trip settings. In addition, Red Flag Warnings, issued by the National Weather Service, could warrant Extreme Fire Mode settings. Red Flag conditions are generally correlated with Severe SFDI. The circuits will remain in Extreme Fire Mode until SFDI is no longer "Severe" or a Red Flag Warning is no longer in effect.

SFDI is provided by an external source and was developed by the US Forest Service. SFDI combines two National Fire Danger Rating System ("NFDRS") indices into a single measure of fire potential. The first index, Energy Release Component ("ERC"), quantifies intermediate to long-term dryness and is strongly correlated with fire occurrence. The second index, Burning Index ("BI"), is proportional to flame length of a head fire and viewed as a measure of suppression difficulty. As shown in Figure 10-6, the combination of ERC and BI percentiles (the basis for SFDI) is strongly correlated with both the number and size of fires.

Liberty obtains gridded ERC and BI percentile forecast data from the US Forest Service Wildland Fire Assessment System ("WFAS"). These indices are converted to SFDI using the chart in Figure 10-6.

Figure 10-6: Liberty SFDI Ratings as a Function of ERC and BI Percentiles

BI Percentile	97-100					Severe
	90-97				Very High	
	80-90			High		
	60-80		Moderate			
	0-60	Low				
		0-60	60-80	80-90	90-97	97-100
		ERC Percentile				

Composite Risk Index

Composite Risk Index (“CRI”) is an internal FPI developed for Liberty to use as part of its PSPS decision making process. As the Percent of CRI Threshold increases above 80%, Liberty will monitor for potential PSPS conditions. If CRI reaches 100%, additional analysis will be done to determine the need for PSPS.

The CRI is a screening criterion that combines a function of wind gust (as proxy for utility fire ignition likelihood) and flame length (as proxy for fire consequence) into a single forecastable composite index. CRI is intended for use in implementation of incremental utility fire mitigation measures up to and including proactive de-energization when weather and fuel conditions create elevated risk from powerline-caused fires. CRI is defined as wind gust force (in units of psf) multiplied by $10 \times$ head fire flame length, which is expressed mathematically in Equation 1 as:

$$(1) \text{ Composite risk index} = F_{\text{wind}} \times (10 \times L_f) = 0.00256 \times V_g^2 \times (10 \times L_f)$$

Here, F_{wind} is wind gust force (lb/ft²), L_f is head fire flame length (ft), and V_g is 3-second wind gust speed (mph). In this formulation, wind force represents probability of powerline-caused ignitions and L_f represents the consequence of those ignitions as flame length directly affects resistance to control. The decision to use wind force, which scales with the square of wind speed, to represent the ignition axis in this composite risk index is based in part on work completed during the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) high fire threat district mapping. In that work, an Independent Expert Team (IET) led by CAL FIRE deliberated over several powerline-fire ignition models and, after analyzing ten years of fault records from utilities, selected the following formula for the ignition axis:

$$(2) \text{ IET ignition axis} = 0.00256 \times V_g^2 \times P_{\text{ign}}$$

where P_{ign} is ignition probability, which is similar to the NFDRS Ignition Component (IC). The same formula is used here but without the P_{ign} factor. The choice to drop P_{ign} is conservative, because in a line down situation, ignition is probable and P_{ign} can only decrease the ignition axis as defined in Equation 2.

The CRI in Equation 1 is calculated for each zone using weather model forecast data and fire modeling. The weather models used in calculation of the CRI include High Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR, 3 km, 48 hours), North American Mesoscale Model nest (NAM, 3 km, 60 hrs), Global Forecast System (GFS, 0.125°, 8 days), and the European Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) HIRES forecast (ECMWF HIRES, 0.1°, 8 days).

The operational fire spread model ELMFIRE (Eulerian Level set Model of FIRE spread), is used to calculate head fire flame length at every 30 m pixel within each zone for each discrete timestep in the forecast period. Although flame length and wind gust vary spatially within a given zone, Equation 1 requires a single value of wind gust and flame length. Therefore, spatial mean values of flame length and wind gust are calculated using zonal statistics for each time in the forecast period. The flame length calculation directly or indirectly includes the following factors:

- Surface fuel characteristics (fuel type, fuel load, etc.)
- Dead fuel moisture by size / time lag class (1-hr, 10-hr, and 100-hr)
- Live herbaceous and live woody fuel moisture
- Sustained mid-flame wind speed and direction
- Topographical slope and aspect
- Relative humidity, temperature, precipitation, and solar heating

Refer to Table 10-5 for tabular information regarding the features of Liberty's FPI.

Table 10-5: Fire Potential Features

Feature Group	Feature	Altitude	Description	Source	Update Cadence	Spatial Granularity	Temporal Granularity
Weather	Wind force	Surface	Wind gust force at surface	High Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) Model	4 times per day	3 km	Hourly
Weather	Wind force	Surface	Wind gust force at surface	North American Mesoscale Model (NAM) Weather Model	4 times per day	3 km	Hourly
Weather	Wind force	Surface	Wind gust force at surface	Global Forecast System (GFS) Weather Model	4 times per day	13 km	3 hours
Weather	Wind force	Surface	Wind gust force at surface	European Center for Medium Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) Weather Model	4 times per day	14 km	12 hours
Weather	Wind speed	Surface	3 second wind gust speed at surface	High Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) Weather Model	4 times per day	3 km	Hourly
Weather	Wind speed	Surface	3 second wind gust speed at surface	North American Mesoscale Model (NAM) Weather Model	4 times per day	3 km	Hourly
Weather	Wind speed	Surface	3 second wind gust speed at surface	Global Forecast System (GFS) Weather Model	4 times per day	13 km	3 Hours
Weather	Wind speed	Surface	3 second wind gust	European Center for Medium Range Weather	4 times per day	14 km	12 Hours

Feature Group	Feature	Altitude	Description	Source	Update Cadence	Spatial Granularity	Temporal Granularity
			speed at surface	Forecasts (ECMWF) Weather Model			
Fuel	Head fire flame length	Surface	Operational fire spread model used to calculate length	Eularian Level set Model of Fire Spread (ELMFIRE)	4 times per day	30 m	6 Hours

10.6.2 Known Limitations of Existing Approach

The electrical corporation must describe any known limitations of current FPI calculation. Specifically, list of any changes implemented since its last WMP submission, including justification of for changes and lessons learned, where applicable.

Liberty's implementation of Composite Risk Index for its FPI is a change its last WMP submission. Liberty began testing the use of CRI as a replacement for the criteria of ERC, Fosberg Fire Weather Index ("FFWI"), and wind gust for PSPS decision making. The previous criteria provided daily ratings that were representative of peak fire potential on a given day. However, fire potential may vary significantly during the day due to diurnal variations in fire weather conditions, disturbances moving into or out of the region, or precipitation. The changes made provide forecasts every six hours allowing for improved monitoring of daily variations. Another advantage of using CRI is the ability to account for fire danger when ERC percentiles may be low, but the likelihood and consequence of an ignition are both high.

The primary limitation of the existing approach is the accuracy of wind gust forecasts more than two days in the future described in Section 10.5.2.

10.6.3 Planned Improvements

The electrical corporation must describe its planned improvements for its FPI, including a description of the improvement, reason for the change, and the planned schedule for implementation.

Liberty does not have any planned improvements for its FPI.

11. Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration, and Public Awareness

Each electrical corporation must develop and adopt an emergency preparedness plan in compliance with the standards established by the CPUC pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 768.6(a).

11.1 Targets

In this section, each electrical corporation must provide qualitative targets for emergency preparedness and tribal/stakeholder outreach.

The electrical corporation must provide at least one qualitative target for the following initiatives:

- Emergency Preparedness and Recovery Plan (Section 11.2)
- External Collaboration and Coordination (Section 11.3)
- Public Communication, Outreach, and Education (Section 11.4)
- Customer Support in Wildfire and PSPS Emergencies (Section 11.5)

11.1.1 Qualitative Targets

The electrical corporation must provide qualitative targets for its three-year plans for implementing and improving its emergency preparedness and community outreach,⁸⁹ including the following:

- Identification of which initiative(s) in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the Tracking ID(s) used in past WMPs (“Previous Tracking ID”), if applicable.
- A completion date for when the electrical corporation will achieve the target.
- Reference(s) to the WMP section(s) or appendix, including page numbers, where the details of the target(s) are documented and substantiated.:

Refer to Table 11-1.

⁸⁹ Annual information included in this section must align with the applicable data submission.

Table 11-1: Emergency Preparedness and Community Outreach Targets by Year

WMP Initiative Category	WMP Initiative	Activity (Tracking ID#)	2026 End of Year Total / Completion Date	2027 Status	2028 Status	Section; Page Number
Emergency Preparedness	Collaboration and coordination with public safety partners (“PSPs”)	WMP-EP-02	Conduct emergency drills; continue engagement with local stakeholders and PSPs to prepare for and respond to fire-related event; meet with Community Advisory Boards.	Conduct emergency drills; continue engagement with local stakeholders and PSPs to prepare for and respond to fire-related event; meet with Community Advisory Boards	Conduct emergency drills; continue engagement with local stakeholders and PSPs to prepare for and respond to fire-related event; meet with Community Advisory Boards	11.3.1; pp. 262-266
Emergency Preparedness	Customer support in wildfire and PSPS emergencies	WMP-EP-05	Conduct Incident Command Training for all identified IC members and hold a PSPS Tabletop exercise; continue implementation of Liberty’s AFN Plan; continue maintenance of emergency response plans; enhance documentation and use of lessons learned to update plans.	Conduct Incident Command Training for all identified IC members and hold a PSPS Tabletop exercise; continue implementation of Liberty’s AFN Plan; continue maintenance of emergency response plans; enhance documentation and use of lessons learned to update plans.	Conduct Incident Command Training for all identified IC members and hold a PSPS Tabletop exercise; continue implementation of Liberty’s AFN Plan; continue maintenance of emergency response plans; enhance documentation and use of lessons learned to update plans.	11.5; pp. 290-292

WMP Initiative Category	WMP Initiative	Activity (Tracking ID#)	2026 End of Year Total / Completion Date	2027 Status	2028 Status	Section; Page Number
Emergency Preparedness	Learning after wildfire and PSPS events	WMP-EP-06	After action reports for each event	After action reports for each event	After action reports for each event	7; p.110-113
Community Outreach and Engagement	Public outreach and education awareness for wildfires, PSPS, outages from protective equipment and device settings, and vegetation management	WMP-CO-01	Two wildfire and PSPS outreach surveys	Two wildfire and PSPS outreach surveys	Two wildfire and PSPS outreach surveys	11.4.3; pp. 280-284
Community Outreach and Engagement	Engagement with AFN populations, local governments, and tribal communities	WMP-CO-03	9 Events	9 Events	9 Events	11.4.4; pp.285-287

WMP Initiative Category	WMP Initiative	Activity (Tracking ID#)	2026 End of Year Total / Completion Date	2027 Status	2028 Status	Section; Page Number
Community Outreach and Engagement	Engagement with AFN populations, local governments, and tribal communities	WMP-CO-03	Enhance accessibility based on community feedback and evolve best practices where possible	Enhance accessibility based on community feedback and evolve best practices where possible	Enhance accessibility based on community feedback and evolve best practices where possible	11.4.4; pp.285-287
Community Outreach and Engagement	Best practice sharing with other electrical corporations	WMP-CO-05	Participation in working groups (i.e., Risk Modeling Working Group) and Joint IOU Councils (i.e., AFN Collaborative Council)	Participation in working groups (i.e., Risk Modeling Working Group) and Joint IOU Councils (i.e., AFN Collaborative Council)	Participation in working groups (i.e., Risk Modeling Working Group) and Joint IOU Councils (i.e., AFN Collaborative Council)	5; p. 35 11.3.2; pp. 266-268 11.4.4; pp. 285-287 13.1; pp. 300-305

11.2 Emergency Preparedness and Recovery Plan

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of how it has evaluated, developed, and integrated wildfire- and PSPS-specific emergency preparedness strategies, practices, policies, and procedures into its overall emergency plan based on the minimum standards described in GO 166.⁹⁰ The electrical corporation must provide the title of and link to its latest emergency preparedness report, the date of the report, and an indication of whether the plan complies with CPUC R. 15-06-009, D. 21-05-019, and GO 166. The overview must be no more than two paragraphs.

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide a list of any other relevant electrical corporation documents that govern its wildfire and PSPS emergency preparedness planning for response and recovery efforts. This must be a bullet point list with document title, version (if applicable), and date.

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.

Tracking ID: WMP-EP-01

In compliance with CPUC R. 15-06-009, D. 21-05-019, and G.O. 166, Liberty has developed the sixth revision of its Corporate Emergency Management Plan (“CEMP”), dated May 6th, 2025. The CEMP outlines the Company’s general procedures for response to and recovery for emergencies at all levels. Under CEMP procedure, wildfire or PSPS-specific emergencies would warrant activation of Liberty’s Incident Management Team under the Incident Command System (“ICS”).

In anticipation of a wildfire or PSPS-specific emergency, Liberty’s Incident Management Team and CEMP procedures are supplemented by the procedures outlined in its PSPS Playbook. Liberty’s PSPS playbook describes the roles, responsibilities, and protocols for PSPS and wildfire response and communications.

The following is a list of additional documents that govern Liberty’s wildfire and PSPS emergency preparedness planning:

- Liberty Wildland Fire Incident Response Guide dated June 28th, 2024;
- Liberty Utilities Public Safety Power Shutoff Playbook dated April 29th, 2025.

⁹⁰ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(c)(7), (11), (16), (19), (20).

11.2.1 Overview of Wildfire and PSPS Emergency Preparedness and Service Restoration

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its wildfire- and PSPS-specific emergency preparedness and service restoration plan.⁹¹ The overview must describe the following:

- Overview of protocols, policies, and procedures for responding to and recovering from a wildfire or PSPS event (e.g., means and methods for assessing conditions, decision-making framework, prioritizations). This must include:
 - o An operational flow diagram illustrating key components of its wildfire- and PSPS-specific emergency response procedures from the moment of activation to response, recovery, and restoration of service.
 - o Separate overviews and operational flow diagrams for wildfires and PSPS events.
- Key personnel, qualifications, and training that show the electrical corporation has trained the workforce to promptly restore service after wildfire or PSPS event, accounting for workers pursuant to mutual aid agreement or contracts. This must include,
 - o The key roles and responsibilities, personnel resource planning (internal and external staffing needs), personnel qualifications, and required training programs.
 - o A brief narrative describing its process for planning to meet its internal and external staffing needs for emergency preparedness planning, preparedness, response, and recovery related to wildfire and PSPS.
 - o The name of each training program, a brief narrative of the purpose and scope of each training program, the frequency of each training program, and how the electrical corporation tracks who has completed the training program.
- Each Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) the electrical corporation has with state, city, county, and tribal agencies within its service territory on wildfire and/or PSPS emergency preparedness, response, and recovery activities. The electrical corporation must provide a brief summary of the MOA, including the agreed role(s) and responsibilities of the external agency before, during, and after a wildfire or PSPS emergency.

⁹¹ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(16), (19), (20).

- o Coordination and collaboration with public safety partners (e.g., emergency planning, interoperable communications).
- o Notification of and communication to customers before, during and after a wildfire or PSPS event.
- o Improvements/updates made since the last WMP submission.

The overview must be no more than six pages. The electrical corporation may refer to its emergency preparedness plan to provide more detail. Where the electrical corporation has already reported the requested information in another section of the WMP, it must provide a cross-reference with a hyperlink to that section.

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide a table with a list of current gaps and limitations in evaluating, developing, and integrating wildfire- and PSPS-specific preparedness and planning features into its overall emergency preparedness and recovery plan(s). Where gaps or limitations exist, the electrical corporation must provide a remedial action plan and the timeline for resolving the gaps or limitations.

The purpose of Liberty's wildfire and PSPS emergency preparedness plans is to promote the safety of staff, contractors, and the members of the communities it serves. Liberty is dedicated to preserving the safety and integrity of its infrastructure and the continuation of service when they are threatened by wildland fires. The scope of the plan includes Liberty's service territory which is comprised of seven counties in Northern California. Refer to Figure 11-1 for an operational flow diagram for Liberty PPS events and Figure 11-2 for an operational flow diagram for wildfire events.

Figure 11-1: Liberty PSPS Event Flow Diagram





Figure 11-2: Wildfire Event Flow Diagram



Gaps and limitations in evaluating, developing, and integrating wildfire- and PSPS specific preparedness and planning features into its Liberty's overall emergency preparedness plan(s) are provided in Table 11-2. Remedial action plans and timelines are provided for gaps or limitations. Coordination and collaboration with PSPs is detailed in Section 11.3.1 and Liberty's public emergency communication strategy is provided in Section 11.4.

Table 11-2: Liberty Gaps and Limitations in Integrating Wildfire- and PSPS-Specific Strategies into Emergency Plan

Gap or Limitation Subject	Remedial Brief Description	Remedial Action Plan
Liberty's 2024 CEMP lacked detailed descriptions of Incident Management Team Liaison functions.	Manager, Emergency management should work with IMT to update CEMP.	Liberty's CEMP was updated on 05/06/2025 to include these descriptions.
Liberty's 2024 CEMP included a description of how its Incident Command System ("ICS") was organized, but not the Incident Action Planning Process.	Manager, Emergency management should work with IMT to update CEMP.	Liberty's CEMP was updated on 05/06/2025 to list the steps in the Incident Action Planning Process.

Key Personnel, Qualifications and Training:

Liberty utilizes the National Incident Management System ("NIMS") Incident Command System ("ICS") structure company-wide in its activations for incidents of any type taking place in North America. In accordance with the ICS principles of adaptability and scalability, only required ICS positions are activated initially, and additional positions are added as an incident progresses. Following an all-hazards approach, Liberty has specific response plans for the most probable incident responses to include PSPS, wildfire, and winter storms. The response plans for these incidents provide the most likely base ICS structure for these scenarios and checklists with responsibilities for the ICS positions activated in each scenario.

Due to the relatively small geographic area that Liberty covers, it is very unlikely that multiple Incident Management Teams ("IMTs") or separate Area Commands would be activated under a Unified Command structure. However, Liberty does have this capability, if needed. In larger incidents involving Liberty, coordination takes place with city, county, and/or CAL FIRE Emergency Operations Centers by providing EOC liaisons.

Liberty's incident management structure complies with SEMS, NIMS, and ICS. A Liberty IMT is made up of trained staff from multiple Liberty organizational units who may be called on to lead a response to an incident. Multiple staff are trained for each IMT position to achieve resiliency in IMT staffing. The IMT may operate in person, via video teleconference, or through a hybrid structure using the two options. A Liberty IMT is activated for "serious impact events" where more than 10,000 customers are impacted, and estimated full restoration will be greater than 24 hours. In addition, an IMT is activated in any PSPS event. That said, Liberty will often

activate the IMT for predicted storms including winter weather and atmospheric river events as well.

Liberty activates its PSPS IMT when conditions are projected to meet Liberty's thresholds for de-energization based on Composite Risk Index described in Section 10.6. PSPS IMT actions are outlined in the Liberty PSPS Playbook, which prescribes PSPS IMT baseline positions and checklist items for each position to accomplish during each phase of the response. A dedicated PSPS Playbook and IMT support consistent decision-making, deeper PSPS-specific experience, and greater ability to support continuous improvements during non-event periods. The PSPS Playbook includes pre-scripted messaging for each stage of a PSPS. It also prescribes separate liaisons for regulatory affairs, public safety partners ("PSPs"), community-based organizations ("CBOs"), and AFN customers.

Initial Qualifications: IMT members are required to complete ICS training through the company Learning Management System ("LMS"). This training was developed from and includes the principles from the FEMA Emergency Management Institute (EMI) IS 100.c and IS 200.c courses. In addition, the Emergency Manager, Fire Prevention Managers, and Incident Commander are required to have completed the IS 100.c, IS 200.c, IS 700.b and IS 800.d courses

Requalification: Training on ICS principals is assigned and tracked through the LMS system and is required to be completed yearly along with the practical application of training in both tabletop and functional exercises. Training has been conducted for customer service supervisors and staff with responsibilities for working in customer resource centers ("CRCs") in the event of a PSPS. CRC staff training is provided and required each year prior to fire season.

Additional information on Emergency Preparedness personnel training is detailed in LU Table 11-1.

Emergency Preparedness and Service Restoration MOUs:

Liberty does not have any MOUs with agencies relates to emergency preparedness, response, and recovery activities. In executing response & recovery activities, Liberty utilizes in-house staff, contractors, and mutual aid if needed. Liberty has MOUs with its CRC locations in the event of a PSPS, however in the event of an active fire, Red Cross and the county governments in Liberty's service territory would be responsible for activating and manning evacuation centers.

LU Table 11-1: Emergency Management Personnel Training

Training Topic	Purpose and Scope	Training Method	Training Frequency	Position or Title of Personnel Required to Take Training	Form of Verification or Reference
Community Resource Center (“CRC”) Response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Train internal employees in Community Resource Center Lead positions. Training for the process of setting up and supporting Community Resource Center locations in the event of PSPS 	Virtual or in-person	Annual	Community Resource Center Lead, CRC Contractor	Training logs
Introduction to the electrical corporation’s emergency preparedness plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The contents of emergency response plans, in particular those for wildfire- and PSPS specific incidents • The electrical corporation’s overall safety practices and those specific to wildfire and PSPS incidents • The organizational structure of how the electrical corporation responds to, manages, and recovers from incidents • The electrical corporation’s and public safety partners’ roles and responsibilities before, during, and after a wildfire or PSPS incident • The electrical corporation’s notification and activation protocols for wildfires and PSPS incidents 	Online course, workshop, or in-person training	Annual	All-staff	Training materials and training logs

Training Topic	Purpose and Scope	Training Method	Training Frequency	Position or Title of Personnel Required to Take Training	Form of Verification or Reference
Emergency response procedures during a wildfire	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident Management Team Assignments during a wildfire scenario • Wildfire response procedures during Incident • Immediate Response, 0-2 hours • Intermediate Response, 2-12 hours • Extended Response, Greater than 12 hours • Demobilization/System Recovery 	Workshop or in-person training	Annually, prior to fire season	Incident Management Team	Training logs
Practices, policies, and procedures for emergency response and service restoration for PSPS events	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incident Management Team actions for PSPS Stages 1, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3, 4, and 5 as outlined in the PSPS Playbook 	TTX and FSX	Annual	Incident Management Team	Training logs

Training Topic	Purpose and Scope	Training Method	Training Frequency	Position or Title of Personnel Required to Take Training	Form of Verification or Reference
Introduction to the electrical corporation's mutual aid agreement with aid partner (contractor training)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Familiarize aid partners with the concepts and actions in the mutual aid operations plan prior to implementation • Allow responding resources the opportunity to practice their procedures and responsibilities • Scope items include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Contents of mutual aid operations plan, in particular those on wildfire- and PSPS-specific incidents ○ The electrical corporation's overall safety practices and those specific to wildfire and PSPS incidents ○ The organizational structure and interoperability of how the mutual aid partners and resources collaborate and coordinate ○ The electrical corporation's and public safety partners' roles and responsibilities before, during, and after a wildfire or PSPS incident ○ The electrical corporation's notification and activation protocols for wildfires and PSPS events 	Online course, workshop, or in-person training	Annual	All potential mutual aid resources	Training materials and training logs

11.2.2 Planning and Allocation of Resources

The electrical corporation must briefly describe its methods for planning appropriate resources (e.g., equipment, specialized workers), and allocating those resources to assure the safety of the public during service restoration.⁹²

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its plans for contingency measures regarding the resources required to respond to an increased number of reports concerning unsafe conditions and expedite a response to a wildfire- or PSPS-related power outage.

This must include a brief narrative on how the electrical corporation:

- Uses weather reports to pre-position manpower and equipment before anticipated severe weather that could result in an outage.
- Sets priorities.
- Facilitates internal and external communications.
- Restores service.

The narrative for this section must be no more than two pages.:

Liberty monitors forecast and real-time weather conditions by utilizing weather station data and fire weather prediction tools. FPI and PSPS zones, which receive individualized forecasts, help to determine the specific circuits that are predicted to experience elevated fire risk conditions. This knowledge allows for patrol resources to be more accurately and efficiently deployed.

In areas with elevated fire weather condition forecasts, Liberty will activate proactive patrols along power lines. Operations personnel will be deployed to observe conditions along the electrical system (vegetation issues, equipment condition, wire sag and sway, and any potential system damage related to the weather event) that may pose a threat to public safety. This added situational awareness provides the ability to identify imminent safety risks in order to resolve them immediately.

Liberty's Fire Prevention Plan ("FPP") describes work restrictions for certain at-risk activities based on FPI conditions. Depending on the FPI fire risk rating, some activities will require the designation of a Fire Safety Monitor or a Fire Safety Leader.

⁹² Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(16), (20).

- *Fire Safety Monitor*: Designated field supervisor or crew member responsible for fire safety requirement oversight during Elevated Fire Risk working conditions.
- *Fire Safety Leader*: Designated field supervisor or crew member who has a dedicated role for fire safety requirement oversight during Extreme Fire Risk working conditions

Liberty's field crews are equipped with fire prevention and suppression tools throughout all areas of the service territory. Liberty's Fire Protection Specialist assists with fire prevention training and operational compliance according to Liberty's protocols. In some instances, the Fire Protection Specialist will assist crews when a fire safety leader must be designated.

When Liberty anticipates forecasted conditions may result in power outages and damage to the electrical system that cannot be resolved under normal operations, the Incident Management Team (IMT) will convene, and the Incident Commander may choose to activate the EOC. The CEMP, as discussed in Section 11.2, outlines the Company's general procedures for response to and recovery from emergencies at all levels. The IMT will discuss potential impacts of the event, determine existing resource availability, current warehouse inventories, and the Incident Commander will decide if additional resources and materials are needed prior to the event. At the discretion of the Incident Commander, resources may be pre-positioned and ready to respond as necessary for the given event.

Liberty describes its plan for communication during emergencies in Section 11.4.1. Liberty's plan to restore customers during emergencies is detailed in Section 11.2.1.

11.3 External Collaboration and Coordination

11.3.1 Communication Strategy with Public Safety Partners

The electrical corporation must describe at a high level its communication strategy to inform external public safety partners and other interconnected electrical corporation partners of wildfire, PSPS, and re-energization events as required by GO 166 and Public Utilities Code section 768.6.⁹³ This must include a brief description of the policies, practices, and procedures the electrical corporation adopts to establish appropriate communication protocols with public safety partners for both wildfire- and PSPS-specific incidents to ensure timely, accurate, and complete communications. The electrical corporation must refer to its emergency preparedness plan as needed to provide more detail. The narrative must be no more than two pages.

⁹³ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(19).

As each public safety partner will have its own unique communication protocols, procedures, and systems, the electrical corporation must coordinate with each entity individually. The electrical corporation must summarize the following information in tabulated format:

- All relevant public safety partner groups (e.g., fire, law enforcement, OES, municipal governments, Energy Safety, CPUC, other electrical corporations) at every level of administration (state, county, city, or Tribal Nation) as needed.
- Key protocols for ensuring the necessary level of voice and data communications (e.g., interoperability channels, methods for information exchange, format for each data typology, communication capabilities, data management systems, backup systems, common alerting protocols, messaging), and associated references in the emergency plan for more details.
- Frequency of prearranged communication review and updates.

In a separate table, the electrical corporation must list the current gaps and limitations in its public safety partner communication strategy coordination. Where gaps or limitations exist, the electrical corporation must indicate the remedial action plan and the timeline for resolving the gaps or limitations. For all requested information, the electrical corporation must indicate a form of verification that can be provided upon request for compliance assurance.

Liberty has established a communication strategy to inform external public safety partners and other interconnected electrical corporation partners of wildfire, PSPS, and re-energization events as required by G.O. 166 and Public Utilities Code Section 768.6.

During a major outage or emergency that affects a significant number of customers, an email is sent to personnel, agencies, and media to provide information, detail, and status of the outage. As the outage or emergency continues, status update emails and/or phone calls will be made to keep the agencies and media informed. Once the outage has concluded and the system is back to normal, a final email will be sent to close out the communication of the incident. A contact list of local governmental agencies, municipalities, and media outlets within Liberty's service territory has been developed. Liberty's public safety partner and critical facilities contact list is formatted for compatibility with the OnSolve mass communication platform. Each entity is listed within the county for which they provide service. Entities such as CALFIRE, which need to be notified regardless of which counties a PSPS may impact, are given a designation in OnSolve.

Governmental, Regulatory, and Public Safety Partner Communications: During emergency events, Liberty works directly with local law enforcement, medical agencies, and fire agencies. In larger emergencies, city and county emergency management representatives provide coordinating responsibilities in responding to the event. In escalating emergency events,

additional coordinating resources, such as an Emergency Response Liaison and/or a Government Liaison, can be activated by the Incident Commander.

During emergency events, Liberty will provide a liaison to the highest level of city or county Emergency Operations Center activated. This will be accomplished through the Emergency Response Liaison or Government Liaison, who are both members of the Incident Management Team. If an emergency event is large enough to initiate the activation of a State level Emergency Operations Center or Regional Emergency Operations Center, the Emergency Response Liaison will communicate with the State Emergency Operations Center ("EOC"). The California state coordination will be through the California Utilities Emergency Association ("CUEA") Emergency Operations Center. As a member of the CUEA, Liberty Utilities is party to its Mutual Assistance Agreement and is represented in the Utility Operations Center ("UOC"), which is in the State Operations Center ("SOC"). All mutual assistance activities will be communicated to the State EOC and the Utilities Operations Center ("UOC")/Office of Emergency Services ("OES") during an emergency.

City and county officials, OES offices, critical infrastructure, CPUC, and agency partners will receive the earliest notifications of a "significant" planned or potentially planned outage, up to eight days in advance, when possible. Liberty will continue to provide updates to these contacts as the outage event nears or whenever conditions or details change. Communications will be executed by text, email, and phone calls. City and county officials, OES offices, critical infrastructure, CPUC, and agency partners will also receive updates at the 48-hour mark. Local website, radio, newspapers, and TV media will be notified and requested to broadcast the PSA. Updates will be directly communicated 24 hours in advance and right before the outage commences, as appropriate.

During the outage, updates will be sent directly to city and county officials, OES offices, critical infrastructure, CPUC, agency partners, and media, as well as posted to social media accounts and the Liberty website as updates are available or situations change. In addition, during a PSPS outage, additional outage information to include critical infrastructure impacted and more detailed information on lines/customers impacted will be provided to Public Safety Partners via the Liberty Public Safety Partner Portal. Once the outage has concluded, a final update will be sent directly to city/county, OES offices, critical infrastructure, CPUC, agency partners, and media, as well as posted to social media accounts and the Liberty website with a request that any remaining power outages or issues be communicated with Liberty.

For all unplanned outages, Liberty will post outage information on social media accounts and website. Media, city/county, OES offices, critical infrastructure, CPUC, and agency partners will be notified if the severity of the outage warrants. City/county, OES offices, critical

infrastructure, CPUC, and agency partners will receive direct text, email, and/or voice message updates via the OnSolve system and again when the outage has concluded. Once power has been restored, Liberty will request that any remaining power outages or issues be communicated with Liberty Communication Channels.

Liberty's key communication protocols with its PSPs include communication capabilities and common protocols. Liberty conducts an annual prearranged communication review and update in April.

Communications with Transmission Provider ("TP"): NV Energy is the TP for Liberty. During emergencies, the Emergency Management Team is ("EMT") Emergency Response Liaison is responsible for coordinating and communicating all anticipated major system impacts to Liberty's System Control Center in New Hampshire. The System Control Center is responsible for providing information to the NV Energy Distribution Desk or Transmission Desk, as appropriate.

Refer to Table 11-3 for Liberty's communication protocols, procedures, and systems with its Public Safety Partners.

Table 11-3: Liberty Communication Protocols, Procedures, and Systems with Public Safety Partners

Public Safety Partner Group	Key Protocols	Frequency of Prearranged Communication Review and Update
City and county officials, fire, law enforcement, and critical infrastructure	Text, email, and/or voice message via OnSolve system; PSP partner portal; exercises; state executive briefings	Annually (April)
CPUC	Email notifications; state executive briefings; PSP portal	Annually (April)
CalOES	OES notification forms; state executive briefings; email communications; PSP portal	Annually (April)

Liberty provides its current gaps and limitations in its PSP communication strategy coordination in Table 11-4.

Table 11-4: Gaps and Limitations in Communication Coordination with PSPs

Gap or Limitation Subject	Remedial Brief Description	Remedial Action Plan
During an event, a complete list of Public Safety Partners (“PSPs”) that have been contacted is needed by the Regulatory Liaison in a timely manner to facilitate reporting to regulatory agencies.	A record of PSP contact should be added to Liberty’s in-event tracking spreadsheet for more efficient reporting by the Regulatory Liaison.	Strategy: IMT members will update the in -event tracking spreadsheet to create a section for PSP contact. Target timeline: Completed
For 2024 events, Liberty’s Customer Solutions team took over responsibility of notification to PSPs, community officials, and key accounts from the PSP Liaison position, which worked well. The PSP Liaison already has multiple duties.	Assign PSP notification officially to Liberty’s Customer Solutions team.	Strategy: Re-assignment of duties. Target timeline: Completed

11.3.2 Collaboration on Local Wildfire Mitigation Planning

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of its plans, programs, and/or policies for collaborating with communities on local wildfire mitigation planning (e.g., wildfire safety elements in general plans, community wildfire protection plans, local multi-hazard mitigation plans) within its service territory.⁹⁴ The narrative must be no more than one page.

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide the following information in tabular form, providing no more than one page of tabulated information in the main body of the WMP and the full table in an appendix as needed.

- List of county, city, regional entities/task forces, Tribal Nations, and non-governmental organizations (e.g., nonprofits, fire safe councils) within the service territory with which the

⁹⁴ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(19).

electrical corporation has collaborated or intends to collaborate on local wildfire mitigation planning efforts (i.e., non-wildfire emergency planning activities).

o For each entity, the local wildfire mitigation planning program/plan/document, level of collaboration (e.g., meeting attendance, verbal or written comments), and date the electrical corporation provided its last feedback. Table 11-5 provides an example of the minimum acceptable level of information. The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.

o In a separate table, the electrical corporation must provide a list of current gaps and limitations in its collaboration efforts with local partners on local wildfire planning efforts. Where gaps or limitations exist, the electrical corporation must indicate proposed means and methods to increase collaborative efforts. Table 11-6 provides an example of the minimum acceptable level of information.

Liberty hosts a series of public workshops each year to provide communities in its service territory with information regarding wildfire mitigation programs and PSPS procedures. Liberty presents wildfire mitigation and PSPS preparedness content at local fire safety council meetings, senior center meetings, local homeowner's association meetings, and meetings of county and tribal representatives. In addition, Liberty meets with the Wildfire Safety Community Advisory Board at least twice a year to disseminate information and to allow participants to voice their concerns regarding wildfire mitigation planning.

Liberty provides information on collaboration efforts in local wildfire mitigation planning in Table 11-5.

Table 11-5: Liberty Collaboration in Local Wildfire Mitigation Planning

Name of County, City, or Tribal Agency or Civil Society Organization (e.g., nongovernmental organization, fire safe council)	Program, Plan, or Document	Last Version of Collaboration	Level of Collaboration
Sierra County Fire Safe and Watershed Council	Home/FireSafe Sierra County (firesafesierracounty.org)	Wildland Urban Interface Project to reduce hazardous fuels upon 65 acres adjacent to Sierraville, CA.	Liberty is a Council stakeholder. Attended meetings: 02/27/2025

Name of County, City, or Tribal Agency or Civil Society Organization (e.g., nongovernmental organization, fire safe council)	Program, Plan, or Document	Last Version of Collaboration	Level of Collaboration
Nevada County Quarterly Wildfire Stakeholder Meeting	Fire adapted communities and community archetypes		Meets quarterly; Attended meetings: 03/07/2025
Liberty and NV Energy Fire Mitigation/PSPS Collaboration	None	Coordination on PSPS exercises and wildfire mitigation.	Meets monthly; Attended meetings: 05/19/2024
Washoe Tribe	Tribal Government Wildfire Safety	Briefed on the Community Resource Center (CRC) MOU between Liberty Utilities and the Washoe Tribe	Attended meetings: 05/02/2024

Liberty provides information on gaps and limitations in collaborating on local wildfire mitigation in Table 11-6.

Table 11-6: Gaps and Limitations in Collaborating on Local Wildfire Mitigation Planning

Subject of Gap or Limitation	Brief Description of Gap or Limitation	Strategy for Improvement
More timely transport and distribution of repair supplies to the Walker / Coleville area is needed as well.	Repair materials for Walker / Coleville should be pre-staged.	Strategy: Store repair materials in CONEX boxes for more timely repairs. Target timeline: Completed

11.3.3 Collaboration with Tribal Governments

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide a high-level overview of its plans, programs, and/or policies for collaborating on local wildfire mitigation planning with tribal

governments served by the electrical corporation and on whose lands its infrastructure is located.⁹⁵ The narrative must be no more than one page.

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide the following information in tabular form, with no more than one page of tabulated information in the main body of the WMP and the full table in an appendix as needed.

- List of tribal governments served by the electrical corporation and on whose lands its infrastructure is located with which the electrical corporation has collaborated or intends to collaborate on local wildfire mitigation planning efforts (i.e., non-wildfire emergency planning activities).

- o For each entity, the local wildfire mitigation planning program/plan/document, level of collaboration (e.g., meeting attendance, verbal or written comments), and date the electrical corporation provided its last feedback. Table 11-7 provides the required format and an example of the minimum acceptable level of information. The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.

- o In a separate table, the electrical corporation must provide a list of current gaps and limitations in its collaboration efforts with local partners on local wildfire planning efforts. Where gaps or limitations exist, the electrical corporation must indicate proposed means and methods to increase collaborative efforts.

Liberty maintains a working relationship with the Washoe tribe, the only tribal community in its service territory. If Liberty needs to perform work on electrical infrastructure on tribal land, it will communicate early and often with the Carson City District of the Bureau of Land Management either directly or through an environmental consultant. The Bureau of Land Management will review project information provided by Liberty and, if appropriate, provide approval to proceed with a project.

In early February of 2025, Liberty obtained an easement to complete the Diamond Valley Road Rebuild. This project included the replacement of approximately two miles of overhead conductor and the installation of 39 electric poles on the Muller 1296 circuit, which serves customers in the Markleeville area and the Washoe Tribe. Liberty completed the project to support a more resilient power grid designed to minimize the potential of outages and withstand the weather elements during both winter and fire seasons.

⁹⁵ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(19).

In October of 2024, Liberty signed a CRC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Washoe Tribe. Liberty understands the unique needs of the Washoe Tribe and considered accessibility and proximity to the Hung-A-Lel-Ti community when selecting this CRC location to support customers during PSPS events. Refer to Table 11-7.

Table 11-7: Collaboration with Tribal Agencies

Name of Tribal Agency	Program, Plan, or Document	Last Version of Collaboration	Level of Collaboration
Washoe Tribe	Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”)	October 17, 2024	Agreement reached for use of tribal facility as CRC location.

Liberty provides information on gaps and limitations in collaborating with tribal agencies in Table 11-8.

Table 11-8: Gaps and Limitations in Collaborating with Tribal Agencies

Subject of Gap or Limitation	Description of Gap or Limitation	Strategy for Improvement
The Washoe CRC location is somewhat remote. More affordable options are needed by the logistics team for lunch items at this CRC.	Vendor contracts are needed for acquisition of CRC lunches.	Strategy: Execute new contracts with vendors for food options. Target timeline: Complete

11.4 Public Communication, Outreach, and Education Awareness

The electrical corporation must describe at a high level its comprehensive communication strategy to inform essential customers and other stakeholder groups of wildfires, outages due to wildfires, and PSPS and service restoration, as required by Public Utilities Code section 768.6.⁹⁶ This should include a discussion of the policies, practices, and procedures the electrical corporation adopts to establish appropriate communication protocols to ensure timely,

⁹⁶ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(7), (19).

accurate, and complete communications. The electrical corporation may refer to its Public Utilities Code section 768.6 emergency preparedness plan to provide more detail. The narrative must be no more than one page.

In the following sections, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of the following components of an effective and comprehensive communication strategy:

- Protocols for emergency communications.
- Messaging.
- Outreach and education awareness program(s) for wildfires, PSPS events, and PEDS; service restoration before, during, and after incidents; and vegetation management.
- Current gaps and limitations.

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.

Tracking ID: WMP-EP-03

Liberty executes a robust, year-round communications and outreach effort to increase community resiliency to wildfires and educate customers and the public about PSPS and how to prepare for potential de-energization events. The goal of this effort is to increase awareness and community resiliency to wildfires and PSPS.

Liberty conducts PSPS and wildfire-specific communications in three phases: before, during, and following an emergency event. Efforts before focus on immediate actions customers and the public can employ to remain safe, resilient, and updated during the emergency. During the event, Liberty focuses on providing real-time awareness and updates about the event and how to remain safe. Following the event, Liberty focuses on transparency, from educating customers and the public on the impact of the event to soliciting customer feedback to improve communication efforts for any future event. Specific details are provided in Section 11.4.2.

Public education and communication efforts target Liberty's service territory with a particular focus on the areas that are most at risk of PSPS or wildfire (High Fire Threat District). Liberty also focuses on areas with an elevated percentage of at-risk customers, such as MBL and AFN customers.

Liberty's wildfire mitigation communications and public education initiative consists of direct and indirect engagement through community outreach materials and engagement campaigns. Materials produced over the course of the year are tailored to match Liberty's respective audience and phase. Additionally, communications and outreach efforts will be enhanced and adjusted to reflect feedback received and emerging best practices.

11.4.1 Protocols for Emergency Communications

The electrical corporation must identify the relevant stakeholder groups and target communities in its service territory and describe the protocols, practices, and procedures used to provide notification of wildfires, outages due to wildfires and PSPS, and service restoration before, during, and after each incident type.⁹⁷ Stakeholder groups and target communities include, but are not limited to, the general public; priority essential services;⁹⁸ AFN populations and other vulnerable or marginalized populations; populations with limited English proficiency; Tribal Nations; and people in remote areas. The narrative must include a brief discussion of the decision-making process and use of best practices to ensure timely, accurate, and complete communications. The narrative must be no more than one page.

In addition, the electrical corporation must summarize the interests or concerns each stakeholder group/target community may have before, during, or after a wildfire or PSPS event to help inform outreach and education awareness needs. Table 11-9 provides the required format for this summary:

Liberty has identified the relevant stakeholder groups in its service territory. These groups include the following: the general public, priority essential services, AFN populations to include Medical Baseline customers, the Spanish-speaking population with limited English proficiency, and members of the Washoe Tribe. The protocols, practices, and procedures, used to provide notification of wildfires, outages due to wildfires, PSPS, and service restoration before, during, and after each incident type are described in Table 11-9. Liberty communications messaging protocols at the operational and tactical levels to include communication efforts prior to a potential threat, during an event, and following an event are provided in Section 11.4.2.

⁹⁷ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(7).

⁹⁸ Priority essential services include but are not limited to public safety offices, critical first responders, health care facilities and operators, and telecommunications infrastructure and operators.

Table 11-9: Protocols for Emergency Communication to Stakeholder Groups

Stakeholder Group	Event Type	Method(s) for Communicating	Means to Verify Message Receipt
General public	Wildfire	Wildfire-specific communications are conducted in three phases: before, during, and following an emergency event. Efforts before focus on immediate actions customers and the public can employ to remain safe, resilient, and updated during the emergency. This applies to all Liberty constituents to include the General Public, Priority Services, AFN populations, populations with limited English-speaking ability, and tribal populations.	Community Outreach; Public Workshops; Yearly surveys
General public	Wildfire-related outage	Liberty will employ standard communication channels to communicate wildfire-related outages including, but not limited to social media channels, broadcast and print media, and the Liberty website. As part of its expanded outreach, Liberty will coordinate roadside changeable message signs with Caltrans throughout affected communities to keep impacted residents informed. These signs will be critically important to educate tourists in Liberty's service territory. Liberty Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	OnSolve acknowledgement receipt
General public	PSPS-related outage	Liberty will employ standard communication channels to promote emergency service resources including, but not limited to social media channels, broadcast and print media, and the Liberty website. As part of its expanded outreach, Liberty will coordinate roadside changeable message signs with Caltrans throughout affected communities to keep impacted residents informed. These signs will be critically important to educate tourists in Liberty's service territory. Liberty has a PSPS Playbook with pre-scripted messages to deliver during all five stages of a PSPS. Liberty Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	OnSolve acknowledgement receipt

Stakeholder Group	Event Type	Method(s) for Communicating	Means to Verify Message Receipt
General public	Restoration of service	Following the event, Liberty focuses on transparency in educating customers and the public on the impact of the event and soliciting customer feedback to improve communication efforts for any future event. Liberty Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	OnSolve acknowledgement receipt, After Action Briefings and Reports
Priority essential services	Wildfire	Wildfire-specific communications are conducted in three phases: before, during, and following an emergency event. These efforts focus on immediate actions that customers and priority essential services can take to remain safe, resilient, and informed during an emergency.	Community Outreach; Public Workshops; Yearly surveys
Priority essential services	Wildfire related outage	During a major outage or emergency that affects a significant number of customers, an email is sent to personnel, agencies, and media to provide information, detail, and status of the outage. As the outage or emergency continues, status update emails and/or phone calls will be made to keep the agencies and media informed. Liberty will also disseminate detailed information on the wildfire including a list and maps of impacted communities, critical facilities, and estimated number of impacted customers and share it with local public safety partners and elected officials via our Public Safety Partner Portal. Public Safety Partners are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Notification receipt via OnSolve.
Priority essential services	PSPS-related outage	Liberty will disseminate detailed information on the PSPS event, including a list and maps of impacted communities, critical facilities, and estimated number of impacted customers and share it with local public safety partners and elected officials via our Public Safety Partner Portal. Public Safety Partners are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Notification receipt via OnSolve, feedback from public workshops.
Priority essential services	Restoration of service	Once the outage has concluded and the system is back to normal, a final email will be sent to close out the communication of the incident, and Public Safety Partners are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Notification receipt via OnSolve.

Stakeholder Group	Event Type	Method(s) for Communicating	Means to Verify Message Receipt
AFN populations	Wildfire Related outage	Medical Baseline or Green Cross customers who will be affected by the outage will receive a direct phone call from Liberty CalPeco staff notifying them of outage details, including but not limited to time, duration, and reason. Liberty's goal, whenever possible, is to notify the medical baseline customer group 72 hours in advance of a planned outage.	Notification receipt via OnSolve.
AFN populations	PSPS related outage	Medical Baseline or Green Cross customers who will be affected by the outage will receive a direct phone call from Liberty CalPeco staff notifying them of outage details, including but not limited to time, duration, and reason. Liberty's goal, whenever possible, is to notify the medical baseline customer group 72 hours in advance of a planned outage. If the customer can't be contacted via OnSolve a Liberty staff member will knock on the customer's door and leave a door hanger.	Notification receipt via OnSolve. In person door knock if no OnSolve receipt notification; Door hanger if door not answered.
AFN populations	Restoration of Service	Once the outage has concluded, a final update will be sent directly to customers and media, as well as posted to social media accounts and the Liberty website with a request that any customers still without power notify the Company. Liberty Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Notification receipt via OnSolve.
Spanish population with limited English proficiency	Wildfire related outage	Wildfire-specific communications are conducted in three phases: before, during, and following an emergency event. Efforts before focus on immediate actions customers and the public can employ to remain safe, resilient, and updated during the emergency. English and Spanish have been identified as the most prevalent languages used in the Liberty service territory. Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system which has the ability to notify in English and Spanish. Liberty Customer Service has staff members and a Community Outreach Coordinator available who are fluent in Spanish.	Customer Service in person communication; Notification receipt via OnSolve.

Stakeholder Group	Event Type	Method(s) for Communicating	Means to Verify Message Receipt
Spanish population with limited English proficiency	PSPS related outage	Liberty will employ standard communication channels to promote emergency service resources including, but not limited to social media channels, broadcast and print media, and the Liberty website. Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Customer Service in person communication; Notification receipt via OnSolve.
Spanish population with limited English proficiency	Restoration of Service	Once the outage has concluded, a final update will be sent directly to customers and media, as well as posted to social media accounts and the Liberty website with a request that any customers still without power notify the Company. Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Customer Service in person communication; Notification receipt via OnSolve.
Washoe Tribe	Wildfire related outage	Wildfire-specific communications are conducted in three phases: before, during, and following an emergency event. Efforts before focus on immediate actions customers and the public can employ to remain safe, resilient, and updated during the emergency. Liberty has conducted in person briefings on emergency management at Tribal meetings.	Community Outreach; Public Workshops; Yearly surveys
Washoe Tribe	PSPS related outage	Liberty will employ standard communication channels to promote emergency service resources including, but not limited to social media channels, broadcast and print media, and the Liberty website. As part of its expanded outreach, Liberty will coordinate roadside changeable message signs with Caltrans throughout affected communities to keep impacted residents informed. Liberty has a PSPS Playbook with pre-scripted messages to deliver during all five stages of a PSPS. Liberty Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	Notification receipt via OnSolve.

Stakeholder Group	Event Type	Method(s) for Communicating	Means to Verify Message Receipt
Washoe Tribe	Restoration of Service	Once the outage has concluded, a final update will be sent directly to customers and media, as well as posted to social media accounts and the Liberty website with a request that any customers still without power notify the Company. Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	OnSolve acknowledgement receipt; After Action Briefings and Reports
People in remote areas	Wildfire related outage	Wildfire-specific communications are conducted in three phases: before, during, and following an emergency event. Efforts before focus on immediate actions customers and the public can employ to remain safe, resilient, and updated during the emergency. Liberty has made extensive efforts to present on emergency management briefings in the towns of Portola and Loyalton in the north part of the service territory and in Alpine and Mono Counties in the southern portion of the service territory.	Community Outreach; Public Workshops; Yearly surveys
People in remote areas	PSPS related outage	Liberty will employ standard communication channels to promote emergency service resources including, but not limited to social media channels, broadcast and print media, and the Liberty website. As part of its expanded outreach, Liberty will coordinate roadside changeable message signs with Caltrans throughout affected communities to keep impacted residents informed. Liberty has a PSPS Playbook with pre-scripted messages to deliver during all five stages of a PSPS. Liberty Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	OnSolve acknowledgement receipt
People in remote areas	Restoration of Service	Once the outage has concluded, a final update will be sent directly to customers and media, as well as posted to social media accounts and the Liberty website with a request that any customers still without power notify the Company. Customers are notified via the OnSolve Communication system.	OnSolve acknowledgement receipt; After Action Briefings and Reports

11.4.2 Messaging

In this section, the electrical corporation must describe its procedures for developing effective messaging to reach the largest percentage of stakeholders in its service territory before, during, and after a wildfire, an outage due to wildfire, or a PSPS event.⁹⁹

In addition, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of the development of the following aspects of its communication messaging strategy:

- Features to maximize accessibility of the messaging (e.g., font size, color contrast analyzer)
- Alert and notification schedules
- Translation of notifications
- Messaging tone and language
- Key components and order of messaging content (e.g., hazard, location, time)

The narrative must be no more than one page.

Liberty's Public Website: Liberty will publish an alert to its customer facing website to notify customers of event status before, during, and after a PSPS. Liberty's public website has the following accessibility features:

- Color contrast: the color palette and typography of Liberty's public website meets Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) Level AA standards for contrast.
- Landmarks: Liberty's public website templates utilize content landmark tags such as <header>, <main>, and <footer>, to assist readers with basic fragmentation of page content.
- Bypass repeating blocks: A link element is present at the top of each web page, visible only to the screen reader, which enables skipping down to the main page content.
- HTML presentational attributes, inline styles, tags, etc.: The updated Liberty public website templates do not use locally-styles content. This reduces the likelihood of interference with assistive technologies that may need to alter the content for its own purposes.
- Page Headings: To assist in organizing page content hierarchically, Liberty public website templates have been updated to better establish a top-down order of page headings, with only a single <h1> tag declaring the page purpose, and encouraging the use of descending tags <h2>, <h3>, etc.

⁹⁹ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(7), (19).

- Liberty website content for California locations is available in Spanish. Liberty has used a third-party vendor for content translation since Q4 of 2022.

Emergency Alerts: In addition to website postings, Liberty uses Onsolve for emergency alerts sent directly to customers with accurate contact information. Onsolve utilizes a tiered approach so Liberty can reach as many people as possible. Onsolve will send a text, phone call, and email, and captures data on who has received and opened the message.

Liberty will utilize its social media platforms on Facebook and X to reach not only customers, but the community as a whole. Lastly, Liberty will send messages to CBOs, PSPs, and media contacts. Liberty considers the tone of messaging and will craft messages to be urgent but not fear-inducing, action-oriented, helpful, and educational. Liberty has a robust communications procedure with multi-department coordination and review so that different stakeholders receive necessary messages crafted efficiently.

Messaging content contains real-time awareness information about the situation and where to find additional updates. Local media and community partners are also provided with similar messaging for amplification. These communications include information about the high-fire risk weather conditions as well as communities at risk for potential outages. Customers and the public are directed to the Liberty website for further information.

Prior to a potential event: In 2024, Liberty continued its public education and outreach efforts associated with its wildfire mitigation plan. Safety and resiliency communications were part of a territory-wide public education campaign. These communications focused on personal preparedness and community resiliency.

During an event: Liberty will execute standard communication protocols, such as customer notifications, media updates and situational awareness postings across social media channels. In addition, Liberty will activate a series of additional tactics to inform customers and the public about the latest developments during emergency, wildfire, and PSPS events.

Liberty will assign dedicated liaisons who are responsible for conveying real-time updates and outreach material to its public safety partners, elected officials, critical facilities, and CBOs. Liberty will also employ standard communication channels to promote emergency service resources including, but not limited to social media channels, broadcast and print media, and the Liberty website. As part of its expanded outreach, Liberty will coordinate roadside changeable message signs with Caltrans throughout affected communities to keep impacted residents informed. These signs will be critically important to educate tourists in Liberty's service territory. Liberty will disseminate detailed information on the emergency, wildfire, or PSPS event, including a list and maps of impacted communities, critical facilities, and estimated

number of impacted customers and share it with local public safety partners and elected officials. To expand its digital outreach, Liberty will distribute public service announcements (“PSAs”) to read live on the airwaves and coordinate with CalOES to distribute wireless emergency alerts to impacted regions. The templates allow for the addition of real-time awareness details and provide referral to Liberty’s social media platforms for additional safety information and updates.

Following an event: Communication with customers and the public early and often is essential to the region’s wildfire preparedness. Liberty engages in discussions and solicits feedback from its communities and stakeholders regarding proactive safety preparations, mitigation measures and community support strategies to reduce infrastructure-related ignitions and mitigate impacts of a wildfire or PSPS. In 2024, Liberty reached out to customers through formal surveys to determine the level of awareness of wildfire mitigation and PSPS-related messaging and communications at the beginning of wildfire season. Liberty uses the gathered feedback to evaluate, refine, and improve customer and public education efforts.

11.4.3 Outreach and Education Awareness Programs

In tabulated format, the electrical corporation must provide a list the various outreach and education awareness programs (i.e., campaigns, informal education, grant programs, participatory learning) that the electrical corporation implements before, during, and after wildfire, vegetation management, and PSPS events to target communities, including efforts to engage with partners in developing and exercising these programs.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the electrical corporation must describe how it implements its overall program, including staff and volunteer needs, other resource needs, method for implementation (e.g., industry best practice, latest research in methods for risk communication, social marketing), long-term monitoring and evaluation of each program’s success, need for improvement, etc. The narrative for this section is limited to two to three pages.

Tracking ID: WMP-CO-01

Liberty’s community outreach efforts focus on providing a presence in communities within all seven counties served by the utility. Liberty participates in a variety of outreach efforts including, but not limited to, general community events, collaboration with local organizations, and targeted tribal outreach. Liberty’s outreach focus is to spread awareness of PSPS preparedness, Liberty’s notification system, customer assistance program benefits, the

¹⁰⁰ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(19).

importance of maintaining updated contact information, and AFN self-identification. CBO collaboration supports Liberty in reaching AFN communities through established community networks, and AFN categories are considered in planning collaborative efforts. Liberty provides information on its WMP and PSPS public outreach and education awareness program in Table 11-10, LU Table 11-1, and LU Table 11-2.

Table 11-10: List of Target Communities for Outreach and Awareness Efforts

Target Community	Interests or Concerns Before, During, and After Wildfire and PSPS events
Identified Access and Functional Needs individuals	Liberty understands customers with access and functional needs may require earlier communication to plan for needs before, during, and after PSPS events and require communication regarding available resources. Liberty values targeted outreach to Access and Functional Needs populations with a focus on PSPS preparedness measures, education around Liberty's notification system, and importance of updated contact information.
Individuals enrolled in Medical Baseline Allowance Program	Liberty understands customers with medical needs may require earlier communication to plan for medical needs before, during, and after PSPS events and require communication regarding available resources.
Community Based Organizations ("CBOs")	Liberty understands CBOs require communication regarding PSPS events in order to effectively communicate with and support their communities before, during, and after PSPS events.

LU Table 11-2: List of Community Partners

Community Partners	County	City
Sierra Community House	Placer	Kings Beach, CA
Tahoe Truckee Community Foundation	Nevada	Truckee, CA
Placer County Health & Human Services	Placer	Carnelian Bay, CA
Sierra Senior Services	Nevada	Truckee, CA
North Tahoe Truckee Homeless Services	Nevada	Truckee, CA
FREED Independent Living Center	Nevada, Placer, Sierra	Grass Valley, CA
Placer Independent Resource Services ("PIRS")	Placer, El Dorado, Alpine	Auburn, CA
211 Connecting Point	Nevada, Placer	Grass Valley, CA
Nevada County Health & Human Services	Nevada	Truckee, CA

Community Partners	County	City
Portola Family Resource Center	Plumas	Portola, CA
Plumas County Mental Health	Plumas	Portola, CA
Eastern Plumas Healthcare	Plumas	Portola, CA
Partnership HealthPlan of CA	Plumas	Fairfield, CA
Loyalton Senior Citizens of Sierra Co.	Sierra	Loyalton, CA
Sierra County Health and Human Services	Sierra	Loyalton, CA
Sierra County Public Health	Sierra	Loyalton, CA
Loyalton Family Resource Center	Sierra	Loyalton, CA
Boys and Girls Club of Lake Tahoe	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Live Violence Free	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Tahoe Coalition for the Homeless	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
El Dorado Health and Human Services	El Dorado	Placerville, CA
First 5 / Community Hub El Dorado	El Dorado	Placerville, CA
South Lake Tahoe Family Resource Center	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Tahoe Youth and Family Services	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Tahoe Magic	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Bread and Broth	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Catalyst Community	El Dorado	South Lake Tahoe, CA
Rolling Start, Inc. Independent Living Center	Mono	San Bernardino, CA
Mono County Health and Human Services	Mono	Coleville, CA
Mono County Public Health	Mono	Mammoth Lakes, CA
Alpine County Health and Human Services	Alpine	Markleeville, CA
Washoe Tribe	Alpine	Markleeville, CA

LU Table 11-3: Community Outreach and Education Programs

Core Activity	Event Type	Period of Application (Before, During, After Incident)	Name of Outreach or Education Program	Description of Program	Target Audience
Wildfire Advisory Council Meeting	Virtual	Biennial	Wildfire Advisory Council Meeting	Perform general PSPS and Wildfire Mitigation outreach ahead of fire season.	All customers
Digital, print, and radio advertising	Campaign	All	PSPS and Wildfire Mitigation Awareness Advertising	Campaign occurs from April-October of each year, covering PSPS and Wildfire Mitigation awareness topics.	All customers, medical baseline customers
Advertising in HOA publications and customer emails	Email, social media	Before	None	Perform general PSPS and Wildfire Mitigation outreach ahead of fire season.	All Customers
Manage outreach /awareness webpage	Virtual	All	Liberty PSPS and Wildfire Mitigation awareness webpage	Social media posts, bill inserts, and customer emails help drive traffic to webpage that covers PSPS and wildfire mitigation awareness topics.	All Customers
General Community Outreach Events	In-Person	Before	None	Liberty attendance at community outreach events to spread PSPS awareness and preparedness education, update contact information, and provide education on available customer programs and Liberty notification system.	All customers

Core Activity	Event Type	Period of Application (Before, During, After Incident)	Name of Outreach or Education Program	Description of Program	Target Audience
Community Based Organization (“CBO”) Meetings	In-Person, Virtual	Before	None	Liberty staff meetings with local CBOs to share PSPS awareness and available materials, preparedness education, customer program updates, and to maintain up to date contract information for CBO facing communities.	CBOs, AFN Customers
Collaborative Community Outreach with CBOs	In-Person	Before	None	Liberty involvement in collaborative outreach events to spread PSPS awareness and preparedness education, update contact information, and provide education on available customer programs and Liberty notification system. This form of outreach leverages CBO relationships within the community to access local communities and supports targeted outreach efforts to reach AFN populations.	All customers, AFN customers, CBOs
Provision of Shelf-Stable Meal Boxes to Senior Nutrition Programs	In-Person	Before	Shelf Stable Meal Box Delivery	Provide preparedness information, customer assistance program information and shelf stable food items to vulnerable seniors.	All customers

11.4.4 Engagement with Access and Functional Needs Populations

The electrical corporation must provide an overview of its process for understanding, evaluating, designing, and implementing wildfire and outage program risk initiative strategies, policies, and procedures specific to AFN customers across its territory.¹⁰¹ The electrical corporation must provide its AFN plan as an attachment and may it to provide more detail. The electrical corporation must also report on the following:

- Summary of key AFN demographics, distribution, and percentage of total customer base.
- Evaluation of the specific challenges and needs during a wildfire or PSPS event of the electrical corporation's AFN customer base.
- Plans to address specific needs of the AFN customer base throughout the service territory specific to the unique threats that wildfires and PSPS events may pose for those populations before, during, and after the incidents. This should include high-level strategies, policies, programs, and procedures for outreach, engagement in the development and implementation of the AFN-specific risk initiative strategies, and ongoing feedback practices.

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.

Tracking ID: WMP-CO-03

Identification of Access and Functional Needs ("AFN") Populations: Liberty identifies electricity dependent individuals above and beyond those enrolled in the Medical Baseline Allowance Program, through direct outreach to customers in Liberty's service area and collaborative opportunities with local partners. Liberty has established the ability to track AFN customer categories beyond MBL in its CIS, including the following categories:

- Customers enrolled in low-income programs
- Customers with a physical, intellectual, or developmental disability
- Customers with a chronic condition or injury
- Customers identified as having limited English proficiency
- Customers in households with older adults
- Transportation-disadvantaged customers

¹⁰¹ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(7), (19).

Liberty has identified 10,096 individuals as AFN in its service territory, including 231 Medical Baseline individuals. Approximately 23% of Liberty's total residential customer base is identified as AFN.

Liberty performs customer outreach to share information about customer programs (CARE, ESA, MBL) and PSPS awareness through a variety of methods, including community events, website resources, social media, bill inserts, targeted outreach to multi-family dwellings and mobile home parks, radio ads, digital ads, print ads, and call center staff.

Liberty has made progress in identifying AFN individuals through collaborative outreach with local CBOs, focusing on program enrollment, and promoting self-identification. Liberty identifies the following customer groups as AFN:

- Customers enrolled in the California Alternate Rates for Energy ("CARE") and Medical Baseline ("MBL") programs;
- Older adults, who are automatically marked as AFN; and
- Customers who self-identify with the AFN categories listed above.

Evaluation of challenges and needs during a wildfire or PSPS Event: Liberty works in coordination with the AFN Collaborative Council, AFN Core Planning Team, CBOs, local governments, the Washoe Tribe, and the other California Small & Multi-Jurisdictional Utilities ("SMJUs") to understand the challenges of supporting individuals with AFN during a wildfire or PSPS de-energization. During a wildfire or PSPS event, Liberty will use the best available information to evaluate and meet the needs of individuals with AFN.

Liberty also participates in community collaborative groups in both South and North Lake Tahoe with the goal of being an involved partner in community conversations, establish new connections, and provide applicable information on available assistance programs and PSPS preparedness information to local networks. Relationships with local organizations are essential to consistently learning about the unique needs of each community served by Liberty with respect to AFN populations. Feedback shared by CBOs has been valuable in understanding communication needs across the service territory in areas with high concentrations of AFN households and has shaped Liberty's evolving outreach strategy.

Liberty maintains communication channels directly with Community Resource Centers during PSPS events and has the ability to communicate AFN related needs in real time to the EOC for mitigation and collaboration with local partners. Relationships established with local Public Safety Partners, organizations, and CRC Leads support awareness of AFN impact and needs throughout an event.

Plans to address the needs of the AFN customer base: Liberty works with other SMJUs and collaboratively within a statewide AFN Core Planning team to develop a joint strategy to meet the needs of individuals with AFN before, during, and after a wildfire or PSPS de-energization event. California IOUs filed their respective 2025 Plans to Support Access and Functional Needs Populations During De-Energization Events on January 31, 2025. The AFN Plan, which has common elements across the utilities, includes information related to de-energization event notification cadence; support services and tools available to customers with AFN; AFN customer identification; collaboration with working groups, advisory councils, and CBOs; and available customer programs and resources. Detailed information can be found in Appendix F – Liberty’s 2025 AFN Plan.

Liberty’s outreach strategy considers AFN population targets and geographic coverage. Liberty understands customer assistance program awareness and enrollment supports AFN identification, ultimately supporting earlier communication of PSPS events. Customer assistance program awareness and PSPS education are key priorities of outreach efforts, and collaboration with local organizations on in-person outreach events has proven to be a successful strategy, especially in more rural communities. Improvements to accessibility of information shared, where possible, has been identified as an impactful area of consideration by local partners with respect to AFN communities. Presentations at senior centers, local organizations, and tribal communities have been included in Liberty’s outreach strategy with bilingual accessibility where appropriate. Information sharing efforts around assistance program categorical enrollment with agencies supporting Public Purpose Programs has been a meaningful evolution in outreach approach.

Liberty’s relationships with local Public Safety Partners and local organizations aligns with a “whole community approach” to supporting AFN populations before, during, and after PSPS events to address needs proactively and as they arise. Liberty has partnered with local senior nutrition programs across its service territory to provide shelf-stable meal boxes to vulnerable seniors to support preparedness. The meal boxes included PSPS awareness and customer assistance program materials and leveraged existing networks to effectively communicate with a population that can be difficult to reach.

11.4.5 Engagement with Tribal Nations

The electrical corporation must provide an overview of its process for understanding, evaluating, designing, and implementing wildfire and outage program risk initiative strategies, policies, and procedures specific for collaboration with to Tribal Nations served by the electrical

corporation and on whose lands its infrastructure is located.¹⁰² The electrical corporation must also report on the following:

- Summary of key tribal demographics.
- Ongoing consultation and collaborative efforts performed by the electrical corporation with Tribal Nations.
- Evaluation of the specific challenges and needs during a wildfire or PSPS event of the electrical corporation's Tribal Nation customer base.
- Plans to address specific needs of the tribal customers throughout the service territory specific to the unique threats that wildfires and PSPS events may pose for those populations before, during, and after the incidents. This should include high-level strategies, policies, programs, and procedures for outreach, engagement in the development and implementation of the tribal-specific risk initiative strategies, and ongoing feedback practices.

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate:

Liberty maintains a working relationship with the Washoe tribe, the only tribal community in its service territory. Liberty experienced 3 PSPS events in November 2024. The Washoe Tribe provides support to customers with AFN and was included as an essential Public Safety partner throughout each of these events. Liberty maintained communication with the Washoe Tribe's Emergency Manager and the Hung-A-Lel-Ti Community Chairman at each stage of PSPS. Liberty has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Washoe tribe and has established a CRC location in Markleeville, CA within close proximity to the local AFN community. This CRC location was activated from 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM during all three PSPS events and was well attended by Hung-A-Lel-Ti residents throughout each event. Customer assistance program information and PSPS awareness materials were shared at the CRC location with attendees. After receiving feedback from tribal leadership that attendees may benefit from an increased understanding of PSPS, educational videos were shown at the location. These videos were developed to support increased awareness in an accessible format and will be integrated into outreach where appropriate.

Liberty acknowledges the unique needs of tribal residents and will continue to develop a supportive relationship in 2025, including collaboration with the Washoe Tribe regarding ongoing grant opportunities. Liberty held meetings with the Washoe Tribe's emergency manager throughout 2024, including discussion related to the importance of electricity

¹⁰² Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(19).

dependent customer awareness of the MBL Program and benefits of enrollment. Liberty also provided applications for dissemination after discovering a small number of identified medical customers in the community, which conflicted with previous conversations in terms of community needs.

Liberty works closely with the tribe throughout the year and conducts targeted outreach to the tribal community of Hung-A-Lel-Ti. Standing monthly meetings were established with the Washoe Tribe’s Emergency Manager in January of 2025. These meetings are utilized to support the Washoe Tribe with a variety of topics including support of tribal grant funding opportunities involving Liberty, project application processes, and customer assistance program outreach.

11.4.6 Current Gaps and Limitations

In tabulated format, the electrical corporation must provide a list of current gaps and limitations in its public communication strategy, including any notification failures identified in the most recent PSPS post-season report. Where gaps or limitations exist, the electrical corporation must indicate the remedial action plan and the timeline for resolving the gaps or limitations. For all requested information, the electrical corporation should indicate a form of verification that can be provided upon request for compliance assurance.

Liberty provides information on gaps and limitations in its public communication strategy in Table 11-11.

Table 11-11: Gaps and Limitations in Public Emergency Communication Strategy

Gap or Limitation Subject	Remedial Brief Description	Remedial Action Plan
During 2024 PSPS events, some customers were notified as being in scope for events but were not de-energized and did not receive notices of cancellation.	Liberty should update its protocols an in-event tracking spreadsheet to make sure customers that are notified, but not, de-energized receive cancellation notices.	Strategy: Liberty will update its in-event tracker to specifically capture cancellation notifications. Target Timeline: Completed
2024 PSPS events highlighted the need to update Liberty’s MBL customer contact list, as some members of the list had recently passed away.	Liberty should do an internal review of its MBL customer list.	Target Timeline: Completed

11.5 Customer Support in Wildfire and PSPS Emergencies

In this section of the WMP, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of its programs, systems, and protocols to support residential and non-residential customers during and after wildfire emergencies and PSPS events.¹⁰³ The overview for each emergency service must be no more than one page. The overview must cover the following customer emergency services:

- Outage reporting
- Support for low-income customers
- Billing adjustments
- Deposit waivers
- Extended payment plans
- Suspension of disconnection and nonpayment fees
- Repair processing and timing
- List and description of community assistance locations and services
- Medical Baseline support services
- Access to electrical corporation representatives

The electrical corporation must reference the Tracking ID where appropriate.:

Tracking ID: WMP-EP-05

Outage Reporting: Liberty utilizes a multi-channel approach for real-time situational awareness. After extreme weather conditions are forecasted and the National Weather Service issues a Red Flag Warning, Liberty begins to coordinate with local government agencies, community-based organizations, and public safety partners approximately 72 hours prior to the event. Communications are then initiated with customers via Onsolve, broadcast media, and social media channels. These communications drive traffic to Liberty's social media and/or dedicated PSPS landing page for more information and real-time situation updates. As the event progresses, these notifications become more specific and targeted to customers as the situation warrants. Along with outage updates, the channels listed above provide information related to wildfire safety, emergency preparedness, PSPS, and community resource centers.

Support for Low-Income Customers: Refer to Appendix F: Liberty's Plan to Support Populations with Access and Functional Needs During PSPS for specific measures that Liberty has developed to support AFN customers during emergencies, including PSPS events. Additionally, CARE and

¹⁰³ Pub. Util. Code, § 8386(c)(21).

MBL customers may be offered special payment arrangements resulting from fire-related outages, as necessary.

Billing Adjustments: Liberty may suspend billing until power is restored to impacted customers.

Deposit Waivers: Liberty may waive deposit requirements for business customers who are seeking to re-establish service at either the same location or a new location.

Extended Payment Plans: Special consideration may be granted for payment extension when customers experience tremendous loss (i.e., property loss).

Suspension of Disconnection and Nonpayment Fees: For customers impacted by wildfires, Liberty may suspend disconnection for non-payment and associated fees, waive the deposit and late fee requirements for affected customers who pay their utility bills late, and not report late payments by customers who are eligible for these protections to credit reporting agencies or to other such services.

Repair Processing and Timing: Timing for repair procedures will be determined on the severity of the wildfire. As feasible, Liberty will accelerate the repair process.

Community Assistance Locations and Services: In coordination with the communities that it serves, Liberty has established a network of Community Resource Centers (“CRCs”) to assist communities in real time during extreme weather events. Planning factors for meeting the safety needs for access and functional needs and vulnerable populations have included local demographic data, as well as the company database of medical baseline customers. The establishment of CRCs was informed by presentations and discussions in seven Town Hall Meetings held in each of seven communities in Liberty’s service territory. Plan creation included consultation with regional local government, advisory boards, public safety partners, representatives of people/communities with access and functional needs, tribal representatives, senior citizen groups, business owners, community resource organizations, and public health and healthcare providers.

- *Locations:* If Liberty anticipates that the power will be off for an extended period, Liberty will open CRCs in the affected areas. The CRC locations selected by Liberty were identified through a rigorous process, which included input from fire and meteorological experts, as well as those areas that are most prone to extreme weather, as indicated by historical data. CRC locations identified to date include Walker, Markleeville, South Lake Tahoe, Truckee Tahoe Airport, Loyalton, and Portola.
- *Accommodations:* All CRCs are in fixed facility locations known to the public. CRCs will have backup power or are in areas that are contiguous to PSPS zones that would not be

shut off in the event of a PSPS. They are ADA-compliant, and CRC site planning includes consideration of customers with access and functional needs.

- *Services provided:* Each CRC site meets fire codes and has at least two egress routes. Once activated, CRCs will operate in 14-hour shifts from 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM daily, until power to the affected community has been restored. Liberty contracts a third party, Fire Dawg, Inc., for support services including CRC staffing and setup. Liberty provides snacks, water, device charging ability, Wi-Fi, ADA-accessible restrooms, resource information, third-party customer service staff (including bilingual representation when possible), and blankets at CRC locations. CRC locations present a unique opportunity for program enrollment, PSPS preparedness information sharing, and AFN identification. Liberty plans to provide information on CARE, ESA, and MBL programs at each CRC. PSPS toolkit information will be shared in English and Spanish at CRC locations.

Medical Baseline Support Services: Liberty will provide live agent outbound calls to medical baseline customers who did not confirm contact through automated notifications (i.e., e-mails, phone calls).

Access to Liberty Representatives: If Liberty's offices are not impacted by the wildfire event, operations will resume, and customer service representatives will be available to provide support. If offices are impacted, nearby offices and corporate communications will be available to customers.

Liberty provides additional information on its programs to support customers in wildfire emergencies and PSPS events in Appendix F – Liberty's 2025 AFN Plan.

12. Enterprise Systems

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide an overview of inputs to, operation of, and support for various enterprise systems it uses for vegetation management, asset management and inspection, grid monitoring, ignition detection, weather forecasting, and risk assessment initiatives.¹⁰⁴ Enterprise systems encompass structures and methods that allow the electrical corporation and its employees and/or contractors to accept, store, retrieve, and update data for the production, management, and scheduling of related work.

12.1 Targets

In this section, the electrical corporation must provide qualitative and quantitative targets for each year of this three-year cycle. The electrical corporation must provide at least one qualitative and one quantitative target for each initiative as related to implementation and improvement of its enterprise systems.

Tracking IDs: WMP-VM-ESG-01

12.1.1 Qualitative Targets

The electrical corporation must provide at least one qualitative target for each relevant initiative (vegetation management, asset management and inspection, grid monitoring, ignition detection, weather forecasting, and risk assessment) in its three-year plan for implementing and improving its enterprise systems, including the following:

- Identification of which initiative activity in the WMP the electrical corporation is implementing to achieve the stated target, including Tracking IDs and the previous tracking ID used in past WMPs, if applicable.
- A target completion date.
- Reference(s) to the WMP section(s) or appendix, including page numbers, where the details of the target(s) are documented and substantiated.

Vegetation Data Quality Management (WMP-VM-ESG-01): Liberty's Vegetation Management program has been developing a Data Quality Management (DQM) tool to ensure data quality throughout the vegetation inspection and maintenance data lifecycle. This tool will perform daily checks against the Fieldnote and Liberty databases to compare tables and report any discrepancies to data owners. DQM Reports will be delivered through automatic emails. These daily checks will help prevent erroneous data from avoiding detection, getting stored in the

¹⁰⁴ Pub. Util. Code § 8386(c)(10), (14), (18).

database, and used in reporting. Currently, this process is carried out manually through inspection of dashboards, lengthy review of source data, and coordination between multiple team members and data collectors in the field. Automatic DQM Reporting on Liberty’s SQL database will be in place by the end of 2028.

Asset Management Inspection Application Reduction: Liberty will implement a single, multi-year asset inspection and management application. Liberty will finish data migration from previous single-year apps into the new application, “Asset Tracking”. Historical inspection apps will be archived, creating a single data source for Liberty’s future gathering of asset inspection and maintenance data. Currently, Liberty has asset inspection and maintenance data stored in six collection apps. Five of these applications are based on inspection type and year for inspections starting in 2020. In 2024 Liberty began rolling out the “Asset Tracking” Fulcrum application. This application will serve as a multi-year asset inspection and management application. By the end of 2028 all asset inspection and management data will be stored in the Asset Tracking application and previous Fulcrum applications will be archived.

Table 12-1: Enterprise System Targets

WMP Initiative	Activity (Tracking ID#)	2026 End-of-Year Total / Completion Date	2027 Total / Status	2028 Total / Status	Section; Page Number
Enterprise System – Vegetation Management	Vegetation Data Quality Management (WMP-VM- ESG-01)	Started: March 2026	In Progress	Completed: December 31, 2028	12.1.1; pp. 293-294
Enterprise System – Asset Management and Inspection	Asset Management Inspection Application Reduction (N/A)	Started: March 2026	In Progress	Completed: December 31, 2028	12.1.1; pp. 293-294

12.2 Summary of Enterprise Systems

Electrical corporations must provide a summary narrative of no more than three pages that discusses how its enterprise systems contain, account, or allow for the following:

- Any database(s) the electrical corporation used for data storage.
- Internal procedures for updating the enterprise system, including database(s), any planned updates, and the ability to migrate data across systems and ensure accuracy if necessary.


- The electrical corporation's asset identification process.
- The electrical corporation's process for integrating 100% asset identification or its justification if not currently in place.
- Processes to ensure data integrity (accuracy, completeness, and quality of data), accessibility (ability of the electrical corporation to access data across formats and locations), and retention (any policies the electrical corporation for how long it stores data and how it disposes of data after any retention period).
- Any QA/QC or auditing of its system.
- Overview of any data governance plan that the electrical corporation has in place. Highlighting any data stewardship practices.
- How current WMP initiatives are being tracked and monitored in enterprise systems.
- Employee and/or contractor ability to access and interact with the data and systems for tracking work order status and scheduling.
- How the electrical corporation's work order and asset management systems feed into risk analysis and alternative or interim initiative activity selection.
- Any changes to the electrical corporation's enterprise systems since the last WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made. Include any planned improvements or updates to the enterprise systems and the timeline for implementation.

Database(s) used for data storage: Liberty utilizes a variety of databases for data storage. Incident management, Customer information, and work planning data, including work orders and as-builts, are stored in SAP. Electric Asset and Vegetation inspection and maintenance data are stored in the respective databases of their field collection applications. These databases can be queried directly through their respective web apps (Fulcrum and Fieldnote). Data is also ingested into Liberty's SQL server database with an API. Data from SAP and SQL databases are combined into file Geodatabases and imported into Liberty's Enterprise GIS database alongside other geospatial data.

Internal procedures for updating the enterprise system, including database(s), any planned updates, and the ability to migrate data across systems and ensure accuracy if necessary: Liberty's procedure for updating the Electric Asset enterprise system begins with the data collected and updated by inspectors and work crews. This data is ingested into the SQL database where Liberty monitors and analyzes the data while making the necessary transformations. Database tables are joined in SQL views for use in BI reports. These reports are used by managers to assist in ensuring data accuracy. After the Electric Asset data is transformed and reviewed, exports are made from SQL Server to the GIS team for storage in their enterprise database. Data requests of Electric Asset and Vegetation data can be

completed through SQL queries as well as GIS exports. SQL and BI updates are performed after requirement gathering and testing is performed by the Data Analytics department. Refer to Figure 12-1 for an overview of Liberty's Enterprise System.

Figure 12-1: Overview of Liberty's Enterprise System



Liberty's asset identification process and process for integrating 100 percent asset identification: Liberty's asset identification process starts with asset designs created by Design and Operations departments in the form of as-builts. After assets are installed in the field, as-builts are sent to GIS for review and ingestion into their database. Liberty inspectors also collect data for use in asset identification as part of the 5-year detailed asset inspection cycle. As-builts and inspection data are reconciled to complete the asset identification process. Over a 5-year period of asset inspections, 100 percent asset identification is completed.

Processes to ensure data integrity (accuracy, completeness, and quality of data), accessibility (ability of the electrical corporation to access data across formats and locations), and retention (any policies the electrical corporation for how long it stores data and how it disposes of data after any retention period): Liberty hosts several Power BI dashboards to model and visualize the data of its enterprise system. As data is observed, quality control is implemented to make corrections as necessary. Electrical Asset and Vegetation data is archived quarterly. Data

Analytics maintains ETL pipelines that migrate data from the field collection apps (Fieldnote and Fulcrum) to the SQL Server database. Transformations are made in SQL and tabular data is exported in csv format. The GIS department converts these into feature classes stored in geodatabases for use in Liberty's enterprise GIS database.

Liberty implemented ESRI's Utility Network in April of 2022. As a result of this deployment, rules are set in place to ensure consistency in its GIS data. These rules must be satisfied in order for the Utility Network to function as designed and will prevent the users from updating the utility subnetworks until all criteria is met. Liberty's enterprise GIS database is stored in an off-site location, and access to the database is allowed via ArcGIS Pro and its web portal where a series of web maps are accessible by internal staff. Data is never deleted but marked as removed when the electric assets are retired, there is currently no determination at this time for when a cut off period will be put in place for disposal of this historical data.

Liberty is required to maintain data over a ten-year period. Historically this has been difficult as prior to 2020 data was held in paper forms. Liberty strives to retain data by leveraging its GIS and SQL databases. Currently Liberty maintains Five-years of historical asset inspection and maintenance data and 3 years of vegetation data. As Liberty reaches the ten-years of data retained, a plan will be created to evaluate retention / disposal rate of historical data.

Data integrity checks are performed at all levels by department members for each data source. For instance: the vegetation management department tasks its arborists with maintaining data quality as it is input by contractors in the field. After these checks, Data Analytics and Vegetation Management will perform their own quality checks using in-house data quality management programs. As mentioned previously, Power BI reports are used for their accessibility to various user groups. By leveraging the accessibility of BI reports, Liberty has been able to maintain consistently higher data quality than was possible before their implementation.

QA/QC or auditing of Liberty's Systems: SQL and GIS data are reviewed quarterly with Operations, Vegetation Management, and GIS departments. Any system changes are completed through a process of requirement gathering, testing in development environments, and continuous monitoring after deployment to production enterprise systems.

Overview of any data governance plan that the electrical corporation has in place. Highlighting any data stewardship practices: The goal of Liberty's data governance plan is to ensure compliance data is correct and that reporting is accurate and repeatable. Accuracy of compliance data is accomplished through consistent training of data collectors, stringent database permissions, and data quality management procedures. Repeatable reporting is

accomplished through data archiving and stored procedures in the SQL database for each report.

Data Analysts, System Arborists, and Electrical Foreman are heavily involved in training inspectors, contractors, and any other groups who are tasked with data collection. Data Analytics maintains strict permissions for database access and keep write and read access to the database reserved for trained analysts. Other users are allowed access through read permissions to Power BI dashboards and ad hoc reporting. Liberty has been developing an in-house Data Quality Management procedure used to reconcile third party data collection application databases with Liberty's SQL Server database.

Liberty strives to create consistent and repeatable compliance reports. Data used for Quarterly Data Reporting as well as WMP Initiatives are archived quarterly. This allows for historical reports to be accessed with their underlying data the same as at the time of their reporting. Liberty also utilizes Stored SQL Procedures to create reports with month, quarter, and year variables for initiative updates as well as for QDR reporting.

How current WMP initiatives and activities are being tracked and monitored in enterprise systems: WMP Initiatives and activities based on field-collected data are tracked and monitored in Power BI dashboards. Vegetation and Asset data from inspections and maintenance programs are aggregated in Power BI dashboards for monitoring by department members. Reports and updates are generated from stored SQL Procedures.

Employee and/or contractor ability to access and interact with the data and systems for tracking work order status and scheduling: Liberty employees and contractors are given access to work order scheduling through SAP and Fulcrum.

How Liberty's work order and asset management systems feed into risk analysis and alternative or interim activity selection: System exports of electric asset details were provided by Liberty's GIS team to Direxyon and Technosylva for use in training their risk models. GIS data is delivered from liberty's work order and asset management systems as needed or through annual reports.

Any changes to Liberty's enterprise systems since the last Base WMP submission and a brief explanation as to why those changes were made, including any planned improvements or updates to the enterprise systems and the timeline for implementation: Since Liberty's last Base WMP submission the enterprise systems for Asset and Vegetation data have been improved by continuing to leverage the capabilities of the SQL Server database as well as continued adoption of Power BI as a business intelligence tool.

Liberty's GIS refreshes data from the customer information system ("CIS") on a nightly basis to ensure that customer data is kept up to date. Previously imports were done manually on a monthly basis from our legacy CIS using excel exports. In the future liberty aims to streamline its data schema so that it can more efficiently and accurately capture asset details for internal and external use.

13. Lessons Learned

An electrical corporation must use lessons learned to drive continual improvement in its WMP.¹⁰⁵ Electrical corporations must include lessons learned due to ongoing monitoring and evaluation initiatives, collaboration with other electrical corporations and industry experts, PSPS or outage events, and feedback from Energy Safety and other regulators.

13.1 Description and Summary of Lessons Learned

In this section, the electric corporation must provide a brief narrative describing the key lessons learned tied to feedback from government agencies and stakeholders, collaboration efforts with other electrical corporations, areas for continued improvement, and outcomes from previous WMP cycles.

The narrative must also include lessons learned from prior catastrophic wildfires ignited by the electrical corporation's facilities or equipment and findings from Energy Safety compliance audits and reports.

For each lesson learned, the electrical corporation must identify the following in Table 13-1:

- The year of the WMP cycle the lesson learned was identified.
- Category and specific source of lesson learned.
- Brief description of the lesson learned that informed improvement to the WMP.
- Brief description of the proposed improvement to the WMP and which initiative(s) or activity(s) the electrical corporation intends to add or modify.
- If applicable, a brief description of how the lesson learned ties to implementation of a corrective action program.
- Estimated timeline for implementing the proposed improvement.
- If applicable, reference to the documentation that describes and substantiates the need for improvement, including:
 - o Where relevant, a hyperlinked section and page number in the appendix of the WMP.
 - o Where relevant, the title of the report, date of report, and link to the electrical corporation web page where the report can be downloaded.
 - o If any lessons learned were derived from quantifiable data, visual/graphical representations of these lessons learned in the supporting documentation.

¹⁰⁵ Pub. Util. Code §§ 8386(a) & (c)(5), (22).

Liberty's WMP framework includes the incorporation of lessons learned, corrective actions, areas of continued improvement, and review and correction of any Notifications of Violation and Defect. Refer to Table 13-1 for a summary of lessons learned.

Table 13-1: WMP Lessons Learned

ID #	Year of Lesson Learned	Subject	Category and Source of Lesson Learned	Description of Lesson Learned	Proposed WMP Improvement	Timeline for Implementation	Reference
1	2023-2024	Grid Hardening	Feedback from government agencies	Permitting projects with multiple agencies can cause project delays. Delays can be due to lack of resources by permitting agencies to respond to requests within expected timelines and other projects within the same area may create need for additional collaboration.	Work with contractors familiar with permitting agency process & requirements.	Ongoing	8.2; pp. 120-134
2	2024-2025	Vegetation Management	QA/QC	In the 2023-2025 WMP Liberty determined pass rate targets for all conditions being evaluated in each QC program component. Liberty determined it is more beneficial to assess an overall pass rate for each of its QC program components to evaluate program effectiveness. Liberty still reviews QC failures for each condition being evaluated in each QC program component, however, measures overall work quality by looking at the overall pass rate, an average of all conditions evaluated.	Liberty is updating QC targets as detailed in its 2026-2028 WMP, Section 9.11, Table 9-19 Vegetation Management QA and QC Activity Targets	2025	9.11; pp. 202-211
3	2025	Vegetation Management	Fuel Management	Leverage joint IOU partnerships for potential of shared biomass utilization projects.	Liberty will continue to collaborate with neighboring utilities to explore opportunities for alternative biomass utilization, as well as other industry specific benchmarking.	Ongoing	9.3-9.7; pp.183-193
4	2025	Vegetation Management	Key Performance Indicators	Liberty identified the need to regularly track and report contractor key performance indicators (KPI) to monitor contractor production metrics.	Liberty developed KPI reporting to set targets to measure production against for its VM contractors.	Completed 2025	12; pp. 293-299
5	2025	Vegetation Management	Contractor Safety	Liberty identified opportunities to continue enhancing safety oversight of contractor work.	Liberty has implemented routine safety observations of VM contractors and worked with its primary tree contractor to implement an updated job tailboard form to include a more detailed roping and rigging plan for tree work.	Ongoing	9; 171-219
6	2024	Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	Collaboration efforts with other electrical corporations	NV Energy's new wildfire encroachment policy, if implemented on the 619 line, would lead to loss of power supply to all customers in Portola and Loyalton.	Plumas-Sierra Rural Electrical Cooperative could provide an alternate power supply to Portola and Loyalton.	Completed 2024	8; 114-170
7	2024	PSPS	2024 PSPS Events	Refer to Table 7-1.	Refer to Table 7-1.	Ongoing	7; pp. 110-113

ID #	Year of Lesson Learned	Subject	Category and Source of Lesson Learned	Description of Lesson Learned	Proposed WMP Improvement	Timeline for Implementation	Reference
8	2020-2024	Risk Modeling	Risk Modeling Working Group	<p>Liberty has gained a greater understanding of best practices across the CA IOUs regarding the following topics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Modeling baselines• Fire consequence• Asset risk events and ignitions• Vegetation risk events and ignitions• PSPS likelihood• PSPS consequence and reliability analysis and impacts• Modeling algorithms, components, and interdependencies• Smoke and suppression impacts• Climate change impacts	Liberty will continue to participate in the Joint IOU Wildfire Risk Modeling Working Group to understand best practices across the California IOUs (i.e., further integration of community vulnerability, improvements to wildfire consequence modeling).	Ongoing	5; pp. 35-87
9	2022	Data tracking	Feedback from stakeholders; outcomes from previous WMP cycles	Liberty was lacking data quality for tracking and reporting WMP initiatives.	Refer to Section 12.	Completed 2024	12; pp. 293-299
10	2024	Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration, and Public Awareness	Feedback from government agencies and stakeholders; outcomes from previous WMP cycles.	Liberty was lacking MBL specific door hangers for communication of critical information during PSPS events.	MBL specific letter to be used as part of the PSPS notification process to leave at customers' houses after exhausting other attempts to notify via text, phone, or other means.	Completed 2024	11; pp. 248-292
11	2024	Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration, and Public Awareness	Feedback from government agencies and stakeholders	Some customers do not understand why PSPS may occur	Provide additional educational materials to Public Safety Partners for them to share through their community outreach channels.	Completed 2024	11; pp. 248-292

13.1.1 Feedback from Governmental Agencies and Stakeholders

Liberty collaborates with multiple government agencies, including Alpine County, Placer County, the Town of Truckee, the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”), Caltrans, CalFIRE, U.S. Forest Service, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, Truckee Fire Protection District, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the South Lake Tahoe Fire Department. Liberty works with these agencies and stakeholders to receive constructive input, feedback, recommendations and support as well as to obtain proper land rights and permits.

13.1.2 Collaboration with Other Electrical Corporations and Industry Experts

Refer to Liberty’s response to ACI LU-25U-03 in Appendix D.

13.1.3 Areas for Continued Improvement

Liberty continues to track and provide updates on the Areas for Continued Improvement (“ACIs”) identified in Energy Safety Decisions on Liberty WMPs. Refer to Appendix D for detailed information on each ACI.

13.1.4 Outcomes from Previous WMP Cycles

Liberty continues to track and provide updates on the Areas for Continued Improvement (“ACIs”) identified in Energy Safety Decisions on Liberty WMPs. Refer to Appendix D for detailed information on each ACI issued in Liberty’s 2025 WMP Update approval.

13.2 Working Group Meetings

The electrical corporation must identify any Energy Safety-required working group meetings attended or planning to attend in the WMP submission year and provide any lessons learned that applied to its WMPs. The electrical corporation must include interactions and collaborations related to the electrical corporation’s WMP submission such as identifying new technology, industry best practices, and shared lessons learned from the WMP process.

13.2.1 Risk Modeling Working Group

Liberty participates in the Energy Safety-led Risk Modeling Working Group, where discussions focus on risk assessment methodologies and wildfire mitigation strategies. Topics covered in these sessions include utility-specific approaches to identifying the likelihood of risk events and ignitions, assessing fire consequences based on meteorological, environmental, and fuel data,

and modeling the probability and impact of PSPS de-energizations. Through these discussions, Liberty has gained insights into industry best practices, including:

- Modeling baselines
- Fire consequence
- Asset risk events and ignitions
- Vegetation risk events and ignitions
- PSPS likelihood
- PSPS consequence and reliability analysis and impacts
- Modeling algorithms, components, and interdependencies
- Smoke and suppression impacts
- Climate change impacts

13.2.2 Enhanced Vegetation Management Working Group

Liberty reviews the publicly-shared outputs of the Energy Safety-required Enhanced Vegetation Management Working Group led by SDG&E. Liberty will participate in future Enhanced Vegetation Management Working Group meetings to the extent the smaller utilities are included.

13.2.3 AFN Statewide Council

Liberty participates in the AFN Statewide Council, where stakeholders discuss perspectives and feedback regarding IOU decision, operations, and lessons learned regarding AFN topics. Through these discussions, Liberty remains aware and continually educated on evolving best practices in terms of a whole community approach to supporting AFN customers and communities.

13.3 Discontinued Initiative Activities

The electrical corporation must provide all initiative activities from previous WMP submissions that it is no longer implementing (“Discontinued Initiative Activities”),¹⁰⁶ the rationale for discontinuation, the applicable lessons learned, and a list of the new or existing activities that mitigate risk in place of the discontinued activity (“Replacement Activities”), including cross-references to the page numbers within the WMP where each replacement activity is discussed.

Liberty is discontinuing its Substation Equipment Replacement WMP initiative, previously tracked as WMP-GDOM-GH-12f. This initiative is being discontinued due to its vague scope and limited direct impact on wildfire risk mitigation. The activity, as previously described, encompassed general substation equipment replacements and upgrades—many of which were not directly tied to wildfire ignition risk. Furthermore, feedback from both internal reviews and Energy Safety emphasized that the initiative lacked clearly defined objectives and measurable outcomes specific to wildfire prevention. The underlying work, such as substation inspections and emergency equipment replacements, continues as part of routine utility operations and capital upgrade programs. While the discontinued initiative will no longer be tracked under a separate WMP initiative, risk mitigation previously attributed to this initiative is now supported through the following ongoing activities and WMP initiatives: Substation Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-06) and Substation Defensible Space (WMP-VM-VFM-03).

Liberty has applied the following lessons learned to its 2026-2028 WMP:

- **Clarity and Risk Relevance Are Essential:** Initiative activities must be clearly defined and directly tied to measurable wildfire risk reduction to be meaningful and auditable.
- **Program Discipline:** Ongoing feedback loops with Energy Safety and operational teams are critical to ensuring that WMP initiatives remain aligned with their intended purpose and are responsive to actual risk.

Refer to Table 13-2.

¹⁰⁶ Discontinued initiative activities do not include initiative activities that the electrical corporation has completed. An initiative activity that has been completed is not a discontinued initiative activity.

Table 13-2: Lessons Learned from Discontinued Activities

Discontinued Activity (Tracking ID)	Rationale for Discontinuation	Lessons Learned	Replacement Activities
Substation Equipment Replacement (WMP-GDOM-GH-12f)	The activity, as previously described, encompassed general substation equipment replacements and upgrades—many of which were not directly tied to wildfire ignition risk. Furthermore, feedback from both internal reviews and Energy Safety emphasized that the initiative lacked clearly defined objectives and measurable outcomes specific to wildfire prevention	<p>1) Clarity and Risk Relevance Are Essential: Initiative activities must be clearly defined and directly tied to measurable wildfire risk reduction to be meaningful and auditable.</p> <p>2) Program Discipline: Ongoing feedback loops with Energy Safety and operational teams are critical to ensuring that WMP initiatives remain aligned with their intended purpose and are responsive to actual risk</p>	The underlying work, such as substation inspections and emergency equipment replacements, continues as part of routine utility operations and capital upgrade programs. While the discontinued initiative will no longer be tracked under a separate WMP initiative, risk mitigation previously attributed to this initiative is now supported through the following ongoing activities and WMP initiatives: Substation Inspections (WMP-GDOM-AI-06) and Substation Defensible Space (WMP-VM-VFM-03)

<p>Appendix A Office of Energy Safety WMP Definitions</p>

Appendix A: Office of Energy Safety WMP Definitions

Unless otherwise expressly stated, the following words and terms, for the purposes of these Guidelines, have the meanings shown in this chapter.

Terms Defined in Other Codes

Where terms are not defined in these Guidelines and are defined in the Government Code, Public Utilities Code, or Public Resources Code, such terms have the meanings ascribed to them in those codes.

Terms Not Defined

Where terms are not defined through the methods authorized by this section, such terms have ordinarily accepted meanings such as the context implies.

Definition of Terms

Term	Definition
Access and functional needs population (AFN)	Individuals, including, but not limited to, those who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, or injuries; who have limited English proficiency or are non-English speaking; who are older adults, children, or people living in institutionalized settings; or who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or are pregnant. (Gov. Code, § 8593.3(f)(1).)
Asset (utility)	Electric lines, equipment, or supporting hardware.
Benchmarking	A comparison between one electrical corporation's protocols, technologies used, or mitigations implemented, and other electrical corporations' similar endeavors.
Burn likelihood	The likelihood that a wildfire with an ignition point will burn at a specific location within the service territory based on a probabilistic set of weather profiles, vegetation, and topography.

Term	Definition
Catastrophic wildfire	A fire that caused at least one death, damaged over 500 structures, or burned over 5,000 acres.
Circuit miles	The total length in miles of separate transmission and/or distribution circuits, regardless of the number of conductors used per circuit (i.e., different phases).
Circuit segment	A specific portion of an electrical circuit that can be separated or disconnected from the rest of the system without affecting the operation of other parts of the network. This isolation is typically achieved using switches, circuit breakers, or other control mechanisms.
Consequence	The adverse effects from an event, considering the hazard intensity, community exposure, and local vulnerability.
Contact from object ignition likelihood	The likelihood that a non-vegetative object (such as a balloon or vehicle) will contact utility-owned equipment and result in an ignition.
Contact from vegetation likelihood of ignition	The likelihood that vegetation will contact utility-owned equipment and result in an ignition.
Contractor	Any individual in the temporary and/or indirect employ of the electrical corporation whose limited hours and/or time-bound term of employment are not considered “full-time” for tax and/or any other purposes.
Critical facilities and infrastructure	Facilities and infrastructure that are essential to public safety and that require additional assistance and advance planning to ensure resiliency during PSPS events. These include the following: Emergency services sector: Police stations Fire stations

Term	Definition
	<p>Emergency operations centers</p> <p>Public safety answering points (e.g., 9-1-1 emergency services)</p> <p>Government facilities sector:</p> <p>Schools</p> <p>Jails and prisons</p> <p>Health care and public health sector:</p> <p>Public health departments</p> <p>Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers, and hospice facilities (excluding doctors' offices and other non-essential medical facilities)</p> <p>Energy sector:</p> <p>Public and private utility facilities vital to maintaining or restoring normal service, including, but not limited to, interconnected publicly owned electrical corporations and electric cooperatives</p> <p>Water and wastewater systems sector:</p> <p>Facilities associated with provision of drinking water or processing of wastewater, including facilities that pump, divert, transport, store, treat, and deliver water or wastewater</p> <p>Communications sector:</p> <p>Communication carrier infrastructure, including selective routers, central offices, head ends, cellular switches, remote terminals, and cellular sites</p> <p>Chemical sector:</p> <p>Facilities associated with manufacturing, maintaining, or distributing hazardous materials and chemicals (including Category N-Customers as defined in D.01-06-085)</p>

Term	Definition
	<p>Transportation sector:</p> <p>Facilities associated with transportation for civilian and military purposes: automotive, rail, aviation, maritime, or major public transportation</p> <p>(D.19-05-042 and D.20-05-051)</p>
Customer hours	Total number of customers, multiplied by average number of hours (e.g., of power outage).
Dead fuel moisture	The moisture content of dead organic fuels, expressed as a percentage of the oven dry weight of the sample, that is controlled entirely by exposure to environmental conditions.
Detailed inspection	In accordance with General Order (GO) 165, an inspection where individual pieces of equipment and structures are carefully examined, visually and through routine diagnostic testing, as appropriate, and (if practical and if useful information can be so gathered) opened, and the condition of each is rated and recorded.
Disaster	A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability, and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic, and environmental losses and impacts. The effect of the disaster can be immediate and localized but is often widespread and could last a long time. The effect may test or exceed the capacity of a community or society to cope using its own resources. Therefore, it may require assistance from external sources, which could include neighboring jurisdictions or those at the national or international levels. (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [UNDRR].)

Term	Definition
Discussion-based exercise	Exercise used to familiarize participants with current plans, policies, agreements, and procedures or to develop new plans, policies, agreements, and procedures. Often includes seminars, workshops, tabletop exercises, and games.
Electrical corporation	Every corporation or person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any electric plant for compensation within California, except where the producer generates electricity on or distributes it through private property solely for its own use or the use of its tenants and not for sale or transmission to others.
Emergency	Any incident, whether natural, technological, or human caused, that requires responsive action to protect life or property but does not result in serious disruption of the functioning of a community or society. (FEMA/UNDRR.)
Enhanced inspection	Inspection whose frequency and thoroughness exceed the requirements of a detailed inspection, particularly if driven by risk calculations.
Equipment caused ignition likelihood	The likelihood that utility-owned equipment will cause an ignition through either normal operation (such as arcing) or failure.
Exercise	An instrument to train for, assess, practice, and improve performance in prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-free environment. (FEMA.)
Exposure	The presence of people, infrastructure, livelihoods, environmental services and resources, and other high-value assets in places that could be adversely affected by a hazard.
Fire hazard index	A numerical rating for specific fuel types, indicating the relative probability of fires starting and spreading, and the probable

Term	Definition
	degree of resistance to control; similar to burning index, but without effects of wind speed. ¹²⁷
Fire potential index (FPI)	Landscape scale index used as a proxy for assessing real-time risk of a wildfire under current and forecasted weather conditions.
Fire season	The time of year when wildfires are most likely for a given geographic region due to historical weather conditions, vegetative characteristics, and impacts of climate change. Each electrical corporation defines the fire season(s) across its service territory based on a recognized fire agency definition for the specific region(s) in California.
Fireline intensity	The rate of heat release per unit time per unit length of fire front. Numerically, it is the product of the heat yield, the quantity of fuel consumed in the fire front, and the rate of spread. ¹²⁸
Frequency	The anticipated number of occurrences of an event or hazard over time.
Frequent PSPS events	Three or more PSPS events per calendar year per line circuit.
Fuel continuity	The degree or extent of continuous or uninterrupted distribution of fuel particles in a fuel bed thus affecting a fire's ability to sustain combustion and spread. This applies to aerial fuels as well as surface fuels. ¹²⁹
Fuel density	Mass of fuel (vegetation) per area that could combust in a wildfire.

¹²⁷ National Wildfire Coordinating Group: <https://www.nwcg.gov/node/393188> (accessed May 9, 2024).

¹²⁸ National Wildfire Coordinating Group: <https://www.nwcg.gov/node/447140> (accessed May 9, 2024).

¹²⁹ National Wildfire Coordinating Group: <https://www.nwcg.gov/node/444281> (accessed May 9, 2024).

Term	Definition
Fuel management	Act or practice of controlling flammability and reducing resistance to control of wildland fuels through mechanical, chemical, biological, or manual means, or by fire, in support of land management objectives. ¹³⁰
Fuel moisture content	Amount of moisture in a given mass of fuel (vegetation), measured as a percentage of its dry weight.
Full-time employee (FTE)	Any individual in the ongoing and/or direct employ of the electrical corporation whose hours and/or term of employment are considered “full-time” for tax and/or any other purposes.
GO 95 nonconformance	Condition of a utility asset that does not meet standards established by GO95.
Grid hardening	Actions (such as equipment upgrades, maintenance, and planning for more resilient infrastructure) taken in response to the risk of undesirable events (such as outages) or undesirable conditions of the electrical system to reduce or mitigate those events and conditions, informed by an assessment of the relevant risk drivers or factors.
Grid topology	General design of an electric grid, whether looped or radial, with consequences for reliability and ability to support PSPS (e.g., ability to deliver electricity from an additional source).
Hazard	A condition, situation, or behavior that presents the potential for harm or damage to people, property, the environment, or other valued resources.

¹³⁰ National Wildfire Coordinating Group: <https://www.nwcg.gov/node/386549> (accessed May 9, 2024).

Term	Definition
Hazard tree	A tree that is, or has portions that are, dead, dying, rotten, diseased, or otherwise has a structural defect that may fail in whole or in part and damage utility facilities should it fail
High Fire Threat District (HFTD)	Areas of the state designated by the CPUC as having elevated wildfire risk, where each utility must take additional action (per GO 95, GO 165, and GO 166) to mitigate wildfire risk. (D.17-01-009.)
High Fire Risk Area (HFRA)	Areas that the electrical corporation has deemed at high risk from wildfire, independent of HFTD designation.
Highly rural region	Area with a population of less than seven persons per square mile, as determined by the United States Bureau of the Census. For purposes of the WMP, “area” must be defined as a census tract.
High-risk species	Species of vegetation that (1) have a higher risk of either coming into contact with powerlines or causing an outage or ignition, or (2) are easily ignitable and within close proximity to potential arcing, sparks, and/or other utility equipment thermal failures. The status of species as “high-risk” must be a function of species-specific characteristics, including growth rate; failure rates of limbs, trunk, and/or roots (as compared to other species); height at maturity; flammability; and vulnerability to disease or insects.
High wind warning (HWW)	Level of wind risk from weather conditions, as declared by the National Weather Service (NWS). For historical NWS data, refer to the Iowa State University archive of NWS watches/warnings. ¹³¹
HWW overhead (OH) circuit mile day	Sum of OH circuit miles of utility grid subject to a HWW each day within a given time period, calculated as the number of OH circuit miles under a HWW multiplied by the number of days those miles are under said HWW. For example, if 100 OH circuit miles are under a HWW for one day, and 10 of those miles are under the

¹³¹ <https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwarn.phtml>.

Term	Definition
	HWW for an additional day, then the total HWW OH circuit mile days would be 110.
Ignition likelihood	The total anticipated annualized number of ignitions resulting from electrical corporation-owned assets at each location in the electrical corporation's service territory. This considers probabilistic weather conditions, type and age of equipment, and potential contact of vegetation and other objects with electrical corporation assets. This should include the use of any method used to reduce the likelihood of ignition. For example, the use of protective equipment and device settings (PEDS) to reduce the likelihood of an ignition upon an initiating event.
Incident command system (ICS)	A standardized on-scene emergency management concept specifically designed to allow its user(s) to adopt an integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents, without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.
Initiative activity	See mitigation activity.
Initiative construction standards	The standard specifications, special provisions, standards of practice, standard material and construction specifications, construction protocols, and construction methods that an electrical corporation applies to activities undertaken by the electrical corporation pursuant to a WMP initiative in a given compliance period.
Level 1 finding	In accordance with GO 95, an immediate safety and/or reliability risk with high probability for significant impact.
Level 2 finding	In accordance with GO 95, a variable safety and/or reliability risk (non-immediate and with high to low probability for significant impact).

Term	Definition
Level 3 finding	In accordance with GO 95, an acceptable safety and/or reliability risk.
Limited English proficiency (LEP) population	Population with limited English working proficiency based on the International Language Roundtable scale.
Line miles	The number of miles of transmission and/or distribution conductors, including the length of each phase and parallel conductor segment.
Live fuel moisture content	Moisture content within living vegetation, which can retain water longer than dead fuel.
Locally relevant	In disaster risk management, generally understood as the cope at which disaster risk strategies and initiatives are considered the most effective at achieving desired outcomes. This tends to be the level closest to impacting residents and communities, reducing existing risks, and building capacity, knowledge, and normative support. Locally relevant scales, conditions, and perspectives depend on the context of application.
Match-drop simulation	Wildfire simulation method forecasting propagation and consequence/impact based on an arbitrary ignition.
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)	A document of agreement between two or more agencies establishing reciprocal assistance to be provided upon request (and if available from the supplying agency) and laying out the guidelines under which this assistance will operate. It can also be a cooperative document in which parties agree to work together on an agreed-upon project or meet an agreed objective.
Mitigation	Undertakings to reduce the loss of life and property from natural and/or human-caused disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster and providing value to the public by creating

Term	Definition
	safer communities. Encompasses mitigation categories, mitigation initiatives, and mitigation activities within the WMP.
Mitigation activity	A measure that contributes to or accomplishes a mitigation initiative designed to reduce the consequences and/or probability of wildfire or outage event. For example, covered conductor installation is a mitigation activity under the mitigation initiative of Grid Design and System Hardening.
Mitigation category	The highest subset in the WMP mitigation hierarchy. There are five Mitigation Categories in total: Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance; Vegetation Management and Inspections; Situational Awareness and Forecasting; Emergency Preparedness; and Enterprise Systems. Contains mitigation initiatives and any subsequent mitigation activities.
Mitigation initiative	Efforts within a mitigation category either proposed or in process, designed to reduce the consequences and/or probability of wildfire or outage event. For example, Asset Inspection is a mitigation initiative under the mitigation category of Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance.
Model uncertainty	The amount by which a calculated value might differ from the true value when the input parameters are known (i.e., limitation of the model itself based on assumptions). ¹³²

¹³² Adapted from SFPE, 2010, "Substantiating a Fire Model for a Given Application," *Society of Fire Protection Engineers Engineering Guides*.

Term	Definition
Mutual aid	Voluntary aid and assistance by the provision of services and facilities, including but not limited to electrical corporations, communication, and transportation. Mutual aid is intended to provide adequate resources, facilities, and other support to an electrical corporation whenever its own resources prove inadequate to cope with a given situation.
National Incident Management System (NIMS)	A systematic, proactive approach to guide all levels of government, nongovernment organizations, and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the effects of incidents. NIMS provides stakeholders across the whole community with the shared vocabulary, systems, and processes to successfully deliver the capabilities described in the National Preparedness System. NIMS provides a consistent foundation for dealing with all incidents, ranging from daily occurrences to incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.
Operations-based exercise	Type of exercise that validates plans, policies, agreements, and procedures; clarifies roles and responsibilities; and identifies resource gaps in an operational environment. Often includes drills, functional exercises (FEs), and full-scale exercises (FSEs).
Outage program risk	The measure of reliability impacts from wildfire mitigation related outages at a given location.
Overall utility risk	The comprehensive risk due to both wildfire and PSPS incidents across a utility's territory; the aggregate potential of adverse impacts to people, property, critical infrastructure, or other valued assets in society.
Overall utility risk, PSPS risk	See Outage program risk.

Term	Definition
Parameter uncertainty	The amount by which a calculated value might differ from the true value based on unknown input parameters. (Adapted from Society of Fire Protection Engineers [SFPE] guidance.)
Patrol inspection	In accordance with GO 165, a simple visual inspection of applicable utility equipment and structures designed to identify obvious structural problems and hazards. Patrol inspections may be carried out in the course of other company business.
Performance metric	A quantifiable measurement that is used by an electrical corporation to indicate the extent to which its WMP is driving performance outcomes.
Population density	Population density is calculated using the American Community Survey (ACS) one-year estimate for the corresponding year or, for years with no such ACS estimate available, the estimate for the immediately preceding year.
Preparedness	A continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response. Within the NIMS, preparedness focuses on planning, procedures and protocols, training and exercises, personnel qualification and certification, and equipment certification.
Priority essential services	Critical first responders, public safety partners, critical facilities and infrastructure, operators of telecommunications infrastructure, and water electrical corporations/agencies.
Property	Private and public property, buildings and structures, infrastructure, and other items of value that may be destroyed by wildfire, including both third-party property and utility assets.

Term	Definition
Protective equipment and device settings (PEDS)	The electrical corporation's procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements to reduce wildfire risk, other than automatic reclosers (such as circuit breakers, switches, etc.). For example, PG&E's "Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings" (EPSS).
PEDS outage consequence	The total anticipated adverse effects from an outage occurring while increased sensitivity settings on a protective device are enabled at a specific location, including reliability and associated safety impacts.
PEDS outage exposure potential	The potential physical, social, or economic impact of an outage occurring when PEDS are enabled on people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, local economies, and other high-value assets.
PEDS outage likelihood	The likelihood of an outage occurring while increased sensitivity settings on a protective device are enabled at a specific location given a probabilistic set of environmental conditions.
PEDS outage risk	The total expected annualized impacts from PEDS enablement at a specific location.
PEDS outage vulnerability	The susceptibility of people or a community to adverse effects of an outage occurring when PEDS are enabled, including all characteristics that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the related adverse effects (e.g., high AFN population, poor energy resiliency, low socioeconomics).
PSPS consequence	The total anticipated adverse effects of a PSPS for a community. This considers the PSPS exposure potential and inherent PSPS vulnerabilities of communities at risk.

Term	Definition
PSPS event	The period from notification of the first public safety partner of a planned public safety PSPS to re-energization of the final customer.
PSPS exposure potential	The potential physical, social, or economic impact of a PSPS event on people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, local economies, and other high-value assets.
PSPS likelihood	The likelihood of an electrical corporation requiring a PSPS given a probabilistic set of environmental conditions.
PSPS risk	The total expected annualized impacts from PSPS at a specific location. This considers two factors: (1) the likelihood a PSPS will be required due to environmental conditions exceeding design conditions, and (2) the potential consequences of the PSPS for each affected community, considering exposure potential and vulnerability.
PSPS vulnerability	The susceptibility of people or a community to adverse effects of a PSPS event, including all characteristics that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of a PSPS event (e.g., high AFN population, poor energy resiliency, low socioeconomic status).
Public safety partners	First/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal levels; water, wastewater, and communication service providers; community choice aggregators (CCAs); affected publicly owned electrical corporations/electrical cooperatives; tribal governments; Energy Safety; the Commission; the California Office of Emergency Services; and CAL FIRE.
Qualitative target	Specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely outcomes for the overall WMP strategy, or mitigation initiatives and activities that a utility can implement to satisfy the primary goals and subgoals of the WMP program.

Term	Definition
Quantitative target	A forward-looking, quantifiable measurement of work to which an electrical corporation commits to in its WMP. Electrical corporations will show progress toward completing targets in subsequent reports, including data submissions and WMP Updates.
RFW OH circuit mile day	Sum of OH circuit miles of utility grid subject to RFW each day within a given time period, calculated as the number of OH circuit miles under RFW multiplied by the number of days those miles are under said RFW. For example, if 100 OH circuit miles are under RFW for one day, and 10 of those miles are under RFW for an additional day, then the total RFW OH circuit mile days would be 110.
Risk	A measure of the anticipated adverse effects from a hazard considering the consequences and frequency of the hazard occurring. ¹³³
Risk component	A part of an electric corporation's risk analysis framework used to determine overall utility risk.
Risk evaluation	The process of comparing the results of a risk analysis with risk criteria to determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude is acceptable or tolerable. (ISO 31000:2009.)

¹³³ Adapted from D. Coppola, 2020, "Risk and Vulnerability," *Introduction to International Disaster Management*, 4th ed.

Term	Definition
Risk event	<p>An event with probability of ignition, such as wire down, contact with objects, line slap, event with evidence of heat generation, or other event that causes sparking or has the potential to cause ignition. The following all qualify as risk events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ignitions • Outages not caused by vegetation • Outages caused by vegetation • Wire-down events • Faults • Other events with potential to cause ignition
Risk management	Systematic application of management policies, procedures, and practices to the tasks of communication, consultation, establishment of context, and identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring, and review of risk. (ISO 31000.)
Rule	Section of Public Utilities Code requiring a particular activity or establishing a particular threshold.
Rural region	In accordance with GO 165, area with a population of less than 1,000 persons per square mile, as determined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For purposes of the WMP, “area” must be defined as a census tract.
Seminar	An informal discussion, designed to orient participants to new or updated plans, policies, or procedures (e.g., to review a new external communications standard operating procedure).
Sensitivity analysis	Process used to determine the relationships between the uncertainty in the independent variables (“input”) used in an analysis and the uncertainty in the resultant dependent variables (“output”). (SFPE guidance.)

Term	Definition
Situational Awareness	An on-going process of gathering information by observation and by communication with others. This information is integrated to create an individual's perception of a given situation. ¹³⁴
Slash	Branches or limbs less than four inches in diameter, and bark and split products debris left on the ground as a result of utility vegetation management. ¹³⁵
Span	The space between adjacent supporting poles or structures on a circuit consisting of electric lines and equipment. "Span level" refers to asset-scale granularity.
Tabletop exercise (TTX)	A discussion-based exercise intended to stimulate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical situation. Tabletop exercises can be used to assess plans, policies, and procedures or to assess types of systems needed to guide the prevention of response to, or recovery from a defined incident.
Trees with strike potential	Trees that could either, in whole or in part, “fall in” to a power line or have portions detach and “fly in” to contact a power line in high-wind conditions.
Uncertainty	The amount by which an observed or calculated value might differ from the true value. For an observed value, the difference is “experimental uncertainty”; for a calculated value, it is “model” or “parameter uncertainty.” (Adapted from SFPE guidance.)
Urban region	In accordance with GO 165, area with a population of more than 1,000 persons per square mile, as determined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. For purposes of the WMP, “area” must be defined as a census tract.

¹³⁴ <https://www.nwcg.gov/node/439827> (assessed May 13, 2024).

¹³⁵ California Public Resources Code section 4525.7.

Term	Definition
Utility-related ignition	An event that meets the criteria for a reportable event subject to fire-related reporting requirements. ¹³⁶
Validation	Process of determining the degree to which a calculation method accurately represents the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the calculation method without modifying input parameters based on observations in a specific scenario. (Adapted from ASTM E 1355.)
Vegetation management (VM)	The assessment, intervention, and management of vegetation, including pruning and removal of trees and other vegetation around electrical infrastructure for safety, reliability, and risk reduction.
Verification	Process to ensure that a model is working as designed, that is, that the equations are being properly solved. Verification is essentially a check of the mathematics. (SFPE guidance.)
Vulnerability	The propensity or predisposition of a community to be adversely affected by a hazard, including the characteristics of a person, group, or service and their situation that influences their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of a hazard.
Wildfire consequence	The total anticipated adverse effects from a wildfire on a community that is reached. This considers the wildfire hazard intensity, the wildfire exposure potential, and the inherent wildfire vulnerabilities of communities at risk.

¹³⁶ CPUC Decision 14-02-015, Appendix C, page C-3:
<https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M087/K892/87892306.PDF>.

Term	Definition
Wildfire exposure potential	The potential physical, social, or economic impact of wildfire on people, property, critical infrastructure, livelihoods, health, environmental services, local economies, cultural/historical resources, and other high-value assets. This may include direct or indirect impacts, as well as short- and long-term impacts.
Wildfire hazard intensity	The potential intensity of a wildfire at a specific location within the service territory given a probabilistic set of weather profiles, vegetation, and topography.
Wildfire likelihood	The total anticipated annualized number of fires reaching each spatial location resulting from utility-related ignitions at each location in the electrical corporation service territory. This considers the ignition likelihood and the likelihood that an ignition will transition into a wildfire based on the probabilistic weather conditions in the area.
Wildfire mitigation strategy	Overview of the key mitigation initiatives at enterprise level and component level across the electrical corporation's service territory, including interim strategies where long-term mitigation initiatives have long implementation timelines. This includes a description of the enterprise-level monitoring and evaluation strategy for assessing overall effectiveness of the WMP.
Wildfire risk	The total expected annualized impacts from ignitions at a specific location. This considers the likelihood that an ignition will occur, the likelihood the ignition will transition into a wildfire, and the potential consequences—considering hazard intensity, exposure potential, and vulnerability—the wildfire will have for each community it reaches.

Term	Definition
Wildfire spread likelihood	The likelihood that a fire with a nearby but unknown ignition point will transition into a wildfire and will spread to a location in the service territory based on a probabilistic set of weather profiles, vegetation, and topography.
Wildfire vulnerability	The susceptibility of people or a community to adverse effects of a wildfire, including all characteristics that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the adverse effects of a wildfire (e.g., AFN customers, Social Vulnerability Index, age of structures, firefighting capacities).
Wildland-urban interface (WUI)	The line, area, or zone where structures and other human development meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetation fuels (National Wildfire Coordinating Group).
Wire down	Instance where an electric transmission or distribution conductor is broken and falls from its intended position to rest on the ground or a foreign object.
Work order	A prescription for asset or vegetation management activities resulting from asset or vegetation management inspection findings.
Workshop	Discussion that resembles a seminar but is employed to build specific products, such as a draft plan or policy (e.g., a multi-year training and exercise plan).

Definitions of Initiatives by Category

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
Risk Methodology and Assessment	5	Risk Methodology and Assessment	Development and use of tools and processes to assess the risk of wildfire and PSPS across an electrical corporation's service territory.
Wildfire Mitigation Strategy	6	Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development	Development and use of processes for deciding on a portfolio of mitigation initiatives to achieve maximum feasible risk reduction and that meet the goals of the WMP.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.2	Grid Design and System Hardening	Strengthening of distribution, transmission, and substation infrastructure to reduce the risk of utility-related ignitions resulting in catastrophic wildfires.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.3	Asset Inspections	Inspections of overhead electric transmission lines, equipment, and right-of-way.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.4	Equipment Maintenance and Repair	Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing connector equipment, such as hotline clamps.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.5	Quality Assurance and Quality Control	Establishment and function of audit process to manage and confirm work completed by employees or contractors, including packaging QA/QC information for input to

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
			decision-making and related integrated workforce management processes.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.6	Work Orders	Actions taken to manage the electrical corporation's open work orders resulting from inspections that prescribe asset management activities.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.7	Grid Operations and Procedures	Operations and procedures to reduce across the electrical corporation's system to reduce wildfire risk.
Grid Design, Operations, and Maintenance	8.8	Workforce Planning	Programs to ensure that the electrical corporation has qualified asset personnel and to ensure that both employees and contractors tasked with asset management responsibilities are adequately trained to perform relevant work.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.2	Vegetation Management Inspections	Inspections of vegetation around and adjacent to electrical facilities and equipment that may be hazardous by growing, blowing, or falling into electrical facilities or equipment.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.3	Pruning and Removal	Pruning, removal, and other vegetation management activities that are performed as a result of inspections.

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.4	Pole Clearing	Plan and execution of vegetation removal around poles per Public Resources Code section 4292 and outside the requirements of Public Resources Code section 4292 (e.g., pole clearing performed outside of the State Responsibility Area).
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.5	Wood and Slash Management	Actions taken to manage all downed wood and “slash” generated from vegetation management activities.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.6	Defensible Space	Actions taken to reduce ignition probability and wildfire consequence due to contact with substation equipment.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.7	Integrated Vegetation Management	Actions taken in accordance with Integrated Vegetation Management principles that are not covered by another initiative.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.8	Partnerships	Collaboration of resources, expertise, and efforts to accomplish agreed upon objectives related to wildfire risk reduction achieved through vegetation management.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.9	Activities Based on Weather Conditions	Actions taken in accordance with weather condition forecasts that indicate an elevated fire threat in terms of ignition probability and wildfire potential.

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.10	Post-Fire Service Restoration	Actions taken during post-fire restoration to restore power while active fire suppression is ongoing and actions that occur following active fire suppression during the post-fire suppression repair and rehabilitation phases of fire protection operations.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.11	Quality Assurance and Quality Control	Establishment and function of audit process to manage and confirm work completed by employees or contractors, including packaging QA/QC information for input to decision-making and related integrated workforce management processes.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.12	Work Orders	Actions taken to manage the electrical corporation's open work orders resulting from inspections that prescribe vegetation management activities.
Vegetation Management and Inspections	9.13	Workforce Planning	Programs to ensure that the electrical corporation has qualified personnel and to ensure that both employees and contractors tasked with vegetation management responsibilities are adequately trained to perform relevant work.

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	10.2	Environmental Monitoring Systems	Development and deployment of systems which measure environmental characteristics, such as fuel moisture, air temperature, and velocity.
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	10.3	Grid Monitoring Systems	Development and deployment of systems that checks the operational conditions of electrical facilities and equipment and detects such things as faults, failures, and recloser operations.
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	10.4	Ignition Detection Systems	Development and deployment of systems which discover or identify the presence or existence of an ignition, such as cameras.
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	10.5	Weather Forecasting	Development methodology for forecast of weather conditions relevant to electrical corporation operations, forecasting weather conditions and conducting analysis to incorporate into utility decision-making, learning and updates to reduce false positives and false negatives of forecast PSPS conditions.
Situational Awareness and Forecasting	10.6	Fire Potential Index	Calculation and application of a landscape scale index used as a proxy for assessing real-time risk of a wildfire under current and forecasted weather conditions.

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration and Public Awareness	11.2	Emergency Preparedness and Recovery Plan	Development and integration of wildfire- and PSPS-specific emergency strategies, practices, policies, and procedures into the electrical corporation's overall emergency plan based on the minimum standards described in GO 166.
Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration and Public Awareness	11.3	External Collaboration and Coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Actions taken to coordinate wildfire and PSPS emergency preparedness with relevant public safety partners including the state, cities, counties, and tribes. • Development and integration of plans, programs, and/or policies for collaborating with communities on local wildfire mitigation planning, such as wildfire safety elements in general plans, community wildfire protection plans, and local multi-hazard mitigation plans.
Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration and Public Awareness	11.4	Public Communication, Outreach, and Education Awareness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development and integration of a comprehensive communication strategy to inform essential customers and other stakeholder groups of wildfires, outages due to wildfires, and PSPS and service

Category	Section #	Initiative	Definition
			<p>restoration, as required by Public Utilities Code section 768.6.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Development and deployment of public outreach and education awareness program(s) for wildfires; outages due to wildfires, PSPS events, and protective equipment and device settings; service restoration before, during, and after the incidents and vegetation management. • Actions taken understand, evaluate, design, and implement wildfire and PSPS risk mitigation strategies, policies, and procedures specific to access and functional needs customers.
Emergency Preparedness, Collaboration and Public Awareness	11.5	Customer Support in Wildfire and PSPS Emergencies	Development and deployment of programs, systems, and protocols to support residential and non-residential customers in wildfire emergencies and PSPS events.
Enterprise Systems	12	Enterprise Systems Development	Structures and methods that allow the electrical corporation and its employees and/or contractors to accept, store, retrieve, and update data for the production, management, and scheduling of related work.

Definitions of Activities by Initiative

Initiative	Section #	Activity	Definition
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.1	Covered conductor installation	Installation of covered or insulated conductors to replace standard bare or unprotected conductors (defined in accordance with GO 95 as supply conductors, including but not limited to lead wires, not enclosed in a grounded metal pole or not covered by: a “suitable protective covering” (in accordance with Rule 22.8), grounded metal conduit, or grounded metal sheath or shield). In accordance with GO 95, conductor is defined as a material suitable for: (1) carrying electric current, usually in the form of a wire, cable or bus bar, or (2) transmitting light in the case of fiber optics; insulated conductors as those which are surrounded by an insulating material (in accordance with Rule 21.6), the dielectric strength of which is sufficient to withstand the maximum difference of potential at normal operating voltages of the circuit without breakdown or puncture; and suitable protective covering as a covering of wood or other non-conductive material having the electrical insulating efficiency (12kV/in. dry) and impact strength (20ft.-lbs) of 1.5 inches of redwood or other material meeting the requirements of Rule 22.8-A, 22.8-B, 22.8-C or 22.8-D.

Initiative	Section #	Activity	Definition
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.2	Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment	Actions taken to convert overhead electric lines and/or equipment to underground electric lines and/or equipment (i.e., located underground and in accordance with GO 128).
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.3	Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements	Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing distribution poles (i.e., those supporting lines under 65kV), including with equipment such as composite poles manufactured with materials reduce ignition probability by increasing pole lifespan and resilience against failure from object contact and other events.
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.4	Transmission pole/tower replacements and reinforcements	Remediation, adjustments, or installations of new equipment to improve or replace existing transmission towers (e.g., structures such as lattice steel towers or tubular steel poles that support lines at or above 65kV).
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.5	Traditional overhead hardening	Maintenance, repair, and replacement of capacitors, circuit breakers, cross-arms, transformers, fuses, and connectors (e.g., hot line clamps) with the intention of minimizing the risk of ignition.
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.6	Emerging grid hardening technology installations and pilots	Development, deployment, and piloting of novel grid hardening technology.
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.7	Microgrids	Development and deployment of microgrids that may reduce the risk of ignition, risk from PSPS, and wildfire consequence. "Microgrid" is

Initiative	Section #	Activity	Definition
			defined by Public Utilities Code section 8370(d).
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.8	Installation of system automation equipment	Installation of electric equipment that increases the ability of the electrical corporation to automate system operation and monitoring, including equipment that can be adjusted remotely such as automatic reclosers (switching devices designed to detect and interrupt momentary faults that can reclose automatically and detect if a fault remains, remaining open if so).
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.9	Line removals (in HFTD)	Removal of overhead lines to minimize the risk of ignition due to the design, location, or configuration of electric equipment in HFTDs.
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.10	Other grid topology improvements to minimize risk of ignitions	Actions taken to minimize the risk of ignition due to the design, location, or configuration of electric equipment in HFTDs not covered by another initiative.
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.11	Other grid topology improvements to mitigate or reduce PSPS events	Actions taken to mitigate or reduce PSPS events in terms of geographic scope and number of customers affected not covered by another initiative.
Grid Design and System Hardening	8.2.12	Other technologies and systems not listed above	Other grid design and system hardening actions which the electrical corporation takes to reduce its ignition and PSPS risk not otherwise covered by other initiatives in this section.
Grid Operations and Procedures	8.7.1	Equipment Settings to Reduce Wildfire Risk	The electrical corporation's procedures for adjusting the sensitivity of grid elements to reduce wildfire risk.

Initiative	Section #	Activity	Definition
Grid Operations and Procedures	8.7.2	Grid Response Procedures and Notifications	The electrical corporation's procedures it uses to respond to faults, ignitions, or other issues detected on its grid that may result in a wildfire.
Grid Operations and Procedures	8.7.3	Personnel Work Procedures and Training in Conditions of Elevated Fire Risk	Work activity guidelines that designate what type of work can be performed during operating conditions of different levels of wildfire risk. Training for personnel on these guidelines and the procedures they prescribe, from normal operating procedures to increased mitigation measures to constraints on work performed.

<p>Appendix B Supporting Documentation for Risk Methodology and Assessment</p>
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Appendix B: Supporting Documentation for Risk Methodology and Assessment

Note: As part of its WMP, the electrical corporation is required to provide the “Summary Documentation” as defined by this appendix. For all other requirements in this appendix, the electrical corporation must be readily able to provide the defined documentation in response to a data request by Energy Safety or designated stakeholders.

The risk modeling and assessment in the main body of these Guidelines and electrical corporation’s WMP are focused on providing a streamlined overview of the electrical corporation risk framework and key findings from the assessment necessary to understand the wildfire mitigation strategy presented in Section 7.

The focus of this appendix is to provide additional information pertaining to the risk modeling approach used by the electrical corporation. This includes the following:

- Additional detail on model calculations supporting the calculation of risk and risk components
- Additional detail on the calculation of risk and risk components
- More detailed presentation of the risk findings

The following sections establish the reporting requirements for the approaches used by the electrical corporation to calculate each risk and risk component. These have been synthesized and adapted from guidance documents on model quality assurance developed by many agencies, with a focus on guidance related to machine learning, artificial intelligence, and fire science and engineering. These guidance documents include those from the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE),¹ the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE),⁸ the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM International),⁹ the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),¹⁰ the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI),⁵² the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),¹¹ and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).¹²

Summary Documentation

The electrical corporation must provide high-level information on the calculation of each risk and risk component used in its risk analysis. The summary documentation must include each of the following:

- **High-level bow tie schematic** showing the inputs, outputs, and interaction between risk components.

¹ IEEE, 2022, “P2841/D2: Draft Framework and Process for Deep Learning Evaluation.”

- **High-level calculation procedure schematic** showing the logical flow from input data to outputs, including separate items for any intermediate calculations in models or sub-models and any input from subject matter experts.
- **High-level narrative describing the calculation procedure** in a concise executive summary. This narrative must include the following:
 - Purpose of the calculation/model
 - Assumptions and limitations
 - Description of the calculation procedure shown in the bow tie and high-level schematics
 - Description of how outputs will be characterized and presented (e.g., visualization) to decision makers
 - Concise description and timeline of planned changes to the calculation procedure over the triennial WMP cycle.

Reference the following sections of Liberty's 2025 WMP:

- Section 5: Risk Methodology and Assessment

Also see attached reports in Appendix B:

- B1 – Direxyon Report_Phase 3_v2
- B2 – Updated Direxyon Documentation for Revision Notice
- B3 - WMP Model Documentation_TSYL_2024_Appendix

Attachment B1
Direxyon Report_Phase 3_v2



DIREXYON



Liberty Utilities

Phase 3 - Implementation of DIREXYON Suite and WMP Support (2025)

Final report

Version 2, May 29th, 2025

Versions

Version	Description	Published date	Author	Reviewer
0	Preliminary version	May 15 th , 2025	K. Hervieux	S. Gharaati
1	Updated results for WMP	May 28 th , 2025	K. Hervieux	S. Gharaati
2	Final version	May 28 th , 2025	K. Hervieux	S. Gharaati, V. Hébert, I. MacNeil

Associated documents

File	Description
IMLB_Phase3_v2_250529.pdf	This report
2025-2028 WMP Targets and Budgets.xlsx	List of initiatives, budgets, circuit rankings
comparisons_fire_score.pdf	Initiatives – detailed fire score results
comparisons_outage_program_risk.pdf	Initiatives – detailed outage program risk results
comparisons_utility_risk.pdf	Initiatives – detailed utility risks results

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1. Executive Summary

This report provides the latest details on the implementation of the DIREXYON for Liberty Utilities. It also presents the results of the analysis conducted during Phase 3 of the project *Expansion and Refinement of Asset Modeling*, submitted on October 30th, 2024, as well as the support provided for the 2025 WMP filing, submitted on March 13th, 2025.

Figure 1 below illustrates the scope of the DIREXYON Solution developed for Liberty Utilities. The modules completed during Phases 1 and 2 are shown in grey and blue, while the new additions are highlighted in violet.




Figure 1 : Schematic of DIREXYON Solution modules for Liberty Utilities

The model at the heart of the solution has seen 4 major improvements in Phase 3:

1. **New asset class:** The ***Service/Secondary Overhead Conductor*** has been added to the model as a child of the conductor asset. Asset lifecycle considerations are now included in all cost and risk analyses performed using DIREXYON.
2. **Outage model:** A new outage model based on historical data has been developed to replace the fire risk condition modifier model used in previous versions of the model. This new model is easier to maintain and generates outage metrics that are more intuitive and are applicable in contexts beyond fire risk mitigation.
3. **PSPS model:** A Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) risk model has been added to the Utility risk model, in compliance with California WMP guidelines. This model calculates the risk of a PSPS event at the circuit level, based on the probability and consequences of such event.
4. **EPSS model:** In addition to the PSPS model, an Enhanced Powerline Safety Setting (EPSS, aka SRP) model has been added. In simulation, EPSS events will be triggered by the outage model. In simulation, the EPSS model will have an impact on the probability of fire or PSPS events.

A new set of analyses have been performed with the enhanced model. The key outputs generated during the project include:

1. **PSPS probability and consequences:** DIREXYON is used to calculate the risk of PSPS event at the circuit level and classify each circuit by PSPS risk. At the same time, the analysis allowed to calculate the Utility and Outage program risk for each circuit.

Repeating this analysis in the future with refreshed data will allow Liberty Utilities to track the performance of the network in regards to PSPS risk.
2. **EPSS cost/benefit analysis:** DIREXYON is used to compare the total consequences of PSPS with and without EPSS enabled.

The results, presented in section 3.1, suggest that the planned investment in the technology next year could significantly reduce risk.

Moving forward, DIREXYON could be used to test different strategies to apply EPSS.

3. **Initiative efficiency analysis:** DIREXYON is used to calculate the efficiency of all 20 generic initiatives used by Liberty to reduce fire risk on their network. Actual budgets for each initiative were provided by Liberty, based on 2025-2028 planning.

Section 3.2 details and ranks the initiatives.

Complete results, including the ranking based on Utility risk reduction (%) for \$1 million invested in each initiative, are shared in the appendix.

4. **Undergrounding project analysis:** The same methodology used for the initiative analysis above was used to evaluate alternative interventions (simple conductor replacement, conductor cover) for 2 major conductor undergrounding projects totalling an investment of around \$7 million over 4 years. Because this methodology calculates fire risk at the network level, it did not provide sufficient detail to identify the most efficient option. Further analysis is required to achieve conclusive results. The results of this analysis are presented in Section 3.3.

Section 4 presents the hypotheses that were made during the project and proposes a list of next steps or improvements for the future.

All datasets and models used to produce the results in this report, as well as the specific result sets are referenced in section 5 of the report and remain available to Liberty Utilities to perform new analysis.

2. Project Methodology

From a modeling standpoint, DIREXYON has organized assets hierarchically, wherein each asset type comprises multiple individual assets, each with its dedicated risk, degradation, and decision model.




Figure 2: Overview of Asset Hierarchy in DIREXYON

At the heart of this model lies the concept of risk, embodying adverse events, specifically fires and PSPS incidents in this context. The current approach calculates risk by multiplying the probability of these adverse events by their potential consequences. Put simply, probability reflects the likelihood of these events happening, while consequence details the potential impact if the event does occur. The following chart summarizes the risk model. This methodology is aligned with the framework proposed in Wildfire Mitigation Plan Technical Guideline [0]



Figure 3: Overview of the Risk Framework for Liberty Utilities in DIREXYON

2.1 Data Set

The ETL is built in FME and is composed of 11 scripts:

- 1_liberty_build_hierarchy_top_levels_csv
- 2_liberty_build_section_and_vegetation
- 4_liberty_build_conductors_csv
- 4_liberty_build_poles_csv
- 5_liberty_build_fuses_csv
- 5_secondary_conductor
- 6_liberty_build_portfolio_csv
- 7_liberty_linked_assets
- 9_liberty_veg_zone_historic_work_order
- 9_outages_historic
- 10_PSPS

The number at the start of the script indicates the sequence. All data are dated in 2023, the update for 2024 is based on the work done since the 2023.

The portfolio is updated the same way and is composed of:

- Circuit
 - o Next pole inspection year
 - o Next vegetation management year
 - o Last pole inspection year
 - o Last vegetation management year
- Pole
 - o Backlog of repair and replacement
 - o Maximum date to do the work
 - o Update characteristics if needed
 - Detail/intrusive inspection date
 - Height
 - Number of devices
 - Class
 - Transformer installation year
 - o Priority
- Vegetation
 - o Next detail inspection date

Data structure needed for next update (name from 2024 data):

*Provide each geography shape in a format that doesn't require a licence. WKT, ShapeFile, long/lat are recommended format.

- Data
 - Circuit
 - last circuit inspected
 - Conductor
 - 2024 Covered Conductor Projects
 - Pole_fuse
 - 2024 Liberty Intrusive Inspections_ Summary
 - 2024_fuses installed_20251009
 - 2024_new poles installed_20251009
 - 2024_pole_inspections
 - 2024_Poles taken out of service_20251009
 - 2024_Poles that were replaced_20251009
 - Inspection Schedule for SAP_20241120
 - Liberty Dist-Trans Circuits_UPDATED
 - pole_asset_info_202412121001
 - transformers_20250115
 - PSPS-SRP
 - weather station data 2023
 - weather station data 2024
 - Weather_Stations
 - (further update needed SRP and PPS are not fully integrated yet)
 - Secondary conductor
 - 2024 Secondary Structures.gdb
 - technosylva_Liberty_FireSight
 - Technosylva-FireSight_QA_Report_2025_LIBERTY
 - Technosylva-FireSight_RAIL_DataDictionary_2025_03_Liberty
 - Liberty2025FireSightDataTables
 - Vegetation
 - 2024 Inspection Plan
 - 2024 Spans
 - 2024 Treetops
 - 2024 Veg Work Orders
 - 2024 Outage Data_UPDATED
 - 2024 Secondary Structures.gdb
 - Liberty Dist-Trans Circuits_UPDATED MAPPING
 - Liberty VM Detailed 3-Year Cycle Schedule

2.2 Utility Risk Model

The utility risk model combines wildfire and PSPS (Public Safety Power Shutoffs) risks calculated at the circuit level. Through collaboration with Liberty's subject matter experts, it was determined that these two risk components should be weighted equally at 50% each. The overall utility risk is therefore calculated as the average of fire risk and PSPS risk.

The formula below illustrates the utility risk calculation at the circuit level:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Utility Risk] calculation
End of Step

$$(0.05666 + 0.00002494) \div 2 = 0.02834$$
$$(\text{f}_{\text{X}} \text{PSPS Risk} + \text{f}_{\text{X}} \text{Fire Risk}) \div 2 = \text{f}_{\text{X}} \text{Utility Risk}$$

2.2.1 Fire Risk

The DIREXYON Solution calculates wildfire risk for individual assets and aggregates these calculations to the circuit level. Fire risk at the circuit level consists of two primary components: probability of fire and consequence of fire, as detailed in the following sections.

The fire risk calculation is shown below:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Fire Risk] calculation
End of Step

$$0.001449 \times 0.01722 = 0.00002494$$
$$\text{f}_{\text{X}} \text{Probability of Fire} \times \text{f}_{\text{X}} \text{Consequence of Fire} = \text{f}_{\text{X}} \text{Fire Risk}$$

2.2.1.1 Probability of Fire

The DIREXYON Solution calculates the probability of fire at the individual asset level. This probability represents the likelihood of fire ignition for each specific asset type. It is calculated as the product of three components: the Probability of Electrical Fire, the asset's probability of failure, and the probability of outage. Each of these components is explained in the following paragraphs.

The probability of fire calculation for a pole is illustrated below:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Probability of Fire] calculation
End of Step

$$0.03 \times 0.7 \times 0.7 = 0.0147$$

$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{a}}$ Probability of Failure

\times

$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{a}}$ Probability of Outage

\times

$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{a}}$ Probability of Electrical Fire

$=$

$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{a}}$ Probability of Fire

The circuit-level Probability of Fire is calculated as the average probability of all individual assets within that circuit.

2.2.1.1.1 Probability of Electrical Fire

The probability of electrical fire represents the likelihood that a given outage will ignite a fire. This metric, also known as the Probability of Ignition (POI), is provided by Technosylva. However, various mitigation strategies specific to different asset types can influence this probability. The following sections outline how DIREXYON adjusts the POI based on asset-specific mitigation measures.

Pole and Fuse

The probability of an electrical fire originating from a pole and its associated equipment depends heavily on the surrounding environment. When vegetation clearance is performed around a pole, the Probability of Ignition (POI) calculated by Technosylva is reduced to reflect the effectiveness of the clearance strategy.

For poles without clearance, the electrical fire probability remains equal to the baseline POI calculated by Technosylva. For poles with clearance, the probability is reduced proportionally based on the strategy's effectiveness, as shown in the calculation below.

Pole Cleared?

False

True

SEG-POI * (1 - ClearingDistance-Efficiency20Ft)

The reduction depends on the voltage class and is defined as follows:

Voltage	Value
120kV	0.405
14.4kV	0.9999
24.9kV	0.996
12.5kV	0.9999
60kV	0.881

Conductor

The probability of an electrical fire originating from a conductor is significantly influenced by whether the conductor is bare, covered, or underground. When a conductor is covered or placed underground, the Probability of Ignition (POI) calculated by Technosylva is reduced to account for the effectiveness of these mitigation strategies.

For bare conductors, the electrical fire probability remains equal to the baseline POI provided by Technosylva. For covered or underground conductors, the probability is proportionally reduced based on the assumed effectiveness of each strategy, as shown in the calculation below.



The reduction factor depends on the conductor type and is defined as follows:

Conductor Cover	Value
Bare	0
Cover	0.5
Underground	0.99

Secondary Conductor

The probability of an electrical fire originating from a secondary conductor remains unchanged across different mitigation strategies and equals the POI calculated by Technosylva, regardless of the mitigation measures implemented.

2.2.1.1.2 Probability of Outage

The probability of outage in the DIREXYON model is defined as the probability that a given failure will result in an outage. The probability of failure is asset-specific and is explained in the next section.

To estimate outage probabilities, DIREXYON analyzed outage records from the past two years, extracting failure causes from the comments associated with each event. Every event in these records is treated as a failure. If an event includes duration information, it is classified as an **outage**. By identifying keywords in the comment fields, the affected asset type can be determined. When outage details are missing, the model assumes that the asset linked to the record caused the outage. This assumption may lead to an overestimation of failures that convert into outages.

Using the "Populate Distribution" scenario, Liberty can estimate the probability of a failure converting into an outage. The logic is straightforward: if no failure occurs, no outage is simulated. If a failure does occur, the model uses a probability—derived from historical outage data via the "Populate Distribution" scenario—to determine whether it results in an outage.

The only exceptions are secondary conductors and fuses. Due to the limited number of recorded failures for these assets, a reliable estimate cannot be calculated. Instead, for secondary conductors, the model applies the average failure-to-outage conversion rate for all conductors, which is approximately **35%** (based on Liberty's outage data). For overhead fuses, a **70%** conversion rate is applied.

2.2.1.1.3 Probability of Failure

As explained previously, the probability of failure is asset-specific. The methodology for calculating the probability of failure for each asset type is explained in the following sections:

Conductor


The conductor failure model is explained in detail in Annex 1: Conductor Failure Model and Vegetation. If you have access to this documentation, you should also have access to all supporting documents used in the model's development, located in a separate folder.

*If possible, refer to the section in the Jupyter Lab Python script "**Documentation_Outage_Conductor.ipynb**", which contains supporting graphs and calculations relevant to this topic.*

The following sections explain the main elements of the conductor failure model:

1. Material-Specific Parameters

The model accounts for different conductor materials (likely ACSR, copper, aluminum, steel) with material-specific parameters. This aligns with the documentation showing different failure characteristics for each material type.



2. Thermal Stress Factor

The `calculate_thermal_stress_factor` function adjusts apparent age based on thermal stress, which directly relates to the annealing process. This implements the principle that conductors operating at elevated temperatures age faster, consistent with the Arrhenius equation mentioned in the "Estimating Cable Life Expectancy" article available in **Annex 1 : Conductor Failure model and vegetation**.

3. Environmental Effects

The model applies an environmental multiplier that varies based on:

- Conductor environment (likely coastal, highlands, plains, arid)
- Conductor material
- Conductor cover Status
- Primary failure cause

4. Vegetation Management Factor

The model accounts for vegetation management through:

- Enhanced tree trimming (ETT) percentage
- Tree density

5. Installation Quality Factors

The model considers installation quality through:

- Crew experience
- Installation complexity
- Quality inspection presence

6. Repair and Failure History

- Aging reduction from repairs (with diminishing returns)
- Failure acceleration from previous failures

7. Age estimation

Since conductor age is a key factor in estimating failure rate, it's important to develop a method for estimating conductor age. To address this, a realistic age distribution was created based on the number of failures recorded in the outages file. More information is available in **Annex 2 : Conductor Age estimation**

Assumptions for this Analysis:

1. Weibull Model Accuracy

- The previously developed Weibull model is assumed to be accurate. Any improvements should be made in other components of the analysis and subsequently integrated into this script.

2. Failure Rate Based on Outage Data

- The previously developed Weibull model is assumed to be accurate. Any improvements should be made in other components of the analysis and subsequently integrated into this script.

3. **Conductor Cohorts**

- Cohorts were created randomly without using any physical or historical criteria. Geographic information was not considered in the cohort definitions.

4. **Age Constraints**

- No minimum or maximum age was imposed on the conductors in the model.

5. **Geolocation Uncertainty**


- Since failures are geolocated, there may be inaccuracies in associating each failure with the nearest conductor.

6. **Apparent Age Assumption**

- The apparent age of a conductor is assumed to be equal to its actual age.

The script tests multiple iterations and combinations of different volumes of assets for each cohort. The goal is to find a distribution of assets that has a good chance of generating the right number of failures for a given year.

Example of Distribution:



*The python script will be available in a joint document

Secondary Conductor

The probability of failure for secondary conductor is calculated as the product of the following factors:

Asset Value Information for Period 2028

Characteristic [Probability of Failure] calculation
End of Step

$$0.00006 \times 2 \times 1.057 = 0.0001268$$

$$123 \text{ Base Line Probability} \times 10 \text{ SEC - Vegetation Factor} \times 10 \text{ Tree Attachment Factor} = 10 \text{ Probability of Failure}$$

1. Vegetation factor is the same as conductors (see **Annex 1 : Conductor Failure model and vegetation**)
2. Tree attachment factor (and Open/Grey Wire)
 - a. If a tree attachment exists:
$$\text{Tree attachment factor} = 1 + 0.005 \times \text{Tree Attachement age}$$
 - Tree Attachment age is a random value pick between 5 and 50
 - b. If no tree attachment exists:
$$\text{Tree attachment factor} = 1$$
 - c. This value is a approximation from Vasquez et al. (2017) [4] and EPRI (2001)[5]
 - d. Open/grey wire is treated like tree attachment. They have different budgets and the cost of replacement, but they act the same in regard to failure risk.
3. Base line probability: 0,00006
 - a. The “Base Line Probability” was determined using the number of past failures in the outages data. With this value we can reproduce year 2024 number of failures considering the “tree attachment factor”

Notes : These default parameters give us a similar braking rate as the last years. Direxyon found some research about secondary conductors, however, the lack of data makes it hard to model (Vasquez et al. (2017) [4] and EPRI (2001)[5].

Pole

Probability of failure for pole is derived from a Weibull distribution with age and material dimensions

Asset Value Information for Period 2024

Characteristic [Probability of Failure] calculation

Intervention: Degradation

$$\min((\text{PoleWeibull}(4;\text{Steel}));1) = 0$$

$$\min((\text{PoleWeibull}(\frac{1}{10} \text{ Age - Choice} ; \frac{1}{10} \text{ MATERIAL}));1) = \int_{\frac{1}{10}}^{\frac{1}{10}} \text{Probability of Failure}$$

Overhead Fuse

Probability of failure for fuse is derived from a Weibull distribution with age dimension. Also, a 0.7 factor was added to calibrate the Weibull curve.

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Probability of Failure] calculation

Intervention: Degradation

$$\min((\text{OverheadFuseWeibull}(2)),1) \times 0.7 = 0.0021$$

$$\min((\text{OverheadFuseWeibull}(\frac{1}{10} \text{ Age Choice}));1) \times 0.7 = \int_{\frac{1}{10}}^{\frac{1}{10}} \text{Probability of Failure}$$

2.2.1.2 Consequence of Fire

The consequence of fire values define the impact of fire on population, buildings destroyed, and acres burned. These values, determined by Technosylva at the segment level, remain constant across all asset types within the same segment. DIREXYON has aggregated these consequences from segment to circuit level, considering the length of the segments. The calculated consequence of fire at the circuit level is shown below:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Consequence of Fire] calculation

End of Step

$$(0.5 \times 0.01307) + (0.25 \times 0.0008886) + (0.25 \times 0.04184) = 0.01722$$
$$(0.5 \times f_{x_{\text{Population Impact}}}) + (0.25 \times f_{x_{\text{Building Destroyed Impact}}}) + (0.25 \times f_{x_{\text{Acres Impact}}}) =$$
$$f_{x_{\text{Consequence of Fire}}}$$

Please note that the assigned weights to each consequence are defined based on subject matter experts' suggestions and can be easily adjusted if needed.

Since the provided consequences are measured in different units, using them in their original form can result in a skewed overall risk assessment. Specifically, the consequence with the largest numerical range may disproportionately influence the final score, potentially overshadowing other critical factors. To address this, each consequence is normalized to a common scale—from 0 to 1—using the formula below. This ensures that no single metric dominates the overall evaluation, allowing for a balanced and fair comparison across all factors.

$$V_i = \frac{x_i - x_{\text{best}}}{x_{\text{worst}} - x_{\text{best}}}$$

Where:

V_i = Normalized (scaled) value of consequence i , ranging from 0 to 1

X_i = Original (unscaled) consequence value for i

X_{best} = The lowest value of the consequence i

X_{worst} = The highest value of the consequence i

2.2.1.3 Technosylva weather sampling

Technosylva provides metrics in the form of data points, per percentile brackets, per asset. These percentiles represent the severity of weather conditions on a given day in a year regarding wildfire risk. A zero-percentile value represents the most favorable weather conditions for wildfire prevention (low temperature, low wind, high humidity, etc.), whereas a 98th-percentile value represents the most severe weather conditions (high temperature, high wind, low humidity, etc.). Since two assets in the same segment should experience similar weather conditions on any given day, Technosylva weather sampling (i.e., sampling a percentile value that quantifies the weather for certain metrics) is conducted at the segment level.

With deeper insights from the Technosylva data, the methodology for incorporating both consequences and Probability of Ignition (POI) in wildfire risk calculations has been refined.

In the previous phase, three different configurations were defined as "Best Case (10th)," "Average Case (50th)," and "Worst Case (90th)." This approach assumed static weather patterns and did not adequately address the uncertainty inherent in future weather conditions.

In the updated methodology, rather than relying on just three predefined scenarios, the full range of percentiles is now considered. With additional input from the Technosylva team, the frequency of occurrence for each percentile has been identified. These frequencies are used to assign probabilities to each percentile, which are then incorporated into the model. Leveraging Monte Carlo simulations, a specific percentile is selected for each iteration and each year based on these defined probabilities—allowing for a more

dynamic and realistic representation of future weather variability. The following table indicates the probability of experiencing each Technosylva percentile:

Percentile	Probability (%)
0	27.41
20	21.82
40	16.24
50	13.7
60	10.91
80	5.33
90	2.79
95	1.27
98	0.53

2.2.2 PSPS Risk

The DIREXYON suite calculates PSPS risk at the circuit level, and the cumulative PSPS risk at the circuit level contributes to the overall utility risk of the network. PSPS risk comprises two components: probability of PSPS and consequence of PSPS, explained below:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [PSPS Risk] calculation
End of Step

$$0.09009 \times 0.629 = 0.05666$$

f_{PSPS} Probability of PSPS

 ×

f_{PSPS} PSPS Consequence

 =

f_{PSPS} PSPS Risk

2.2.2.1 PSPS Probability

As mentioned by Liberty [1], PSPS events are primarily driven by environmental factors such as wind gusts, humidity, and fuel moisture.

Thirty-four weather stations across Liberty's service territory recorded information on the maximum wind gust of the day, duration of that maximum wind gust, and Fosberg Fire Weather Index (FFWI). FFWI considers multiple factors including humidity and fuel moisture.

With the availability of two years of historical weather information and identification of PSPS criteria specific to Liberty Electric Service, DIREXYON has developed a PSPS probability model. This methodology is based on Liberty-defined criteria and provides insights on the probability of PSPS across different circuits in Liberty's service area.

Liberty's 2024 PSPS Pre-Season Report [1] has defined wind gusts of more than 40 mph and FFWI of more than 50 as PSPS thresholds across all circuits. However, Liberty's subject matter experts have mentioned that circuits with available Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) will have a more relaxed threshold. Accordingly, DIREXYON has considered the following thresholds for PSPS events:

Circuit Type	Wind Gust (mph)	FFWI
Without EPSS	40	50
With EPSS	50	50

DIREXYON conducted a comprehensive analysis of these 2 years of wind data (2023-2024) and projected future wind gust probabilities. The probability of PSPS events for each circuit type has been calculated as the sum product of FFWI and wind gust probabilities according to the established threshold table. This mathematical approach provides a quantifiable risk assessment for different circuit configurations.

The following sections present a summary of the wind gust and FFWI data analysis:

2.2.2.1.1 Wind Gust analysis

The analysis began by categorizing wind gusts recorded at each station into seven distinct categories. In the next step, the total recorded duration of each wind speed category was calculated for each circuit. Then, for each year, the probability of experiencing a given wind category was determined by dividing the observed duration of that category by the total recorded duration for that year.

The following table represents the results of this analysis for **circuit CEM41**:

Wind category mph	Recorded Minutes in 2023	Recorded Minutes in 2024	Total recorded duration 2023	Total recorded duration 2023	Frequency 2023	Frequency 2024
Below 35	446628	464861	501376	515941	0.891	0.901
35-39	29898	19336			0.06	0.037
40-44	21088	20240			0.042	0.039
45-49	3055	6740			0.006	0.013
50-54	707	4652			0.001	0.009
55-59	0	0			0	0
60+	0	112			0	0.0002

Finally, the projected probability of experiencing a given wind category is estimated by taking the average of the values from 2023 and 2024.

The following table represents the projected probability of each wind category for **circuit CEM41**:

Wind category mph	Projected probability
Below 35	0.896
35-39	0.049
40-44	0.041
45-49	0.01
50-54	0.005
55-59	0
60+	0.0001

2.2.2.1.2 FFWI analysis

Fosberg Fire Weather Index (FFWI) is a fire danger index that incorporates multiple environmental factors such as moisture content, wind speed, and humidity [2]. FFWI data were available from weather station records for the years 2023 and 2024. However, due to incomplete data for 2023, only the 2024 dataset was used in the analysis.

The analysis began by categorizing FFWI values recorded at each station into seven distinct categories. In the next step, the number of records falling in each category was calculated based on the 2024 data.

The following table represents the results of this analysis for **circuit CEM41**:

FFWI Category	Number of records in 2024
Less than 45	351
45 - 49	6
50 - 54	7
55 - 59	1
60 - 64	0
65 - 69	1
70+	0

Finally, the projected frequency of experiencing each FFWI category was assumed to be consistent with the distribution observed in 2024.

As per the client's request for this phase, the analysis was conducted without considering the potential impacts of climate change or long-term environmental trends. While this aligns with the defined project scope, it does introduce certain limitations. In addition, the reliance on a limited dataset—spanning only two years for wind gusts (2023 and 2024) and a single year for FFWI (2024)—further constrains the robustness of the results.

Methodology Limitations:

1. **Limited Time Frame:** The analysis uses wind gust data from only 2023 and 2024, and FFWI data from 2024 alone. This short time frame may not capture the full range of natural variability, especially for rare or extreme events, potentially limiting the representativeness of the identified patterns.

2. **Lack of Consideration for Climate Change:** The analysis assumes that environmental factors remain stable over time—without accounting for environmental or climatic changes. Accordingly, potential long-term shifts in wind behavior or FFWI due to climate change are not considered.

Using the explained methodology, the following table indicates the circuits ranked based on Probability of PSPS:

Circuit	Probability of PSPS
CEM41 Circuit	0.12
MEY3400 Circuit	0.09009
TPZ1202 Circuit	0.008868
MULLER1296 Circuit	0.005282
WSH201 Circuit	0.000843
TRK7203 Circuit	0.00012

Now that we have these metrics, the model can calculate the probability of having 1 PSPS event in the current year.

Df: Number of days with FFWI > 50

Pw: Probability of having problematic winds (40 or 50 mph if we have SRP).

Probability of picking no PSPS event: $N_{psps} = 1 - P_w$

Probability of picking an event for PSPS for the current year: $P(psp) = 1 - N_{psps}^{Df}$

Example in the documentation for CEM41:

- Df: $7 + 1 + 1 = 9$
- Pw: 5.61% (for 40 mph) or 0.51% (for 50 mph)
- Npsps: 0.9439 (for 40 mph) or 0.9949 (for 50 mph)
- $P(psp) = 1 - 0.9439^9 = 40.53\%$

- $P(\text{psps with SRP}) = 1 - 0.9949^9 = 4.50\%$

So, on any given year, CEM41 will have a 40.53% chance of a PSPS event, or a 4.50% chance with SRP.

2.2.2.2 PSPS Consequence

The PSPS Consequence model is inspired by Liberty's 2024 PSPS Pre-Season Report [1]. The model evaluates the impact of a PSPS event on the community at risk.

Three main elements were used with Multi-Attribute Value Framework (MAVF) methodology to calculate the PSPS Consequence:

2.2.2.2.1 Reliability Impact

Reliability impact is measured based on Customer Minute Interruption (CMI) during PSPS events. CMI for a circuit is calculated as the product of the number of customers and the duration of the PSPS event.

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [PSPS Consequence - Reliability] calculation
End of Step

$4.234\text{M} = 4.234\text{M}$

$f_{\text{X}} \text{ Customer Minute Interrupted (CMI)}$

=

$f_{\text{X}} \text{ PSPS Consequence - Reliability}$

Characteristic [Customer Minute Interrupted (CMI)] calculation
End of Step

$3317 \times 1276 = 4.234\text{M}$

$f_{\text{X}} \text{ Customer Count - Importation}$

x

$f_{\text{X}} \text{ Average PSPS Duration (Minute)}$

=

$f_{\text{X}} \text{ Customer Minute Interrupted (CMI)}$

Liberty has estimated the duration of a PSPS event to range between 12 and 24 hours, with the majority of cases averaging around 18 hours. This estimate includes the total disruption time, encompassing both the outage itself and the time required for post-event patrol inspections. As specified in [1] , this value is assumed to be constant for each circuit during extreme weather conditions.

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2.2.2.2.2 Financial Impact

As specified in [1], every minute of interruption during PSPS for each customer has a cost of \$0.17. Accordingly, financial impacts are calculated as follows:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [PSPS Consequence - Financial] calculation
End of Step

$$0.17 \times 4.234\text{M} = 719.7\text{K}$$

$$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Financial lose Per CMI} \times f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Customer Minute Intrupted (CMI)} = f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ PSPS Consequence - Financial}$$

Characteristic [Customer Minute Intrupted (CMI)] calculation
End of Step

$$3317 \times 1276 = 4.234\text{M}$$

$$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Customer Count - Importation} \times f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Average PSPS Duration (Minute)} = f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Customer Minute Intrupted (CMI)}$$

2.2.2.2.3 Safety Impact

Safety impact is calculated as the expected number of fatalities (EF), which is determined by multiplying the EF rate per customer interruption by the number of weighted customers.

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [PSPS Consequence - Safety] calculation
End of Step

$$0.000000000050 \times 4.234\text{M} \times 9.357\text{M} = 1981$$

$$f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Expected fatalities per CMI} \times f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Customer Minute Intrupted (CMI)} \times f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ Weighted Customer} = f_{\mathbf{x}}^{\mathbf{z}} \text{ PSPS Consequence - Safety}$$

Liberty uses an estimated EF rate of 1.5×10^{-9} fatalities per 30-minute customer interruption (CMI30) [1].

The weighted customers is calculated as:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Weighted Customer] calculation
End of Step

$$\frac{2821}{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ PSPS Safety Multiplier}} \times \frac{3317}{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Customer Count - Importation}} = \frac{9.357M}{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Weighted Customer}}$$

Where the Safety Multiplier is defined as:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [PSPS Safety Multiplier] calculation
End of Step

$$\frac{\text{iferror}((30 \times 6) + (30 \times 88) + (3223) \div 3317, 0)}{\text{iferror}((30 \times \frac{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Number of Medical Baselines}}{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Customer Count - Importation}}) + (30 \times \frac{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Number of Critical Facilities}}{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Customer Count - Importation}}) + (\frac{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Other customer}}{f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ Customer Count - Importation}}) \div 3317, 0)} = f_{x_5}^{(2)} \text{ PSPS Safety Multiplier}$$

Since the provided consequences of a PSPS event are measured in different units, using them in their original form can lead to a skewed overall risk assessment. Specifically, the factor with the largest numerical range may disproportionately influence the final score, overshadowing other important considerations. To address this, the use of a Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) is recommended [1]. This method enables the integration of diverse impact types by normalizing each consequence to a common scale, typically between 0 and 1, ensuring that no single metric dominates the overall evaluation. MAVF provides a structured approach for combining these normalized values into a balanced and meaningful risk score.

2.2.2.2.4 Normalization

The following formula is used to calculate normalize values for each consequence:

$$V_i = \frac{x_i - x_{\text{best}}}{x_{\text{worst}} - x_{\text{best}}}$$

Where:

V_i = Normalized (scaled) value of consequence i , ranging from 0 to 1

X_i = Original (unscaled) consequence value for i

X_{best} = The lowest value of the consequence i

X_{worst} = The highest value of the consequence i

Using the explained methodology, the following table indicates the circuits ranked based on probability of PSPS:

Circuit	Number of EPSS triggered events	Probability of PSPS ↓	Probability of triggering EPSS	PSPS Consequence
CEM41 Circuit	0.01	0.12	0.03	0.04
MEY3400 Circuit	0.19	0.09	0.25	0.56
TPZ1202 Circuit	0.12	0.01	0.22	0.1
MULLER1296 Circuit	0.07	0.01	0.16	0.09
WSH201 Circuit	0.01	0	0.01	0.01
TRK7203 Circuit	0.02	0	0.02	0.27
CAL2501 Circuit	0.02	0	0.03	0.01
CEM42 Circuit	0.03	0	0.03	0.03
GLS7400 Circuit	0.03	0	0.03	0.17
GLS7600 Circuit	0.02	0	0	0.01
HOB7700 Circuit	0.01	0	0.01	0
KBH4201 Circuit	0.04	0	0.02	0.07

You can use the dashboard in Direxyon to have more detail or look at the 2025-2028 WMP Targets and Budgets.xlsx>Circuit Ranking joint with this documentation.

2.2.3 EPSS Risk

2.2.3.1 EPSS Probability

To calculate the probability of failure, the model will use this formula:

$$\text{Probability of EPSS} = 1 - (1 - \text{Average Probability of Failure of all equipment} \times \text{Probability of having at least 95th percentile weather})^{\text{(Count of Asset)}}$$


Since EPSS is only triggered when a failure and a bad weather event occur and EPSS is enable, the probability of EPSS can quite high since any failure can cause the outage. The two way Liberty can have an impact on this probability is to invest more in the circuit (reduces the failure rate) and changing the number of days when EPSS is enable.

2.2.3.2 EPSS Consequence

The consequences are calculated like PSPS consequence, but the duration is in between 180-300 minutes.

2.2.4 In-service Risk

To build the in-service risk, we used this diagram from phases 1-2 that was originally applied only to poles and extended it to all assets. The risk is calculated at the circuit level.



2.2.4.1 Probability

For the probability, the model uses the average probability of failure of all assets. An important note for conductors is that all conductors use their length to calculate their probability of failure, so they are treated as one asset, like poles and fuses. For secondary conductors, the model doesn't consider their length. The probability of failure now uses more components than age and material for poles.

2.2.4.2 Consequence

The consequence of failure for the in-service risk includes:

- Finance (10%)
 - o Use the sum of the normal replacement cost of each asset
- Reliability (50%)
 - o Use the metric imported from Liberty at the circuit level
- Safety (40%)
 - o Use the average POI of each asset
 - o POI is a value taken from Techno Sylva


When consequences are calculated, since they represent different metrics, we'll use the MAVF method using the 10-50-40 % weight to scale the risk between 0 and 1 to compare all circuit.

2.2.1 Outage Program Risk

The Outage Program Risk is the average risk of PSPS et EPSS.

2.2.1.1 Example Outage Program Risk

Note that the specific number can change during the simulation and include a random element, but this an example taken directly from Direxyon.



Using Value from MEY3400

All Scaled consequence uses the method use in the [PSPS Consequence](#) Section (MAVF). This way, all consequences and probabilities are between 0 and 1, with probabilities as percentages and consequences as comparisons between circuits where 1 would be the worst case in Reliability, Financial, and Safety.

2.3 Asset Model

2.3.1 Secondary Conductor

Due to the limited amount of data for this asset, no degradation was model and the model will only intervene to repair secondary conductor with tree attachment or open\grey wire or if the asset is failed.

2.3.1.1 At risk material

At-risk materials are identified based on two factors: tree attachment and the type of secondary conductor (Grey/Open wire). Tree attachment data was available from the Liberty dataset. However, due to the absence of detailed information on the type of secondary conductor, a placeholder value was used based on subject matter expert (SME) input. It is assumed that 25% of the network consists of grey/open wire.

2.3.1.2 Budget


The cost for open/grey wire replacement and normal replacement is set at **\$109.27 per foot** based on \$3 million for 5.2 miles. The replacement cost for a tree attachment is set at **\$18,000**, based on the average cost outlined in the initiative document, which reports a total cost of **\$1,100,000** for **60 replacements**. The model will replace secondary conductors if their budget is available in their respective budget or if they fail.

3. Results

3.1 PSPS , SRP and Fault indicator comparison

The provided dashboard compares the impacts of three different strategies on PSPS. Each strategy is presented in a different color:

- **Green (Baseline):** All mitigation strategies are enabled, including SRP and fault indicators.
- **Blue (Initiative without SRP):** The SRP mitigation is disabled, but fault indicators remain active.
- **Red (Initiative without Fault Indicator):** Fault indicators are disabled, while SRP remains active.




The map in the center visualizes the spatial distribution of PSPS probability by circuit for the year 2025, where higher-risk areas are highlighted in orange and red. The map is overlaid based on the baseline scenario. As indicated, the following circuits have the highest probability of PSPS:

Average Probability of PSPS in 2024

Circuit	Asset Type	Probability of P... ↓
TPZ1202 Circuit	Circuit	0.68
MULLER1296 Circuit	Circuit	0.46
MEY3400 Circuit	Circuit	0.38
WSH201 Circuit	Circuit	0.11
T619 Circuit	Circuit	0.04
CEM41 Circuit	Circuit	0.04
TRK7203 Circuit	Circuit	0.01


The average probability of a PSPS chart illustrates how activating SRP settings reduces the likelihood of needing to trigger such events. As previously mentioned, SRP configurations are sensitive and can shut down the network when a branch touches a power line; therefore, when SRP is activated, a more relaxed wind gust threshold is applied. In contrast, in the blue use case—where no SRP settings are active—the system operates under stricter wind gust thresholds, resulting in a higher probability of triggering a PSPS event. Please note, as mentioned earlier, the analysis assumes that environmental factors remain stable over time without accounting for environmental or climatic changes. Accordingly, no potential change is observed in PSPS probability over time.

Average Probability of PSPS



The average consequence of PSPS chart tracks the average consequence of PSPS across the green and red strategies. As indicated, the strategy without fault indicators (red line) consistently carries higher PSPS consequences. This is expected as disabling fault indicators delays fault detection during patrol inspections following a shut-off event. Without this technology, manual inspections are required before re-energizing the network, which increases the duration of outages and results in higher impacts on customers.

Average PSPS Consequence per Year



Overall, the analysis confirms that enabling both SRP and fault indicators yields the most effective outcome. While SRP primarily reduces the probability of a PSPS by increasing the wind gust thresholds required to trigger it, fault indicators reduce the consequences by shortening the outage duration. Accordingly, for a resilient and customer-centric strategy, both mitigation elements should be maintained together.

3.2 Initiatives Effectiveness

More detail information is available in "comparisons_fire_score.pdf"," comparisons_outage_program_risk.pdf"," comparisons_utility_risk.pdf".

The first initiative (Patrol Inspection - Vegetation) will be described in more detail to explain the methodology, while the others will focus more on results and commentary.

All initiatives will be scored using the "electrical fire - count" characteristic in the model. This will be called the **Fire Score**. The provided Fire Score is employed for calculation of the metrics at the network level.

The result indicates the percentage reduction in the Fire Score achieved by investing one million dollars in the initiative.

- **Probability of Fire** = (Probability of failure × Probability of Outage × Probability of electrical fire)
- **Electrical fire - count**: random value < Probability of failure AND random value < Probability of Outage AND random value < Probability of electrical fire
 - If all values are true, it will generate a score of 1

Please note that in this context, the "electrical fire -- count" refers to a score, not an estimate of the actual number of fires Liberty is expected to experience in the coming years. This is because not all outages are equal—some may produce larger or smaller sparks (or fire elements), each with varying probabilities of reaching the ground and igniting a fire. Efforts have been made, such as with the pole clearing initiative, to incorporate these differences into the model. However, further refinement is needed, as the current model predicts approximately 150 electrical fires per year, which is not realistic.

Another important note is that the failure rate is assumed to be constant in the model analyzed here. However, we now know that failure rates should increase—by approximately 10% for every 15 mph of wind gusts, for example. With the availability of geo-localized environmental data, along with failure, outage, and asset health information, the team has laid the groundwork to develop new methodologies for identifying patterns

between failures and environmental conditions, such as temperature. Additionally, the model is designed to be flexible, allowing the use of various metrics for this type of analysis.

Initiative Ranking (Fire Score)

Rank	WMP Initiative Activity	Asset Type
1	Grid monitoring systems	Circuit
2	Equipment settings to reduce wildfire risk	Circuit
3	Expulsion fuse replacement	OHF
4	Distribution pole replacements and reinforcements	Pole
5	Open wire/grey wire	Secondary_Conductor
6	Vegetation Management Inspection Program - Detailed	Vegetation
7	Undergrounding of electric lines and/or equipment	Conductor
8	Wood and Slash Management	Vegetation
9	Quality Assurance and Quality Control	Conductor
10	Covered conductor installation	Conductor
11	Clearance	Vegetation
12	Fall-In Mitigation	Vegetation
13	Detailed inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment	Circuit
14	Tree attachment removals	Secondary_Conductor
15	Vegetation Sum LiDar + Patrol	Vegetation
16	Pole Clearing	Pole
17	Patrol inspections of distribution electric lines and equipment	Circuit
18	Fire-Resilient Right-of-Ways	Vegetation
19	Intrusive pole inspections	Pole
20	Substation Defensible Space	Vegetation

Outage program and Utility risk efficiency are calculated the same way and are available in "2025-2028 WMP Targets and Budgets.xlsx > Budget."

The calculation for Outage program and Utility risk could be improved by either using a different methodology or by exploring more the effects of asset health on PSPS. For now, the asset health will modify the probability of failure (linked to SRP and probability of fire).

For example, for the utility risk of CEM41 we have:

Characteristic [Utility Risk] calculation
End of Step

$$(0.001911 + 0.0000588) \div 2 = 0.0009847$$
$$(\boxed{f_{\mathbf{x}} \text{ PSPS Risk}} + \boxed{f_{\mathbf{x}} \text{ Fire Risk}}) \div 2 = \boxed{f_{\mathbf{x}} \text{ Utility Risk}}$$

‘Fire Risk’ is around 100x smaller than ‘PSPS Risk’. Since the effect of investment impacts principally the probability of failure (that will affect directly the probability of fire and SRP), even if that probability doubles, almost no effect will be transferred to ‘Utility Risk’. More work is necessary here to identify the relation between asset health and other key components of those risk metrics.

3.2.1 Baseline

The baseline is the common point of comparison for all initiatives. This simulation will use the budget shown in the "2025-2028 WMP Targets and Budgets.xlsx". Two modifications were made to this budget:

- **Vegetation Management Inspection Program** - Patrol and LiDAR are joined together since there's no distinction between those 2 initiatives in the model.
- **Conductor - Undergrounding** will not use the full budget available and only model the 2 projects available (Stateline Project and Tahoe Vista Project)

Each initiative is evaluated through a separate simulation, identical to the baseline, except that the budget for that specific initiative is set to zero. We assume that the associated risk will increase. However, if the risk decreases or remains unchanged, the following factors may help explain it:

- The initiative does not have a significant impact on risk

- The model needs more information to identify the underlying sources of fire that the initiative is supposed to contain
- The stochastic approach can create certain outliers; maybe more iterations or longer simulations are necessary
- Some initiatives could have a lagging effect (see detailed inspection - vegetation)
- The model is missing key components of risk. For example, a failure rate linked to the wind profile of a circuit

Please note that the general priority in the simulation to spend the budget is in this order:

1. Outage
2. Project
3. Number of years to inspection (if applicable)
4. Probability of fire

3.2.2 Patrol Inspection - Vegetation


To obtain these numbers, all iterations were analyzed using a heatmap to provide better visual representation. Additionally, we can use the average values available in Direxyon's dashboard. Since fire is a rare event in the network, applying a more precise methodology is particularly appropriate.

Steps to generate results:

- The data from Direxyon simulation is extracted and manipulated with a python script
- Heatmap to show the distribution and difference of iteration are created
- Overall statistics are generated to analyze the difference

Here's an example from comparisons_fire_score.pdf

- 14719 - Initiative V2 - Without Patrol Inspection - Vegetation.csv
 - o Unique simulation id = 14719
 - o Simulation Name = Initiative V2 - Without Patrol Inspection – Vegetation
- Since we ran 100 iteration per initiative all column should come to 100.
- The Number used to calculate effectiveness is in the section : 'Overall Statistics', column : 'Diff %', row : 'Mean'



Discussion:

- **Patrol Inspections:** Patrol inspections focus on clearing areas close to the conductor (Area 1). If these inspections are not conducted, these areas are cleared during a detailed inspection instead.

- **Impact of Vegetation Density:** The mentioned areas are small and have minimal tree coverage, so the effect of vegetation density is not significant (refer to the conductor-vegetation failure multiplier).
- **Vegetation Growth Rate:** The vegetation growth rate defined in the model may not be aggressive enough to accurately reflect real-world conditions.

3.2.3 Detail Inspection - Vegetation

Discussion:

Lagging Effect: Since one element of the vegetation factor is tied to the number of years since the last detailed inspection, longer simulation periods are required to allow sufficient vegetation growth. This delay is necessary for the benefits and overall impact of the initiative to become more significant.

3.2.4 Detail Inspection - Capital

Discussion:

- **Pole health model:** The current model for pole health may need to be revisited, particularly in relation to inspections. If most failures are identified during inspections, this could create a significant backlog of deferred failures, potentially leading to future risks. Alternative modeling approaches could be considered.
- **Role of inspections:** While inspections are essential for risk reduction by identifying and triggering necessary maintenance work, they have limited direct impact on the fire score themselves.

3.2.5 Patrol Inspection - Capital

Discussion:

- See detail inspection - capital

3.2.6 Tree attachment

Discussion:

- **Tree attachments:** Tree attachments currently appear to have minimal impact on network risk. This may be due to the assumed random age range of 5 to 50 years, which could underestimate the actual risk associated with older attachments.
- **Growth risk modeling:** The risk associated with tree attachments is likely exponential over time. Running longer simulations could provide more insight into how this risk evolves.
- **Data limitations:** There is limited available data for secondary conductors, which may constrain the accuracy of related risk assessments.

3.2.7 Open/grey wire

Discussion:

- See Tree attachment
- **Data availability:** There is virtually no data available, which significantly limits analysis and model accuracy.

3.2.8 Pole Clearing

Discussion:

- **Model:** The current model used for this initiative has limited input from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), which may impact its accuracy and overall effectiveness.
- **Potential Improvements:** Relevant literature and established mathematical models are available online and could be leveraged to enhance the model's reliability.
- **Initial Approach:** The current phase, as a preliminary attempt, focuses solely on assessing this initiative's impact on the Probability of Ignition (POI) as calculated by Technosylva.
- **Impact:** It looks like these initiatives have a great impact on Min and Max fire score

3.2.9 Intrusive Inspection

Discussion :

- See Patrol inspection - Capital

3.2.10 Pole Replacement

Discussion:

- **Minimum risk reduction:** This approach appears effective in reducing the minimum risk.
- **Investment returns:** It would be valuable to analyze whether Liberty experiences diminishing returns with higher levels of investment.

3.2.11 Expulsion Fuse

Discussion:

- **Overall risk reduction:** This approach seems effective in reducing the overall risk.
- **Investment returns:** It would be insightful to explore whether Liberty experiences diminishing returns as investment levels increase.

3.2.12 Quality Control - Conductor

Discussion:

- **Impact of initiative:** These initiatives primarily affect infant mortality (low percentage) and long-term degradation.
- **Number of simulated years:** Conducting longer simulations would be valuable to assess the full impact of these types of initiatives.
- **Capital management benefits:** If this approach proves to be effective for capital management, it could free up future budget allocations for more targeted and efficient fire management.

3.2.13 Cover Conductor

Discussion:

- **Cost-effectiveness:** While this initiative is relatively expensive, it yields strong results.
- **Potential benefits:** It could have beneficial effects on PSPS (Public Safety Power Shutoffs), SRP (System Restoration Plans), and their associated consequences, which should be further investigated.

3.2.14 Undergrounding

Discussion:

- **High cost:** This initiative appears to be very expensive.
- **Degradation model:** The degradation model used is identical to that of overhead conductors, except for the assumption that it is 99% fire resistant. This model should be further developed for more accuracy.
- **Frequency vs. consequences:** In this analysis, only the frequency of issues is considered. However, undergrounding conductors might prove more beneficial when considering the full range of consequences.

3.2.15 SRP

Discussion:

- **Effectiveness:** This approach has proven to be very effective
- **SRP strategy optimization:** Exploring different SRP strategies could help identify the most effective one for Liberty.

3.2.16 Substation Defensible Space

Discussion:

- **Approach:** Areas are treated in the same way as Vegetation Area 1.
- **Potential undervaluation:** The impact on fire risk may be undervalued.

3.2.17 Clearance

Discussion:

- **Lagging effect:** This initiative seems to have a lagging effect, so running longer simulations could provide more insight.
- **Clearance practices:** Some clearance is still being managed through fall-in management.

3.2.18 Right-of-Ways

Discussion:

- **Approach:** These areas are treated in the same manner as Vegetation Areas 1 and 2.
- **Potential undervaluation:** The impact on fire risk may be undervalued.
- **Consequences on accessibility:** These areas may have accessibility issues, which could affect the consequences. However, this logic is not currently incorporated into the model.

3.2.19 Slash Management

Discussion:

- **Hauling impact:** Hauling has minimal effect on fire risk in the model, as it is treated as standard vegetation density.
- **Undervalued fire score impact:** The effect on the fire score appears to be undervalued.

3.2.20 Fall-in

Discussion:

- **Fall-in mitigation efforts:** Liberty has already made significant progress in fall-in mitigation.
- **Lagging effect:** There is a lagging effect, so running longer simulations could provide more useful insights.
- **New budget related simulations:** It might be valuable to try a simulation with a reduced budget to assess the impact.
- **Vegetation growth assumptions:** The current model might not account for sufficiently aggressive vegetation growth.
- **Fall-in risk evaluation:** The fall-in risk is assessed as if all trees, both current and future, are the same species, which may not reflect the full range of risk.

3.2.21 Fault indicators

This initiative has effects on the consequence and not the fire score, so it is analyzed differently. This shouldn't be analyzed base on fire risk, but it influences Utility and Outage program Risk.

3.3 Undergrounding project analysis

Here are the overall metrics for the undergrounding projects, more details are available in 2025-2028 WMP Targets and Budgets.xlsx > Project

No SRP

Project	Cost (million \$)	Diff % - Utility Risk	Diff % - Outage Program Risk	Diff % - Fire Risk
Undergrounding without SRP	6,96	0,44	-0,11	1
Cover Without SRP	1,47	0,44	-0,39	-0,05
Normal Replacement without SRP (Baseline)	0,04	N/A	N/A	N/A

With SRP

Project	Cost (million \$)	Diff % - Mean - Utility Risk	Diff % - Outage Program Risk	Diff % - Fire Risk
Undergrounding	7,46	0,95	-0,11	0,16
Cover	1,97	-0,16	-0,03	-0,99
Normal Replacement (Baseline)	0,54	N/A	N/A	N/A

DIREXYON recommends conducting the analysis of the projects based on the probability of fire, since this is the principal metric affected by those projects. Utility and outage program risks will not be significantly affected by these projects.

This analysis examines 2 underground projects (Tahoe Vista and the State Line) based on the fire score, where lower is better. Note that every project modeled with SRP has an additional cost of \$500,000.

Covered conductor appears to be the most beneficial approach since it makes additional budget available for other initiatives that could further reduce risk. The difference between undergrounding and covering conductor is small; an analysis could be conducted at the circuit level to determine if there's a significant difference between circuits. However, by examining the effect of the project on the entire network, Liberty can compare it with other initiatives.

If Liberty wants to analyze with more precision, all the data is already available in the dashboards. Additionally, if Liberty wants to analyze more projects like these, using the portfolio module would be beneficial since it already has an integrated value framework.

This analysis does not consider possible consequences, which could change the benefit of each project.

4. Assumptions and next steps

4.1 Assumptions

1. Post-PSPS/SRP Event Restoration Time

Following PSPS and SRP events, a patrol inspection is conducted to detect any faults. If a fault is identified, an additional 2 hours are typically required for repairs. Currently, the model does not account for this repair time. As this impacts the total restoration time and the overall consequence of a PSPS event, future work should incorporate this additional component into the model.

2. Circuit-Level Deactivation Assumption during PSPS

In the current model, it is assumed that the entire circuit is de-energized during a PSPS or EPSS event. However, in practice, it may be possible to isolate and shut down only parts of the circuit. This simplification may overestimate the impact of such events.

3. No climate change impact consideration in PSPS

The analysis assumes that environmental factors remain stable over time—without accounting for environmental or climatic changes. Accordingly, potential long-term shifts in wind behavior or FFWI due to climate change are not considered.

4. Secondary Conductor Tree Attachment:

A uniform random distribution is assumed for the secondary conductors, with values ranging between 5 and 50.

4.2 Next Steps

1. Improve Failure Rate Estimation

The model currently assumes a constant failure rate throughout the year. Future versions should refine this by incorporating seasonal or weather-dependent variations.

2. Model Multiple Events per Year

Extend the model to simulate multiple PSPS and SRP events per circuit annually, potentially using a Poisson distribution to determine frequency of such events.

5. Integrate Additional Asset Types

Expand the model to include other critical asset types, including:

- a. Overhead Transformers
- b. Underground Transformers
- c. Arresters
- d. Connectors
- e. Substation Assets: Power Transformers, Relays, Breakers, Substation Batteries, Monitors

6. Enhance Vegetation Risk Modeling

Improve the vegetation model by incorporating:

- Tree species and their specific fire risk profiles
- Fuel management practices and their mitigation effectiveness
- Enhance vegetation growth model

7. Incorporate Climate Change Impacts on PSPS

Assess how projected climate change scenarios could influence the frequency, severity, and geographic distribution of PSPS events.

8. Evaluate Investment Impact on PSPS Risk Reduction

If available, use data from Liberty to quantify how system investments reduce PSPS risk over time and validate the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies.

9. Incorporate logic to shutdown part of circuit during PSPS and SRP

As noted by the client, the next phase may focus on further segmentation of circuits to enhance the modeling of PSPS and SRP impacts.

10. Refine Outage Model for Key Assets

a. Poles and overhead fuse

Improve the accuracy of outage probability and consequences for key assets such as poles and overhead fuses.

b. Conductors

Liberty can significantly improve the conductor outage model through the following actions:

I. Subject Matter Expert (SME) Engagement

- Review and validate the current conductor outage model with Direxyon team.
- Incorporate asset cohort information to distinguish between conductor groups with shared characteristics.
- Include age ranges (minimum and maximum) for different conductor materials.
- Capture contextual circuit information (e.g., whether the circuit is newly built, composed mainly of copper, or part of legacy infrastructure) to help reduce variability in regional failure distributions.

II. Inspection Data Integration

- In the Direxyon model, apparent age is more relevant than actual installation age for predicting outages. Accordingly, the next phase can focus on leverage findings from the research project “Overhead Conductor Condition Monitoring [6] [7], which provides methods to estimate the apparent age of conductors through inspection.

III. Improve Outage Attribution

- Collect and incorporate more detailed data on the specific assets responsible for outages.

11. Define and Integrate Reliability Metrics

Incorporate industry-standard reliability indices into the model, including:

- SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index)

- SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index)

12. In service risk new methodology

5. Important Links for phase 3

Category	ID	Name	Link
Dataset	2575	2024 - PSPS	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/Dataset/2575/Config
Model	2543	Liberty (Phase 3) - Official	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/Model/2543/AssetTypeList
Results	14620 to 14922	All results set between those ID 13994 and 14264 included (25 simulations)	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/ResultSetList
Dashboard	694	Phase 3 - Final	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/Dashboard/694/Page/2
Portfolio	631	Portfolio - Importation - 2025 (Undergrounding)	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/Portfolio/631
	632	Portfolio - Importation - 2025 (Cover)	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/Portfolio/632
	633	Portfolio - Importation - 2025 (Replacement)	https://liberty-calpeco.direxyon.com/Portfolio/633

6. List of Participants in the project

Liberty SMEs	
Peter Stoltman	Senior Manager, Wildfire Prevention
Kyle Wright	Manager, Strategic Projects
DIREXYON team	
Kevin Hervieux	Main Modeler
Sadaf Gharaati	PSPS Modeler
Vincent Hébert-Garneau	Project manager

7. References

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8. Annex

8.1 Annex 1 : Conductor Failure model and vegetation

Documentation

Key Components of the Model

1. Material-Specific Parameters

The model accounts for different conductor materials (likely ACSR, copper, aluminum, steel) with material-specific parameters. This aligns with the documentation showing different failure characteristics for each material type (Figure 9 in the Energex data).

2. Thermal Stress Factor

The function `calculate_thermal_stress_factor` adjusts apparent age based on thermal stress, which directly relates to the annealing process described in Section 4.1.1 of the UQ report. This implements the principle that conductors operating at elevated temperatures age faster, consistent with the Arrhenius equation mentioned in the "Estimating Cable Life Expectancy" article.

3. Environmental Effects

The model applies an environmental multiplier that varies based on:

- The conductor's environment (likely coastal, highlands, plains, arid)

- The conductor material
- Whether the conductor is covered
- The primary failure cause

This aligns with findings in Figure 7 and Figure 14 showing that geographical location (particularly coastal proximity) significantly impacts failure rates.

4. Vegetation Management Factor

The model accounts for vegetation management through:

- Enhanced tree trimming (ETT) percentage
- Tree density

This is supported by data from Table 3-1 showing significant differences in failure rates between bare and covered conductors with ETT.

5. Installation Quality Factors

The model considers installation quality through:

- Crew experience
- Installation complexity
- Quality inspection presence

This relates to findings in Section 4.1.4 highlighting how poor installation techniques can affect conductor reliability.

6. Repair and Failure History

The model incorporates:

- Aging reduction from repairs (with diminishing returns)
- Failure acceleration from previous failures

These align with the observations about splices/joints being significant failure points (19% of unassisted failures in Figure 6).

7. Phase Configuration

The model applies a 0.8 factor for multiphase configurations, consistent with Table 3-1 showing multiphase configurations having lower failure rates than single-phase lines.

Step 1

```
```python
```

```
def base_failure_probability(age, shape, scale, location=0, installation_defect_rate=0.005, early_age_factor=0.5):
```

```
 """
```

```
 Calculate base failure probability using Weibull distribution with early-life component
```

```
 Parameters:
```

- age: Age of conductor in years
- shape: Shape parameter ( $\beta$ ) defines the failure rate behavior
- scale: Scale parameter ( $\eta$ ) defines the characteristic life
- location: Location parameter ( $\gamma$ ) shifts the distribution



- installation\_defect\_rate: Probability of installation defects
- early\_age\_factor: Factor that determines the decay rate of installation defects

Returns:

- Failure probability

"""

# Standard Weibull failure probability for aging

if age <= location:

aging\_prob = 0.0

else:

aging\_prob = 1 - np.exp(-((age - location) / scale) \*\* shape)

# Early-life failure probability due to installation issues

early\_life\_prob = installation\_defect\_rate \* np.exp(-early\_age\_factor \* age)

# Combined probability (avoid double-counting)

combined\_prob = aging\_prob + early\_life\_prob - (aging\_prob \* early\_life\_prob)

return combined\_prob

...

## # Analysis of the Base Failure Probability Function

The ``base_failure_probability`` function implements a modified Weibull model that combines two failure mechanisms: age-related deterioration and early-life failures. Let me analyze each component:

### ## Standard Weibull Component

```
```python
aging_prob = 1 - np.exp(-((age - location) / scale) ** shape)
```
```

This is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a three-parameter Weibull distribution where:

- **age**: The current age of the conductor in years
- **shape ( $\beta$ )**: Determines the failure rate behavior
  - When  $\beta > 1$  (as in our model with values like 12-15), it indicates increasing failure rate with age (wear-out failures)
  - Higher values create a steeper increase in failures at end-of-life
- **scale ( $\eta$ )**: The characteristic life where 63.2% of components would fail if only age-related mechanisms were present
- **location ( $\gamma$ )**: Shifts the distribution, representing a period where no failures occur (typically 0 for conductors)

This component models the typical "wear-out" phase of the bathtub curve, where failures increase with age as conductors deteriorate due to mechanical stress, corrosion, and environmental damage.

### ## Early-Life Component

```

```python

early_life_prob = installation_defect_rate * np.exp(-early_age_factor * age)

```

```

This is an exponentially decaying function that models early-life failures:

- **installation\_defect\_rate**: The initial probability of failure due to manufacturing or installation defects
- **early\_age\_factor**: Controls how quickly these early failures diminish (0.5 means they reduce by about 60% every 2 years)

This component represents the "infant mortality" phase of the bathtub curve, where defective conductors fail early in their lifecycle.

## ## Combined Probability

```

```python

combined_prob = aging_prob + early_life_prob - (aging_prob * early_life_prob)

```

```

This uses the probability union formula  $P(A \cup B) = P(A) + P(B) - P(A \cap B)$  to combine the two failure mechanisms, ensuring the total probability doesn't exceed 1.0.

The subtraction term ( $\text{aging\_prob} * \text{early\_life\_prob}$ ) prevents double-counting when both mechanisms contribute to failure.

## ## Analysis of Parameter Values

- **shape** (12-15): These high shape values create a steep increase in failure rates at end-of-life, consistent with observed conductor failure patterns in the EPRI data
- **scale** (42-54 years): Aligns with typical conductor replacement ages mentioned in the Australian DNSPs data
- **location** (0): Assumes no guaranteed failure-free period, which is realistic for conductors
- **installation\_defect\_rate** (0.005 or 0.4-0.6%): Represents a reasonable percentage of conductors with manufacturing or installation defects
- **early\_age\_factor** (0.5): Creates a relatively fast decay of early failures, consistent with observed patterns where most manufacturing defects manifest within the first few years

This model effectively captures the "bathtub curve" behavior frequently observed in reliability engineering, with higher failure rates both early in life (due to defects) and late in life (due to wear-out), with a relatively stable period in between.

The function aligns with reliability theory concepts discussed in the EPRI report and reflects the failure patterns described in the conductor monitoring research from the University of Queensland.

## ## Step 2

```
```python
```

```
def get_material_parameters(material_type, is_covered=False):
```

```
    """
```

```
    Returns Weibull parameters based on conductor material and covering
```

"""

Base parameters for bare conductors (shape, scale, location, corrosion_factor, installation_defect_rate)

bare_parameters = {

 'ACSR': {

 'shape': 15.0,

 'scale': 46.9,

 'location': 0,

 'corrosion_factor': 1.3,

 'installation_defect_rate': 0.005

 },

 'Copper': {

 'shape': 12.0,

 'scale': 54.0,

 'location': 0,

 'corrosion_factor': 1.1,

 'installation_defect_rate': 0.004

 },

 'Aluminum': {

 'shape': 14.0,

 'scale': 42.0,

 'location': 0,

 'corrosion_factor': 1.4,

 'installation_defect_rate': 0.006

```

    },

    'Steel': {

        'shape': 13.0,

        'scale': 49.0,

        'location': 0,

        'corrosion_factor': 1.5,

        'installation_defect_rate': 0.004

    }

}

# If conductor is covered, adjust parameters

if is_covered:

    material_params = bare_parameters.get(material_type, bare_parameters['ACSR']).copy()

    # Covered conductors have longer characteristic life

    material_params['scale'] *= 1.3

    # Covered conductors have reduced corrosion factor

    material_params['corrosion_factor'] *= 0.6

    # Covered conductors may have slightly higher installation defect rates due to complexity

    material_params['installation_defect_rate'] *= 1.25

    return material_params

return bare_parameters.get(material_type, bare_parameters['ACSR'])

...

```

You're right to question the source of these specific numbers. Looking more carefully at the provided documents, I should clarify where these parameters come from:

The parameters in the ``get_material_parameters`` function don't appear to be directly taken from the provided documents. Rather, they appear to be values chosen for a simulation model that attempts to align with some of the general trends observed in the documents.

From the documents provided:

1. From "A Review of the Reliability of Electric Distribution System Components" (EPRI):

- There is failure data showing a Weibull shape parameter value of 15 for ACSR (page 23, Table B-3)
- The scale parameter of 46.9 years for ACSR appears to match a value mentioned on page B-2
- However, the specific values for other materials aren't directly stated in the exact form shown in the function

2. From "Overhead Conductor Condition Monitoring" (University of Queensland):

- The report confirms steel and aluminum are more susceptible to corrosion than copper (consistent with the corrosion factors)
- It mentions average conductor replacement age is around 54 years (aligning with some of the scale parameters)
- It discusses factors like coastal proximity affecting failure rates

3. From other documents, we see references to various failure mechanisms and differences between materials, but not these exact numerical values.

The specific numerical parameters in the function appear to be:

1. Partially based on some data points from the documents
2. Partially derived from engineering judgment to create a plausible model
3. Not directly quoted verbatim from a single source in the provided documents

If you need the exact sources for each parameter value, you would need to check additional references beyond what was provided in the documents, or verify if these are hypothetical values created for simulation purposes.

Step 3

```
```python
```

```
def get_environment_multiplier(environment, material_parameters, is_covered=False, failure_cause='Unknown'):
```

```
 """
```

Calculate environmental stress multiplier with integrated covered conductor effects

Parameters:

- environment: 'Coastal', 'Arid', 'Highland', or 'Plain'
- material\_parameters: Dict with material-specific parameters
- is\_covered: Boolean indicating if conductor has insulative covering
- failure\_cause: Primary failure cause

Returns:



- Environmental stress multiplier

"""

# Base environmental factors for bare conductors

```
env_factors = {
 'Coastal': 1.5 * material_parameters['corrosion_factor'],
 'Arid': 0.8,
 'Highland': 1.2,
 'Plain': 1.0,
 'Urban': 0.9
}
```

# Get base environmental factor

```
base_factor = env_factors.get(environment, 1.0)
```

# If conductor is covered, adjust based on failure cause and environment

if is\_covered:

# Base reduction factors by failure cause

```
cause_specific_reductions = {
 'Corrosion': 0.60, # 60% reduction in corrosion-related failures
 'Lightning': 0.20, # 20% reduction in lightning-related failures
 'Mechanical': 0.10, # 10% reduction in mechanical failures
 'Animal': 0.70, # 70% reduction in animal-related failures
 'Unknown': 0.40 # 40% reduction in unknown causes
```

```
}
```

```
Get specific reduction factor or default
```

```
reduction_factor = cause_specific_reductions.get(failure_cause, 0.40)
```

```
Apply different reduction factors based on environment
```

```
if environment == 'Coastal':
```

```
 # Covered conductors in coastal areas get extra protection against corrosion
```

```
 if failure_cause == 'Corrosion':
```

```
 return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.3 * (1 - reduction_factor)
```

```
 else:
```

```
 return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.3
```

```
else:
```

```
 # Other environments
```

```
 if failure_cause == failure_cause:
```

```
 return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.5 * (1 - reduction_factor)
```

```
 else:
```

```
 return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.5
```

```
return base_factor
```

```
'''
```

## # Analysis of the Environment Multiplier Function

The ``get_environment_multiplier`` function calculates how environmental factors affect conductor failure rates, with adjustments for the conductor's covering status and failure cause. This is a crucial component in modeling conductor reliability in diverse geographical locations.

## ## Base Environmental Factors

```
```python
env_factors = {
    'Coastal': 1.5 * material_parameters['corrosion_factor'],
    'Arid': 0.8,
    'Highland': 1.2,
    'Plain': 1.0,
    'Urban': 0.9
}
```
```

These base factors represent how different environments affect conductor degradation:

- **\*\*Coastal (1.5 × corrosion\_factor)\*\***: The highest multiplier, reflecting severe environmental stress from salt spray, humidity, and corrosive elements. This is further amplified by the material-specific corrosion factor, creating a compound effect.
- **\*\*Arid (0.8)\*\***: A factor less than 1.0 indicates reduced failure rates compared to the baseline. This aligns with research showing conductors in dry environments experience less corrosion and degradation.

- **Highland (1.2)**: Higher than the baseline, possibly accounting for increased mechanical stress from wind loading, temperature variations, and potential lightning exposure in elevated areas.

- **Plain (1.0)**: Used as the baseline reference environment.

These values align with findings from the conductor failure statistics in the UQ report which showed significantly higher failure rates in coastal areas (89% of copper failures and 85-92% of other conductor failures occurred in coastal areas).

## ## Covered Conductor Adjustments

For covered conductors, the function applies reduction factors that vary by failure cause:

```
```python
cause_specific_reductions = {
    'Corrosion': 0.60, # 60% reduction in corrosion-related failures
    'Lightning': 0.20, # 20% reduction in lightning-related failures
    'Mechanical': 0.10, # 10% reduction in mechanical failures
    'Animal': 0.70, # 70% reduction in animal-related failures
    'Unknown': 0.40 # 40% reduction in unknown causes
}
```
```

These reduction factors reflect how insulative coverings protect against different failure modes:

- **\*\*Corrosion (0.60)\*\***: Significant reduction, as coverings provide a barrier against moisture and corrosive elements.
- **\*\*Animal (0.70)\*\***: Large reduction, as insulation prevents animal-related shorts.
- **\*\*Unknown (0.40)\*\***: Moderate reduction for general causes.
- **\*\*Lightning (0.20)\*\***: Minor reduction, as coverings provide limited protection against lightning strikes.
- **\*\*Mechanical (0.10)\*\***: Minimal reduction, as coverings offer little protection against mechanical stresses.

These values align with industry understanding that covered conductors primarily reduce corrosion and animal-related failures but offer less protection against mechanical stresses.

## **## Environment-Specific Adjustments for Covered Conductors**

The function applies different formulas for coastal versus other environments:

For coastal areas:

```
```python
return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.3 * (1 - reduction_factor) # For specific failure cause
return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.3 # For other causes
```
```

For other environments:

```

```python

return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.5 * (1 - reduction_factor) # For specific failure cause

return 1.0 + (base_factor - 1.0) * 0.5 # For other causes

```

```

These formulas reduce the environmental effect by either 70% (coastal) or 50% (other environments) before applying the cause-specific reduction. This reflects that covered conductors provide better relative protection in coastal areas (where bare conductors are most vulnerable) than in other environments.

## ## Alignment with Research

This approach aligns with the findings from the provided documents:

1. The UQ report shows most failures (77-92%) occur in coastal areas, supporting the higher multiplier for coastal environments.
2. The EPRI document discusses how environmental factors influence different conductor types and their degradation rates.
3. The failure statistics in TasNetworks' data (in the UQ report) show correlation between distance from coastline and failure rates, with most failures occurring within 0-5 km from the coast.

The model captures these relationships by making coastal environments particularly severe for bare conductors while providing significant protection through covering in those same environments.

## ## Step 4

```
```python
```

```
def calculate_thermal_stress_factor(avg_temperature, design_temperature=75, is_covered=False):
```

```
    """
```

Calculate thermal stress factor based on average operating temperature

Parameters:

- avg_temperature: Average conductor operating temperature in Celsius
- design_temperature: Design temperature in Celsius
- is_covered: Boolean indicating if conductor has insulative covering

Returns:

- Thermal acceleration factor

```
    """
```

```
# Activation energy in eV (different for covered vs bare conductors)
```

```
Ea = 1.13 if not is_covered else 1.25
```

```
# Boltzmann constant
```

```
kb = 8.617333e-5
```

```
# Convert to Kelvin
```

```
T_oper = avg_temperature + 273.15
```

```
T_design = design_temperature + 273.15
```

```
# Arrhenius factor
```

```
factor = np.exp(Ea/kb * (1/T_design - 1/T_oper))
```

```
# If covered, the thermal impact is reduced due to insulation protection
```

```
if is_covered:
```

```
    return max(1.0, factor * 0.85)
```

```
    return max(1.0, factor)
```

```
'''
```

Analysis of the Thermal Stress Factor Function

The `calculate_thermal_stress_factor` function applies the Arrhenius equation to model how elevated operating temperatures accelerate the aging of conductors. This is a critical component in predicting conductor degradation, particularly for determining the loss of tensile strength due to annealing.

Arrhenius Relationship

```
```python
```

```
factor = np.exp(Ea/kb * (1/T_design - 1/T_oper))
```

```
'''
```



This implements the Arrhenius equation, which describes how reaction rates (including material degradation) increase exponentially with temperature. In reliability engineering, this relationship is used to model thermal acceleration of aging processes.

The key parameters are:

- **Ea (Activation Energy)**: 1.13 eV for bare conductors and 1.25 eV for covered conductors
  - Higher values indicate greater temperature sensitivity
  - The higher value for covered conductors suggests their insulation material is more temperature-sensitive than bare metal
- **kb (Boltzmann Constant)**:  $8.617333 \times 10^{-5}$  eV/K
  - This is a physical constant used in the Arrhenius equation
- **T\_oper**: Operating temperature in Kelvin
- **T\_design**: Design temperature in Kelvin (default 75°C or 348.15K)

## ## Scientific Basis

This implementation aligns precisely with the information in the documents, particularly:

1. From the "Estimating Cable Life Expectancy" (ELEK Software) document:

- Page 4 explicitly shows the Arrhenius equation being used to estimate cable lifetime
- The example calculation uses an activation energy of 1.13 eV, matching the value in this function

- The document presents a similar formula:  $L = t_{\text{aging}} * e^{(E_a/K_B*(1/T_{\text{cond}}-1/T_{\text{aging}}))}$

2. From the "Overhead Conductor Condition Monitoring" report:

- Section 4.1.1 discusses annealing and how it reduces tensile strength at elevated temperatures
- Section 5.2.2 proposes modeling conductor temperature and annealing effects

3. From "XLPE-Insulated Cables" (EPRI report):

- Discusses how temperature affects aging and accelerates degradation of insulation

## **## Adjustment for Covered Conductors**

```
```python
```

```
if is_covered:
```

```
    return max(1.0, factor * 0.85)
```

```
```
```

This adjustment reflects that covered conductors experience slightly less acceleration of thermal degradation (only 85% of the calculated factor) compared to bare conductors. This may be because:

1. The insulation provides some thermal protection to the conductor
2. The different activation energy (1.25 eV vs 1.13 eV) already captures some of the difference
3. The insulation itself may degrade at high temperatures, but this affects electrical properties more than mechanical strength

## ## Minimum Factor of 1.0

```
```python  
  
return max(1.0, factor)  
  
```
```

This ensures that the thermal stress factor never reduces below 1.0, meaning that even at temperatures below the design temperature, aging proceeds at least at the normal rate. This is a reasonable assumption since other degradation mechanisms continue to operate even at lower temperatures.

## ## Practical Implications

To illustrate the practical effect of this function, consider:

- At design temperature (75°C): factor = 1.0 (baseline aging)
- At 85°C (10°C above design): factor  $\approx$  2.0 (aging occurs  $\sim 2\times$  faster)
- At 95°C (20°C above design): factor  $\approx$  4.0 (aging occurs  $\sim 4\times$  faster)
- At 105°C (30°C above design): factor  $\approx$  8.0 (aging occurs  $\sim 8\times$  faster)

This exponential acceleration aligns with the "rule of thumb" often cited in reliability engineering that each 10°C increase in temperature approximately doubles the rate of degradation for many materials.

The implementation effectively captures the thermal aging behavior of conductors, creating a scientifically sound model based on well-established physical principles documented in the literature.

## ## Step 5

```
```python
```

```
def vegetation_management_factor(ett_percentage, tree_density, is_covered=False, failure_cause='Unknown'):
```

```
    """
```

Calculate reduction factor from vegetation management with integrated covered conductor effects

Parameters:

- ett_percentage: Percentage of Enhanced Tree Trimming completed (0-100)
- tree_density: Tree density metric (0-10)
- is_covered: Boolean indicating if conductor has insulative covering
- failure_cause: Primary failure cause

Returns:

- Vegetation management reduction factor (lower means better)

```
    """
```

```
# Base factor without ETT
```

```
base_factor = 1.0 + (tree_density / 10)
```

```
# Reduction from ETT (up to 40% reduction for bare conductors)
```

```
ett_reduction = min(0.4, ett_percentage / 100 * 0.4)
```

```
# Covered conductors are less affected by vegetation contact
```

```
if is_covered:
```

```
    # Specific reductions for tree and vegetation issues
```

```
    if failure_cause == 'Tree':
```

```
        # Covered conductors have 75% reduction in tree-related failures
```

```
        vegetation_impact_reduction = 0.25
```

```
    else:
```

```
        # General vegetation protection
```

```
        vegetation_impact_reduction = 0.7
```

```
    # ETT has an additive effect with covered conductors
```

```
    combined_factor = base_factor * vegetation_impact_reduction * (1 - ett_reduction)
```

```
    return combined_factor
```

```
    return base_factor * (1 - ett_reduction)
```

```
...
```

Analysis of the Vegetation Management Factor Function

The `vegetation_management_factor` function models how vegetation management practices and tree density affect conductor failure rates, with additional considerations for covered conductors. This is particularly important as vegetation-related issues are among the leading causes of distribution conductor failures.

Base Vegetation Impact Factor

```
```python  

base_factor = 1.0 + (tree_density / 10)

```
```

This establishes the baseline impact of vegetation on failure rates:

- **tree_density**: A metric from 0-10 representing vegetation density near the line
- At tree_density = 0 (no trees), base_factor = 1.0 (no increased risk)
- At tree_density = 10 (maximum density), base_factor = 2.0 (doubles failure risk)

This linear relationship assumes that failure risk increases proportionally with tree density, which aligns with operational experience that more trees near power lines lead to more outages.

Enhanced Tree Trimming (ETT) Effect

```
```python  

ett_reduction = min(0.4, ett_percentage / 100 * 0.4)

```
```

This models the beneficial effect of Enhanced Tree Trimming:

- ****ett_percentage****: Percentage of ETT completed (0-100%)
- Maximum reduction is capped at 40% (0.4)
- The reduction scales linearly with the percentage of ETT completed

The 40% maximum reduction aligns with findings in the UQ report where ETT treatment reduced outage rates by approximately 35-49% compared to standard maintenance trimming.

Covered Conductor Adjustments

For covered conductors, additional protection factors are applied:

```
```python
if failure_cause == 'Tree':

 # Covered conductors have 75% reduction in tree-related failures

 vegetation_impact_reduction = 0.25

else:

 # General vegetation protection

 vegetation_impact_reduction = 0.7
```
```

These factors reflect that:

- For direct tree-related failures, covered conductors provide significant protection (75% reduction, resulting in only 25% of the impact)

- For other failure causes, there's still a moderate protection benefit (30% reduction)

The combined effect is calculated as:

```
```python  
combined_factor = base_factor * vegetation_impact_reduction * (1 - ett_reduction)
```
```

This formula creates a multiplicative effect where:

1. The base vegetation risk is first established
2. This is reduced by the covering protection factor
3. Then further reduced by ETT practices

Alignment with Research

This approach aligns with findings from the provided documents:

1. The UQ report states that "trees or branches falling, blowing, or growing into lines are the single greatest cause of outages" and that "\$2 billion is spent on vegetation management each year."
2. In the conductor failure case studies (Section 3.4), vegetation management is highlighted as a key maintenance activity.

3. The EPRI document discusses vegetation as a significant environmental factor affecting conductor reliability.

4. From ActewAGL's practices (in Section 3.5.1), we see that LiDAR technology is used to monitor vegetation along overhead lines for "risk mitigation of unassisted conductor failure."

The model assumes an additive benefit between ETT and covered conductors, which is reasonable since they address the vegetation risk through different mechanisms:

- ETT reduces the probability of tree contact
- Covering reduces the probability that a contact leads to failure

This combined approach provides a comprehensive model of how vegetation affects conductor reliability and how both vegetation management and covering technologies can mitigate these risks.

Step 6

```
```python
```

```
def installation_quality_factor(crew_experience, installation_complexity, quality_inspection=False):
```

```
 """
```

```
 Calculate installation quality factor to modify early-life failures
```

```
 Parameters:
```

- crew\_experience: Experience level of the installation crew (0-10)
- installation\_complexity: Complexity of the installation (1-5)
- quality\_inspection: Whether rigorous post-installation quality inspection was performed

Returns:

- Installation quality multiplier for early-life failures

"""

# Base multiplier based on crew experience

experience\_factor = max(0.5, 1.0 - (crew\_experience / 20))

# Adjust for installation complexity

complexity\_multiplier = 1.0 + ((installation\_complexity - 1) / 8)

# Combined factor

combined\_factor = experience\_factor \* complexity\_multiplier

# Reduce if quality inspection was performed

if quality\_inspection:

combined\_factor \*= 0.7

return combined\_factor

...

## # Analyzing the Installation Quality Factor Function

The ``installation_quality_factor`` function calculates a multiplier that can adjust the probability of early-life failures in electric power distribution components based on three key installation variables. Let me break down how this works and the principles behind it:

## ## Function Purpose

This function evaluates how installation quality affects the early-life portion of the "bathtub curve" failure model for distribution system components. Poor installation can significantly increase early failures, while high-quality installation can reduce them.

## ## Parameters Analysis

### 1. **``crew_experience` (0-10 scale)`**:

- Higher values represent more experienced crews
- Experience reduces early-life failures
- The formula ``max(0.5, 1.0 - (crew_experience / 20))`` ensures a range of approximately 0.5-1.0
- A highly experienced crew (10) creates a factor of 0.5, halving early failure rates
- An inexperienced crew (0) creates a factor of 1.0, providing no reduction

### 2. **``installation_complexity` (1-5 scale)`**:

- Higher values indicate more complex installations that are prone to errors
- The formula ``1.0 + ((installation_complexity - 1) / 8)`` creates a multiplier between 1.0-1.5
- Simple installations (1) have no additional complexity penalty
- Highly complex installations (5) increase failure probability by 50%

3. **\*\*`quality\_inspection` (Boolean)\*\*:**

- Post-installation quality inspections can identify and remedy installation issues
- When performed, reduces the combined factor by 30%

## **## Mathematical Integration**

The function combines these factors multiplicatively:

1. First calculates an experience-based factor
2. Multiplies by the complexity adjustment
3. Applies a 30% reduction if quality inspection was performed

## **## Application to Distribution Systems**

This approach aligns with industry findings that installation quality significantly impacts early-life reliability of distribution system components, including:

- Improper crimping of connectors can lead to premature failure due to high-resistance connections and thermal cycling
- Incorrect tensioning of conductors may accelerate mechanical fatigue
- Poor installation of splices can introduce moisture or contamination
- Improper handling during installation may introduce microscopic damage to conductors

## **## Numerical Example**

For a moderately experienced crew (6/10) performing a fairly complex installation (4/5) with quality inspection:

- Experience factor =  $\max(0.5, 1.0 - (6/20)) = 0.7$
- Complexity multiplier =  $1.0 + ((4-1)/8) = 1.375$
- Combined factor =  $0.7 \times 1.375 = 0.9625$
- With quality inspection =  $0.9625 \times 0.7 = 0.674$

This would reduce early-life failures by about 32.6% compared to a baseline installation.

The function provides a practical way to incorporate installation quality into reliability models for power distribution systems without requiring complex calculations, while accounting for the major factors known to affect early-life failure rates.

### **# Installation Quality Factor Function Analysis**

Based on my review of the provided documents, the installation quality factor function aligns with several key concepts in electrical distribution system reliability analysis and conductor failure modeling. Let me reference specific parts of the documents that support this approach:

### **## Installation Quality and Early-Life Failures**

The function addresses what's described in document "A Review of the Reliability of Electric Distribution System Components: EPRI White Paper" (document #5) as the "bathtub curve" of failure rates shown in Figure 3-1 (page 3-1). The early-life portion of this curve is significantly affected by installation quality, with the document noting that "Early in their life, equipment experiences a high rate of failures often due to manufacturing or installation problems."

## **## Crew Experience Impact**

The crew experience parameter relates to what document #6 "Overhead Conductor Condition Monitoring" identifies on page 3 as a critical factor in conductor performance: "The manufacturing process of overhead conductors has a direct relationship with the strength of the final product and some of its degradation mechanisms." By extension, the installation process performed by crews similarly affects initial conductor integrity.

## **## Installation Complexity**

The complexity factor reflects challenges identified in document #4 "Estimating Cable Life Expectancy" which notes that "Cables are generally supplied with greased steel core wires to inhibit corrosion" (page 3). More complex installations involve more components and connection points, increasing probability of early failures as described in the "Overhead Conductor Condition Monitoring" document which states that "due to conductor fatigue, cracks can develop in the conductor strands, decrease the fatigue strength and eventually lead to conductor failures" (page 22).

## **## Quality Inspection**

The quality inspection parameter aligns with maintenance practices described in the "Overhead Conductor Condition Monitoring" document on page 18, where it states that "Australian DNSPs have adopted comprehensive maintenance strategies to reduce the risk of unexpected overhead conductor failures." Post-installation inspection is highlighted as a critical practice, with the document noting that "Standard Aerial or Ground Line Inspection" is performed regularly (page 19).

## **## Mathematical Approach**

The mathematical formulation of the function follows similar approaches to those referenced in document #2 "Advanced aging failure model for overhead conductors," which applies mathematical models to predict failure rates based on multiple variables. This paper specifically presents "a method used to calculate reliability of subtransmission networks" (page 3).

This function provides a practical implementation of the reliability concepts outlined throughout the documentation, particularly addressing the early-life portion of the failure curve where installation quality is most influential.

## ## Step 7

```
```python
```

```
def calculate_repair_effectiveness(num_prior_repairs, initial_age_reduction=3.0, diminishing_factor=0.7):
```

```
    """
```

```
    Calculate how effective a repair is at reducing apparent age based on repair history
```

```
    Parameters:
```

- num_prior_repairs: Number of previous repairs on the conductor
- initial_age_reduction: Years of age reduction for the first repair
- diminishing_factor: How quickly repair effectiveness diminishes (0-1)

```
    Returns:
```

- Age reduction in years

```
    """
```

```
    # Each successive repair is less effective at reducing apparent age
```

```
age_reduction = initial_age_reduction * (diminishing_factor ** num_prior_repairs)

return age_reduction
```

```
def calculate_failure_acceleration(num_prior_failures, base_acceleration=1.2):
```

```
    """
```

Calculate how much past failures accelerate future failures

Parameters:

- num_prior_failures: Number of previous failures on the conductor
- base_acceleration: Base multiplier for each failure

Returns:

- Failure acceleration factor

```
    """
```

```
    # Exponential relationship between past failures and future failure probability
```

```
    return base_acceleration ** num_prior_failures
```

```
    """
```

Analysis of Conductor Failure Model

Based on the documentation provided, this model uses a Weibull distribution to determine the probability of conductor failure based on apparent age. The code contains two key functions:


```
```python
```

```
def calculate_repair_effectiveness(num_prior_repairs, initial_age_reduction=3.0, diminishing_factor=0.7):
```

```
 """
```

Calculate how effective a repair is at reducing apparent age based on repair history

Parameters:

- num\_prior\_repairs: Number of previous repairs on the conductor
- initial\_age\_reduction: Years of age reduction for the first repair
- diminishing\_factor: How quickly repair effectiveness diminishes (0-1)

Returns:

- Age reduction in years

```
 """
```

```
Each successive repair is less effective at reducing apparent age
```

```
age_reduction = initial_age_reduction * (diminishing_factor ** num_prior_repairs)
```

```
return age_reduction
```

```
def calculate_failure_acceleration(num_prior_failures, base_acceleration=1.2):
```

```
 """
```

Calculate how much past failures accelerate future failures

Parameters:

- num\_prior\_failures: Number of previous failures on the conductor

- base\_acceleration: Base multiplier for each failure

Returns:

- Failure acceleration factor

```
"""
```

```
Exponential relationship between past failures and future failure probability
```

```
return base_acceleration ** num_prior_failures
```

```
'''
```

## ## Function Analysis

1. `calculate\_repair\_effectiveness()` models how repairs affect the conductor's apparent age:

- First repair reduces apparent age by 3 years
- Each subsequent repair is 30% less effective than the previous one
- This aligns with findings that repairs and splices can become points of failure

2. `calculate\_failure\_acceleration()` models how previous failures increase future failure probability:

- Each failure increases probability of future failures by a factor of 1.2
- Creates an exponential relationship between failure history and future risk
- Consistent with cascading effects observed in conductor degradation

## ## Supporting Evidence from Documentation

- The UQ report indicates that service age is a major cause of failures in aluminum, copper, and ACSR cables
- TasNetworks data shows failure rates increasing with conductor age
- Western Power data states that 0.3% of distribution overhead conductors are beyond the 50-year design life
- EPRI white paper demonstrates the "bathtub curve" of failures, with increasing rates during wear-out phase
- The "Estimating Cable Life Expectancy" article mentions the Arrhenius equation for modeling thermal stress impacts

## ## Step 8

```
```python
```

```
def predict_failure_rate(conductor_data):
```

```
    """
```

```
    Predict annual failure rate per km for an overhead conductor
```

```
    Parameters:
```

```
    - conductor_data: Dictionary with conductor attributes
```

```
    Returns:
```

```
    - Annual failure rate per km
```

```
    """
```

```
    # Extract key parameters
```

```
    is_covered = conductor_data.get('covered_conductor', False)
```

```
age = conductor_data['age']

failure_cause = conductor_data.get('primary_failure_cause', 'Unknown')


# Extract failure history

num_prior_failures = conductor_data.get('num_prior_failures', 0)

num_prior_repairs = conductor_data.get('num_prior_repairs', 0)


# Get base parameters based on material and covered status

material_params = get_material_parameters(

    conductor_data['material'],

    is_covered

)


# Modify installation defect rate based on installation quality

installation_defect_rate = material_params['installation_defect_rate']

if 'crew_experience' in conductor_data:

    quality_factor = installation_quality_factor(

        conductor_data.get('crew_experience', 5),

        conductor_data.get('installation_complexity', 3),

        conductor_data.get('quality_inspection', False)

    )

    installation_defect_rate *= quality_factor
```

```
# Calculate apparent age based on chronological age and operating conditions
```

```
apparent_age = age * calculate_thermal_stress_factor(
```

```
    conductor_data['avg_temperature'],
```

```
    design_temperature=75,
```

```
    is_covered=is_covered
```

```
)
```

```
# Reduce apparent age based on repair history (repairs rejuvenate the conductor)
```

```
if num_prior_repairs > 0:
```

```
    total_age_reduction = 0
```

```
    for i in range(num_prior_repairs):
```

```
        total_age_reduction += calculate_repair_effectiveness(i)
```

```
# Apparent age cannot be reduced below 20% of original age
```

```
apparent_age = max(apparent_age * 0.2, apparent_age - total_age_reduction)
```

```
# Calculate base failure probability including early-life component
```

```
base_prob = base_failure_probability(
```

```
    apparent_age,
```

```
    material_params['shape'],
```

```
    material_params['scale'],
```

```
    material_params['location'],
```

```
    installation_defect_rate
```

)

Apply environmental factor with integrated covered conductor effects

env_multiplier = get_environment_multiplier(

conductor_data['environment'],

material_params,

is_covered,

failure_cause

)

Apply vegetation management factor with integrated covered conductor effects

veg_factor = vegetation_management_factor(

conductor_data['ett_percentage'],

conductor_data['tree_density'],

is_covered,

failure_cause

)

Calculate phase factor (if applicable)

phase_factor = 0.8 if conductor_data.get('multiphase', False) else 1.0

Calculate failure acceleration factor based on prior failures

failure_acceleration = calculate_failure_acceleration(num_prior_failures)

```
# Final failure rate calculation (failures per km per year)

failure_rate = base_prob * env_multiplier * veg_factor * phase_factor * failure_acceleration

return failure_rate

...
```

Relationship to Documentation

This model integrates multiple findings from the provided documents:

The use of Weibull distributions aligns with the "bathtub curve" approach in the EPRI white paper

The environmental factors match the findings about coastal environments accelerating corrosion

The vegetation management factor corresponds to the ETT studies showing reduced failure rates

The thermal stress calculation implements the theories about annealing presented in the UQ report

Overall, this function delivers a sophisticated prediction of conductor failure rates by combining statistical models with physical degradation mechanisms, consistent with the methodologies discussed in the documentation.

Visualisation

Code

generate_age_profile

```
```python

def generate_age_profile(conductor_data, max_age=70):
 """
 Generate failure rate profile across different ages

 Parameters:
 - conductor_data: Dictionary with conductor attributes
 - max_age: Maximum age to consider

 Returns:
 - Dictionary with ages and corresponding failure rates
 """
 ages = range(1, max_age + 1)
 failure_rates = []

 for age in ages:
 conductor = conductor_data.copy()
 conductor['age'] = age
 failure_rates.append(predict_failure_rate(conductor))

 return {'ages': list(ages), 'failure_rates': failure_rates}
```
```


generate_repair_history_profile

```
```python
```

```
def generate_repair_history_profile(base_conductor, max_repairs=3, age=30):
```

```
 """
```

Generate failure rate profile with different repair histories

Parameters:

- base\_conductor: Base conductor data
- max\_repairs: Maximum number of repairs to simulate
- age: Age of conductor in years

Returns:

- Dictionary with repair counts and corresponding failure rates

```
 """
```

```
 repair_counts = range(max_repairs + 1)
```

```
 failure_rates = []
```

```
 for num_repairs in repair_counts:
```

```
 conductor = base_conductor.copy()
```

```
 conductor['age'] = age
```

```
 conductor['num_prior_failures'] = num_repairs
```

```
conductor['num_prior_repairs'] = num_repairs

failure_rates.append(predict_failure_rate(conductor))

return {'repair_counts': list(repair_counts), 'failure_rates': failure_rates}
...

```

## ## Plot

```
```python

import numpy as np

import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

# [Insert all previous functions here]

# Example usage

if __name__ == "__main__":

    # Base conductor data

    base_conductor = {

        'material': 'ACSR',

        'age': 30,

        'avg_temperature': 65,

        'environment': 'Coastal',

        'ett_percentage': 25,
    }

```

```
'tree_density': 6,  
'multiphase': True,  
'primary_failure_cause': 'Tree',  
'crew_experience': 7,  
'installation_complexity': 2,  
'quality_inspection': True,  
'num_prior_failures': 0,  
'num_prior_repairs': 0  
}
```

```
# 1. Compare materials (bare conductors)
```

```
materials = ['ACSR', 'Copper', 'Aluminum', 'Steel']
```

```
material_profiles = {}
```

```
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 8))
```

```
colors = {'ACSR': 'blue', 'Copper': 'green', 'Aluminum': 'red', 'Steel': 'purple'}
```

```
for material in materials:
```

```
    conductor = base_conductor.copy()
```

```
    conductor['material'] = material
```

```
    profile = generate_age_profile(conductor)
```

```
    material_profiles[material] = profile
```

```
plt.plot(profile['ages'], profile['failure_rates'], color=colors[material], linewidth=2.5, label=f"{material}
Conductor")
```

```
plt.title('Failure Rate Comparison by Conductor Material Type', fontsize=16)
```

```
plt.xlabel('Age (years)', fontsize=14)
```

```
plt.ylabel('Failure Rate (failures/km/year)', fontsize=14)
```

```
plt.grid(True, alpha=0.3)
```

```
plt.legend(fontsize=12)
```

```
plt.show()
```

```
# 2. Compare bare vs. covered for each material
```

```
plt.figure(figsize=(12, 8))
```

```
line_styles = ['- ', '--']
```

```
for material in materials:
```

```
    # Bare conductor
```

```
    bare_conductor = base_conductor.copy()
```

```
    bare_conductor['material'] = material
```

```
    bare_conductor['covered_conductor'] = False
```

```
    bare_profile = generate_age_profile(bare_conductor)
```

```
    # Covered conductor
```

```
    covered_conductor = base_conductor.copy()
```

```
covered_conductor['material'] = material
```

```
covered_conductor['covered_conductor'] = True
```

```
covered_profile = generate_age_profile(covered_conductor)
```

```
plt.plot(bare_profile['ages'], bare_profile['failure_rates'], color=colors[material], linewidth=2.5, linestyle='-', label=f"Bare {material}")
```

```
plt.plot(covered_profile['ages'], covered_profile['failure_rates'], color=colors[material], linewidth=2.5, linestyle='--', label=f"Covered {material}")
```

```
plt.title('Bare vs. Covered Conductor Comparison', fontsize=16)
```

```
plt.xlabel('Age (years)', fontsize=14)
```

```
plt.ylabel('Failure Rate (failures/km/year)', fontsize=14)
```

```
plt.grid(True, alpha=0.3)
```

```
plt.legend(fontsize=10, loc='upper left')
```

```
plt.show()
```

```
# 3. Compare failure/repair histories
```

```
scenarios = [
```

```
    {'name': 'No failures/repairs', 'failures': 0, 'repairs': 0},
```

```
    {'name': '1 failure/repair', 'failures': 1, 'repairs': 1},
```

```
    {'name': '2 failures/repairs', 'failures': 2, 'repairs': 2},
```

```
    {'name': '3 failures/repairs', 'failures': 3, 'repairs': 3}
```

```
]
```

```

plt.figure(figsize=(12, 8))

scenario_colors = ['blue', 'green', 'orange', 'red']

for i, scenario in enumerate(scenarios):

    conductor = base_conductor.copy()

    conductor['num_prior_failures'] = scenario['failures']

    conductor['num_prior_repairs'] = scenario['repairs']

    profile = generate_age_profile(conductor)

    plt.plot(profile['ages'], profile['failure_rates'], color=scenario_colors[i], linewidth=2.5, label=sce-
nario['name'])

plt.title('Impact of Failures and Repairs on Conductor Failure Rates', fontsize=16)

plt.xlabel('Age (years)', fontsize=14)

plt.ylabel('Failure Rate (failures/km/year)', fontsize=14)

plt.grid(True, alpha=0.3)

plt.legend(fontsize=12)

plt.show()

# 4. Show diminishing returns of repairs

repair_numbers = range(10)

age_reductions = [calculate_repair_effectiveness(n) for n in repair_numbers]

```

```
plt.figure(figsize=(10, 6))

plt.bar(repair_numbers, age_reductions, color='teal')

plt.title('Diminishing Effectiveness of Successive Repairs', fontsize=16)

plt.xlabel('Previous Repair Number', fontsize=14)



plt.ylabel('Age improvement (years)', fontsize=14)



plt.grid(True, alpha=0.3, axis='y')

plt.xticks(repair_numbers)

plt.show()

...
```





8.2 Annex 2 : Conductor Age estimation

```
# import numpy as np
```

```
import pandas as pd
```

```
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
```

```
from scipy.stats import norm
```

```
import seaborn as sns
```

```
import numpy as np
```

```
class ConductorAgeAnalysis:
```

```
    def __init__(self):
```

```
        # Initialize Weibull reliability parameters
```

```
        self.weibull_parameters = {
```

```
            'ACSR': {
```

```
                'shape': 15.0,
```

```
                'scale': 46.9,
```

```
                'location': 0,
```

```
                'corrosion_factor': 1.3,
```

```
'installation_defect_rate': 0.005

},

'Copper': {

    'shape': 12.0,

    'scale': 54.0,

    'location': 0,

    'corrosion_factor': 1.1,

    'installation_defect_rate': 0.004

},

'Aluminum': {

    'shape': 14.0,

    'scale': 42.0,

    'location': 0,

    'corrosion_factor': 1.4,

    'installation_defect_rate': 0.006

},

'Steel': {

    'shape': 13.0,

    'scale': 49.0,
```

```
        'location': 0,  
  
        'corrosion_factor': 1.5,  
  
        'installation_defect_rate': 0.004  
    }  
}
```

Conductor miles by material type

```
self.conductor_counts = {  
  
    'Aluminum': 183, # miles  
  
    'ACSR': 393,    # miles  
  
    'Copper': 44,   # miles  
  
    'Steel': 1      # miles  
}
```

Observed failures

```
self.observed_failures = {  
  
    'ACSR': 136,  
  
    'Aluminum': 56,  
  
    'Copper': 17,
```

```
'Steel': 0

}

# Cohort models for each material type

self.cohort_models = {

    'ACSR': [

        {'mean': 10, 'stdDev': 5, 'percentage': 10},

        {'mean': 32, 'stdDev': 7, 'percentage': 30},

        {'mean': 48, 'stdDev': 6, 'percentage': 60}

    ],

    'Aluminum': [

        {'mean': 5, 'stdDev': 3, 'percentage': 20},

        {'mean': 18, 'stdDev': 4, 'percentage': 60},

        {'mean': 35, 'stdDev': 5, 'percentage': 20}

    ],

    'Copper': [

        {'mean': 15, 'stdDev': 5, 'percentage': 10},

        {'mean': 35, 'stdDev': 7, 'percentage': 30},

        {'mean': 55, 'stdDev': 6, 'percentage': 60}
```

```

],

'Steel': [

    {'mean': 5, 'stdDev': 2, 'percentage': 30},

    {'mean': 18, 'stdDev': 5, 'percentage': 70}

]

}

```

```

# Initialize results storage

```

```

self.age_profiles = {}

```

```

self.age_distributions = {}

```

```

self.statistics = {}

```

```

self.expected_failures = {}

```

```

self.failure_rates = {}

```

```

def weibull_hazard(self, t, shape, scale):

```

```

    """Calculate Weibull hazard rate (instantaneous failure rate)"""

```

```

    return (shape / scale) * (t / scale) ** (shape - 1)

```

```

def annual_failure_probability(self, t, params):

```

```
"""Calculate annual failure probability for a component of age t"""
```

```
# Extract parameters
```

```
shape = params['shape']
```

```
scale = params['scale']
```

```
corrosion_factor = params['corrosion_factor']
```

```
installation_defect_rate = params['installation_defect_rate']
```

```
# For very young assets, installation defects dominate
```

```
if t < 1:
```

```
    return installation_defect_rate * 2
```

```
# Base hazard rate from Weibull distribution
```

```
base_hazard = self.weibull_hazard(t, shape, scale)
```

```
# Adjust for corrosion (increases with age)
```

```
corrosion_effect = corrosion_factor ** min(t / scale, 1.0)
```

```
modified_hazard = base_hazard * corrosion_effect
```

```
# Add installation defect contribution (higher early in life)
```

```
installation_effect = installation_defect_rate * np.exp(-t/5)

total_hazard = modified_hazard + installation_effect


# Cap at reasonable value

return min(total_hazard, 0.1) # 10% max annual failure rate


def generate_age_profiles(self, segments_per_mile=10):

    """Generate age profiles for each material based on cohort models"""

    for material, cohorts in self.cohort_models.items():

        miles = self.conductor_counts[material]

        total_segments = int(miles * segments_per_mile)

        ages = []


        # For each cohort, generate ages according to a normal distribution

        for cohort in cohorts:

            mean = cohort['mean']

            std_dev = cohort['stdDev']

            percentage = cohort['percentage']
```



```

# Calculate number of segments for this cohort

num_segments = int(total_segments * percentage / 100)


# Generate ages using normal distribution

cohort_ages = np.random.normal(mean, std_dev, num_segments)


# Ensure ages are non-negative

cohort_ages = np.maximum(cohort_ages, 0)


ages.extend(cohort_ages)


# Store the generated ages

self.age_profiles[material] = np.array(ages)


def calculate_age_distributions(self, bin_width=5):

    """Calculate age distribution histograms"""

    for material, ages in self.age_profiles.items():

        bins = np.arange(0, 100 + bin_width, bin_width)

        hist, bin_edges = np.histogram(ages, bins=bins)

```

```

# Convert to percentages

hist_pct = hist / len(ages) * 100


# Create a dictionary of bin ranges to percentages

distribution = {}

for i in range(len(hist)):

    bin_start = int(bin_edges[i])

    bin_end = int(bin_edges[i+1])

    bin_key = f"{bin_start}-{bin_end}"

    distribution[bin_key] = hist_pct[i]


self.age_distributions[material] = distribution


def calculate_statistics(self):

    """Calculate statistical summaries for each material"""

    for material, ages in self.age_profiles.items():

        stats = {

            'mean': np.mean(ages),

```

```

        'stdDev': np.std(ages),

        'median': np.median(ages),

        'p10': np.percentile(ages, 10),

        'p90': np.percentile(ages, 90)

    }

    self.statistics[material] = stats

def calculate_expected_failures(self):

    """Calculate expected failures based on age profiles and Weibull parameters"""

    for material, ages in self.age_profiles.items():

        params = self.weibull_parameters[material]

        miles = self.conductor_counts[material]

        segments_per_mile = len(ages) / miles

        # Calculate failure probability for each segment

        failure_probs = np.array([self.annual_failure_probability(age, params) for age in ages])

        # Sum up and scale to get expected failures

        total_failure_prob = np.sum(failure_probs)

```

```
expected_failures = total_failure_prob * (miles / (len(ages) / segments_per_mile))
```

```
self.expected_failures[material] = expected_failures
```

```
def calculate_failure_rates_by_age(self, bin_width=5):
```

```
    """Calculate failure rates for each age bin"""
```

```
    for material, params in self.weibull_parameters.items():
```

```
        rates = {}
```

```
        # Calculate failure rate for the midpoint of each bin
```

```
        for i in range(0, 100, bin_width):
```

```
            bin_start = i
```

```
            bin_end = i + bin_width
```

```
            midpoint = (bin_start + bin_end) / 2
```

```
            failure_rate = self.annual_failure_probability(midpoint, params) * 100 # as percentage
```

```
            bin_key = f"{bin_start}-{bin_end}"
```

```
            rates[bin_key] = failure_rate
```

```
self.failure_rates[material] = rates
```

```
def calibrate_model(self):
```

```
    """Calibrate the model to match observed failures"""
```

```
    # Generate initial profiles and calculate initial expected failures
```

```
    self.generate_age_profiles()
```

```
    self.calculate_expected_failures()
```

```
    print("Initial expected failures:")
```

```
    for material, expected in self.expected_failures.items():
```

```
        observed = self.observed_failures.get(material, 0)
```

```
        print(f"{material}: Expected {expected:.1f}, Observed {observed}")
```

```
    # Calculate scaling factors
```

```
    scaling_factors = {}
```

```
    for material, expected in self.expected_failures.items():
```

```
        observed = self.observed_failures.get(material, 0)
```

```
        # Avoid division by zero
```

```
if expected > 0 and observed > 0:

    scaling_factors[material] = observed / expected

else:

    scaling_factors[material] = 1.0

print("\nCalibration scaling factors:")

for material, factor in scaling_factors.items():

    print(f"{material}: {factor:.2f}")

# Apply scaling factors to Weibull parameters

for material, factor in scaling_factors.items():

    # Adjust scale parameter to calibrate failure rate

    if factor != 1.0:

        # If factor > 1, decrease scale (increases failure rate)

        # If factor < 1, increase scale (decreases failure rate)

        self.weibull_parameters[material]['scale'] /= factor**(1/self.weibull_parameters[material]['shape'])

# Recalculate with adjusted parameters

self.calculate_expected_failures()
```

```
print("\nCalibrated expected failures:")

for material, expected in self.expected_failures.items():

    observed = self.observed_failures.get(material, 0)

    error = abs(expected - observed)

    error_pct = error / observed * 100 if observed > 0 else float('inf')

    print(f"{material}: Expected {expected:.1f}, Observed {observed}, Error {error:.1f} ({error_pct:.1f}%)")


def run_analysis(self):

    """Run the full analysis pipeline"""

    # Generate age profiles

    self.generate_age_profiles()


    # Calculate age distributions

    self.calculate_age_distributions()


    # Calculate statistics

    self.calculate_statistics()
```

```
# Calculate expected failures
```

```
self.calculate_expected_failures()
```

```
# Calculate failure rates by age
```

```
self.calculate_failure_rates_by_age()
```

```
# Calibrate the model
```

```
self.calibrate_model()
```

```
# Recalculate distributions and statistics after calibration
```

```
self.calculate_age_distributions()
```

```
self.calculate_statistics()
```

```
self.calculate_failure_rates_by_age()
```

```
return {
```

```
    'age_distributions': self.age_distributions,
```

```
    'statistics': self.statistics,
```

```
    'expected_failures': self.expected_failures,
```

```
    'observed_failures': self.observed_failures,
```



```
        'failure_rates': self.failure_rates

    }

def plot_age_distributions(self):

    """Plot age distributions for all materials"""

    plt.figure(figsize=(12, 8))

    # Set up colors

    colors = {

        'ACSR': '#8884d8',

        'Aluminum': '#82ca9d',

        'Copper': '#ffc658',

        'Steel': '#ff8042'

    }

    # For each material

    for i, (material, distribution) in enumerate(self.age_distributions.items()):

        # Extract bin ranges and percentages

        bins = list(distribution.keys())
```

```
percentages = list(distribution.values())

# Get midpoints of bins for plotting

bin_midpoints = [np.mean([int(b.split('-')[0]), int(b.split('-')[1])]) for b in bins]

# Plot

plt.subplot(2, 2, i+1)

plt.bar(bin_midpoints, percentages, width=4, color=colors.get(material, 'blue'), alpha=0.7)

plt.title(f'{material} Conductor Age Distribution')

plt.xlabel('Age (years)')

plt.ylabel('Percentage (%)')

plt.xlim(0, 75)

plt.grid(True, linestyle='--', alpha=0.7)

# Add statistics as text

stats = self.statistics[material]

stats_text = f"Mean: {stats['mean']:.1f} yrs\nMedian: {stats['median']:.1f} yrs\nStd Dev: {stats['stdDev']:.1f} yrs"

plt.annotate(stats_text, xy=(0.7, 0.85), xycoords='axes fraction',
```

```
bbox=dict(boxstyle="round,pad=0.3", fc="white", ec="gray", alpha=0.8))
```

```
plt.tight_layout()
```

```
plt.savefig('conductor_age_distributions.png', dpi=300)
```

```
plt.show()
```

```
def plot_failure_rates(self):
```

```
    """Plot failure rates by age for all materials"""
```

```
    plt.figure(figsize=(10, 6))
```

```
    # Set up colors
```

```
    colors = {
```

```
        'ACSR': '#8884d8',
```

```
        'Aluminum': '#82ca9d',
```

```
        'Copper': '#ffc658',
```

```
        'Steel': '#ff8042'
```

```
    }
```

```
    # For each material
```

```
for material, rates in self.failure_rates.items():

    # Extract bin ranges and rates

    bins = list(rates.keys())

    failure_rates = list(rates.values())


    # Get midpoints of bins for plotting

    bin_midpoints = [np.mean([int(b.split('-')[0]), int(b.split('-')[1])]) for b in bins]


    # Plot

    plt.plot(bin_midpoints, failure_rates, marker='o', linestyle='-', label=material, color=colors.get(material, 'blue'))


plt.title('Annual Failure Rates by Age and Material')

plt.xlabel('Age (years)')

plt.ylabel('Annual Failure Rate (%)')

plt.xlim(0, 75)

plt.grid(True, linestyle='--', alpha=0.7)

plt.legend()

plt.tight_layout()
```

```
plt.savefig('failure_rates_by_age.png', dpi=300)
```

```
plt.show()
```

```
def export_to_csv(self):
```

```
    """Export results to CSV files"""
```

```
    # Export age distributions
```

```
    age_dist_data = []
```

```
    for bin_range in sorted(self.age_distributions['ACSR'].keys(), key=lambda x: int(x.split('-')[0])):
```

```
        row = {'AgeRange': bin_range}
```

```
        for material in self.age_distributions:
```

```
            row[material] = self.age_distributions[material].get(bin_range, 0)
```

```
        age_dist_data.append(row)
```

```
    pd.DataFrame(age_dist_data).to_csv('age_distributions.csv', index=False)
```

```
    # Export statistics
```

```
    stats_data = []
```

```
    for material, stats in self.statistics.items():
```

```
        row = {'Material': material}
```

```
row.update(stats)

stats_data.append(row)


pd.DataFrame(stats_data).to_csv('age_statistics.csv', index=False)


# Export failure data

failure_data = []

for material in self.observed_failures:

    row = {

        'Material': material,

        'Miles': self.conductor_counts.get(material, 0),

        'ObservedFailures': self.observed_failures.get(material, 0),

        'ExpectedFailures': self.expected_failures.get(material, 0)

    }

    failure_data.append(row)


pd.DataFrame(failure_data).to_csv('failure_data.csv', index=False)


print("Data exported to CSV files.")
```

```
def get_age_bin_probability(self, material, age_min, age_max=None):
```

```
    """
```

Calculate the probability of selecting a conductor within a specific age range.

Parameters:

material (str): The conductor material ('ACSR', 'Aluminum', 'Copper', or 'Steel')

age_min (int): The minimum age (or exact age if age_max is None)

age_max (int, optional): The maximum age for a range. If None, calculates for exact age.

Returns:

float: The probability (as a percentage) of selecting a conductor in the given age range

```
    """
```

```
    if material not in self.age_distributions:
```

```
        raise ValueError(f"Unknown material: {material}. Available materials: {list(self.age_distributions.keys())}")
```

```
    # If calculating for exact age
```

```
    if age_max is None:
```

```
age_max = age_min

# Find all bins that overlap with the specified range

probability = 0.0

for bin_range, bin_prob in self.age_distributions[material].items():

    bin_min, bin_max = map(int, bin_range.split('-'))

    # Check if this bin overlaps with the specified range

    if (bin_min <= age_max and bin_max >= age_min):

        # If partial overlap, pro-rate the probability

        overlap_min = max(bin_min, age_min)

        overlap_max = min(bin_max, age_max)

        overlap_ratio = (overlap_max - overlap_min) / (bin_max - bin_min)

        probability += bin_prob * overlap_ratio

return probability
```



```
# Run the analysis
```

```
if __name__ == "__main__":
```

```
    analyzer = ConductorAgeAnalysis()
```

```
    results = analyzer.run_analysis()
```

```
# Plot results
```

```
    analyzer.plot_age_distributions()
```

```
    analyzer.plot_failure_rates()
```

```
# Export to CSV
```

```
    analyzer.export_to_csv()
```

```
# Print summary
```

```
print("\nSummary of Age Distribution Analysis:")
```

```
for material, stats in results['statistics'].items():
```

```
    print(f"\n{material}:")
```

```
    print(f"  Mean Age: {stats['mean']:.1f} years")
```

```
    print(f"  Median Age: {stats['median']:.1f} years")
```

```
    print(f"  Miles: {analyzer.conductor_counts.get(material, 0)}")
```

```

print(f" Observed Failures: {analyzer.observed_failures.get(material, 0)}")

print(f" Expected Failures: {results['expected_failures'].get(material, 0):.1f}")


# Print age bin probabilities

print("\nProbability of selecting a conductor from each age bin by material:")

age_bins = sorted(analyzer.age_distributions['ACSR'].keys(), key=lambda x: int(x.split('-')[0]))


# Create a DataFrame for better formatting

prob_data = []

for bin_range in age_bins:

    row = {'Age Range (years)': bin_range}

    for material in analyzer.age_distributions:

        row[material] = f"{analyzer.age_distributions[material].get(bin_range, 0):.1f}%"

    prob_data.append(row)


prob_df = pd.DataFrame(prob_data)

print(prob_df.to_string(index=False))


# Export probability table to CSV

```

```
prob_df.to_csv('age_bin_probabilities.csv', index=False)

print("\nAge bin probabilities exported to 'age_bin_probabilities.csv'")


# Example usage of get_age_bin_probability function

print("\nExample age bin probability calculations:")


# Probability of finding a 40-50 year old ACSR conductor

acsr_prob = analyzer.get_age_bin_probability('ACSR', 40, 50)

print(f"Probability of finding ACSR conductor aged 40-50 years: {acsr_prob:.1f}%")


# Probability of finding an Aluminum conductor less than 20 years old

alum_prob = analyzer.get_age_bin_probability('Aluminum', 0, 20)

print(f"Probability of finding Aluminum conductor less than 20 years old: {alum_prob:.1f}%")


# Probability of finding a Copper conductor over 50 years old

copper_prob = analyzer.get_age_bin_probability('Copper', 50, 100)

print(f"Probability of finding Copper conductor over 50 years old: {copper_prob:.1f}%")


# Probability of finding a Steel conductor around 15-25 years old
```

```
steel_prob = analyzer.get_age_bin_probability('Steel', 15, 25)
```

```
print(f"Probability of finding Steel conductor aged 15-25 years old: {steel_prob:.1f}%")
```

Initial expected failures:

ACSR: Expected 230.9, Observed 136

Aluminum: Expected 19.0, Observed 56

Copper: Expected 24.9, Observed 17

Steel: Expected 0.0, Observed 0

Calibration scaling factors:

ACSR: 0.59

Aluminum: 2.95

Copper: 0.68

Steel: 1.00


Calibrated expected failures:


ACSR: Expected 214.2, Observed 136, Error 78.2 (57.5%)

Aluminum: Expected 26.6, Observed 56, Error 29.4 (52.5%)

Copper: Expected 23.3, Observed 17, Error 6.3 (37.1%)

Steel: Expected 0.0, Observed 0, Error 0.0 (inf%)





Data exported to CSV files.

Summary of Age Distribution Analysis:

ACSR:

Mean Age: 39.3 years

Median Age: 42.9 years

Miles: 393

Observed Failures: 136

Expected Failures: 214.2

Aluminum:

Mean Age: 18.7 years

Median Age: 18.0 years

Miles: 183

Observed Failures: 56

Expected Failures: 26.6

Copper:

Mean Age: 44.8 years

Median Age: 49.0 years

Miles: 44

Observed Failures: 17

Expected Failures: 23.3

Steel:

Mean Age: 16.0 years

Median Age: 15.9 years

Miles: 1

Observed Failures: 0

Expected Failures: 0.0

Probability of selecting a conductor from each age bin by material:

Age Range (years) ACSR Aluminum Copper Steel

0-5	1.7%	10.2%	0.2%	10.0%
5-10	3.6%	9.8%	2.3%	30.0%
10-15	3.5%	14.3%	2.3%	10.0%
15-20	2.5%	27.2%	4.1%	0.0%
20-25	3.7%	17.2%	3.0%	30.0%
25-30	6.9%	4.3%	5.0%	10.0%
30-35	8.5%	7.9%	8.2%	10.0%
35-40	11.6%	6.1%	8.2%	0.0%
40-45	15.7%	2.6%	7.7%	0.0%
45-50	20.3%	0.4%	12.0%	0.0%
50-55	14.5%	0.0%	18.2%	0.0%
55-60	5.9%	0.0%	15.7%	0.0%
60-65	1.5%	0.0%	10.9%	0.0%
65-70	0.1%	0.0%	2.0%	0.0%
70-75	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

75-80	0.0%	0.0%	0.2%	0.0%
80-85	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
85-90	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
90-95	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
95-100	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Age bin probabilities exported to 'age_bin_probabilities.csv'

Example age bin probability calculations:

Probability of finding ACSR conductor aged 40-50 years: 35.9%

Probability of finding Aluminum conductor less than 20 years old: 61.5%

Probability of finding Copper conductor over 50 years old: 47.0%

Probability of finding Steel conductor aged 15-25 years old: 30.0%

Attachment B2
Updated Direxyon Documentation for Revision Notice

Utility Risk Model

The utility risk model combines **Wildfire** and **Outage program** risk, with calculations performed at the circuit level. To make the results comparable and easy to interpret, both fire risk and outage program risk are multiplied by 100. This scaling is done purely for better visualization, ensuring that both components appear clearly and consistently in charts and dashboards.

With these weightings applied, the utility risk at the circuit level is calculated as the sum of the weighted wildfire risk and the weighted outage-program risk (which includes both PSPS and EPSS).

The current weighting structure is preliminary and should be confirmed and validated by Liberty to ensure it reflects their priority and risk-tolerance framework.

The formula below illustrates the utility risk calculation at the circuit level:

Asset Value Information for Period 2025

Characteristic [Utility Risk] calculation
End of Step

$$(0.01775 + 7.781) = 7.799$$
$$\left(\int_{\text{X}} \text{Outage Program Risk} + \int_{\text{X}} \text{Fire Risk (PG\&E)} \right) = \int_{\text{X}} \text{Utility Risk}$$

Wildfire Risk

The DIREXYON solution calculates fire risk by multiplying the **number of fire events** produced in the Monte Carlo simulation by the **corresponding consequence** value in segment level. Once the segment-level fire risk is calculated, the results are aggregated upward: segment risks are summed to produce circuit – level fire risk, and circuit level risk are further combined to generate the overall utility-level fire risk.

The fire risk calculation at segment level is shown below:

✕

Asset Value Information for Period 2026

Characteristic [Segment Fire Risk (PG&E)] calculation
 End of Step

$$1 \times 0.01541 = 0.01541$$

\sum Sum Fire Events

 \times

\int Consequence of Fire

 $=$

\int Segment Fire Risk (PG&E)

Number of fire events:

The DIREXYON Solution estimates the number of fire events through Monte Carlo simulation that evaluates, for each asset and each year, whether a sequence of conditions is met that would result in a fire. Since wildfires initiated by utility equipment requires several independent conditions to align, the model reproduces this dependency by explicitly simulating failure, outage, and ignition. A fire event is counted only all stages of the chain occur. For every asset, the simulation first determines whether the asset experiences a failure during the year. The yearly probability of failure is age-dependent and is derived from Weibull incremental failure probability. The probability of failure for each asset class is described in section 2.2.1.1.1 DIREXYON report.

A random value is drawn from a uniform distribution and compared to this yearly failure probability; If the value is less than the probability, the model records a failure for that asset in that year.

If a failure occurs, the model then tests whether the failure results in an electrical outage. This is done by drawing a second random number and comparing it to the probability of outage given failure. Probability of outage is explained in 2.2.1.1.2 DIREXYON report.

Only if the outage occurs, the model proceeds to ignition step.

The ignition step determines whether the outage generates a fire causing spark or thermal event. This is the final step in the fire-generation chain. A third random value is drawn and compared against the ignition probability. If the value is below the ignition probability, the asset generates a fire event for that iteration and that year. Each ignition event is counted as one fire event.

At the segment level, the total number of fire events for a given simulation year is obtained by summing the fire events generated by all child assets in that segment. This process is repeated across many Monte Carlo iterations, where each iteration represents a different possible future year with different combinations of failure, outages, and ignitions. After completing all iterations, the model calculates the expected annual number of fire events for each segment by averaging the total fire event counts across all iterations. Segment level fire event counts are then summed to determine the total number of fire events at circuit level, and circuit-level counts are further aggregated to obtain the total number of fire events for the entire utility.

Attachment B3
WMP Model Documentation_TSYL_2024_Appendix



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Technosylva Statement of Confidentiality

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1 Technical Model Documentation

1.1 Purpose

The Office of Energy Infrastructure (OEIS) requires transparency in risk calculation methodologies supporting Wildfire Mitigation. Per the guidelines, OEIS has specific requirements for technical documentation, substantiation, and data governance of the models used in risk calculations for the WMP. This template outlines the required technical documentation and substantiation for the models, while the [WMP Data Governance Framework](#) covers the data governance requirements for the models.

1.2 Applicability

The applicability of the model documentation and governance applies to every model included in the [Wildfire Mitigation Plan](#) filed with the OEIS.

2 Technical Documentation

2.1 Problem or Function

2.1.1 Problem Modeled

Define the problem modeled for function performed by the program, for example, calculation of fire growth, smoke spread, people movement, etc.

The application of wildfire behavior modeling and risk analysis is used to quantify the potential impacts from possible electric utility infrastructure asset caused ignitions. The basis of this modeling is that not all ignitions (fires) are created equal, and each asset caused ignition can have substantially different consequence based on ignition location and related landscape characteristics.

The wildfire modeling and risk analysis derives a set of consequence metrics that quantify impacts. This includes potential acres burned, population impacted, number of buildings threatened, and estimated number of buildings destroyed. These are currently derived using an 8-hour simulation duration, based on a typical first burning period. Testing is underway to evaluate different fire durations based on suggestions in the most recent WMP Guidelines.

Technosylva's Wildfire Analyst™ (WFA) product is used to conduct the modeling, deliver modeling outputs, and monitor and visualize results with software applications.

The wildfire behavior modeling and risk analysis is applied to address two different, yet similar, scenarios. First, the modeling is used with historical re-analysis WRF weather data to support the mitigation planning process. The WFA FireSight, previously called Wildfire Risk Reduction Model (WRRM), is used to quantify risk metrics from millions of wildfire simulations using the numerous WRF weather scenarios defined. This wildfire consequence data is then combined with probability of failure and ignition analysis developed internally to define composite risk values to support prioritization decision making for asset hardening and related mitigation.

Secondly, the modeling is also used with daily WRF-based weather forecast data to calculate consequence based risk metrics for all assets as possible ignition sources to support operational requirements. Other key input datasets such as surface and canopy fuels, and live fuel moisture and dead fuel moisture, are developed daily using Machine Learning (ML) models to calculate the wildfire



behavior outputs as part of the risk analysis model. Wildfire risk forecasts are derived daily, or sometimes twice daily, with a multi-day outlook on an hourly basis. This information is used as input into key decision making related to operational requirements, such as PSPS, resource allocation and deployment, field operations, etc.

Note that the Technosylva Wildfire Analyst™ product is comprised of three discrete applications – FireSim, FireRisk and FireSight. “FireRisk” is the new name for the application formerly called “FireCast”. This was renamed to better meet platform functionality naming consistency. Accordingly, all references to FireRisk are identical to all functionality previously provided under the name “FireCast”. Also note that the platform is now called Wildfire Analyst. “Enterprise” has been removed from the product platform name. To meet PacifiCorp requirements, a subscription to all three applications is required.^[4] These include:

1. WFA FireRisk – daily asset-based risk forecasting to support operational needs, such as PSPS (previously called FireCast), including all situational awareness capabilities.
2. WFA FireSim – on-demand wildfire spread modeling to support real-time incident analysis and “what if” analysis for pending weather events to support operational needs.
3. WFA FireSight – risk analysis for assets using historical fire scenarios to ensure comprehensive understanding of asset ignition probability and consequence to support mitigation planning, such as WMP prioritization and development (previously called WRRM). FireSight includes integration of outage analytics, probability of outage/failure, and probability of ignition as well as built-in integrations to support calculations for risk reduction, mitigation effectiveness and risk spend efficiency.

FireRisk and FireSim support operational needs while FireSight supports enterprise risk management and mitigation planning needs. FireSight is implemented separately from FireRisk and FireSim.

2.2 Technical Description

2.2.1 Theoretical and Mathematical Foundations

Convey a thorough understanding of the theoretical and mathematical foundations, referencing the open literature where appropriate.

The basis of the wildfire risk modeling for electric utility assets lies in the published, proven and accepted fire science for wildfire behavior modeling. The Technosylva WFA product used to create risk metrics for both operational and planning initiatives utilizes the best-in-class fire science available. Technosylva has been able to operationalize proven wildfire behavior models and validate these models through on-going collaboration with CAL FIRE and the US Forest Service Missoula Fire Laboratory as the only unique vendor selected. This collaboration provides the operational platform to test and validate a suite of wildfire behavior and risk models that are utilized for statewide intelligence and operations by CAL FIRE, and by each IOU in California for operations and mitigation.

To support the model R&D and implementation, Technosylva regularly publishes peer reviewed and accepted articles regarding these models. Technosylva has been involved in 30+ publications over the past 24 months, with 11 as the principal investigator. Some of these publications are referenced on the Technosylva web site at <https://technosylva.com/scientific-research/>.



The published fire science provides the theoretical foundation for the operational models, tempered by validation analysis conducted on an on-going basis, to continually refine the models to match what occurs with observed wildfire behavior. The rest of this section provides a detailed description of the theoretical and mathematical foundation for the WFA models.

2.3 Theoretical Foundation

2.3.1 Phenomenon and Physical Laws (Model Basis)

Describe the theoretical basis of the phenomenon and the physical laws on which the model is based.

Fire is a self-sustained and usually uncontrolled sequence of processes basically carried out by the combination of fuel, oxygen and heat. In forest fires (also referred to as wildland fire or wildfire), the fuel is given by the vegetation layer composed of trees, bushes and all kinds of dead and living foliage (organic matter). The oxygen is abundantly present in the atmosphere and the heat is caused by the combustion of the flame and transported mainly by radiation and convection within the vegetation.

A quick review of the process involved could be described as follows. Consider a homogeneous flammable solid material like wood to which an external heat flux has been imposed. As the solid material absorbs the heat it raises its temperature at a rate dependent on the net heat capacity of the material (mix of all the components of the solid, including water). As the temperature increases, the moisture content in the solid diminishes and eventually dries up the solid. A further increase of the temperature causes the pyrolysis process of the wood (around 550 K), the organic material decomposes into a stream of volatile gasses (smoke, carbon and oxygen) and into solid remains like char (nearly pure carbon), and ashes (incombustible minerals like calcium, potassium, etc). The pyrolyzed fuel vapor convects and diffuses, mixing with the oxygen of the atmosphere and forming a combustible mixture. The high gas temperature favors the initiation of a gas phase combustion reaction in the combustible-oxidizer mixture. The compound molecules break apart, the atoms recombine with the oxygen to form water, carbon dioxide and some other products. The whole process is ruled by many factors, the types of char and volatile, the amount of oxygen and the exact chemical reactions taking place. The temperature difference between the gasses released in the pyrolysis process and the ambient air together with the gained temperature due to the oxidation reaction (around 1000 K), generates a buoyancy flow that raises up the hot combusting gas forming the characteristic flames of the fire.

In the wildland, fire behavior deeply depends on the vegetation (type, size and vertical arrangement), terrain, wind and moisture conditions of the vegetation (dead and living material). From a descriptive perspective, wildfires main observables are the fires Rate of Spread (ROS), flame length, flame intensity, heat per unit area, flame depth, and residence time. Depending on the behavior of the fire it may be classified as surface and crown fire. Surface fires burn loose needles, moss, lichen, herbaceous vegetation, shrubs, small trees and saplings that are at or near the surface of the ground. Crown fires burn forest canopy fuels, which include live and dead foliage/ branches, lichens in trees, and tall shrubs that lie well above the surface fuels. They are usually ignited by a surface fire. Crown fires can be passive or active. Passive crown fires involve the burning of individual trees or small groups of trees (often called torching). Active crown fires, or also referred to as running crown fires, present a solid wall of flame from the surface through the canopy fuel layers.

Fire growth from an ignition point can be split into four distinct phases (Fire science 2021), in the first phase the fire starts to burn slowly as the influx of air caused by the buoyancy flow of hot gasses causes the flames to tilt inwards. Once the fire has spread enough from the ignition point, wind is able to enter




the already burned vegetation and pushes the flames away from the center and tilts them towards the unburned fuels, increasing the heat transfer, and therefore accelerating the fire. As the fire moves further away from the center, the acceleration of the fire depends more on the local characteristics of the curvilinear front. Finally, the fire may reach a steady-state when the fire line is uniform enough so that it can be considered of infinite length.

2.3.2 Governing Equations

Present the governing equations and the mathematical model employed.

Fire modeling is a highly challenging problem from both the physical and the numerical point of view, and consequently historical advances in this field have always been forced to a compromised position due to the desire of practical usefulness, computer capabilities, required input data, and existing numerical methods. It is only by the consideration of these requirements that the primary natural approaches to the problem can be understood. The primary broad approaches are physical models, quasi-empirical models, and empirical ones.

Physical models are the most complex and have the advantage to be more generally valid across different fuels and weather conditions (Cruz 2017). They are usually posed as a set of coupled differential equations derived from conservation laws and defined on a usually bidimensional domain representing the vegetation layer considered as a porous medium where the main variables develop. The degree of approximation of the initial semi-physical description of the problem, as well as the rest of physical effects considered in the modeling may vary greatly from one model to another. Despite these different approaches, a conventional 2D multiphase model, sketching vegetation temperature through a convection reaction diffusion equation, and a solid combustible material evolution in time may serve as a simple example for illustration purposes.



Example of a 2D multiphase model sketching vegetation temperature and solid combustible

Even though physical models are very promising, they are not easy to make operational because in many cases the detailed input data they need is not readily available, and because they require a lot of computer processing capability, as they usually use adaptive meshes to keep track of the burning front. Some numerical methods used for solving these models are the Finite Element Method (FEM), Finite Difference methods (FDM), etc.

Empirical and semi-empirical models are mainly based on experimental data: laboratory runs, controlled outdoor fires, or well documented wildland fires. The difference between the empirical and



semi-empirical approach is that the former ones contain no physical basis at all and are generally statistical in nature, while the later use some form of physical framework on which the statistical model is based (Andrews 2018, Sullivan 2009). These models are largely developed to support decision making and are the main operational models used today. They are typically able to predict the source dataset with mean absolute percent errors between 20 and 40% (Cruz et al. 2013)

Further review of existing fire modeling approaches can be found in Catchpole and De Mestre (1986), Weber (1991), Pastor et al. (2003), Sullivan (2009a,b,c)

2.3.3 Assumptions

Identify the major assumptions on which the fire model is based and any simplifying assumptions.

The following are some of major assumptions contained in the models

- The physical framework development is based on an idealized situation in steady state spread which may not fit some extreme behavior of fires.
- Fuels are assumed to be continuous and uniform for the scale of the input (typically between 10 to 30 meter (m) resolution)
- Fire characteristics at a point only depend on the conditions at that point (point-functional model). This means that there are certain non-local phenomena like:
 - Increase of ROS due to a concave front.
 - Fire interaction between different parts of the same fire or a different one
- Fire spread is assumed to be elliptical although there are several variations such as double ellipse, oval, egg-shape, etc.
- Weather is given hourly and is assumed to remain constant during that time. There is no interpolation in time to compute the evolution of weather between hours.
- Reliability of weather inputs in the mid-range forecast (2 to 5 days)
- Fire is not coupled with the atmosphere in any way. This may seem like a major limitation in the model as wind is a main contribution to fire spread and at present many models (specially physical ones) try to couple wind and fire. The main reasons for us not to consider the coupling is:
 - It would make it infeasible to run millions of simulations considering the coupling effect.
 - Empirical and semi-empirical models have been developed using an average wind speed as an input, so it is not clear that considering more granular wind at the front is advisable.
- Fire is always assumed to be fully developed. Fire acceleration, flashover, or decay is not considered.
- Atmospheric instability which may have a deep impact on ROS (beer 1991) is not considered in the model.
- Gusts are not considered in the model
- No interaction between slope and wind other than creating an effective or equivalent wind. This means that fire is assumed to have an elliptical shape no matter the alignment of wind and slope.
- Models have been developed with scarce empirical data. The abundance of today's fire data sources, however, is allowing us to better adjust models to observed fire patterns.
- Fuel array description of the vegetation may not perfectly describe fuel characteristics.
- Spotting is only considered in surface fires



2.3.4 Independent Review Results (see Guide ASTM E 1355)

Provide the results of any independent review of the theoretical basis of the model. Guide E1355 recommends a review by one or more recognized experts fully conversant with the chemistry and physics of the fire phenomena but not involved with the production of the model.

The core models implemented in WFA form the basis of most operational propagation models in use today (Andrews et al 1980, Gould 1991). They have been implemented in well-known software like NEXUS (Scott and Reinhardt 2001), Fire and Fuels Extension to Forest Vegetation Simulator (FFE-FVS) (Reinhardt and Crookston 2003), FARSITE (Finney 2004), Fuel Management Analyst (FMAPlus) (Carlton 2005), FlamMap (Finney 2006) and BehavePlus (Andrews et al. 2008). Nevertheless, forest fires are a very difficult phenomenon to simulate which depends on many different factors and typical simulations are able to predict the source dataset with mean absolute percent errors between 20 and 40% (Cruz et al. 2013)

One of the important facts in fire simulation is the definition of the fuel models, with analysis providing different results for different fuels and regions. For example, Sanders (2001) observed a pattern of over-prediction by FARSITE in fuel models 1, 2, 5 by a large margin, moderate in fuel 10 and some underprediction for fuel model 8. Zigner et al (2020) used two case studies during strong winds revealing that FARSITE was able to successfully reconstruct the spread rate and size of wildfires when spotting was minimal. However, in situations when spotting was an important factor in rapid downslope wildfire spread, both FARSITE and FlamMap were unable to simulate realistic fire perimeters. Ross et al. (2006) used measurements from temperature sensors during prescribed burns in the Appalachian Mountains to recreate the fires and compared fire behavior simulated by FARSITE. They obtained a set of ROS adjustment factors that better represented the observed fire behavior obtaining a ROS adjustment factor of 1.5 and 2 for fuels 9 and 11 respectively, and a decreasing factor of 0.2 to the fuel type 6.

Apart from these reviews Technosylva has been constantly improving the accuracy and performance of the published fire models to better adjust the results to observed fire behavior. This includes a better definition of the fuel types, improved forecast of live fuel moisture content, modifications to the crown fire modeling initialization scheme, and automatic fire adjustment based on data assimilation techniques using ROS adjustment factor. In addition, Technosylva has implemented more than 21 additional models into the WFA platform to enhance accuracy and address known limitations of published fire models. These improvements include crown fire analysis, ember and spotting, urban / non-burnable area encroachment, consequence and impact quantification, etc. It is important to note that improvement of the fire modeling platform of choice necessitates not only improvements in mathematical algorithms but substantial improvements in the accuracy and resolution of input data sources. These work in concert to enhance the modeling and outputs to match observed and expected fire behavior. A robust operationalization of fire models requires constant and on-going research, testing, validation and implementation of both models and data sources.

2.4 Mathematical Foundation

2.4.1 Techniques, Procedures, Algorithms

Describe the mathematical techniques, procedures, and computational algorithms employed to obtain numerical solutions.



The fire propagation model in WFA is a point-punctual model where the fire characteristics at a given point (cell) only depends on the conditions at that cell (weather, terrain, vegetation). This fits well in fire simulation as most of wildfire characteristics mainly depend on local characteristics (Di Gregorio et al 2003), but excludes the effects of non-local phenomena.

The overall resolution is done using a Cellular Automata (CA) where space is discretized into cells (from 10 m to 30 m resolution), and physical quantities take on a finite set of values at each cell. The potential ROS at each cell at any time is given by the propagation models (surface and crown fire). CA models directly incorporate spatial heterogeneity in topography, fuel characteristics, and meteorological conditions, and they can easily accommodate any empirical or theoretical fire propagation mechanism, even complex ones (Collin et al. 2011)

Spotting is introduced as a random event where firebrands can be lifted and generate secondary ignition points ahead of the fire (in the direction of the wind).

The time evolution is done using a Minimum Travel Time (Fast-Marching) algorithm. This algorithm is similar to the well-known Dijkstra's (1959) algorithm but more adapted to grids instead of the original model that uses graphs. This approach has been used with success in many forest fires propagation models like FlamMap (Finney 2002) and many others (CITES). The algorithm provides a solution of the Eikonal equation of a spreading curve subject to a given speed function $ROS(\mathbf{x})$. This is done by searching for the fastest fire travel time along straight line transects of neighboring cells in the lattice. The number of neighboring cells considered determines the angle discretization of the spreading fire. The neighborhood or degrees of freedom, u , in WFA ranges from 8 cells (Moore neighborhood) to 32 cells.

2.4.2 References to Techniques and Algorithms

Provide references to the algorithms and numerical techniques.

The Technosylva WFA platform utilizes numerous models to address specific operational requirements. These models are integrated into an extendible platform that facilitates continued improvement as R&D advancements are made. The following table lists the primary models employed on WFA :

Model	Model Reference	Notes
Surface fire	Rothermel 1972, Albini 1976 Kitral IntecChile	WFA uses the core Rothermel model for fire propagation, however it can be configured for custom versions to support any empirical or semi empirical fire model. This has been done for different models employed in other countries, i.e. Chile, Canada, etc. In this regard, WFA platform is easily extended for use in unique geographies.
Crown Fire	Van Wagner (1977,1989,1993); Finney (1998); Scott and Reinhardt (2001)	Critical surface intensity and critical ROS for crown fire initialization. Expected ROS and flame intensity.
Time Evolution	Technosylva (Monedero, Ramirez 2011)	Fast-Marching method adapted to fire simulations. Minimum Travel Time algorithm with 32 degrees of freedom.



Model	Model Reference	Notes
High-Definition Wind	Forthoffer et al (2009)	High resolution wind model obtained through the integration of the USFS WindNinja software. Note: Technosylva is also the contractor for the USFS Missoula Fire Sciences Lab. for the on-going enhancement and customization of the WindNinja software. This provides Technosylva a unique understanding of the model science foundation and implementation approaches.
Wind Adjustment Factor	Andrews 2012	Wind speed conversion with height. Based on Albini and Baughman (1979); Baughman and Albini (1980); Rothermel (1983); Andrews (2012)
Fire Shape	Andrews 2018,	Unique ellipse based solely on the effective wind speed.
Live Moisture Content	Cardil et al.	Machine learning Algorithm based on historical NDVI weather reading
Dead Moisture Content	Nelson (2002)	
Spark Modeling	Technosylva	Ignition point displacement based on wind speed
Urban Encroachment	Technosylva 2016	Includes several variations of urban encroachment algorithms developed internally to facilitate spread of fires into non-burnable urban fuels. This incorporates a distance-based friction model. Based on research publications by NIST.
Spotting	Technosylva 2019	Surface spotting model for wind driven fires. Albini (1983a, 1983b); Chase (1984); Morris (1987)
Building Loss Factor	Technosylva (Cardil xxx)	Machine Learning algorithm taking into account building conditions. Based on historical damage inspection data on buildings affected by fires over the past 13 years

Many of these models were originally published from research by the USFS Missoula Fire Sciences Laboratory. Technosylva has implemented, and enhanced these models, in addition to developing new models. Most Technosylva custom developed models are supported by journal publications as part of our corporate R&D program. Some of these models are referenced on the Technosylva web site at <https://technosylva.com/scientific-research/>. Key references are provided below for many of the models employed in the WFA platform.

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- Phillips, Ross J.; Waldrop, Thomas A.; Simon, Dean M. 2006. Assessment of the FARSITE model for predicting fire behavior in the Southern Appalachian Mountains. *Proceedings of the 13th biennial Southern Silvicultural Research Conference*. Gen. Tech. Rep. SRS-92. Asheville, NC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Southern Research Station: 521-525

2.4.3 Equations and Implementation

Present the mathematical equations in conventional terminology and show how they are implemented in the code.

Summary



The mathematical model used to simulate surface fire spread is the model developed by Rothermel (1972) with some modifications from Albini (1976) and some minor adjustments from Technosylva. It accepts the initial 13 fuel models (Anderson 1982) as well as Scott and Burgan's (2005) dynamical fuels where there is a transfer load between the herbaceous and dead classes. Among other outputs this model provides the surface fire rate of spread, flame length and flame intensity in the direction of maximum spread (head front). Crown fire is implemented using the model developed by Van Wagner (1977,1993) which computes the transition viability to crown fire, as well as the expected ROS and intensity in active crown fires. Spotting is modeled as a pseudo random event. The maximum expected spotting distance from the fire is obtained using the wind-driven model developed by (Albini 1983a; Albini 1983b; Chase 1984) and then embers are generated randomly on the front of the fire and the actual traveled distance is computed also randomly based on the maximum distance available. In this modeling there is no tracking of individual embers in the air. Wind speed profiles at different heights (2m, 10m, 20ft) are obtained through a logarithmic wind profile found in Andrews (2012). Fire is assumed to spread following an elliptical shape only dependent on the effective wind speed (Andrews 2012). The time evolution is done using a Fast-Marching method on a regularly spaced landscape grid of a Cellular Automata.

Surface Fire

The default propagation engine implemented in WFA is Rothermel's (1972) surface model with the modifications proposed by Albini (1976) and the requirements to accept Scott and Burgan (2005) fuel models. The basic equation in the model predicts the heads fire rate of spread without wind or slope:

$$R_0 = I_R \xi / \rho_b \epsilon Q_{ig}$$

Here I_R is the reaction intensity (energy released rate per unit area of the fire front), ξ the propagating flux ratio, ρ_b the bulk density, ϵ the effective heating number, and Q_{ig} the heat of ignition. The equation is derived by applying the energy conservation to a unit volume of fuel ahead of a steadily advancing fire in a homogeneous fuel bed. In this model, the ROS may be viewed as the ratio between the heat flux received by the unburned fuel ahead of the fire (numerator) and the heat required to ignite it (denominator).

The input parameters to compute the ROS in the case of no wind or slope are the moisture content and the characteristics of the vegetation. Moisture content is given by the 1h, 10h and 100h dead moisture content, and the woody and herbaceous live moisture content. Fuels are assumed to be a mixture of different vegetation types depending on their class (dead or live) and size (less than 0.25 inch, 0.25-1 inch, 1-3 inch), with each class having different surface to volume ratio and loads. The inputs required to define a fuel type is given in the following table:

			LOAD				SAV					
Fuel	1h	10h	100h	herb	woody	1h	herb	woody	Dyn	Depth	MoistExt	heat

Table: input variables for each fuel type.

Here Dyn (dynamic) is a boolean variable to define if there should be a transfer between the herbaceous load and the dead one based on the herbaceous content. In general, SAV values (the fineness of the



fuel) strongly affects the ROS and flame length of the fire, while the fuel load does not affect the rate of spread but can have a strong effect on the flame length.

The effect of wind and slope can be incorporated in the model through a couple of dimensionless parameters depending on the midflame wind speed U and the terrain angle θ :

$$ROS = R_0 (1 + \Phi_w + \Phi_s)$$

with

$$\Phi_s = 5.275 \beta - 0.3 (\tan \theta)$$

$$\Phi_w = C * U^B (\beta / \beta_{op})^{-E}$$

Where β_{op} and β are the optimum and standard packing ratios respectively, and C , B , and E are parameters depending on the surface to volume ratio σ :

$$C = 7.47 * \exp(-0.133 \sigma^{0.55});$$

$$B = 0.02526 \sigma^{0.54}$$

$$E = 0.715 * \exp(-0.000359 * \sigma)$$

The slope and wind factors are summed together to obtain the final ROS. If they are not aligned the resultant vector defines the direction of maximum spread (which will be between the direction of wind and the direction of slope). This final slope-wind factor can also be used to compute an equivalent or effective wind speed causing the same effect as the combined effect of wind and slope. To do that we simply inverse the equation of the wind factor to obtain:

$$U_e = [\Phi_w (\beta / \beta_{op})^E / C]^{-1/B}$$

The Rothermel model predicts fire characteristics (ROS, flame length, etc) only in the direction of maximum spread (head front) obtained from the combined effect of wind and slope. To compute the ROS in a direction different from the direction of maximum spread, and to be able to use the model in a 2D landscape it is assumed that a free burning fire perimeter from a single ignition point has an elliptical shape. There are several different approaches to compute the ellipse (or ellipses) eccentricity based on wind and slope (Albini [2], Anderson 1983 [6], Alexander, etc). The present implementation follows the equations in Andrews (2008) depending on the effective wind speed U_e in mi/h in the direction of maximum spread. The length to width ratio is given by:

$$L/W = 0.1 + 0.25 U_e$$

Or equivalently the eccentricity e is given by

$$e = (Z^2 - 1)^{0.5} / Z$$

so that the ROS in any direction ϕ is given by

$$ROS(\phi) = ROS (1-e) / (1+e)$$

One of the most important variables of fire is the amount of heat it generates as this is the main contributor to fire spread and fire severity. The amount of heat can be measured using different variables like the reaction intensity (IR), the Heat per Unit Area (HPA) or the fireline intensity. The Reaction intensity is the rate of energy release per unit area within the flaming front (with units of energy/area/time), heat per unit area is the amount of heat energy released per unit area within the



flaming front (units of energy/area), fire line intensity is the rate of heat energy released per unit time per unit length of the fire front (units of energy/distance/time). Fireline intensity is independent of the depth zone and It is calculated as the product of the available fuel energy and the ROS of the fire (Byram 1959):

$$I_B = H_A \cdot ROS$$

Where The heat per unit area depends on the reaction intensity of the fire (I_R) and the time that the area is in the flaming front (residence time tr)

$$H_A = I_R \cdot tr = 384 \cdot I_R / \sigma$$

In this model the flame length and Byram's intensity are closely related by:

$$FL = 0.45 I^{0.46}$$

Where the flame length is in feet and the intensity in Btu/ft/sc.




Fig X: Flow of Calculation provided in Andrews (2018)



For a much more in-depth discussion of the Rothermel surface model please read Andrews (2018) and Rothermel (1972).

Crown fire

Crown fires burn forest canopy fuels. They are usually generated by surface fires and represent a major change in fire behavior due to an increased rate of spread and heat released. Crown fires can be passive, active or conditional based on the capacity of the surface fire to move into areal fuels, and to the capacity of the burning canopy to move between individual trees.

Crown fire initiation occurs when the surface fire provides enough heat to raise the temperature of the canopy fuel to ignition temperature. In Van Wagner (1977) model, this minimum intensity is given by:

$$I_{ini} = (0.01 \cdot CBH (460 + 25.9 FMC))^{1.5}$$

Where CBH is the canopy base height (m) and FMC is the foliage moisture content of the canopy cover. Foliar moisture content (FMC) is usually not known, but it is assumed that for most species old foliage should be around 100 percent and this value has been used as a default value when no other information is available (Scott 2001). This approach however does not consider any known humidity conditions of the site and in WFA the FMC is computed based on the 100h moisture content as follows:

$$FMC = 75 + 2 \cdot m100h$$

Once the fire has transitioned to the canopy it is necessary to have a critical mass-flow rate for the fire to be self-sustained. Vang Wagner found this critical mass to be 0.05 kg m⁻² sec⁻¹ (Scott 2001) which can be used to determine a minimum crown fire rate of spread only dependent on the Canopy Bulk Density (CBD) and given by

$$R_{active} = 3 / CBD$$

Other existing models not used in WFA are Alexander (1998) which is very similar to Van Wagner (1977) but includes additional inputs like flaming residence time, plume angle and fuel bed characteristics, Cruz et al. (1999) fire transition model, and Cruz et al. (2002) crown fire spread model given by:

$$ROS = c1 U^{c2} CBD \cdot C3 \cdot e^{c4 x EFM}$$

Where U is the wind at 10m, CBD the canopy bulk density, EFM is the fine dead moisture content, and C1, C2, C3, C4 are a set of regression coefficients.

The model for the ROS of crown fires was computed by Rothermel (1991) through a linear regression between observed crown ROS and the surface fire model. It states that the crown fire of an active ROS is 3.34 times the rate of spread of the surface model 10 assuming a 0.4 wind reduction factor.

$$R = 3.34(R_{10})_{40\%}$$

Based on these conditions, crown fire may be classified as:

- Surface fire if neither the intensity nor the minimum crown ROS is met
- Passive Crown fire (torching): Fire spreads through the surface fuels, occasionally torching overstory trees. Overall ROS is that of the surface fire.
- Conditional Crown: Fire cannot transition to crown, but active crown fire is possible if there was a fire transition to crown by other means
- Active Crown: Fire spreads through the overstory tree canopy if both conditions are met



Fire Type		Active crown fire?	
		No	Yes
Transition to crown fire?	No	Surface	Conditional Crown
	Yes	Torching	Crowning


Crown fire classification as shown in BehavePlus

Van Wagner's crown fire transition and propagation models are well known and used operationally but have shown to have a significant underprediction bias when used in assessing potential crown fire behavior in conifer forests of western North America (Cruz et al. 2010). To try to correct this bias Technosylva has introduced two new parameters in the model that have been adjusted based on the analysis carried out by the scientific team using data from the last two fire seasons in California. The model introduces two new parameters 1) a crown factor multiplier for the Canopy Bulk Density (CBD) which decreases the minimum crown ROS required to have an active crown fire, and a factor that forces a smooth transition between the surface and the crown fire behavior. The final ROS of the overall fire when crown fire type is conditional or crowning is a weighted average of surface and crown ROS

$$ROS = surfROS * (1 - \alpha) + \alpha * crownRos$$

Where the value α ranges from 0 to 1 and depends on the **active ratio** in the following way:

$$\alpha = activeRatio^{1/smoothFactor}$$



Example effect of the smooth factor (0 blue, 0.25 red, 0.5 gray, 1 yellow) in the crown contribution for active ratios lower than 1

At present, with WFA the crown CBD factor is set to 1.2 and the smooth factor to 0.4. This approach to provide a gradual transition in the fire's rate of spread (and flame length) from the initial onset of crowning similar to the crown fraction burned (CFB) (Alexander 1998) used in other modeling systems like FlamMap, FARSITE or Nexus, with the main difference being the smoothing function itself. Cruz et al. observes that there is no evidence of such a smooth transition between surface and crown fire regimes in the experimental data but rather an abrupt transition is observed far more commonly. In our context, however, where the main aim is to produce a forecast risk and not to simulate an individual fire we



consider that it is important to reflect the fact that the fire conditions are close to generate an active crown fire.

For a more in-depth discussion of the crown fire models please read Cruz et al (2010) Scott et al. (2006)

Wind adjustment factor

Fire simulations require wind speed at midflame to compute surface fire spread and at 20ft to compute crown fire characteristics. To convert the wind between the two heights, WFA uses the wind adjustment factor (WAF) found in Andrews (2012) and implemented in the software BehavePlus and Farsite. The model is based on the work of Albini and Baughman (1979) and Baughman and Albini (1980), using some assumptions made by Finney (1998). This implementation considers two different models for sheltered and unsheltered conditions from the overstory. As described in Andrews (2012), the unsheltered WAF is based on an average wind speed from the top of the fuel bed to a height of twice the fuel bed depth. The sheltered WAF is based on the assumption that the wind speed is approximately constant with height below the top of a uniform forest canopy. Sheltered WAF is based on the fraction of crown space occupied by tree crowns. The unsheltered WAF model is used if crown fill portion is less than 5 percent. Midflame wind speed is the 20-ft wind multiplied by the WAF.

Unsheltered WAF depends on the surface fuel bed depth (in feet):

$$WAF = \frac{1.83}{\ln\left(\frac{20+0.36H}{0.13H}\right)}$$

Sheltered WAF:

$$WAF = \frac{0.555}{\sqrt{fH} \ln\left(\frac{20+0.36H}{0.13H}\right)}$$

With H, the canopy height, and f, the crown fill portion, depending on the canopy cover (CC) and the crown ratio (CR):

$$f = CC * CR / 3$$

$$CR = (CH - CBH) / CH$$

CR is the ratio of the crown length to the total height of a tree.

Time evolution

The fire models can predict the potential ROS of the front at any point and direction but are not able to compute the evolution of the fire perimeter in time. The main models to do that are:

- 1) Using Huygens principle of wave propagation like in Farsite (xxx) and discretizing in time
- 2) Using a Minimum Travel Time Algorithm or Fast Marching method, and discretizing in space
- 3) Using the more general but usually slower Level Set Method.

In the context of wildfires, Huygens principle states that each point on a fire front is in itself the source of an elliptical wavelet (fire) which spreads out in an independent way in the forward direction. This approach is numerically solved by splitting the perimeter into a set of nodes, computing the evolution of those nodes in the direction normal to the perimeter based on the ROS given by the propagation model and a given time steps, and then reconstructing the front based on the position of the transported nodes. The main weakness of vector-based approaches is the need for a computationally costly algorithm for generating the convex hull fire-spread perimeter at each time step, especially in the



presence of fire crossovers and unburned islands (Ghisu et al. 2014). Raster based implementations are computationally more efficient (Glasa et al. 2008), but can suffer from significant distortion of the produced fire shape if the number of neighboring cells considered (number of possible spread directions) is low.

Spotting

Wildfires can create powerful updrafts which launch burning firebrands into the atmosphere, these firebrands are then carried horizontally by the wind landing some distance downwind from the source and creating a new ignition. Due to its unpredictable nature, fire-spotting modeling, here, is considered through a statistical approach.

Encroachment

Encroachment is a critical component in the WFA fire modeling simulations as it affects the number of buildings, assets, facilities and population impacted. It does not have a relevant effect on other impact metrics. To take advantage of enhanced algorithms for spread encroachment using adjacent fuels and fire behavior data, the non-burnable (and especially urban) fuel classification needed to be updated to provide better granularity and characterization of the type of urban/WUI. Accordingly, to test these methods an enrichment of the current fuels data was developed by Technosylva to delineate urban fuels into different types of urban and also a level of density of buildings. This enhancement of the basic Scott and Burgan fuel models is used in combination with enhanced encroachment algorithms to more accurately calculate potential impacts to buildings and population.

Urban areas have been classified into classes depending on their structure (roads, urban core, isolated, sparse) and their surrounding fuels, characterized as high versus low fire behavior fuels). Specific encroachment factors can then be applied to each grouping.

Spark Modeling

Electrical failures can cause sparks and produce an ignition meters away from the asset location. To take this into account, the WFA allows the ignition point location to be displaced if the underlying vegetation type is either non-combustible or WUI. This displacement is in the direction of the wind and is proportional to the wind speed. The displacement distance and wind speed algorithm has been developed using expert opinion from electric utility engineers familiar with asset failure and ignition probability.

Weather

WFA requires historical daily weather data to run the fire simulations. The minimum required variables are the wind speed at 10m, the dead moisture content, and the live moisture content. More explicitly:


- Northward 10m wind speed
- Eastward 10m wind speed
- Dead moisture content 1hr
- Dead moisture content 10hr
- Dead moisture content 100hr
- Herbaceous moisture content



- Woody moisture content

The dead moisture may be given by the client or may be computed based on the Nelson model. Similarly, the herbaceous moisture content may be provided by the client or may be computed using Technosylva's Machine Learning algorithm based on historical NDVI weather reading. The Technosylva DFM model has been developed to meet customer needs using the latest modeling approaches. The input wind speed required by the propagation model is 20ft; to convert the initial 10m wind speeds to 20ft, we use a logarithmic profile from Andrews (2012) leading to a 13% wind speed reduction.

Weather data is obtained from the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) Model weather forecast data. The forecast weather has a 2 km resolution which can lead to sharp changes in weather conditions between neighboring cells. In order to increase accuracy and meet the underlying 30m cell size resolution of the fuels data, weather data is interpolated spatially using a bilinear interpolation scheme. The smoothing of the source weather data ensures that integration with the wildfire behavior models results in outputs that do not have hard edges in the data.



Left: Initial weather definition. Right interpolated weather definition

Impact and consequence value calculation

Wildfire spread modeling is undertaken with asset ignition locations to derive potential impacts. The output impact values (risk metrics) are assigned back to the asset ignition point location. Using this approach allows us to differentiate between the risk output associated with different assets (and their ignition locations) using the same weather data although weather values may vary based on spatial location and time of day (hourly). For both operational and mitigation applications, the wildfire spread modeling is conducted using High Performance Computers (HPC) and typically involves hundreds of millions of spread simulations. The amount of simulation will vary depending operational use with daily forecasts versus mitigation planning use with hundreds of weather scenarios.

The main goal for the WFA simulations is to create a forecast risk associated to each ignition point and surrounding area. This is done by running individual simulations and associating the following main risk metrics back to each ignition point. The following baseline risk metrics are calculated from the spread simulations



- Acres Burned (referred to as Fire Size Potential)
- Number of Buildings Threatened
- Estimated Number of Buildings destroyed
- Population impacted

Numerous conventional fire behavior outputs are also calculated, the most important being:

- Rate Of Spread (ROS)
- Flame Length (FL)
- Fire Behavior Index (FBI) – combination of ROS and FL

2.4.4 Limitations (see Guide ASTM E 1895)

Identified the limitations of the model based on the algorithms and numerical techniques.

The Technosylva WFA platform is an integration of numerous speciality models designed to address specific scientific requirements and methods.

The following assumptions applied to the models used in WFA:

- The physical framework development is based on an idealized situation in steady state spread
- Rate Of Spread at a point only depends on the conditions at that point (point-functional models). This means that there is no increase in speed due to non-local contributions of the fire front.
- Fire model is not directly coupled with the atmosphere. Fire will not modify local atmosphere. However, this is being addressed with seamless integration with the WRF-SFIRE model in development at San Jose State University, Wildfire Interdisciplinary Research Center. WRF-SFIRE is an option available to WFA customers to address specific convection based fire scenarios.
- Fire is always assumed to be fully developed with fire acceleration, flashover, or decay not being considered.
- Atmospheric instability, which may have a deep impact on ROS (Beer 1991), is not considered in the model in any way.
- Gusts are not considered in the model
- No interaction between slope and wind other than creating an effective or equivalent wind. This means that fire is assumed to have an elliptical shape no matter the alignment of wind and slope.
- Experimental data is scarce and the empirical adjustment of models have been based on wind tunnel experiments and a few well documented fires
- Fuel array description of the vegetation may not perfectly describe fuel characteristics.
- Spotting is only considered in surface fires

2.5 Data Libraries

Provide background information on the source, contents, and use of data libraries.

This section provides a brief summary of the key input datasets required for wildfire behavior analysis and risk analysis. The following categories of input data are:

1. Landscape characteristics
2. Weather and atmospheric data



3. Fuel moisture
4. Values at risk (highly valued resources and assets)
5. Possible ignition sources
6. Fire activity

2.5.1 Landscape Characteristics

This includes a range of possible data that describe the characteristics of the landscape. The most important data are related to surface and canopy fuels, and vegetation. There are many publications available that describe these datasets, many from the USFS Missoula Fire Lab. Most use the Scott & Burgan 2005 Fuels Model Set standard for classification of fuels data.

Standard fire behavior analysis input layers are:



1. Terrain – elevation, slope, aspect
2. Surface fuels (Scott & Burgan 2005)
3. Canopy fuels
 - a. Canopy height
 - b. Canopy base height
 - c. Canopy bulk density
 - d. Canopy closure
4. WUI and Non Forest Land Use classes (Technosylva, 2020)

2.5.2 Surface and Canopy Fuels

For these layers, data developed by Technosylva is used. Technosylva provides an annual fuel updating subscription where initial fuels is developed using advanced remote sensing object segmentation methods using high resolution imagery, available LiDAR & GEDI, and other standard imagery sources, such as NAIP, Sentinel 2 and Landsat. This is supplemented with in-the-field surveys to verify the fuels for possible areas of concern and to validate the fuels classification. Surface and canopy fuels data is critical for accurate fire behavior modeling, so it is paramount that this data is up-to-date, and when used, results in the observed and expected fire behavior.





Survey Date



Summary

- 2019 → 14,906,880 ac
- 2018 → 26,874,880 ac
- 2017 → 4,423,040 ac
- 2016 → 6,377,600 ac
- 2013 → 2,319,360 ac

Point Cloud Density



LIDAR Data used for Technosylva Fuels 2021, with capture date and points density

Surface and canopy fuels are updated throughout the year, to accommodate changes to the fuels, typically monthly during fire season. This ensures that all major disturbances, such as fires, urban growth, landslides, etc. are updated in the fuels data. A variety of methods, including burn severity analysis, are used to update the fuels. Up to date fuels data is critical to ensuring the fire behavior outputs from our modeling are accurate, as it is a key input into risk analysis.


Technosylva continually tests new fuels datasets that become available from other sources, such as LANDFIRE, federal risk assessment regional projects, and independent sources, such as the California Forest Observatory data. Unfortunately, the publicly available data does not perform at the level required when confronted with operational testing. In general, these publicly available data do not result in fire behavior outputs that facilitated accurate predictions. Ultimately with any fuels dataset, the quality and accuracy of the fuels is measured on whether it produces 'observed and expected fire behavior'. Fortunately, Technosylva is able to test this data, and other fuels data including their custom data, operationally on a daily basis with CAL FIRE and the IOUs against active wildfires to see how it performs.




Updates to the fuels, and algorithms that use the fuels data for fire behavior modeling are on-going with us, as we continue to enhance the data and algorithms to match observed fire behavior across the state. These methods and algorithms are proprietary.

WUI and Non-Forest Fuels Land Use classes are based on a Technosylva proprietary method that characterizes WUI and other land uses classes that have been a typical limitation of the Scott and Burgan classification, as they are defined in general non burnable classes. In combination with the Surface Fuels, this provides a solid foundation for fire behavior and impact analysis.

The following two figures present an example of publicly available LANDFIRE data commonly used for fire modeling, and the custom Technosylva fuels used.



LandFire Fuels – Non Burnable Classes




Technosylva Fuels Dec 2021 – WUI and Non-Forest Fuels Classes

2.5.3 Weather and Atmospheric Data

WRF data is developed using third party weather and predictive services experts available through commercial providers. Data is 2 km spatial resolution and hourly (temporal) for a multi-day period, up to five+ days. Multiple forecasts are generated daily.

Weather observation data can also be used along with, or independently, to support fire behavior analysis. This data is typically available through published weather stations on MesoWest, or through commercial providers, such as Synoptic. The methods of how this data can be integrated within the Technosylva software and processes is proprietary.

The following figure shows a typical 2km WRF model of wind speed overlaid with weather stations data (WFA software example).



Predicted (WRF model) and Observed Wind (Weather Stations, Synoptic)




2.5.4 Fuel Moisture

Fuel moisture data is also a key input into fire behavior modeling. Fuel moisture can be characterized as either Dead or Live fuel moisture. Standard methods for measuring and quantifying fuel moistures are well documented in publications by the USFS Missoula Fire Lab and other research agencies.

However, to date the ability to accurately predict live and dead fuel moistures at high resolution has been limited. Only a few IOUs and commercial vendors are producing daily estimates that can be integrated into fire modeling. Technosylva produces both a dead and live fuel moisture data product that combines historical and current sample data with remotely sensing imagery in a machine learning model to estimate daily data products. These methods are proprietary although they are substantiated with several publications and on-going collaboration between the IOUs, Technosylva and fire weather and behavior research agencies. This fuel moisture data product is used by CAL FIRE and several IOUs across seven western US states.

The following figure shows the Technosylva Dead Fuel Moisture overlaid with weather stations data (WFA software example).



Predicted (WRF model) and Observed 10-hr Fuel Moisture (Weather Stations, Synoptic)




2.5.5 Values at Risk

Values-at-Risk data reflects the resources and assets that exist across that landscape that we are concerned about. Typically, ‘resources’ refers to natural items while ‘assets’ refers to man made items. Wildfire modeling is used to identify the “risk” associated with resources and assets, with risk representing the possibility of loss or harm occurring due to wildfire.

VAR data is typically characterized into public safety or financial impacts. Technosylva IOU customers use similar input datasets for VAR, such as population count (location), building footprints, and critical facilities. A variety of datasets exist to define the location and characteristics of these VAR, each with varying temporal and spatial accuracy. Census data is a common source for population data along with ORNL LandScan data (population count). LandScan has become a de facto standard for static wildfire risk assessments across the Nation in the past 10 years. It is available through the Dept. of Homeland Security HSIP program for certified vendors of government agencies, or the agencies themselves. It is typically updated every 2 years with a 90 meter spatial resolution of population count. Technosylva currently uses the latest 2021 LandScan data for calculating population impacts.

The Microsoft Buildings Footprint dataset is a publicly available free data source used as a starting point by many vendors and agencies. Technosylva has taken this data and updated it using local high resolution imagery data sources to enhance the data. The original Microsoft data is a good starting point, however it does have holes with missing data and some misrepresentation of buildings with natural features. This data was updated in 2020 by Microsoft. This provides the primary source for the buildings data used by Technosylva.

Population and buildings are the two primary datasets used as input into wildfire risk analysis, although most IOU customers add confidential data to derive more detailed consequence metrics. These are proprietary to the IOUs and cannot be shared by Technosylva.





Buildings (Microsoft 2020) and Damaged Inspections data (DINS) from CAL FIRE

2.5.6 Possible Ignition Sources

Wildfire ignition data varies greatly depending on the organization and purpose of the wildfire risk analysis. Traditionally, agency driven risk assessments will use historical fire location data to create Historical Fire Occurrence datasets, reflecting ignition density over a specific time period. This data is obtained from federal and state fire reporting systems.

IOUs are often concerned with using their assets as possible ignition sources, in equipment failure scenarios or extreme weather events, where a spark from an electric utility asset may cause a fire ignition. Risk can be assessed related to the probability of ignition for electric utility assets, or more commonly with the potential spread and impacts of a wildfire ignited by an asset. Technosylva provides integration of both ignition and spread analysis to derive risk metrics using VAR data. This focuses on assigning possible consequence back to the electric utility assets to identify those assets more prone to having significant impacts should a wildfire ignite. Different proprietary methods exist to integrate and model probability of ignition data for electric utility assets with consequence modeling. Referred to as “asset wildfire risk” this information can be used to support operational decisions, such as PSPS, resource allocation and placement, and stakeholder communication, in addition to short and long term mitigation planning efforts, reflected in IOU WMPs. The weather and fuels inputs will vary depending on the purpose of these risk analyses.


IOUs and agencies are also concerned with non-asset wildfire ignitions and the risk associated with these ignitions due to possible spread and potential impacts. Technosylva has developed proprietary methods for deriving territory wide risk that integrates millions of possible ignition points with wildfire spread modeling to derive standard risk outputs, similar to “asset risk” metrics. These output metrics vary greatly depending on the customer and purpose for using the risk data. The methods and outputs are proprietary.

2.5.7 Fire Activity

The fire activity data used to support operational situational awareness is captured from different sources:

- VIIRS and MODIS Satellite hotspots, from public sources (FIRMS)
- GOES 16 and 17 data based on agreement with providers to the IOUs
- Lighting data also from IOU’s providers
- Fire Perimeters from Open Wildfire data from NIFC
- Fire activity from National Guard data from Fire Guard program
- Alert Wildfire Cameras integration

The following figure shows an example of Fire Activity data integrated into the Technosylva WFA system. All data is temporal and displayed color coded based on a selected time from the software timeline.



Hotspots, Fire Perimeters and Alert Wildfire Cameras

2.5.8 Summary of Input Data Sources

The following table presents a summary of the data sources used in the wildfire risk analysis. Some data varies slightly depending on mitigation versus operational use.

DATASET	SPATIAL RESOLUTION (meters)	TEMPORAL RESOLUTION	DATA VINTAGE	SOURCE
Landscape Characteristics				
TERRAIN	10	YEARLY		USGS
SURFACE FUELS	30/10	PRE FIRE SEASON, MONTHLY UPDATE IN FIRE SEASON, END OF FIRE SEASON	2020	TECHNOSYLVA
WUI AND NON FOREST FUELS LAND USE	30/10	TWICE A YEAR	2020	TECHNOSYLVA
CANOPY FUELS (CBD,CH,CC,CBH)	30/10	PRE FIRE SEASON, MONTHLY UPDATE IN FIRE SEASON,	2020	TECHNOSYLVA



DATASET	SPATIAL RESOLUTION (meters)	TEMPORAL RESOLUTION	DATA VINTAGE	SOURCE
		END OF FIRE SEASON		
ROADS NETWORK	30	YEARLY		USGS
HYDROGRAPHY	30	YEARLY		USGS
CROPLANDS	30	YEARLY	1997	USDA
Weather and Atmospheric Data				
WIND SPEED	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
WIND DIRECTION	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
WIND GUST	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
AIR TEMPERATURE	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
SURFACE PRESSURE	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
RELATIVE HUMIDITY	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	TECHNOSYLVA
PRECIPITATION	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
RADIATION	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
WATER VAPOR MIXING RATIO 2m	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	ADS/DTN
SNOW ACCUMULATED - OBS	1000	DAILY	2008	NOAA
PRECIPITATION ACCUMULATED - OBS	4000	DAILY	2008	NOAA
BURN SCARS	10	5 DAYS	2000	NASA/ESA
WEATHER OBSERVATIONS DATA	Points	10 MIN	1990	SYNOPTIC
Fuel Moisture				
HERBACEOUS LIVE FUEL MOISTURE	250	DAILY / 5-DAY FORECAST	2000	TECHNOSYLVA



DATASET	SPATIAL RESOLUTION (meters)	TEMPORAL RESOLUTION	DATA VINTAGE	SOURCE
WOODY LIVE FUEL MOISTURE	250	DAILY / 5-DAY FORECAST	2000	TECHNOSYLVA / ADS
1 hr DEAD FM	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	TECHNOSYLVA / ADS
10 hr DEAD FM	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	TECHNOSYLVA / ADS
100 hr DEAD FM	2000	HOURLY / 124 HOUR FORECAST	1990	TECHNOSYLVA / ADS



DATASET	SPATIAL RESOLUTION (meters)	TEMPORAL RESOLUTION	DATA VINTAGE	SOURCE
Values at Risk				
BUILDINGS	Polygon footprints	YEARLY	2020-21	MICROSOFT/TECHNOSY LVA
DINS	Points	YEARLY	2014-21	CAL FIRE
POPULATION	90	YEARLY	2019	LANDSCAN, ORNL
ROADS	Vector lines	YEARLY	2021	CALTRANS
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY	Plexels	YEARLY	2021	ESRI GEOENRICHMENT SERVICE
FIRE STATIONS	Points	YEARLY	2021	ESRI, USGS
BUILDING LOSS FACTOR	Building footprints	YEARLY	2022	TECHNOSYLVA
CRITICAL FACILITIES	Points	YEARLY	2021	FRAP – CAL FIRE
Potential Ignitions locations				
IOU DISTRIBUTION & TRANSMISSION LINES	Linear segments	Updated quarterly	2022	IOUs
IOU POLES & EQUIPMENT	Points	Updated quarterly	2022	IOUs
Fire Activity				
HOTSPOTS MODIS	1000	TWICE A DAY	2000	NASA
HOTSPOTS VIIRS	375	TWICE A DAY	2014	NASA
HOTSPOTS GOES 16/17	3000	10 MIN	2019	NASA
FIREGUARD	Polygons	15 MIN	2020	NATIONAL GUARD
FIRE SEASON PERIMETERS	Polygons	DAILY	2021	NIFS
HISTORIC FIRE PERIMETERS	Polygons	YEARLY	1900	CAL FIRE
ALERT WILDFIRE CAMERAS	Live Feeds	1 min	Real Time	AWF Consortium
LIGHTING STRIKES	1000	1 MIN	Real Time	EARTH NETWORKS / OTHERS




2.5.9 Fire Potential Index (FPI)

FPI quantifies the fire activity potential over the territory aiming to assist operational decision-making to reduce fire threats and risks. FPI allows agencies to easily analyze the short-term fire danger that could exist across the service territory and better communicate the wildfire potential on any given day and time, promoting safe and reliable operations.

Hexel-based (h3) FPI is a forecast product, which is produced on a daily basis, calculated every 3 hours at different h3 resolutions from level 4 to 8 (182 ac and 1km resolution approximately). One of the main advantages of this index is that it was calibrated with real fires (2012 to 2022) using VIIRS hotspots as a proxy of fire activity.

FPI estimates the expected daily number of VIIRS hotspots in a h3-hexel level 6.

FPI comprises several variables including fuels, terrain and weather:



Technosylva has integrated FPI into its operational decision-making WFA enterprise to facilitate its use operationally.

FPI promotes proactive and reactive operational measures through standard operating procedures aiming to reduce the likelihood facilities and assets will be the source of ignition for a fire when FPI is high or extreme.

FPI can be used to inform operation decisions (restrictions on the type of work being performed), as an input to PSPS decision-making and to make risk informed mitigation decisions.

Fire Potential Index products developed for electrical utilities usually include weather data: wind speed, wind gusts, and both dead and live fuel moisture content. Technosylva's FPI also includes the Fuel Complexity (fuel structure, load and age) and Terrain Difficulty. These are key inputs of the classical fire triangle that explain fire behavior.

Technosylva's Fire Potential Index (FPI) has been empirically trained and validated with real fire activity. The product is hexel-based (h3) allowing a better temporal and spatial analysis of outcomes, including the analysis by district or any administrative division.

<p>Appendix C Additional Maps</p>

Appendix C: Additional Maps

In this appendix, the electrical corporation must provide the additional maps required by the Guidelines. As stated in the General Directions, if any additional maps needed for clarity (e.g., the scale is insufficiently large to show useful detail), the electrical corporation must either provide those additional maps in this appendix or host applicable geospatial layers on a publicly accessible web viewer. If the electrical corporation chooses the latter option, it must refer to the specific web address in appropriate places throughout its WMP. Additionally, the electrical corporation must host these layers until the submission of its 2026-2028 WMP or until otherwise directed by Energy Safety. The electrical corporation may not modify these publicly available layers without cause or without notifying Energy Safety.

Liberty does not have additional maps to provide with its 2026-2028 Base WMP.

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1. Progress on Areas for Continued Improvement

This section provides required progress on the Areas of Continued Improvement (“ACIs”) identified by Energy Safety in its Final Decision on Liberty’s 2025 WMP Update.¹

1.1 LU-25U-01: PSPS and Wildfire Risk Trade-Off Transparency

Description: Liberty’s PSPS risk model is still in development. Liberty has not provided sufficient detail on how PSPS risk impacts its decision-making compared to wildfire risk.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Provide a description of how it plans to quantify PSPS risk and integrate PSPS risk into its overall risk assessment once its PSPS risk model is in place. This must include how Liberty plans on analyzing the trade-offs between PSPS risk and wildfire risk.
- Develop and provide a timeline and milestones for implementing PSPS risk calculations into its suite of risk modeling tools. This must include a description of where PSPS risk impacts Liberty’s current decision-making framework and process.
- Describe how Liberty expects PSPS risk will impact the outputs (circuit risk rankings) of its overall risk model and associated prioritization of mitigation initiatives.

Liberty Response: Liberty provides an update to its PSPS risk calculations and assessment in Section 5: Risk Methodology and Assessment of its 2026-2028 Base WMP.

1.2 LU-25U-02: Vendor Fire Risk Model Implementation Milestones and Dates

Description: While Liberty provided a high-level summary of its risk modeling updates, it did not provide a detailed, concrete breakdown of the steps it plans to implement or specific target completion dates for each of the steps involved in updating its models.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Provide updates on the progress made for implementing new models as shown in Figure 5-2: Timeline of Liberty’s Risk Modeling Plan of its 2025 WMP Update,²²⁴ including dates of actual completion and any new updates not captured in this timeline.
- Provide Liberty’s latest timeline for risk model implementation with milestones and associated target dates of completion, including a detailed breakdown of the various

¹ Energy Safety Decision on Liberty 2025 WMP Update, April 8, 2025.

components and objectives required to complete a given task, and interim measures used for decision-making while implementation is in progress.

- Explain how Liberty is using the results from the Direxyon Risk Assessment Tool (DRAT) to determine the prioritization of its mitigations, including the determination of highest risk circuits and selection of mitigation activities.

Liberty Response: Table 1-1 below provides an update on the milestones listed in Liberty’s Risk Modeling Plan of its 2025 WMP Update. Liberty provides additional details regarding how Liberty is using the Direxyon Risk Assessment Tool in Section 5: Risk Methodology and Assessment and Section 6: Wildfire Mitigation Strategy Development of its 2026-2028 Base WMP.

Table 1-1: 2025 WMP Update Milestones

Milestone	Status
Enhancements to Asset Data Collection in Fulcrum	Completed 2024
Include Vegetation Management in SQL	Completed 2024
Vegetation Management BI Suite	Completed 2024
Add Asset Types in Direxyon (poles, fuses, conductor, vegetation)	Completed 2024
Operationalize Technosylva FireSight & FireRisk	Completed 2025
Operationalize Direxyon Asset Risk Analysis Tool	Completed 2025
Update/Enhance Direxyon Asset Risk Analysis	Completed 2025
PSPS Risk Assessment Solution	Completed 2025

1.3 LU-25U-03: Cross-Utility Collaboration on Best Practices for Inclusion of Climate Change Forecasts in Consequence Modeling, Inclusion of Community Vulnerability in Consequence Modeling, and Utility Vegetation Management for Wildfire Safety

Description: In response to LU-23-05, Liberty participated in past Energy Safety-sponsored scoping meetings on these topics. However, Liberty did not report on any additional WMP-related collaboration with the other California IOUs as of its 2025 WMP Update submission.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must continue its existing collaboration efforts and demonstrate that it has made efforts to specifically collaborate with PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, BVES, and PacifiCorp, where appropriate and relevant to each IOU’s interests. Liberty must also document how its collaboration efforts with the other California IOUs impacted the WMP initiatives presented in its 2026-2028 Base WMP.

Liberty must also continue to participate in all Energy Safety Safety-organized activities related to best practices for:

- Inclusion of climate change forecasts in consequence modeling.
- Inclusion of community vulnerability in consequence modeling.
- Utility vegetation management for wildfire safety.

Liberty Response:

Collaboration with PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, BVES, and PacifiCorp

Liberty collaborates with other utilities, including PG&E, SDG&E, SCE, BVES, and PacifiCorp through monthly meetings focusing on Energy Safety activities and other WMP-related topics such as:

- Inspection programs;
- Vegetation management programs;
- Quality Control programs;
- Internal and Contract Resources;
- Remote Sensing Technologies; and
- Optimization of the off-cycle HFTD inspections.

In addition to meetings driven by Energy Safety, the utilities also collaborate by participating in various industry-related events throughout the year to share best practices and further knowledge on these topics.

Inclusion of climate change forecasts in consequence modeling

Liberty will continue to participate in all Energy Safety-organized activities related to best practices for inclusion of climate change forecasts in consequence modeling.

Inclusion of community vulnerability in consequence modeling

Liberty will continue to participate in all Energy Safety-organized activities related to best practices for inclusion of community vulnerability in consequence modeling.

Utility vegetation management for wildfire safety

Liberty will continue to participate in all Energy Safety-organized activities related to best practices for utility vegetation management for wildfire safety.

1.4 LU-23B-06: Effectiveness of Sensitive Relay Profile (“SRP”) and Traditional Hardening

Description: Liberty stated that it is not pursuing more installation of covered conductor due to implementation of SRP and the use of traditional hardening but does not adequately demonstrate the effectiveness or comparability of SRP versus covered conductor.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Provide its calculations for ignition reduction effectiveness for covered conductor compared to SRP, traditional hardening, and SRP in combination with traditional hardening. This must demonstrate considerations of various ignition risk drivers, deployment time and resources, performance comparison in forested versus non-forested areas, and risk model output of riskiest areas.
- Use the analysis performed to set its covered conductor targets as appropriate.

Liberty Response: Table 1-1 below provides comparison of risk calculations for undergrounding, covered conductor, and traditional overhead hardening with and without SRP enabled. In all scenarios, SRP enablement in combination with other activities is preferred due to its additional risk reduction. Traditional overhead hardening in combination with SRP provides the best Risk Spend Efficiency when compared to covered conductor and undergrounding.

Table 1-2: Comparison of Risk Calculations

Project	Cost (Millions \$)	Min	Max	Average	Median	Benefit
Cover without SRP	1.47	78	223	128.31	109.51	0.797415
Undergrounding without SRP	6.96	77	228	128.06	111	0.192619
Undergrounding	7.46	75	216	123.73	106	0.629256
Cover	1.97	71	217	124.31	106	2.187671
Normal Replacement Baseline	0.54	78	222	124.42	107	8.259496
Normal Replacement without SRP (Baseline)	0.04	80	238	129.79	112	N/A

Additional Liberty Response, per Critical Issue RN-LU-26-04:

1. Ignition Reduction Effectiveness for the projects and activities in Appendix D: Table 1-2.

In its response to area for continued improvement LU-23B-06, Liberty calculated the ignition reduction effectiveness for two projects in Appendix D: Table 1-2, the Tahoe Vista Rule 20 project and the Stateline Resiliency project. After recalibrating the risk model and methodology for calculating wildfire risk, Liberty is providing an updated table that includes the ignition reduction effectiveness of various scenarios for the Stateline Resiliency project. These scenarios include probability of fire calculations of no replacement with and without SRP as well as normal replacement (bare wire), covered conductor, and underground conductor with and without SRP. The scenario of not replacing the conductor without SRP enabled was used as the baseline against which all other scenarios were compared. In all scenarios in which the conductor is replaced, there is a greater than 14% reduction in the probability of fire. Covered conductor and normal replacement show similar risk reduction results. Scenarios of covered conductor and normal replacement with SRP resulted in increased risk reduction than without SRP. Both the scenario of underground conductor with SRP and underground conductor without SRP resulted in the greatest risk reduction for the project. See Table 1-3: below for the ignition reduction effectiveness results.

To calculate the ignition reduction effectiveness, Liberty used the following calculation:

$$((\text{Baseline} - \text{Scenario}) / \text{Baseline}) * 100 = \% \text{ Ignition Risk Reduction}$$

Table 1-3: Effectiveness of Activities for the Stateline Resiliency Project

Scenario	Probability of Fire	% Ignition Risk Reduction
No Replacement Without SRP (baseline)	0.001400853	0.00%
No Replacement With SRP	0.001370988	2.13%
Covered Conductor Without SRP	0.001200451	14.31%
Normal Replacement Without SRP	0.001192315	14.89%
Covered Conductor With SRP	0.001128903	19.41%
Normal Replacement With SRP	0.001123307	19.81%
Underground Conductor Without SRP	0.001093527	21.94%
Underground Conductor With SRP	0.000993525	29.08%

2. Considerations of various ignition risk drivers, deployment time and resources, performance comparison in forested versus non-forested areas, and risk model output of riskiest areas and discussion of how Liberty determines covered conductor targets.

For the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, Liberty adopted a hybrid prioritization strategy that combines subject matter expertise with historical and emerging data. This approach is being applied while

Liberty is advancing development of enhancements to enable circuit-segment-level risk analysis within the Direxyon platform.

Covered conductor and traditional overhead hardening project selection begins with Liberty's Tier 3 High Fire-Threat District (HFTD) circuits and expands to include Liberty's top risk circuits identified through risk modeling. Top risk circuits with indicators of elevated risk are prioritized to achieve the greatest ignition risk reductions. Risk drivers for circuits considered in the risk model and by Liberty's subject matter experts include:

- Results from asset inspections;
- Age of assets;
- Probability and Consequence of Ignition from Technosylva wildfire risk models;
- Meteorological data such as historical wind gusts;
- Vegetation density;
- Overhead conductor span length;
- Fuse type;
- Number of tree attachments; and
- Outage data.

Liberty's current covered conductor projects were initiated before Liberty's risk-analysis framework was operational. Liberty is now transitioning to a quantitative, model-driven process for project selection and prioritization. The next phase of Direxyon development is expected to be operational during this WMP cycle and will provide segment-level ignition-reduction effectiveness calculations by comparing baseline risk to post-mitigation scenarios for each alternative, including covered conductor, undergrounding, and traditional hardening. Liberty has completed SRP implementation throughout its system and risk modeling refinement is being conducted to quantify the risk reduction of these alternative scenarios in combination with SRP enabled.

As this data matures, Liberty will use it to prioritize segments where model outputs indicate the highest expected risk reduction per dollar spent; integrate GO 165 findings and vegetation exposure to identify segments where conductor replacement addresses both wildfire risk and asset condition needs; and set annual covered conductor targets by aligning these high-priority segments with available construction resources, permitting timelines, and budget constraints. Table 1-4 provides a comparison of deployment time considerations for grid hardening initiatives.

Table 1-4: Summary of Project Timelines for Grid Hardening Initiatives

Mitigation	Initiate	Planning	Schedule	Execute	Total Duration
Sensitive Relay Profile (SRP)	1-2 months	1-2 months	1-2 months	1-3 months	4-8 months
Traditional Overhead Hardening	2-3 months	4-9 months	4-9 months	4-12 months	12-30 months
Covered Conductor	2-3 months	9-18 months	9-18 months	4-9 months	24-48 months
Undergrounding	3-6 months	12-24 months	12-24 months	9-18 months	36-72 months

As demonstrated by recent risk modeling results, the risk mitigation effectiveness of covered conductor and traditional overhead hardening (normal replacement) provide similar results. As part of its plan to improve the risk model, Liberty will work to validate and recalibrate results as model enhancements continue. Traditional overhead hardening may be the preferred mitigation activity due considerations of cost, maintenance, and inspection requirements; however, forested vs. non-forested areas will influence which mitigation approach is selected. In non-forested areas, such as Topaz and Markleeville, Liberty may choose traditional overhead hardening, because there is more opportunity to design the project with additional poles and wider crossarms. Where possible, Liberty will install additional poles to create shorter span lengths, and wider crossarms to increase the distance between phases of conductors to minimize the likelihood of wire-to-wire contact during high wind events which can lead to an ignition. In heavily forested areas, such as South Lake Tahoe and Meyers, there is less opportunity for installing additional poles and wider crossarms due to presence of large trees, which removal may not be possible due to environmental permitting constraints or not prudent due to increased vegetation management costs. Where traditional overhead hardening is not feasible due to these constraints, covered conductor is an alternative mitigation activity.

For the remainder of the 2026–2028 WMP cycle, Liberty will continue using the hybrid method, combining HFTD Tier 3 circuits, recent risk event data, and circuit-level analysis to scope and sequence projects while refining segment-level model precision. Liberty will document and validate the quantitative ignition-reduction effectiveness for SRP, covered conductor, and traditional hardening alternatives, and incorporate forested versus non-forested performance comparisons once the model outputs are available at sufficient spatial resolution.

This evolving process will allow Liberty to continue to set mitigation targets that remain both defensible and proportionate to its small rate base, balancing affordability with the highest achievable ignition-risk reduction across its approximately 700 miles of primary distribution

1.5 LU-25U-04: Cost-Benefit Analysis for the Stateline Resiliency Project

Description: Liberty's updated target, projected expenditure, and project changes to its undergrounding initiative in 2025 raise concerns about the cost-benefit ratio of undergrounding in its service territory.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Discuss its undergrounding cost-benefit analysis evaluation and decision-making process, including consideration of feasibility and resource use efficiency, and its plan to improve on this process based on lessons learned. This discussion must include lessons learned from the Tahoe Vista project.
- Provide cost-benefit analysis and cost-benefit ratios for hardening the Stateline Resiliency Project through undergrounding, covered conductor, SRP, covered conductor in combination with SRP, and traditional hardening in combination with SRP. This analysis must consider the risk drivers present on the affected circuits, the effectiveness of each mitigation at addressing the present risk drivers, the estimated capital cost of each initiative activity, and the time required to implement each initiative activity. For each hardening scenario, Liberty must provide the estimated circuit risk scores after hardening. Liberty must also provide documentation to support the methodology, calculations, and estimates used to determine the cost values applied in its cost benefit analysis.

Liberty Response: Liberty provides an analysis of two underground projects (Tahoe Vista and the State Line) based on the fire score, where lower is better. Note that every project that is modeled with SRP has an additional cost of \$500,000. Covered conductor seems to be the most beneficial approach since it makes additional budget available for other initiatives that could further reduce risk.

Table 1-5: Analysis of Undergrounding Projects

Project	Cost (Million \$)	Min	Max	Average	Median	Benefit (%) / Cost (Million \$)
Without SRP						
Covered Conductor without SRP	1.47	78	223	128.31	109.51	0.797415
Undergrounding without SRP	6.96	77	228	128.06	111	0.192619
Normal Replacement without SRP (baseline)	0.04	80	238	129.79	112	N/A
With SRP						
Undergrounding	7.46	75	216	123.73	106	0.081296
Covered Conductor	1.97	71	217	124.31	106	0.06744
Normal Replacement Baseline (baseline)	0.54	78	222	124.43	107	N/A

Additional Liberty Response, per Critical Issue RN-LU-26-05:

1. Lessons learned from the Tahoe Vista Project

The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) imposes a “construction season” for the Lake Tahoe Basin, which effectively limits when major earthwork, grading, and ground-disturbing construction can occur because of weather, runoff and environmental protection concerns. In addition to the limited window that such work is permitted to be done in the area, Caltrans permitting delays caused the Tahoe Vista Project to be deferred.

While Liberty had strong early coordination with Caltrans and proactively engaged contractors, Liberty identified several areas to further streamline similar projects going forward. These include: securing MSAs with qualified civil contractors in advance to reduce procurement cycle time; confirming contractor availability earlier in the season; refining how and when RFPs are issued so contractors have sufficient information to bid even while Caltrans permit conditions are still being finalized; improving early understanding of Caltrans traffic-control and lane-closure requirements during project development; and engaging civil contractors during design to ensure constructability and permit feasibility are fully aligned before bid and award. These refinements will help avoid compression of the permit–procurement timeline and better position future undergrounding and Rule 20 projects for successful execution within the short seasonal work window.

2. Cost Benefit Analysis

Table 1-6 provides the cost benefit analysis for the Stateline Resiliency Project where benefit is expressed as risk effectiveness achieved per million dollars spent. To calculate the cost benefit, Liberty used the following formula:

$$\frac{\frac{(\text{Effectiveness Baseline} - \text{Effectiveness Scenario})}{\text{Effectiveness Baseline}}}{\frac{\text{Estimated Cost}}{1,000,000}} = \text{Benefit Per \$1,000,000}$$

Table 1-6: Cost Benefit Analysis of Stateline Resiliency Project

Scenario	Risk Effectiveness	Estimated Cost	Benefit Per \$1,000,000
No Replacement Without SRP (baseline)	0.00000	\$0	N/A
Normal Replacement With SRP	0.19813	\$926,564.26	0.21383
Normal Replacement Without SRP	0.14886	\$926,564.26	0.16066
Covered Conductor With SRP	0.19413	\$2,454,342.00	0.07910
Covered Conductor Without SRP	0.14306	\$300,000.00	0.07106
No Replacement With SRP	0.02132	\$4,500,000.00	0.06462
Underground Conductor With SRP	0.29077	\$2,454,342.00	0.05829
Underground Conductor Without SRP	0.21939	\$4,500,000.00	0.04875

Liberty based its cost estimates for the normal replacement and covered conductor scenarios on historic costs of similar projects in the area. Due to limited availability of cost data for underground construction, Liberty used preliminary cost estimates and subject matter expertise to arrive at an estimated cost of \$4.5 million for the underground conductor scenario. The cost for SRP is approximately \$150,000 per circuit. Since Liberty has already completed SRP enablement on the two circuits that make up the Stateline Resiliency Project, the \$300,000 cost was only included in the scenario of “No Replacement With SRP” and was not added to the other scenarios.

Covered conductor cost was calculated by the use of data for 13 covered conductor projects that have been recently completed or have a budgeted cost to complete associated with them. These projects total nearly 16 miles of covered conductor and more than \$30 million of capital deployment. The average cost per mile for these projects is approximately \$2.2 million. Due to differences in location, access, and permitting of covered conductor projects, there is more variability in cost per mile. After removing the highest cost per mile project of \$4.8 million and the lowest cost per mile project of \$1.2 million, Liberty arrived at an average cost per mile of \$2,045,285.00. For 1.2 circuit miles, the estimated cost is \$2,454,342.00. Table 1-7 provides

details of the cost of the 13 projects used to arrive at the estimated project cost for the covered conductor scenarios.

Table 1-7: Covered Conductor Cost Analysis

Project Name	Cost	Mileage	Cost per Mile	Cost per Mile (less min & max)
Celio A	\$1,946,230	1.6	\$1,208,839	Min (removed)
Celio B	\$1,388,530	0.9	\$1,493,043	\$1,493,043
Fallen Leaf B	\$3,144,944.78	1.5	\$2,055,519	\$2,055,519
7300 Ph7	\$2,597,379.06	0.8	\$3,246,724	\$3,246,724
7300 Ph8	\$2,453,122.32	1.0	\$2,528,992	\$2,528,992
Angora (Ph 1 & Ph2)	\$4,703,935.39	1.8	\$2,613,297	\$2,613,297
Fallen Leaf C	\$2,610,974.74	1.5	\$1,740,650	\$1,740,650
7300 Ph9	\$1,840,773	0.4	\$4,844,139	Max (removed)
Fallen Leaf D	\$3,552,550	2.1	\$1,691,690	\$1,691,690
7300 Ph10	\$1,040,000	0.8	\$1,300,000	\$1,300,000
7300 Ph11	\$1,920,000	1.1	\$1,777,778	\$1,777,778
Spring Creek Tract	\$2,664,411	1.5	\$1,776,274	\$1,776,274
Fir Craggs	\$1,591,917	0.7	\$2,274,167	\$2,274,167
Average Cost Per Mile			\$2,196,239	\$2,045,285

Normal replacement cost was calculated by the use of data for 5 overhead line rebuild projects that have recently been completed. These projects total approximately 13 miles of primary overhead conductor and nearly \$7 million of capital deployed. The average cost per mile of these projects was approximately \$515 thousand per mile. These projects were completed outside of the Tahoe Basin where there is less complexity due to roadside access, less vegetation, and less permitting requirements. The Stateline Resiliency Project is in South Lake Tahoe which adds costs due to being more forested, complex permitting requirements, and additional considerations for limited operating periods, and traffic management. Taking these additional considerations into account, Liberty added a 1.5X multiplier to the average cost per mile and arrived at an estimated cost per mile of \$772,136.88. For 1.2 circuit miles, the estimated cost is \$926,564.26. Table 1-8 provides details of the cost of the 5 projects used to arrive at the estimated project cost for the normal replacement scenarios.

Table 1-8: Normal Replacement Cost Analysis

Project Name	Cost	Mileage	Cost per Mile	1.5 X Multiplier for Tahoe Basin
Eastside Lane Tap Rebuild	\$1,194,003.98	2.3	\$523,686	
Cunningham Tap Rebuild	\$1,869,373.53	3.8	\$494,543	
Larson Lane Tap Rebuild	\$1,739,611.53	3.4	\$508,658	
Topaz Lane Tap Rebuild Ph1	\$791,373.17	1.5	\$517,237	
Topaz Lane Rebuild Ph2	\$1,106,999.16	2.1	\$529,665	
Average Cost Per Mile			\$514,758	\$772,137

1.6 LU-25U-05: Conductor Inspections and Maintenance

Description: In its 2025 Update, Liberty stated that it is adding water intrusion, splice covers, surface damage/bulging, and bracket placement to its detailed inspection checklist. These criteria had not been added as of October 8, 2024. Liberty must tailor its inspection practices to address failure modes specifically related to covered conductor.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must demonstrate that it has added checks for water intrusion, splice covers, surface damage/bulging, and bracket placement to its detailed inspection checklist. If Liberty determines any or all the preceding changes are unnecessary, then it must provide how its current inspection and maintenance processes address covered conductor failure modes.

Liberty Response: Liberty added the covered conductor criteria for water intrusion, splice covers, surface damage/bulging, and bracket placement to its detailed asset inspection checklist in June of 2024. Refer to Figure 1-1 for a screenshot of Liberty's detailed inspection checklist, which includes the required covered conductor criteria.

Figure 1-1: Screenshot of Liberty's Detailed Asset Inspection Checklist

The screenshot shows a web-based form for entering codes for failed inspections. The form is titled "Enter Codes for Failed Inspections (editing)" and has a green checkmark icon in the top right corner. Below the title bar, there is a section for "Metadata" with fields for "Duration" (1 second (First Creation)) and "Location" (No Location Change). The "Repairs" section includes fields for "Inspection Comment", "Priority for Repair", "Repaired?", "Repaired By", "Repair Date", "Repair Comments", and "Repair Photo". A dropdown menu is open, showing a list of "Condition Codes for Failed Inspections" including: CC Bracket Placement, CC Damage or Bulging, CC Splice Cover, CC Water Intrusion, Clearance, Conductor Issue, Crossarm Braces Falling Off, Crossarm Needs Replacing, Equipment Anchors, Foreign Objects on Poles, Ground Wire Damaged/Missing, Ground Molding Damaged/Missing, Guys/Guards Broken/Loose, High Voltage Sign Problem, Idle hardware, Lid/Door Inoperable, Insulators Need Replacing, and Missing Bolt Covers.

1.7 LU-23B-10: Distribution Detailed Inspection Frequency

Description: Liberty performs the minimum frequency of detailed inspections required by GOs 95 and 165. Liberty must strive to adopt a risk-based approach by increasing the frequency of detailed inspections on assets that have the highest risk according to its risk model.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must either:

- Outline a plan to update its detailed inspections in higher risk areas, including:
 - An analysis for determining the updated frequency for performing detailed inspections.
 - Prioritization of higher risk areas based on risk analysis and risk model output, including HFTD Tier 3 lands.
 - Updates to inspection checklists to account for equipment or configurations that may pose greater wildfire risk.

- A plan to obtain any needed workforce for performing more frequent inspections; OR
- Demonstrate that its existing inspection program adequately addresses risk. This must include analysis of the following:
 - Number of Level 1 and Level 2 issues found during detailed inspections of its highest risk circuits.

Liberty Response: Nearly all of Liberty's service territory lies within High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Tier 2 or Tier 3; therefore, Liberty treats the entire system as a high fire risk area when scheduling detailed inspections. Liberty's program incorporates a risk-based approach by using additional patrol inspections during high-risk events and performing other discretionary inspections of electric lines and equipment based on environmental exposure.

Liberty's inspection program is fully compliant with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) General Order (GO) 165, which mandates detailed inspections of electric distribution facilities at intervals not exceeding five years. Patrol inspections to identify hazards are conducted more frequently in the normal course of business. Liberty adheres to these standards by conducting comprehensive detailed inspections on a five-year cycle. These detailed inspections are supplemented with routine patrol inspections for the remainder of the system to address risk on areas not immediately due for detailed inspections. This approach provides 100% coverage of the entire system on an annual basis.

In its Base 2026-2028 WMP, Liberty is implementing an optimized detailed asset inspection schedule to make the number of inspections completed consistent year over year. Liberty's previous inspection schedule was based on inspecting 20% of the circuit miles in its system each year. Liberty has updated its inspection scheduling process to account for two factors:

- 1) Liberty's assets are not distributed evenly across its service territory. That is, some areas of its system have a much higher density of electric assets than others.
- 2) Liberty's past inspection process scheduled inspection of distribution and transmission assets at different times and did not account for proximity of distribution assets to transmission assets.

Liberty's inspection schedule is still based on a five-year cycle; however, it is now basing its target calculation on the number of electric assets rather than circuit miles. Liberty is now also simultaneously inspecting distribution and transmission assets that are in the same corridor of its system. Both changes will optimize inspection efforts and improve consistency of completed inspections year over year.

Additional Liberty Response, per Critical Issue RN-LU-26-06:

1. Plan to increase Liberty's detailed distribution inspection frequency during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Beginning in 2026, Liberty plans to add annual drone inspection for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone. HFTD-3 is designated by the California Public Utility Commission as having extreme wildfire risk. Based on the updated risk assessments performed as part of this revision notice, to include only wildfire risk, there is notable overlap between the riskiest circuits and circuits located within the HFTD-3 zone. Liberty will focus this incremental drone inspection program on the HFTD-3 zone, however as Liberty's risk assessment results continue to mature per the Risk Assessment Improvement Plan, Liberty will consider adjusting its drone inspection program based on the risk results. This incremental detailed drone inspection program is intended to proactively identify Level 1 and 2 conditions, as defined by General Order 95.

2. Plan to implement additional inspection programs that proactively identify Level 1 and 2 conditions during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.

Liberty is planning to utilize drone inspections to identify Level 1 and 2 conditions as well. As part of this effort, Liberty has connected with drone inspection service vendors as well as other utilities performing drone inspections to educate itself on best practices and areas of improvement in the use of drone inspections. For example, in October of 2025, Liberty sent a request for information to nearly two dozen inspection service vendors to assess what services and capabilities best suit Liberty's needs. Subsequently, Liberty will be initiating a request for proposal in December of 2025. Liberty has requested the drone services include thermal detection capabilities.

Liberty plans to identify and partner with a full-service drone inspection entity by the Spring of 2026. The plan is to implement annual, detailed, drone inspection on all distribution and transmission circuits within Liberty's HFTD-3 zone, beginning in 2026. There are approximately 127 miles of transmission and distribution circuits, including approximately 1,682 poles, in Liberty's HFTD-3 zone.

3. Analysis of Level 1 and 2 conditions found on Liberty's highest wildfire risk circuits.

LU-23B-10 required that if Liberty elected not to adopt a risk-based approach, then Liberty must demonstrate that its existing program adequately addresses risk through an analysis of Level 1 and 2 conditions found during detailed inspections of its highest risk circuits. Because Liberty is implementing an annual drone inspection program of its HFTD-3 zone beginning in

2026, this analysis may not be required, however, because this Revision Notice requires this analysis, refer to Table 1-9, which includes the number of Level 1 and 2 findings, and the date of the most recent detailed inspection for the circuits requested.

Analysis identified that after the detailed inspection of 2020, which included a detailed inspection of Liberty's entire system, there have been approximately 19% fewer Level 1 and 2 conditions recorded in the sum of the years following (2021 through year-to-date 2025). Liberty correlates the decrease in identified conditions with the investments made in the system throughout this same period. This aligns with the improvement seen in these same years regarding the System Average Interruption Duration and Frequency Indexes (SAIDI and SAIFI). Both SAIDI and SAIFI have been steadily improving, including a 36-percent drop in minutes for both indices between 2021 and 2024, when considering the performance of the entire system.

In addition, as depicted in the workbook, 35-percent of the Level 2 conditions were directly related to issues with the poles themselves. Liberty has aggressively executed its pole replacement program. For example, 83-percent of the Level 2 conditions identified are corrected with a new pole and associated hardware. Once a pole and its associated hardware is replaced, it's much less likely that a Level 1 or 2 condition will return for quite some time. Liberty's pole replacement program is an effective tool for addressing Level 2 conditions and reducing the risk of wildfire ignitions.

Liberty has made significant efforts in maintaining its entire system, which includes the detailed inspection of the entire system. This is demonstrated by the upward trend in reduced identified conditions. In continuation of its efforts, Liberty will be commencing the annual drone inspection program of the HFTD-3 zone. Liberty will also continue to evaluate the effectiveness of inspections and subsequent programs to address identified condition codes.

Table 1-9: Analysis of Level 1 and 2 Conditions Found on Liberty's Highest Risk Circuits

Overhead Detailed Inspections				5 Most Frequent Condition Codes			
Circuit	Most Recent Inspection Date	Priority Level 1 Assets	Priority Level 2 Assets	Priority	Count	Condition Codes	Notes
111	7/25/2024	0	27	Level 2	21 8 1	Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Work Space/Climbing Space Crossarm Needs Replacing	
132	4/1/2022	1	4	Level 1 Level 2	1 1 1 1 1	Hardware Issue Pole Needs Replaced Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Insulators Need Replacing Tree / Vegetation Issue	Pin broken and insulator inverted
608	4/6/2022	0	46	Level 2	21	Pole Cracked Pole Needs Replaced Pole Top Split Crossarm Broken / Loose Crossarm Needs Replacing	
609	12/29/2022	0	16	Level 2	8 7 6 5 5	Guys / Guards Broken / Loose High Voltage Sign Problem Pole Needs Replaced Pole Cracked Pole Stub	
619 (includes LOY619)	2/9/2022	0	1	Level 2	1	Crossarm Broken/Loose	
629	11/23/2022	0	12	Level 2	4 4 3 3 3	Guys / Guards Broken / Loose Insulators Need Replacing Bare Jumpers High Voltage Sign Problem Need Stirrups	
640	9/10/2024	0	13	Level 2	11 1 1 1	Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Conductor Issue Crossarm Braces Falling Off Crossarm Needs Replacing	

Overhead Detailed Inspections				5 Most Frequent Condition Codes			
Circuit	Most Recent Inspection Date	Priority Level 1 Assets	Priority Level 2 Assets	Priority	Count	Condition Codes	Notes
CAL204 (renamed CAL2501)	9/7/2022	0	17	Level 2	11 9 8 7 6	Need Stirrups Pole Top Split Pole Cracked Bare Jumpers Pole Needs Replaced	
CEM41	9/24/2020	0	7	Level 2	3 2 1 1 1	Other Hardware Issue (Describe) Pole Needs Replaced Crossarm Broken / Split / Loose Crossarm Needs Replacing High Voltage Sign Problem	Conductor not properly secured
CEM42	9/24/2020	0	5	Level 2	3 1 1 1	Tree / Vegetation Issue Other Conductor Issue (Describe) Pole Leaning / Unsafe to Climb Pole Needs Replaced	Preform tie coming off center phase
GLS7600	11/9/2024	0	2	Level 2	1 1	Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Insulators Need Replacing	
HOB7700	9/19/2020	0	3	Level 2	2 1 1 1 1	Pole Needs Replaced Other Other Conductor Issue (Describe) Pole Cracked Pole Rot	East side phase tie wire is loose East side phase tie wire is loose
POR3100	11/11/2024	0	4	Level 2	1 1 1 1	Clearance Crossarm Needs Replacing Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Insulators Need Replacing	
POR3200	11/11/2024	0	58	Level 2	16 10 10 8 5	Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Clearance Crossarm Needs Replacing Ground Molding Damaged/Missing Conductor Issue	
RUS7900	2/27/2025	0	2	Level 2	1 1	Conductor Issue Guys/Guards Broken/Loose	

Overhead Detailed Inspections				5 Most Frequent Condition Codes			
Circuit	Most Recent Inspection Date	Priority Level 1 Assets	Priority Level 2 Assets	Priority	Count	Condition Codes	Notes
SQV8300	9/4/2024	0	11	Level 2	3 3 2 1 1	Clearance Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Insulators Need Replacing Conductor Issue Equipment Anchors	
STL2200	3/21/2025	0	3	Level 2	3 2 1	Crossarm Needs Replacing Insulators Need Replacing Clearance	
STL3101	9/17/2020	0	85	Level 2	36 31 25 24 23	Pole Top Split Bare Jumpers Need Stirrups Grey Wire Pole Cracked	
TAH7200	6/18/2024	0	8	Level 2	4 2 1 1	Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Crossarm Needs Replacing Conductor Issue Insulators Need Replacing	
TRK7202	11/12/2024	0	19	Level 2	10 4 4 2 1	Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Insulators Need Replacing Work Space/Climbing Space Conductor Issue Equipment Anchors	
WSH201	10/31/2025	0	6	Level 2	3 1 1 1 1	Crossarm Needs Replacing Conductor Issue Crossarm Braces Falling Off Guys/Guards Broken/Loose Insulators Need Replacing	

1.8 LU-25U-06: Additional Inspection Practices

Description: In its 2023-2025 Base WMP, Liberty stated that it planned to incorporate three technologies (LiDAR, infrared, and drone inspections) during the 2023-2025 WMP cycle. Energy Safety required Liberty to define the pilot program scopes and provide timelines and milestones for each technology. In its 2025 WMP Update, Liberty did not provide timelines and milestones.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Provide a timeline for each technology. The timeline must include start and end dates for the planning, execution, and analysis phases of each pilot.
- Provide and explain the pilot scope for each technology, including how the scope is selected to ensure that Liberty has timely and usable outputs.
- Define how it will determine the success of each pilot and provide the criteria that it will use for each pilot to determine whether to make the pilot a continuous program.

Liberty Response: Throughout the 2023-2025 WMP cycle, Liberty piloted infrared inspections, LiDAR inspections, and drone inspections as other discretionary asset inspections. Below are updates on each technology and pilot:

- Infrared inspections: In 2023, Liberty piloted and completed 0.1 miles of fixed wing drone infrared inspections on its transmission assets. The inspections were performed on 120kV and 60kV riser poles to identify hot spots on the potheads, cable and other associated hardware at the riser locations. No discrepancies were noted during these inspections. Liberty does not plan to conduct additional infrared inspections during the 2026-2028 WMP cycle.
- Drone inspections: Liberty piloted one mile of drone inspections in 2024, utilizing an internal drone and pilot. Liberty identified benefits for drone inspections for outage management due to hazardous winter conditions, including affected infrastructure in avalanche zones. In winter conditions, avalanche hazards often prevent qualified staff from accessing these remote locations to inspect facilities prior to re-energization. The ability to use a drone in these situations expedites either the restoration efforts or identifying hazardous conditions that are causing the outage which allows Liberty to properly plan its repair work. Liberty will continue to set a target for drone inspections in its other discretionary asset inspection WMP initiative.
- LiDAR inspections: Liberty performed a LiDAR inspection of its system in 2024, with a focus on gaining increased visibility and data for mapping tree attachments and secondary wires. The data acquired from the LiDAR inspection was used to update the

inventory of tree attachments in Liberty's GIS. The data was also uploaded into the Direxion Risk Assessment Tool, described in Section 5 of Liberty 2026-2028 WMP, to assess risk impacts from tree attachment removal and open wire/grey wire secondary removal initiatives.

Liberty does not plan any additional pilot projects for its other discretionary asset inspections WMP initiative.

Additional Liberty Response, per Critical Issue RN-LU-26-07:

1. How Liberty selected the assets to be inspected during its infrared pilot.

Quanta Aviation is a vendor that specializes in managing, coordinating, and serving electric power aviation operations. Utilizing Quanta Aviation services, Liberty completed 0.1 miles of drone inspections on its transmission assets during the infrared pilot. The criteria for the pilot were qualitative and focused on understanding how a drone can perform the inspection and if the drone can produce results equal to or better than ground-based infrared inspection. The inspections were performed on and around transmission riser poles so that Liberty could identify hot spots on the potheads, arrestors, connections and other associated hardware. Liberty's decision to select these assets for the pilot was guided by subject matter experts who have experience with ground-based infrared inspection with these types of assets. Liberty was able to compare the results of the pilot to assess the reliability of the infrared inspection.

Furthermore, Liberty piloted the use of drones for demand response inspection including 1.4 miles of inspection on the various distribution and sub-transmission circuits, including the Tahoe City 7300, Truckee 7202, and the T609 line. The drone was piloted by Liberty's inspector and focused on the qualitative capability and efficiency of the drone.

Liberty also piloted the use of drones to perform 2.2 miles of detailed inspection on the Washoe 201 circuit. The inspection was performed by Liberty's inspector and focused on the qualitative capability and efficiency of the drone.

2. The success criteria used in Liberty's infrared pilot.

The criteria Liberty used for the infrared pilot was whether the drone was able to successfully and safely perform an infrared inspection in a manner that was equal to or better than a ground-based inspection.

Although the infrared pilot identified zero thermal or visual anomalies during the inspection, the drone was able to successfully and safely inspect the assets from multiple angles, including detection for hot spots.

3. Expansion of the infrared pilot.

Liberty has been cautious to expand its drone infrared inspection program as Liberty wanted to ensure healthy maturation and prudence of drone inspection service capabilities and efficiencies. That said, after performing these pilots and speaking with drone inspection service vendors as well as other utilities performing drone inspections, Liberty plans to add annual drone inspection for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone beginning in 2026. Liberty plans to evaluate infrared detection as part of the full-service agreement with the selected vendor.

4. Implementation of infrared inspections as a continuous program.

Liberty plans to add annual drone inspection for all distribution and transmission circuits within its HFTD-3 zone beginning in 2026. Liberty plans to evaluate infrared detection as part of the full-service agreement with the selected vendor.

1.9 LU-25U-07: Reliability Impacts of SRP

Description: Liberty has not demonstrated an understanding of the reliability impacts of using SRP.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Provide the following information for 2024 outages that occurred while SRP settings were enabled in a spreadsheet format:
 - Circuit impacted by outage.
 - Circuit segment impacted by outage.
 - Cause of outage (in line with QDR Table 6 drivers).
 - Number of customers impacted.
 - Number of customers impacted belonging to vulnerable populations (such as customers with access and functional needs and Medical Baseline customers).
 - Duration of outage.
 - Response time to outage.
 - Customer minutes of interruption.
- Provide Liberty's calculations on the effectiveness of the SRP implementation. This must demonstrate calculations of avoided ignitions based on outages that occurred.
- Discuss any expected changes in SRP implementation based on the above, including percentages of coverage across Liberty's territory and SRP enablement thresholds used by Liberty.

Liberty Response:

Table 1-10: Liberty 2024 Outages Occurring While SRP Settings Enabled

Circuit Impacted	Circuit Segment Impacted	Cause of Outage	Customers Impacted	Vulnerable Customers Impacted	Outage Duration (minutes)	Outage Response Time (minutes)	Customer Minutes Interrupted
Meyers 3300 (MEY3300)	Downstream of MEY3300R4	Downed wire	19	0	128.58	4	2,438

Liberty's calculations on the effectiveness of SRP implementation

Liberty provides details regarding its SRP calculations in Section 5.2: Risk Analysis Framework of its 2026-2028 Base WMP.

Changes in SRP Implementation

Liberty does not plan any changes to its SRP program implementation throughout the 2026-2028 WMP cycle. By the end of 2025, Liberty will have 100% coverage of SRP across its system.

Severe Fire Danger Index ("SFDI") is used to help determine when to enable SRP Fast Trip settings on circuits to mitigate wildfire risk. When SFDI is "Severe", Liberty will put circuits into 'Extreme Fire Mode' to enable Fast Trip settings. In addition, Red Flag Warnings, issued by the National Weather Service, could warrant Extreme Fire Mode settings. Red Flag conditions are generally correlated with Severe SFDI. The circuits will remain in Extreme Fire Mode until SFDI is no longer "Severe" or a Red Flag Warning is no longer in effect. Liberty provides additional details regarding SFDI in Section 10.6 Fire Potential Index of its 2026-2028 Base WMP.

Now that the initial implementation phase is complete, Liberty will start reviewing one-third of the circuits every three years to confirm that the settings still adequately reduce wildfire risk. The addition of more line reclosers will allow Liberty to better sectionalize and have protective devices closer to the fault locations.

1.10 LU-25U-08: Evaluation of High Impedance Fault Detection

Description: In response to LU-23-16, Liberty cited the University of Nevada Reno (UNR) study's recommendation to pursue a fast-tripping scheme and not pursue High Impedance Fault Detection (HIFD) technology. Liberty has not demonstrated how this approach will effectively mitigate high impedance faults, like fallen conductors, given its limited plan to enable SRP

settings for only 10-12 days per year. Additionally, Liberty has not presented a comprehensive solution for detecting fallen conductors, an issue that SRP settings alone cannot resolve.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Provide a detailed explanation of how the fast-tripping scheme will detect fallen conductors without HIFD, particularly how relay thresholds and settings will be used to detect fallen conductors.
- Provide a detailed explanation of how enabling SRP settings 10-12 days per year provides sufficient reduction of wildfire risk due to fallen conductors.
- Present alternative or complementary strategies to detect fallen conductors and describe how these approaches will be integrated with the current fast-tripping scheme.
- Outline a clear, measurable implementation plan to address fallen conductor detection, including a timeline to implement, the strategies or combination of strategies to be implemented, how strategies will be validated, and coordination with other electrical corporations to adopt best practices and technologies for mitigating this risk.

Liberty Response: Liberty agrees that fast-tripping schemes will not reliably detect fallen conductors and high impedance faults without HIFD. Enabling SRP settings 10-12 days per year does not provide sufficient reduction in wildfire risk due to fallen conductors. Liberty's alternative strategy is to utilize the Sensitive Earth Fault ("SEF") protection module on three-wire uni-grounded wye feeders. This scheme utilizes a ground element that is set relatively low (20-40A pickup) with a definite time-delay of 2-4 seconds. This scheme has been a standard for three-wire circuits since the system was owned by NV Energy.

To address this ACI, Liberty will compare its SEF implementation on three-wire circuits to other utilities to align with their strategies. If sufficient operational data is not available, Liberty will seek out operational data from the other utilities. For Liberty's small amount of four-wire distribution where SEF protection is not feasible, Liberty will evaluate alternative methodologies and adopt best practices and technologies for mitigating this risk. Liberty will have a report detailing its findings and a corrective action plan by Q2 of 2026.

1.11 LU-25U-09: Weather Station Optimization

Description: Liberty plans to use a weather station optimization tool to identify spatial gaps in its weather station network and determine if additional weather stations are needed. Liberty must report on its progress as it completes the assessment.

Required Progress: In its 2026-2028 Base WMP, Liberty must:

- Describe how the weather optimization tool was used to assess the density of weather stations in its service territory.
- Summarize the results of the assessment.
- Provide any locations identified for additional weather station installations.
- Include the number of weather stations planned for future installations of weather stations, based on the assessment.

Liberty Response: The weather optimization tool is used to create similarity scores between areas with weather stations compared to areas without weather stations. A low similarity to weather station areas indicates places to add weather stations and improve coverage.

Data inputs into the model include:


- Coordinates of existing weather stations
- Coordinates of locations without weather stations
- Climate data layers for service territory

Model output:

- Raster for service territory with similarity scores

The results of the assessment demonstrated a positive improvement in similarity scores for Liberty's service territory. Refer to Figure 1-2. All planned weather station installations to improve coverage have been completed. No additional weather stations are currently planned.

Figure 1-2: Liberty Weather Station Optimization Similarity Scores



<p>Appendix E Referenced Regulations, Codes, and Standards</p>
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Appendix E: Referenced Regulations, Codes, and Standards

In this appendix, the electrical corporation must provide in tabulated format a list of referenced codes, regulations, and standards.

Name of Regulation, Code, or Standard	Brief Description
Public Utilities Code § 8386	Law that requires electric corporations to submit wildfire mitigation plans.
Public Utilities Code section 768.6	Statute related to emergency and disaster preparedness plans.
General Order 166	Standards for Operation, Reliability, and Safety During Emergencies and Disasters.
Government Code section 8593.3	The California Government Code Section 8593.3 defines Access and Functional Needs as “Individuals who have: Developmental, intellectual, or physical disabilities; Chronic conditions or injuries; Limited English proficiency or non-English speaking; Or individuals who are: older adults, children, or pregnant; living in institutional settings; or Low-income, homeless, and/or transportation disadvantaged.”
Public Resources Code § 4292	CAL FIRE requires 10 feet of minimum clearance around the base of the pole cleared of all flammable vegetation down to bare soil and the removal of all dead tree branches within this cylinder up to the cross-arm (within the State Responsibility Area).
Office of Energy Safety (“OEIS”) 2023-2025 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Process and Evaluation Guidelines	This document establishes guidelines ¹ outlining the process for disposition of Wildfire Mitigation Plans (WMPs) and details the public participation process and submission requirements. These guidelines will remain in effect for the 2023-2025 WMP three-year cycle.
OEIS 2023-2025 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Technical Guidelines	OEIS has authority under Government Code section 15475.6 to “adopt guidelines setting forth the requirements, format, timing, and any other matters required to exercise its powers, perform its duties, and meet its responsibilities described in Sections 326, 326.1, and 326.2 and Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 8385) of Division 4.1 of the Public Utilities Code.

Name of Regulation, Code, or Standard	Brief Description
OEIS Final Decision on Liberty 2022 Wildfire Mitigation Plan Update	This Decision represents OEIS’ assessment of Liberty’s 2022 WMP Update and approves Liberty’s 2022 Update, with areas for continued improvement identified.
OEIS Final Data Guidelines (Version 3.0)	Data Guidelines that set forth the required standards, schemas, and guidance on data preparation, submittal, and schedule for submission of Quarterly Data Report (QDR), Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data, and tabular Wildfire Mitigation Data to Energy Safety in support of its oversight and enforcement of electrical corporations’ compliance with wildfire safety.
General Order 95	Overhead electric line design, construction, and maintenance requirements in order to ensure adequacy of service and safety; covers topics such as proper grounding, clearances, strength requirements, and tree trimming.
General Order 165	Inspection requirements for transmission and distribution facilities in order to ensure safety and high-quality electrical service; sets maximum allowable inspection cycle lengths, scheduling and performance of corrective action, record-keeping, and reporting.
General Order 174	Inspection requirements for substations to promote the safety of workers, the public, and enable adequacy of service.
California Standardized Emergency Management Systems (“SEMS”)	The California Emergency Services Act 2021 Edition (“ESA”) requires SEMS for managing multiagency and multijurisdictional responses to emergencies in California.
National Incident Management System (“NIMS”)	NIMS provides guidelines for government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover from emergency management incidents.
Resolution WSD-011	California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) Resolution implementing the requirements of Public Utilities Code Sections 8389(d)(1), (2) and (4), related to catastrophic wildfire caused by electrical corporations subject to the Commission’s regulatory authority.

Name of Regulation, Code, or Standard	Brief Description
R.18-10-007	Order Instituting Rulemaking (OIR) to Implement Electric Utility Wildfire Mitigation Plans Pursuant to Senate Bill 901 (2018).
R.20-07-013	OIR to Further Develop a Risk-based Decision-making Framework for Electric and Gas Utilities.
D.20-03-004	Decision on community awareness and public outreach before, during and after a wildfire, and explaining next steps for other Phase 2 issues. Decision in Rulemaking 18-10-007 requiring IOUs to conduct community awareness and public outreach before, during, and after a wildfire in any language that is “prevalent” in its service territory or portions thereof.
D.19-05-042	CPUC Decision Adopting De-Energization (Public Safety Power Shutoff) Guidelines (Phase 1 Guidelines).
D.20-05-051	CPUC Decision Adopting Phase 2 Updated and Additional Guidelines for De-Energization of Electric Facilities to Mitigate Wildfire Risk.

Appendix F
Liberty's 2025 AFN Plan

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine
Electric Utility De-Energization of Power
Lines in Dangerous Conditions.

Rulemaking 18-12-005
(Filed December 13, 2018)

**LIBERTY UTILITIES (CALPECO ELECTRIC) LLC'S (U 933-E)
PLAN TO SUPPORT ACCESS AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS POPULATIONS DURING
DE-ENERGIZATION EVENTS**

2025 AFN PLAN

Dated: January 31, 2025

Jordan Parrillo
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**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Order Instituting Rulemaking to Examine
Electric Utility De-Energization of Power
Lines in Dangerous Conditions.

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PLAN TO SUPPORT ACCESS AND FUNCTIONAL NEEDS POPULATIONS DURING
DE-ENERGIZATION EVENTS**

2025 AFN PLAN

Liberty Utilities (CalPeco Electric) LLC ("Liberty") hereby submits its 2025 Access and Functional Needs Plan for Public Safety Power Shutoff Support Pursuant to Commission Decision in Phase Three of R.18-12-005, attached hereto as Attachment A.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jordan Parrillo

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Dated: January 31, 2025

ATTACHMENT A
Liberty's 2025 Access and Functional Needs Plan



Liberty Utilities (CalPeco Electric) LLC (U 933-E)

Liberty's Plan to Support Populations with Access and Functional Needs ("AFN") During PSPS

January 31, 2025

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

During extreme weather conditions, utilities may temporarily turn off power to specific areas to protect the safety of customers and communities. This is called a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). A PSPS is a tool of last resort to mitigate the risk of wildfires. To support individuals with Access and Functional Needs (AFN) during a PSPS, each of the Joint Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) developed its respective 2025 Annual AFN PSPS Plan (“AFN Plan” or “Plan”) with assistance from regional and statewide AFN stakeholders, which represent a broad spectrum of expertise. The Plan leverages the Six-Step Planning Process in the Federal Emergency Management Administration’s (FEMA) Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101.¹

The IOUs have established a partnership and will continue to work closely with the AFN Collaborative Council and the AFN Core Planning Team² to seek guidance and address the “Why,” “Who,” “What,” and “How” of supporting individuals with AFN. The IOUs are committed to addressing the needs of individuals with AFN before, during, and after a PSPS.

Liberty acknowledges and thanks the AFN Collaborative Council, Joint IOUs, and AFN Core Planning Team for their guidance and commitment in developing the 2025 AFN plan.

WHY

As climate conditions change, the threat of wildfires in California remains and continues to grow. When wildfire conditions present a safety risk to customers and communities, electric utilities may enact a PSPS and temporarily turn off power to specific areas to protect the safety of customers and communities.

Liberty recognizes that a PSPS disrupts the everyday lives of impacted individuals, including those with AFN and/or those who may be electricity dependent, which will be discussed further in this Plan. The purpose of this Plan is to mitigate the impact of a PSPS on individuals with AFN.

WHO

The Joint IOU Statewide AFN Advisory Council³ and AFN Core Planning Team developed a definition of Electricity Dependent individuals⁴ that this Plan seeks to support. That definition remains unchanged from 2022.

¹ For details on how to develop and maintain Emergency Operations Plans, visit: [Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans Comprehensive Preparedness Guide \(fema.gov\)](https://www.fema.gov/emergency-planning-guidance).

² See Appendix A for members of the AFN Core Planning Team and Collaborative Council.

³ Please see Appendix B for a list of the Joint IOU Statewide AFN Advisory Council members.

⁴ IOUs will strive to implement this proposed definition contingent on operational feasibility and in alignment with AFN identification requirements with the CPUC’s PSPS decisions. See e.g., D.21-06-034, pp. A8 – A9; D.20-05-051, p. A8; D.19-05-042, pp. A12-A14, A20-A21. The IOUs will continue collaborating with AFN stakeholders to refine this definition as appropriate.

Electricity Dependent Definition: Individuals who are at an increased risk of harm to their health, safety, and independence during a PSPS for reasons including, but not limited to:

- Medical and non-medical;
- Behavioral, mental, and emotional health;
- Mobility and movement; or
- Communication.

Liberty has continued to work collaboratively with others in the community to identify individuals with AFN across its service territory. As of the submission of this document, Liberty has identified 10,041 customers through collaborative outreach with local community-based organizations (“CBOs”) that provide certain program enrollment assistance (i.e., CARE, Medical Baseline) and promoting self-identification. Liberty will continue these efforts through 2025.

WHAT AND HOW

Through participation in the AFN Collaborative Council and AFN Core Planning Team, Liberty remains informed of the IOUs’ goals, objectives, and potential opportunities for enhancements in 2025. Liberty learns from feedback and best practices shared by other IOUs. The overarching goal is to mitigate the potential impacts of a PSPS on individuals with AFN through improved customer outreach, education, assistance programs, and services.

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “CPUC”) Decision (D.) 21-06-034 Phase 3 OIR Decision Guidelines and leveraging Federal Emergency Management Administration’s Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 6 Step Process, the Joint IOUs have worked collaboratively with the AFN Core Planning Team to implement the “Whole Community”⁵ approach. This paved way to the development of an overarching Joint IOU statewide strategy to address the diverse needs of AFN individuals.

The California IOUs will file their respective 2025 AFN Plans with the CPUC by January 31, 2025, detailing the programs they have available to support people and communities with AFN before, during, and after a PSPS event. The IOUs will provide the CPUC with quarterly updates regarding its progress toward meeting the established objectives and the impact of their efforts to address the AFN population before, during, and after PSPS, while seeking opportunities for statewide consistency where possible.

Liberty will continue to work throughout the year to engage local AFN stakeholders and share applicable information about Liberty’s available programs and services.

1.1 Subject Matter Experts (Engage the Whole Community)

According to FEMA Step 1: Engaging the Whole Community in the Planning. Engaging in community-based planning—planning that is for the whole community and involves the whole community—is crucial to the success of any plan.

On September 17, 2024, the IOUs introduced this effort at the broader Q3 Joint IOU Statewide AFN Advisory Council meeting, invited participation, and subsequently held a kick-off meeting with the Core Planning Team⁶ members on October 23, 2024. The 2025 AFN Core Planning Team is comprised of organizations representing the diverse needs of the AFN community. Table 1 below reflects the organizations involved in the development of the 2025 AFN Plan.

⁵ Whole Community approach as defined by FEMA, refers to preparedness as a shared responsibility and involvement of everyone including, but not limited to Individuals and families, including those with access and functional needs.

⁶ See Appendix A and B for members of the AFN Core Planning Team

Table 1. Engaging the Whole Community

Planning Group	Participants/Stakeholders
Joint IOUs	San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E)
	Southern California Edison (SCE)
	Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)
AFN Collaborative Council (per the Phase 3 OIR PSPS Decision):	California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC)
	California Health & Human Services (CHHS)
	California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES)
	Disability Rights California (DRC)
	Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF)
	State Council on Developmental Disabilities (SCDD)
AFN Core Planning Team	California Council of the Blind (CCB)
	California Department of Developmental Services (DDS)
	Deaf Link, Inc.
	California Department of Rehabilitation (DOR)
	Disability Policy Consultant
	Liberty Utilities (CalPeco)
	PacifiCorp
	Bear Valley Electric Service (BVES)
	Redwood Coast Regional Center (RCRC)
	Service Center for Independent Living (SCIL)
	State Council on Developmental Disabilities (SCDD)

A key component is engaging the whole community in planning. As such, the IOUs will continue to solicit feedback from the AFN Collaborative Council, the Joint IOU Statewide AFN Advisory Council, each utility's respective regional PSPS working groups⁷ and other regional and statewide AFN experts such as community-based organizations (CBOs), healthcare partners, representatives of durable medical equipment and local government agencies. These groups serve as a sound board and offer insight, feedback, and input on the IOUs' customer strategy, programs, and priorities. The IOUs seek to conduct regular meetings to actively identify issues, opportunities, and challenges related to the IOUs' ability to mitigate the impacts of wildfire safety strategies, namely

⁷ These working groups convene at least quarterly to share lessons between the impacted communities and the IOUs per D.20-05-051.

PSPS.

The planning process the Joint IOUs presented provides opportunities to collect feedback and implement strategic improvements with details included in specific IOU plans. The Joint IOUs continue to look at expansion of program offerings, refresh the Joint IOU statewide PSPS preparedness website, www.PrepareForPowerDown.com, conduct outreach and education, as well as expand access to eligible populations. Liberty continues to learn from these efforts and best practices set forth by the Joint IOUs.

1.2 Purpose, Scope, Situation Overview, and Assumptions

1.2.1 Purpose/Background - WHY

The Plan focuses on mitigating the impacts of PSPS for individuals with AFN. The IOUs intend to build on this Plan and strive for continuous improvement based on insights from the experts and feedback channels outlined in this plan.

Each IOU's respective 2025 AFN Plan addresses the following:

- Whom the IOUs need to communicate with;
- What resources and services are needed during PSPS;
- How the IOUs communicate with individuals with AFN; and
- How the IOUs make resources and services available to individuals with AFN.

1.2.2 Scope - WHO

The Joint IOUs and the CPUC adopt the definition of AFN as defined by the California Government Code §8593.3: “individuals who have developmental disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiencies, who are non-English speakers, older adults, children, people living in institutional settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit and those who are pregnant.”⁸

Acknowledging that the California Government code definition of AFN is broad, the CPUC authorized the IOUs to follow the FEMA 6 Step Process by engaging the Whole Community through the Joint IOU Statewide AFN Advisory Council to create a common definition of “Electricity Dependent.” Therefore, the IOUs use this common definition to help inform new enhancements to programs and resources that are currently available.

- **Electricity Dependent:** Individuals who are at an increased risk of harm to their health, safety, and independence during a PSPS, for reasons including, but not limited to:
 - Medical and non-medical;
 - Behavioral, mental, and emotional health;
 - Mobility and movement; or
 - Communication.

⁸ D.19-05-042.

Examples of Electricity Dependent include, but are not limited to:

- **Medical and non-medical:**
 - Respiratory equipment: oxygen, respirator, inhalation therapy, apnea monitoring, suction, machines, airway clearance, airway clearances, vests, cough assistive devices, hemodialysis;
 - Nutritional equipment: gastric feed tube, specialized diet meal preparation equipment (e.g., feeding pumps, blenders); or
 - Heating/cooling equipment: refrigeration, body temperature regulation.
- **Behavioral, mental, and emotional health:**
 - Powered equipment supporting regulation of emotional behaviors (e.g., sensory lights).
- **Mobility and movement:**
 - Positioning equipment: lift, mobility tracking system, power wheelchairs, in home chair lift, electric beds.
- **Communication:**
 - Augmentative communication devices (e.g., tablets, wearables, eye gaze), alert systems;
 - Powered equipment for hearing or vision support (e.g., alert systems).

1.2.3 Situational Overview

According to FEMA Step 2: Understand the Situation. Understanding the consequences of a potential incident requires gathering information about the potential AFN of residents within the community.

“Understand the Situation” continues with identifying risks and hazards. This assessment helps a planning team decide what hazards or threats merit special attention, what actions must be planned for, and what resources are likely to be needed.

This Plan mitigates the key risk of PSPS identified by the Core Planning Team:

- Individuals with AFN are unable to use power for devices or equipment for health, safety, and independence due to a PSPS.

During the planning process, the AFN Core Planning Team emphasized that the needs of individuals with AFN extend well beyond medical devices alone and that the risks are as diverse as the population. The IOUs recognize that the impacts of PSPS are dynamic and are committed to supporting customers before, during, and after a PSPS.

1.2.3.1 AFN Population and Identification

Liberty has made progress in identifying AFN individuals through collaborative outreach with local CBOs, focusing on program enrollment and promoting self-identification amongst its service territory.

Liberty identifies the following customers as AFN:

- Customers enrolled in the following programs:

- California Alternate Rates for Energy (“CARE”); or
- Medical Baseline (“MBL”)⁹
- Customers who self-identify as:
 - Customers with disabilities;
 - Customers with chronic conditions or injuries;
 - Customers with limited English proficiency; or
 - Transportation disadvantaged customers.
- Older Adults
 - Liberty has improved its customer data process to automatically categorize older adult customers as AFN.

Table 2 below accounts for the number of customers identified as AFN in Liberty’s service area.


Table 1. Joint IOU Access and Functional Needs Individuals

	MBL Individuals	Individuals Identified as AFN (Beyond MBL)	Percentage of Individuals Identified as AFN based on Total Residential Customer Base
Liberty	Total: 233	Total: 10,041	22.6%

Liberty’s AFN density map, depicted below, acts as a reference to identify areas within its service territory that have larger populations of AFN individuals. Maps like these enable Liberty to strategize geographical resource allocations, such as staffing of customer resource centers (“CRCs”) for customers who may be impacted by a PSPS event.

⁹ Per D.21-06-034, identification efforts include also “persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment as assistive technology.” *Id.* at pp. A8-A9.

Service Area Map of Customers with AFN



In 2025, the IOUs will continue identifying individuals who are electricity dependent beyond those enrolled in the Medical Baseline Allowance Program through direct outreach to customers in each respective IOUs service area.

1.2.4 Planning Assumptions

- For PSPS, efforts are made to provide notification in advance of a power shutoff.
- Effective support of individuals with AFN requires a whole community (e.g., utilities, CBOs, non-profits organizations, government agencies) approach.
- PSPS may occur concurrently with unrelated emergencies (e.g., active wildfires, earthquake, cyber-attacks, NV Energy PSOM, technological hazard incidents).
- The scope of PSPS can increase or decrease as weather conditions are monitored across Liberty's service territory.
-

1.3 Operational Priorities - WHAT

According to FEMA Step 3: Operational priorities – specifying what the responding organizations are to accomplish to achieve a desired end-state for the operation.

The goal of the AFN Plan is to mitigate the impacts of a PSPS on Liberty’s AFN customers through improved customer outreach, education, assistance programs, and services.

Key objectives for 2025 include:

- Further identify individuals with AFN.
- Execute communication plan that considers survey feedback on successes and areas of opportunity.
- Cultivate new partnerships and expand existing partnerships, where possible, with the whole community.
- Continue to investigate external state, community, and utility resources to minimize duplication.
- Continue to collaborate to support the needs of individuals with AFN before, during, and after PSPS.

1.4 Plan Development

According to FEMA Step 4: Plan Development – Develop and Analyze Courses of Action – This step is a process of generating, comparing, and selecting possible solutions for achieving the goals and objectives identified in Step 3.

The IOUs have worked to deliver consistent services and resource offerings; however, the delivery and eligibility are likely to differ by service area.

Goals identified to meet the key objectives for 2025 include:

Communications/Offerings

- Continue targeted communication of wildfire preparedness and PSPS information to critical customers and AFN groups.
- Continue information sharing regarding available customer programs and resources, directly correlating the benefit of program enrollment in terms of PSPS communication and AFN identification.
- Continue to expand information-sharing efforts with CBOs and local partners, where possible, to reach AFN audiences.
- Consider feedback gathered in Wildfire Mitigation Plan pre-season and post-season surveys and PSPS customer complaints to inform customer and partner communication approach.

Resources

- Continue to explore inclusion of transportation and paratransit agency services throughout service territory in PSPS planning.
- Seek opportunities to increase accessibility and awareness of PSPS preparedness materials, workshops, and assistance program availability.

Metrics

- Continue tracking of customer journey and escalations during PSPS event through call centers and CRC locations.
- Integrate relevant metrics into quarterly updates, *i.e.*, percentage of identified AFN customers, WMP survey results when available, and number of outreach events.

AFN Self-Identification

- Explore opportunities associated with identification of additional individuals who identify as AFN through a focus on program communication, internal awareness, and integration into business processes where possible.
- Continue collaborative efforts to increase AFN self-identification with local partners (*e.g.*, healthcare providers, CBOs, collaborative outreach, etc.).

1.5 Plan Preparation and Review

According to FEMA Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval – This step is a process of preparing the document and getting it ready for implementation

Under the regular Joint IOU AFN Plan preparation cadence, the Joint IOUs provide members of the AFN Collaborative Council and AFN Core Planning team with a draft plan template for their review before the annual filing date. A draft 2025 template was not available prior to the planned filing date of January 31, 2025. As a result, each of the IOUs will file their respective 2025 AFN Plans with the CPUC, utilizing the most current information available. These plans will detail the IOUs' programs to support individuals and communities with AFN before, during, and after PSPS.

Liberty continues to utilize the most recent Joint IOU template available and will make necessary adjustments to its quarterly plan updates when a draft 2025 template is provided by the Joint IOUs.

1.6 Plan Implementation

According to FEMA Step 6: Implement and Maintain the Plan – This step is the final step which is an ongoing process of training personnel to perform tasks identified in the plan, exercising, and evaluating plan effectiveness, and revising and maintaining the plan.

Upon filing the AFN plan, Liberty will implement new and maintain existing goals and objectives as specified in the Plan. Additionally, Liberty will continue to provide quarterly updates on progress made.

1.7 Research and Surveys

In 2025, Liberty will continue to conduct and/or participate in listening sessions and working groups with local governments, tribes, and critical facilities; outreach to customers and communities; wildfire and PSPS awareness studies; PSPS table-top exercises; and notification message testing.

See Section 2.1.6 for more information on Liberty’s 2024 survey results. Liberty assesses annual survey results against its KPIs in Section 1.8 below. Survey results consistently reinforce the importance of keeping customers informed of relevant wildfire safety, preparedness, and PSPS information. Liberty’s operational priorities and plan development goals above reflect this.

1.8 Success Measures and Metrics

In 2025, Liberty will use the key performance indicators (“KPIs”) that were developed with the AFN Core Planning Team for the joint IOU AFN Plan. These KPIs measure the impacts of PSPS on individuals with AFN and tracks the awareness of support programs and satisfaction of services offered when a PSPS is enacted. Liberty assesses KPIs success through its customer survey results. Refer to Section 2.1.6 for more detail about the assessment of these metrics.

Key Performance Indicators:

1. The percentage of individuals with AFN who were aware of what support and resources were available to them during a PSPS.
2. The percentage of individuals with AFN who were able to use necessary medical equipment to maintain necessary life functions for the duration of any PSPS that affected them.
3. The percentage of individuals who utilized mitigation services who reported they were satisfied with the level of support.

While Section 1 is a high-level overview of Liberty’s vision according to the Joint IOU template. Further details of Liberty’s AFN Plan can be found in Section 2. Liberty will continue to remain informed of IOU progress throughout the state and looks to improve AFN support where services and partnerships are available.

APPENDIX A – CORE PLANNING TEAM AND COLLABORATIVE COUNCIL INVITEES

Name	Organization	Title	Group
Aaron Carruthers	State Council on Developmental Disabilities (SCDD)	Executive Director	Collaborative Council
Ana Acton	Department of Rehabilitation (DOR)	Deputy Director Independent Living and Community Access Division	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Andy Imparato	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Executive Director	Collaborative Council
Audrey Williams	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Project and Program Supervisor – SPD	Collaborative Council
Brett Eisenberg	California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC)	Executive Director	Collaborative Council
Brian Weisel	State Council on Developmental Disabilities (SCDD)	Legal Counsel	Collaborative Council AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Chris Garbarini	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Senior Emergency Services Coordinator	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Eric Schwarzrock	Liberty	President	Collaborative Council
James Cho	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Program Manager	Collaborative Council
James Collins	California Council of the Blind (CCB)	Community Educator	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
James Dui	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Safety Policy Division	Collaborative Council
Joe Nitti	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	Supervisor, Customer Care and Operations Support	Collaborative Council
Jordan Davis	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Attorney	Collaborative Council
Junaid Rahman	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Senior Regulatory Analyst – SPD	Collaborative Council
June Isaacson Kailes	Disability Policy Consultant	Disability Policy Consultant	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Karen Mercado	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Senior Administrative Assistant – Executive Unit	Collaborative Council
Kate Marrone	Liberty	Key Account Manager	Collaborative Council AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Kay Chiodo	Deaf Link	CEO	AFN Plan Core Planning Team

Larry Grable	Service Center for Independent Living (SCIL)	Executive Director	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Maria Jaya	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Public Utilities Regulatory Analyst – SPD	Collaborative Council
Matthew McVee	PacifiCorp	Vice President, Regulatory Policy and Operations	Collaborative Council
Moustafa Abou-taleb	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Safety Policy Division	Collaborative Council
Nicholas Raft	Liberty	Regulatory Analyst	Collaborative Council
Paul Marconi	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	President, Treasurer, & Secretary, Board Director	Collaborative Council
Pooja Kishore	PacifiCorp	Renewable Compliance Officer	Collaborative Council
Robert Hand	California Foundation for Independent Living Centers	Interim Executive Director	Collaborative Council
Ron Lee	Redwood Coast Regional Center	Emergency Management Coordinator	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Sean Matlock	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	Energy Resource Manager / Assistant Corporate Secretary	Collaborative Council
Susan Henderson	Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF)	Executive Director	Collaborative Council
Tamara Rodriguez	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Officer, Emergency Preparedness & Response	AFN Plan Core Planning Team
Tawny Re	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	Customer Program Specialist	Collaborative Council
Vance Taylor	California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES)	Chief, Office of Access and Functional Needs	Collaborative Council

APPENDIX B – STATEWIDE COUNCIL INVITEES

Name	Organization	Title
Aaron Christian	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Assistant Deputy Director of Office of Community Operations
Adam Willoughby	California Department of Aging (CDA)	Asst. Director of Legislation and Public Affairs
Alana Hitchcock	California 211	Executive Director
Allyson Bartz	California Department of Social Services (DSS)	Manager, Staff Services
Alyson Feldmeir	California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC)	Disability Disaster Access and Resource Manager
Amanda Kirchner	County Welfare Directors Association of California (CWDA)	Legislative Director
Ana Acton	Department of Rehabilitation (DOR)	Deputy Director Independent Living and Community Access Division
Annabel Vera	California Department of Social Services (DSS)	Program Analyst
Beatrice Lavrov	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Staff Service Manager
Brian Weisel	State Council on Developmental Disabilities	Legal Counsel
Carolyn Nava	Disability Action Center (DAC)	Executive Assistant
Chris Garbarini	California Department of Developmental Services (DDS)	Senior Emergency Services Coordinator
Dan Heller	Deaf Link	President
Dan Okenfuss	California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC)	Public Policy Manager
Dara Mikesell	San Gabriel Pomona Regional Center (SGPRC)	CFO
Eleonore Yotsov	PacifiCorp	Director, Emergency Management, PacifiCorp
Gabby Eshrati	North Los Angeles County Regional Center	Consumer Services Director
Gina Esparza	Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center (ELARC)	Emergency Management Coordinator
Greg Oliva	California Department of Social Services (DSS)	Assistant Deputy Director, Central Operations, Community Care Licensing Division
James Cho	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Program Manager
James Collins	California Council of the Blind (CCB)	Community Educator
James Dui	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Safety Policy Division

Jennifer Guenther	Liberty	Senior –Manager, Customer Solutions
Joe Xavier	Department of Rehabilitation (DOR)	Director
Jordan Davis	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Attorney
Nicholas Raft	Liberty	Analyst, Regulatory Affairs
Joseph Grounds	Kern Regional Center (KERNRC)	Emergency Services Officer
Josh Gleason	California Department of Social Services (DSS)	Unknown
JR Antablian	California Department of Social Services (DSS)	Chief, Disaster Services Branch
June Isaacson Kailes	Disability Policy Consultant	Disability Policy Consultant
Karey Morris	Kern Regional Center (KERNRC)	HR Manager
Kate Marrone	Liberty Utilities	Customer Care Manager
Kay Chiodo	Deaf Link	CEO
Kelly Brown	211, Interface Children & Family Services	Community Information Officer
Kendall Skillicorn	California Department of Social Services Disaster Unit (DSS)	Bureau Chief, Department Operations Bureau
Larry Grable	Service Center for Independent Living (SCIL)	Executive Director
Lauren Giardina	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Executive Director Managing Attorney
Leora Filosena	California Department of Social Services Adult Program Division (DSS)	Deputy Director, Adult Programs Division
Malorie Lanthier	North Los Angeles County Regional Center	IT Director
Maria Aliferis-Gierde	Department of Rehabilitation (DOR)	Executive Officer, California Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities
Maria Jaya	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Public Utilities Regulatory Analyst – SPD
Matthew McVee	PacifiCorp	Vice President, Regulatory Policy
Melissa Kasnitz	The Center for Accessible Technology (C4AT)	Director, Legal
Michael Butier	California Department of Social Services Disaster Unit (DSS)	Functional Assessment Service Team Coordinator
Michael Costa	California Association of Area Agencies on Aging (C4A)	Executive Director
Miguel Larios	San Diego Regional Center (SDRC)	Director, Community Services
Molly Giguere	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Equal Justice Works Disaster Resilience Fellow
Moustafa Abou-taleb	California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)	Safety Policy Division
Myisha Aban	San Gabriel Pomona Regional Center (SGPRC)	Emergency Management Coordinator
Nguyen Quan	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	Regulatory Affairs
Nicole Pachaeco	California Council of the Blind	Operations Manager

	(CCB)	
Paul Marconi	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	President, Treasurer, & Secretary
Paula Villescaz	County Welfare Directors Association of California (CWDA)	Associate Director of Legislative Advocacy
Pooja Kishore	PacifiCorp	Renewable Compliance Officer
Rapone Anderson	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Northern Region Manager, Career Executive Assignment (CEA)
Rachel Sweetnam	The Center for Accessible Technology (C4AT)	Legal Fellow
Rick Yrigoyen	California Department of Social Services Adult Program Division (DSS)	Staff Services Manager
Ron Lee	Redwood Coast Regional Center	Emergency Management Coordinator
Rose Samaniego	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Community Program Specialist III-FHA Supervisor
Samuel Jain	Disability Rights California (DRC)	Senior Attorney
Scott O'Connell	Red Cross	Regional Disaster Officer
Sean Matlock	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	Energy Resource Manager / Assistant Corporate Secretary
Seneca St. James	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Community Program Specialist III
Serra Rea	California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC)	DDAR Manager
Sheri Farinha	NorCal Services for Deaf and Hard of Hearing	CEO
Sydney Schellinger	California Department of Aging (CDA)	Senior Emergency Services Coordinator
T. Abraham	Hospital Council	Regional Vice President
Tamara Rodriguez	California Department of Development Services (DDS)	Officer, Emergency Preparedness & Response
Tawny Re	Bear Valley Electric Services (BVES)	Customer Program Specialist
Tiffany Swan	San Diego Regional Center (SDRC)	Community Services Home and Community Based Services Specialist
Yenter Tu	Deaf Link Inc. / No Barrier Communications (NOBACOMM)	National Deaf Liaison – Deaf/Deaf-Blind Community

2. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2024 Public Safety Power Shutoff Events

In response to extreme weather conditions, Liberty enacted PSPS in its service territory on November 11, 20, and 22 of 2024. Prior to these PSPS events, Liberty had experienced potential PSPS events, but conditions had not risen to the level where a PSPS needed to be implemented. During PSPS events, Liberty's goal is first and foremost to protect the community by promoting safety and minimizing the potential risk presented by fire weather conditions. In doing so, Liberty also considers the potential disruption that occurs to its AFN and electricity dependent customers when there is de-energization. As such, Liberty only utilizes PSPS as an option of last resort. To mitigate the potential impact on AFN customers, Liberty works with local public safety partners throughout each of these PSPS events.

Specific details regarding Liberty's 2024 PSPS events are available on Liberty's website.¹⁰

2.1 Preparedness/Readiness (Before Power Shutoff)

2.1.1 AFN Identification Outreach

In 2025, Liberty plans to execute AFN identification outreach via a variety of channels, including CBO outreach and targeted customer outreach to encourage AFN self-identification, customer program enrollment, and increased awareness of AFN resource availability. More information on customer preparedness outreach can be found in Section 2.1.6.

2.1.2 AFN Support Resources

211 Care Coordination and Referral Service

In 2021, Liberty launched a webpage dedicated to 211 customer resource information. Liberty does not currently participate in 211 Care Coordination contracts; however, 211 partnership continues to be an area of further exploration in 2025 where available. Currently, El Dorado and Sierra counties do not have active 211 services in place, and there are varying degrees of support in other counties served by Liberty.

In 2023, Liberty established new relationships with Connecting Point in Nevada and Placer Counties, resulting in ongoing 211 inclusion in tabletop exercises. Liberty continues to seek CBO and agency connections throughout the service territory, including areas where 211 is not yet active.

Resource Planning and Partnerships

In 2024, Liberty continued to maintain its partnerships with local agencies and CBOs and intends to continue to expand these partnerships in 2025. For example, Liberty has continued its effort to collaborate with senior nutrition providers throughout its service territory by providing them with emergency shelf-stable meal boxes including food items, customer assistance program information, AFN self-identification information, and PSPS preparedness deliverables. The next round of shelf-stable food

¹⁰ For details regarding Liberty's 2024 PSPS events, visit [Liberty's Wildfire Mitigation Website](#)

items has been procured and packaged and is scheduled to be delivered in Q1 of 2025.

Additionally, Liberty continues to seek collaborative opportunities to provide resource support for AFN communities beyond elderly populations. Relationships with schools and local governments are potential avenues for additional targeted awareness efforts.

Liberty is also participating in monthly coordination meetings with the other California Small Multi-Jurisdictional Utilities (“SMJUs”) to discuss best practices and learning opportunities related to serving AFN communities.

2.1.3 Back-Up Power

Medical Baseline Backup Battery Program in Development

In 2022, Liberty filed an application with the CPUC for its proposed Customer Resiliency Program (“CRP”). The proposed CRP included a behind-the-meter (“BTM”) battery storage program that was intended to be offered to all of Liberty’s critical needs customers, including Medical Baseline Customers. The proposed BTM battery storage component was not in the implemented version of CRP.

Now, to support resiliency for its customers that depend on power for life-sustaining medical devices, Liberty is working to establish a program to offer eligible Medical Baseline customers a free portable backup battery in 2025.

2.1.4 Customer Assistance Programs

Medical Baseline (“MBL”) Allowance Program

Liberty’s MBL Program provides an increase in the baseline allowance to qualified residential customers. Liberty performs program outreach through bill inserts, radio, social media, digital advertisements, community events, targeted outreach, and collaboration with CBOs, agencies, and the Washoe Tribal community. In 2024, Liberty added the option to apply for the MBL Allowance Program online.

Energy Saving Assistance (“ESA”) Program

Liberty offers the ESA Program to eligible income-qualified customers. This program provides energy-efficient home improvements and energy education. Liberty performs program outreach through bill inserts, radio, social media, digital advertisements, community events, targeted outreach, and collaboration with CBOs, agencies, and the Washoe Tribal community.

California Alternate Rates for Energy (“CARE”)

Liberty offers a 20 percent CARE discount to qualified low-income primary residential customers who receive energy directly from Liberty or through a sub-meter, such as in a mobile home park or an apartment complex. Liberty performs program outreach through bill inserts, radio, social media, digital advertisements, community events, targeted outreach, and collaboration with CBOs through the CARE

Community Organization Outreach Program, agencies, and the Washoe Tribal community.

PSPS Offering Additions

Liberty stocks grocery gift cards to offer support to CARE or MBL customers in the event of an active PSPS through CRC locations and is also prepared to support alternative lodging for critical MBL customers as needs are communicated by community partners or MBL customers.

2.1.5 Emergency Operations Centers

Emergency Operations Centers are in both the South Lake Tahoe and North Lake Tahoe offices. Liberty has the ability to manage these events partially or fully via virtual Incident Command with paperless Incident Command System (“ICS”) forms, job descriptions, event documentation, and electronic meeting venues. Staff members are trained to perform their roles in both formats.

Preparation Exercises

In preparation for wildfire season, Liberty will conduct a Public Safety Partner Workshop on April 3, 2025, a tabletop PSPS exercise on May 15, 2025, and a full-scale PSPS exercise on June 19, 2025. The full-scale exercise and the planning meetings leading up to the exercise will include Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, and Office of Energy Infrastructure Safety (“OEIS”), along with other public safety partners, including government, critical facilities, and AFN Community advocates.

Training

Liberty employees receive annual Emergency Management Plan training. The instruction includes specific training on the roles and responsibilities of each functional area in support of the ICS. Emergency response exercises are executed annually, so employees practice using the plan, as well as test the plan for effectiveness. Liberty also participates in regional exercises to train employees and exercise the Emergency Management Plan and will participate in emergency exercises and training with state and regional OES and county emergency offices.

Additional PSPS CRC Staff training was developed in 2022 for CRC representative and CRC lead positions. This training program provides a thorough overview of PSPS criteria, activation, and execution expectations for involved roles. Disability sensitivity content was integrated into the training program to support AFN individuals during a PSPS event. This training was last administered in December 2024. In November 2024, Liberty experienced three PSPS events that required on-the-job training of additional CRC leads. CRC-related lessons learned from these events will be included in future training. Liberty’s third-party contractor, Fire Dawg, also provided significant support during two of these PSPS events by preparing and staffing CRC locations ahead of de-energization.

2.1.6 PSPS Preparedness Outreach and Community Engagement

CBO Outreach

Liberty seeks opportunities to provide PSPS preparedness information through established CBOs

throughout the year. Liberty sent PSPS preparedness information, materials, and web resource information to CBO contacts via email on June 19, 2024, and October 16, 2024. This effort was also used as an opportunity to update contact information for CBOs for notification during PSPS events.

Refer to the following attachment for an example of the PSPS and self-identification information provided to CBOs as part of this effort:

“Attachment_01-Liberty-CBO_Outreach”

Liberty also continues to grow and expand CBO networks throughout its service territory where possible by providing materials and resource information for CBOs to share with the communities they serve. A targeted webinar presentation focused on PSPS awareness and information was provided again in 2024 to CBOs and local agencies. Invitations were sent to contacts throughout the service territory.

Liberty has held and participated in multiple outreach events to access AFN communities with Spanish-speaking support on-site through collaboration with local CBOs and partners. Liberty will maintain CBO relationships throughout 2025 by continuing to share outreach opportunities for dissemination to clients and pursuing collaborative opportunities to reach AFN audiences. Liberty shares available resources and materials with organizations through in-person and virtual meetings

Liberty also participates in community collaborative groups in both South and North Lake Tahoe with the goal of being an involved partner in community conversations, establish new connections, and provide applicable information on available assistance programs and PSPS preparedness information to local networks.

Liberty’s Key Account Manager, working primarily with AFN matters, continues to serve as a member of the Community Action Council of El Dorado County. This council is comprised of a tripartite board and includes three categories: public official sector, low-income sector, and community sector. The Council provides advice and recommendations to the Board of Supervisors, aids in educating the community on human services and available resources in El Dorado County and participates in developing collaborative solutions to meet ongoing community needs, while working together to meet the basic needs and to improve the quality of life for residents of El Dorado County.

AFN Customer Outreach

Liberty executes customer outreach to share information about customer programs (CARE, ESA, MBL) and PSPS awareness through a variety of methods, including community events, website resources, social media, bill inserts, targeted outreach, radio ads (multicultural media), digital ads, print ads, and through call center staff. AFN identification and available resource communication will continue to be a focus in 2025. Utilizing CBO networks and targeted customer program outreach, including community events and direct mailings, remains a core method of AFN identification and increased customer awareness of available resources. Liberty continued outreach efforts in 2024, completing 18 collaborative outreach events.

2024 outreach events included:

- South Lake Tahoe Library Event, February 15, 2024
- Meeting with Washoe Tribe, March 19, 2024

- Lake Valley Properties Event, April 1, 2024
- Palisades Earth Day, Truckee, April 20, 2024
- Lake Tahoe Community College Earth Day Event, South Lake Tahoe, April 27, 2024
- Loyalton Timberfest, Loyalton, May 4, 2024
- Markleeville Farmer's Market, Markleeville, May 11, 2024
- FireFest, South Lake Tahoe, May 18, 2024
- South Lake Tahoe Summer Library Event, June 21, 2024
- Tahoe Youth and Family 50th Anniversary Celebration, South Lake Tahoe, June 30, 2024
- Sierra Community House Food Distribution Event, Kings Beach, August 7, 2024
- 2024 Lake Tahoe Summit, Zephyr Cove, NV, August 14, 2024
- Sierra Community House Food Distribution Event, Truckee, August 20, 2024
- Fire Fest, South Lake Tahoe, September 28, 2024
- Multi-Cultural Event, South Lake Tahoe, September 14, 2024
- Barton Health Fair, South Lake Tahoe, October 17, 2024
- Community Hub Fall Fest Event, South Lake Tahoe, October 31, 2024
- Verdi Community Outreach Program Enrollment Event, Verdi, December 4, 2024

Wildfire Messaging Customer Awareness Surveys

In 2024, Liberty again utilized MDC Research to conduct wildfire messaging awareness surveys that gauge customer awareness of information related to wildfire preparedness and safety. Survey questions were designed to measure awareness of Liberty messages related to wildfire preparedness, PSPS, notifications, customer information recall, and more.

Liberty's most recent survey round, took place between December 5 and December 22, 2024, included 460 completed phone and web surveys. Compared to Liberty's June 2024 survey round, the December survey results showed increases in awareness of wildfire safety communications and recall of the phrase "Public Safety Power Shutoff" or "PSPS." This is a significant improvement in communication awareness compared to the steady decline between June 2023 and June 2024.

- 62% of respondents from the December 2024 survey were aware of wildfire survey communications, up significantly since June 2024 (47%).
- 73% of respondents from the December 2024 survey recalled the acronym "PSPS," a significant increase from 45% in June 2024.
- Among those recalling the acronym "PSPS", 99% are aware of its possible implementation to prevent wildfire, significantly higher than June 2024 (94%).
 - 72% understood that PSPS is a mitigation of last resort, and that the likelihood of implementation can be reduced when Liberty takes steps to harden its infrastructure (83%).

MDC points out that these results indicate success in Liberty's recent outreach efforts. Additionally, in November 2024, Liberty experienced three PSPS events and one NV Energy PSOM event in its service territory. Prior to November 2024, Liberty had not experienced a PSPS event in the history of its program. As MDC points out in its evaluation, 42% of customers surveyed in December experienced a PSPS in 2024, which likely had an influence on increased awareness.

As the first survey in Liberty's program history to follow implemented PSPS events, the December 2024 survey round also provided the first opportunity to assess metrics tied to Liberty's KPIs discussed in Section 1.8:

1. 42% of surveyed respondents with AFN were aware of what support and resources were available to them during a PSPS.
2. 21% of respondents said they were able to use necessary medical equipment during a PSPS that affected them and 34% stated that they were unable to do so. 45% of survey respondents that identified as electricity dependent said they had no need to utilize medical equipment during the PSPS that affected them.
3. MDC's methodology surveys Liberty's customers at random. Of the 460 surveys completed in December, 42% stated that they experienced a PSPS. Only 5 surveyed respondents of that 42% attended a CRC location during PSPS. 4 of these respondents reported that the CRC met their needs.

For additional survey findings, MDC's recommendations, and other detailed metrics from Liberty's 2024 survey results, refer to the following attachments:

“Attachment 02-Liberty-Survey_Results_June2024”

“Attachment 03-Liberty-Survey_Results_December2024”

Tribal Engagement

Liberty maintains a working relationship with the Washoe tribe, the only tribal community in its service territory. As mentioned above, Liberty experienced 3 PSPS events in November 2024. The Washoe Tribe provides support to customers with AFN and was included as an essential Public Safety partner throughout each of these events. Liberty maintained communication with the Washoe tribe's Emergency Manager and the Hung-A-Lel-Ti Community Chairman at each stage of PSPS. Liberty has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Washoe tribe and has established a CRC location in Markleeville, CA within close proximity to the local AFN community. This CRC location was activated from 8:00 AM to 10:00 PM during all three PSPS events.

Liberty acknowledges the unique needs of tribal residents and will continue to develop a supportive relationship in 2025, including continued collaboration with the Washoe Tribe regarding ongoing grant opportunities. Liberty held meetings with the Washoe Tribe's emergency manager throughout 2024, including discussion related to the importance of electricity dependent customer awareness of the MBL Program and benefits of enrollment. Liberty also provided applications for dissemination after discovering a small number of identified medical customers in the community, which conflicted with previous conversations in terms of community needs.

Marketing and Communications

Liberty has developed the following communications outreach plan to notify AFN customers of pertinent PSPS status updates, including ongoing proactive education.

Liberty will continue to engage AFN customers throughout 2025 to educate them about the PSPS of notification process and how they can prepare for prolonged de-energization through the following channels:

- Community meetings: Liberty will continue to share information through community meetings to educate customers about the PSPS notification process and preparing for PSPS events. When applicable, Liberty will co-host meetings with public safety partners and AFN advocacy groups.
- Toolkits: Liberty will distribute PSPS educational pamphlets, flyers, and checklists in accessible formats. Toolkit information is available in English, Spanish, French, German, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Tagalog.
- Website: Liberty will publish and maintain PSPS web copy outlining Liberty's notification process and detailing ways for customers to prepare for PSPS events, including information specific to AFN populations.
- Social media: Liberty will post content to Facebook and X informing customers of Liberty's PSPS notification process.
- Customer email: Liberty will distribute an email informing customers of Liberty's PSPS notification process.
- Bill insert/mail: Liberty will distribute a bill insert/mailer informing customers of Liberty's PSPS notification process.

Throughout 2024, Liberty shared AFN self-identification information through bill inserts, emails, direct mail, and shared paper versions of the AFN self-identification web forms for increased accessibility. A link to the online forms is included in shelf-stable meal emergency preparedness boxes to target elderly customers receiving senior nutrition assistance. AFN identified households received targeted communication via direct mail in 2024 focused on PSPS awareness and preparedness information.

Translations

Liberty call centers provide customers access to bilingual (Spanish and English) customer service representatives. Call center representatives also have access to additional translation services, supporting customer communication. Additionally, Liberty offers Spanish language translation on its website and Spanish language PSPS preparedness videos.

2.1.7 Community Resource Centers

Liberty has established an internal working group comprised of representatives from a variety of departments, including emergency management and wildfire mitigation, to focus on CRC planning. This group meets regularly to further develop plans, determine priorities, and execute required actions for CRC preparedness. After a PSPS event where one or more CRCs are activated, Liberty performs a post-event hotwash to gather CRC lessons learned.

Liberty contracts a third party, Fire Dawg, Inc., for support services including CRC staffing and setup. Liberty provides snacks, water, device charging ability, Wi-Fi, ADA-accessible restrooms, resource information, third-party customer service staff (including bilingual representation when possible), and blankets at CRC locations. CRC locations present a unique opportunity for program enrollment, PSPS preparedness information sharing, and AFN identification. Liberty plans to provide information on CARE, ESA, and MBL programs at each CRC. PSPS toolkit information will be shared in English and Spanish at CRC locations.

Unique community needs have been considered in CRC planning, including a water truck for agricultural areas. Refrigeration needs for medication are also considered in CRC planning based on feedback gathered from local CBOs. Ice delivery has also been included in the planning process, and both services were successfully executed during Liberty's potential PSPS event in September 2021. Liberty will continue to build relationships and solicit feedback and suggestions regarding community PSPS support from local organizations and customers.

2.2 PSPS Activation (During –Emergency Operation Center activated)

MBL Customer Communication

To identify and reach MBL customers in a PSPS event, Liberty identifies accounts marked as MBL within the potentially impacted area and executes its notification sequence according to protocol. The MBL notification sequence is as follows:

1. Onsolve notification (providing text, email, and voice push notifications, with receipt verification capability).
2. If no positive contact, phone call to customer from customer service representative.
3. If still no positive contact, physical site visit to the residence.
4. If still no positive contact, door hanger notification left at the residence.

PSPS Notifications

Liberty will continue to notify AFN customers before, during, and after a PSPS through the following channels (posted and updated as needed):

- Onsolve alerts: Liberty will distribute an alert through the Onsolve system notifying customers of the status of the PSPS. The Onsolve system consists of a three-part alert: first a text is sent, then an email, and lastly a call.
- CBOs: Liberty will notify CBOs that serve AFN populations of the status of the PSPS and request that they distribute the alert to their contact list. CBOs may include:
 - Homeless shelters
 - Food banks
 - Special needs programs
- Critical facilities and infrastructure: Liberty will notify critical facilities and infrastructure

of the status of the PSPS and request that they distribute the alert to their own AFN contact lists. Critical facilities and infrastructure include:

- Police stations
 - Fire stations
 - Emergency operations centers
 - Schools
 - Jails and prisons
 - Public health departments
 - Medical facilities, including hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, nursing homes, blood banks, health care facilities, dialysis centers, and hospice facilities
 - Facilities associated with automobile, rail, and aviation transportation for civilian and military purposes
 - Telecommunication companies
- Website: Liberty will publish an alert to its customer-facing website notifying customers of the status of the PSPS. Microsites are made available in both English and Spanish during a PSPS event.
- Social media: Liberty will post content to Facebook and X notifying customers of the status of the PSPS.
- Customer email: Liberty will distribute an email to AFN customers notifying them of the status of the PSPS. An enhancement added in 2021 includes Spanish language messaging within PSPS customer emails.
- News release and public service announcements: Liberty will distribute a news release and/or a public service announcement to local media outlets alerting customers of the status of the PSPS. In 2021, Liberty added multicultural media outlets to lists of media contacts utilized for PSPS notification.
- Customer service representatives (CSR): Liberty will provide CSRs with information and resources for AFN customers during a PSPS.
- Content intended for customers will be translated and disseminated in English and Spanish when possible.

2.3 Recovery (After - Power has been restored)

Customer Support/Notification

Liberty will continue to expand partnerships with local organizations where possible to remain aware of customer needs before, during, and after PSPS events. Liberty will notify AFN customers after a PSPS through the same channels utilized during a PSPS event described in Section 2.2. These channels include Onsolve alerts, communications to CBOs and critical facilities, updates to the Liberty website, posts on social media, customer emails, and news releases. Content intended for customers will be translated and disseminated in English and Spanish when possible.

After-Action Reviews and Reports

After-action reviews (“AARs”) with company leadership and the Incident Management Team are conducted after an exercise and/or event. Exercise and event AARs are documented in Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (“HSEEP”) format. AARs include an improvement plan that assigns actions and tracks items needing improvement. Following implemented PSPS events, Liberty will conduct CRC-specific hotwashes, as applicable, to gather lessons learned.

Customer Surveys

Liberty will continue its pre-season and post-season wildfire outreach survey efforts in 2025 to gather information about wildfire awareness and inform communications plans. Liberty intends to use the results of its next survey round in 2025 to capture additional customer feedback regarding its 2024 PSPS events.

CONCLUSION

In 2025, Liberty will continue to seek opportunities to enhance outreach effectiveness and expand CBO networks across the service territory, such as informing partners of program changes, sharing accessibility improvements as applicable, and acting as a participative member of community outreach events. Liberty will continue to prioritize identifying and engaging with AFN populations in its service area and will continue working with local governments, public safety organizations, tribal communities, representatives of AFN communities, and CBOs to help communicate with support AFN customers in compliance with guidelines in R.18-12-005.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jordan Parrillo

Jordan Parrillo
Manager of Regulatory Affairs
Liberty Utilities (CalPeco Electric) LLC
701 National Ave,
Tahoe Vista, CA 96148
Telephone: 530-721-7818
Dated: January 31, 2025
jordan.parrillo@libertyutilities.com

Attachment 1
Liberty's Community Based Organization Outreach



Liberty™

Access and Functional Needs Customers



What is AFN?

The CPUC defines the Access and Functional Needs (AFN) population as individuals who have developmental or intellectual disabilities, physical disabilities, chronic conditions, injuries, limited English proficiency or who are non-English speaking, a household with older adults and/or children, people living in institutionalized settings, or those who are low income, homeless, or transportation disadvantaged, including, but not limited to, those who are dependent on public transit or those who are pregnant.

Benefits of Self-Identification

Liberty is working to identify the unique needs of the communities we serve. When you self-identify as an AFN customer, Liberty will attempt to provide more information about Public Safety Power Shutoffs, low income programs, and other resources using the contact information on file or submitted through this form.

Privacy Statement

Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. and its affiliates and subsidiaries, which include those entities forming part of the Liberty Utilities Group and the Liberty Power Group (collectively referred to as "Algonquin," "we," "us," or "our") are concerned with your privacy and want you to be familiar with how we collect, use and disclose personal information. This Privacy Policy describes Algonquin's practices with respect to personal information collected through our websites (collectively referred to as "websites") as well as offline, such as when you ("user," "you" or "your") apply for or use our services, or otherwise interact with us. This Privacy Policy does not apply to personal information relating to our employees.

By accessing or using our websites or services or providing us with personal information, you agree and consent to the provisions of this Privacy Policy. Learn more about our Privacy Policy at libertyenergyandwater.com.

Submit Your Self-Identification Form

Customers are encouraged to submit a self-identification form online at <https://libertyutilities.com/afn/english/> or by scanning the QR code below with their phones.

Customers may also mail this paper form to:

Attn: Cindy Ramos
Liberty
933 Eloise Ave.
South Lake Tahoe, CA 96150

Scan this QR code to fill
out the form online!



libertyenergyandwater.com



1-800-782-2506

Liberty Self-Identification Form: Access and Functional Needs

1. Customer First Name _____

2. Customer Last Name _____

3. Account Number

Enter full Liberty 16 digit account number in the following format: 885xxxxx-88xxxxxx

4. Phone Number _____

5. Email Address _____

6. Service Address – Street

Enter information reflecting service location associated with your Liberty account

7. Service Address – City

Enter information reflecting service location associated with your Liberty account

8. Service Address – Zip Code

Enter information reflecting service location associated with your Liberty account

9. I agree to willingly self-identify as an AFN customer.*

* When you self-identify as an AFN customer, Liberty will attempt to provide more information about Public Safety Power Shutoffs, low income programs, and other resources using the contact information on file or submitted through this form.

☐ I agree

10. AFN Category

Please select the AFN category below you wish to self-identify with below. Medical Baseline Allowance and CARE program enrollment will automatically identify Liberty customers as AFN status. Please see program applications if you are interested in applying for these financial assistance programs.

☐ Physical or developmental or intellectual disabilities

☐ Households with older adults

☐ Chronic conditions or injuries

☐ Homeless and/or transportation disadvantaged

☐ Limited English proficiency

☐ Other _____



@LibertyUtilitiesLT



@LibertyUtil_CA



Liberty™

Cientes de acceso y necesidades funcionales



¿Qué es AFN?

La CPUC define la población con necesidades funcionales y de acceso (AFN, por sus siglas en inglés) como personas que tienen discapacidades del desarrollo o intelectuales, discapacidades físicas, afecciones crónicas, lesiones, dominio limitado del inglés o que no hablan inglés, un hogar con adultos mayores y/o niños, personas que viven en entornos institucionalizados, o aquellos que tienen bajos ingresos, personas sin hogar o personas con desventajas de transporte, incluidos, entre otros, aquellos que dependen del transporte público o aquellos que están embarazadas.

Beneficios de la autoidentificación

Liberty está trabajando para identificar las necesidades únicas de las comunidades a las que servimos. Cuando se identifique a sí mismo como cliente de AFN, Liberty intentará proporcionar más información sobre los cortes de energía por motivos de seguridad pública, los programas para personas de bajos ingresos y otros recursos utilizando la información de contacto archivada o enviada a través de este formulario.

Declaración de privacidad

Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. y sus afiliadas y subsidiarias, que incluyen aquellas entidades que forman parte de Liberty Utilities Group y Liberty Power Group (denominados colectivamente como "Algonquin", "nosotros" o "nuestro") están preocupados por su privacidad y quieren que esté familiarizado con la forma en que recopilamos, usamos y divulgamos información personal. Esta Política de privacidad describe las prácticas de Algonquin con respecto a la información personal recopilada a través de nuestros sitios web (denominados colectivamente como "sitios web") y fuera de línea, como cuando usted ("usuario", "usted" o "su") solicita o utiliza nuestros servicios, o interactuar con nosotros. Esta Política de privacidad no se aplica a la información personal relacionada con nuestros empleados.

Al acceder o utilizar nuestros sitios web o servicios o proporcionarnos información personal, usted acepta y da su consentimiento a las disposiciones de esta Política de privacidad. Obtenga más información sobre nuestra Política de privacidad en libertyenergyandwater.com.

Envíe su formulario de autoidentificación

Se alienta a los clientes a enviar un formulario de autoidentificación en línea en <https://libertyutilities.com/afn/spanish/> o escaneando el código QR a continuación con sus teléfonos.

Los clientes también pueden enviar este formulario en papel a:

Attn: Cindy Ramos
Liberty
933 Eloise Ave.
South Lake Tahoe, CA 96150

¡Escanee este código QR
para completar el
formulario en línea!



libertyenergyandwater.com



1-800-782-2506

Formulario de autoidentificación de Liberty: Acceso y Necesidades Funcionales

1. Nombre del cliente _____

2. Apellido del cliente _____

3. Número de cuenta

Ingrese el número de cuenta completo de 16 dígitos de Liberty en el siguiente formato: 885xxxxx-88xxxxxx

4. Número de teléfono _____

5. Dirección de correo electrónico _____

6. Dirección del servicio – Calle

Ingrese información que refleje la ubicación del servicio asociada con su cuenta de Liberty

7. Dirección de servicio – Ciudad

Ingrese información que refleje la ubicación del servicio asociada con su cuenta de Liberty

8. Dirección de servicio – Código postal

Ingrese información que refleje la ubicación del servicio asociada con su cuenta de Liberty

9. Acepto identificarme voluntariamente como cliente de AFN.*

* Cuando se identifique a sí mismo como cliente de AFN, Liberty intentará proporcionar más información sobre los cortes de energía por motivos de seguridad pública, los programas para personas de bajos ingresos y otros recursos utilizando la información de contacto archivada o enviada a través de este formulario.

☐ Estoy de acuerdo

10. Categoría AFN

Seleccione la categoría AFN a continuación con la que desea identificarse. La inscripción en el programa Medical Baseline Allowance y CARE identificará automáticamente a los clientes de Liberty como estado AFN. Consulte las solicitudes del programa si está interesado en solicitar estos programas de asistencia financiera.

☐ Discapacidades físicas o del desarrollo o intelectuales

☐ Hogares con adultos mayores

☐ Condiciones crónicas o lesiones

☐ Personas sin hogar y/o en desventaja de transporte

☐ Dominio limitado del inglés

☐ Otro _____



Attachment 2
Liberty's Survey Results, June 2024



Wildfire Messaging Awareness

Prepared by

MDC Research

Jakob Lahmers - Jakob.Lahmers@mdcresearch.com





Objectives & Methodology

The **overall objective** of this research was to measure the public's awareness of messaging related to wildfire preparedness and safety. Specific research objectives include:

- Measure awareness of Liberty Utilities (Liberty) messages related to wildfire preparedness
- Identify recall of specific message topics
- Identify recall of message channels
- Measure recall and understanding of Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS
- Evaluate sources customers are most likely to turn to for information about PSPS
- Explore actions taken by customers to prepare for wildfire season
- Measure awareness of Liberty's efforts to reduce the risk of wildfires
- Evaluate PSPS notifications perception

Target Audience

- Liberty residential and business customers in California
- Liberty critical customers

Methodology

- Customers were surveyed at random from Liberty customer records, targeted for either phone or web administration
- Surveys available to customers in English and Spanish
- A total of 220 surveys, including 6 from critical customers, were completed between June 11 and July 7
 - 📞 Phone: 80 completed surveys from 14,532 records
 - 💻 Web: 140 completed surveys from 27,266 records



Key Findings

Communications

- **47% are aware of wildfire safety communications**, consistent with November 2023 (53%).
- **Liberty** remains the primary source for wildfire preparedness information, though it saw a significant decrease from November 2023 (26% vs 48%). **Vegetation management** and **personal preparedness** are the most common messages recalled.
- **Email** remains the most cited channel for wildfire preparedness communication, down significantly from November 2023 (38% vs 54%); bill inserts, TV news, and social media make up the next most common tier.
- **Local organizations, non-Liberty websites, the Liberty website, and email are considered the clearest; email, social media, and bill inserts are seen as the most useful resources** for information about wildfire preparedness.
- **45%** recall seeing, hearing or reading the phrase **"Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS,"** down significantly from last wave (61%). **TV News (28%) and email (26%)** remain the most common sources of PSPS communication.
- Among those recalling the phrase "PSPS" from the past year, **94% are aware of its possible implementation to prevent wildfire** and roughly three quarters **understand PSPS is a last resort (73%),** and the likelihood of **implementation becomes reduced when Liberty takes steps to harden its infrastructure (77%)**
- **37%** say they would first turn to the **Liberty website** for information about a PSPS event.
- Notifications via text and email are considered most effective forms of communication from Liberty. Larger font is considered the most helpful element of communications that could be incorporated.

Actions Taken

- **60% have taken some form of action to prevent wildfires or to prepare their home or business** for the event of a PSPS. Having a **generator** and **trimming vegetation around properties** are the most common actions taken, followed by creating defensible space.
- **47% are aware of Liberty's efforts to prune vegetation** around power lines in higher-risk areas. **Recallers** are significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to be aware of the majority of Liberty's efforts. Recall of all Liberty's efforts to reduce the risk of wildfire is consistent with November 2023.
- **51%** are aware they can **update their contact information with Liberty**, and 69% of those have done so, in line with November 2023 findings.

AFN and Critical Customers

- **80% of customers can be considered AFN.**
- Of the resources available to the public, customers are most likely to be aware of **LIHEAP, special payment arrangements, and Residential Energy Audit**; 22% have not investigated any of the resources and 30% report no need.
- Only 4% of AFN customers have heard of AFN Self-Identification.
- Among those reporting that they rely on electricity for medical needs, 26% are aware of additional notices from Liberty, 18% are currently enrolled in the Medical Baseline Allowance program
- 99% of respondents indicated it would not be helpful to receive communications in a language other than English.

Other Topics

- Though not covered by the survey, CBO interviews indicate frustration in the community over extended winter outages, poor communication about restoration times, and increasing costs.
- A messaging campaign to acknowledge and address issues may be warranted.



Recommendations

During the 2024 fire season, consider additional outreach efforts to educate the public on wildfire safety and knowledge of PSPS.

- Communication awareness has steadily declined from 74% in November 2021 to 47% in June 2024.
- Awareness levels in June 2024 are the lowest levels seen thus far.
- Recall of PSPS has continued to decrease from June 2021 (74%) to June 2024 (45%).
- Among those hearing or seeing communication about wildfire preparedness over the past year, just 26% mention Liberty as the source of this information, the lowest number seen over the past six waves. Several messages saw significant decreases when compared with November 2023, including messages around PSPS, local emergency services – resources, medical needs, and notifications & updating customer information.

Pursue opportunities to educate the public of actions taken by Liberty to mitigate the risk of wildfires and PSPS.

- Although 94% of people who encountered the term PSPS over the past year are aware of a possible PSPS by Liberty, less than half are aware of any one of Liberty's efforts.

Leverage TV news, emails, social media, and bill inserts to drive customers to the Liberty website.


- More people indicate they would turn to the Liberty website than any other source for information about PSPS.
- Where people are actually learning about PSPS continues to be from TV news, email, social media, and bill inserts, though all of these sources have seen marginal declines when compared with previous waves.
- Local organizations or community centers, non-Liberty websites, the Liberty website, email, bill inserts, and social media are all seen as clear and useful, with email, social media, and newspapers seen as most useful.
- Notifications via text is considered the most effective method of communication from Liberty (48%), followed by email (27%), although caution should be used if text is primarily reserved for emergency communications.

Consider communications around purchasing or preparing backup generators in the event of PSPS, and associated safety measures, as purchasing/preparing generators is the most common preparation for a PSPS. There may be opportunity to raise general awareness and address the top challenges expressed when facing an extended power outage, like food replacement, heating/cooling, communication, and having electricity for medical needs.





Wildfire Safety Communications Awareness

- Just under half (47%) have seen or heard communications about wildfire safety in the past year, consistent with November 2023 (53%)



Q2 Have you seen or heard any communications about wildfire safety in the past year? (n=220; Total)

	Recallers (n=104)	Non-Recallers (n=116)
Gender	Male – 53% Female – 37%	Male – 46% Female – 44%
Age	18-54 – 21% 55-64 – 21% 65+ – 48%	18-54 – 32% 55-64 – 20% 65+ – 39%
Median Income	\$116K	\$98K
Home Ownership	Rent – 11% Own – 82%	Rent – 12% Own – 79%
Primary Language is not English	14%	16%
Responded they Rely on Electricity for Medical Needs	16%	15%

  Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave Bold denotes statistically significant difference between Recallers and Non-Recallers



Communication Recall


(among those aware of communications)



Sources of Wildfire Preparedness Communications

- Of those aware of communications, just over one in four (26%) mention Liberty as the source of wildfire preparedness communication, down significantly from the previous wave
- Just under one in four (24%) are not aware of the source of communication, up significantly from November 2023 (10%)

Wildfire Preparedness Communications Sources
(among those who recall communication)



Q5 Who was the communication about wildfire preparedness from? (n=104; Aware of Communication)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Unaided Message Recall

- Of those who recall communications, just over one in four cited vegetation management (26%) and creating a defensible space (26%) as the main takeaways from communications about wildfire safety over the past year

Communications Main Takeaway

(among those who recall communication)



QB1 What was your main takeaway from the communications? (n=104; Aware of Communication)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Wildfire Preparedness Communications Messages

- Of those who recall communications, just under three in five recall messages about vegetation management (57%), followed by personal preparedness (43%)
- Compared to the previous wave, mentions of PSPS, local emergency services – resources, medical needs, and notifications & updating customer information have decreased significantly

Communications Messages Recalled (among those who recall communication)		Nov 2023 (n=168)	June 2023 (n=158)	Nov 2022 (n=218)	June 2022 (n=213)	Nov 2021 (n=162)
Vegetation Management	57%	58%	56%	59%	56%	52%
Personal Preparedness	43%	55%	61%	56%	55%	56%
Liberty's Wildfire Mitigation Plan	29%	38%	31%	40%	33%	31%
Infrastructure Hardening	21%	18%	9%	20%	10%	15%
Public Safety Power Shutoff	19% ↓	32%	27%	41%	37%	48%
Local Emergency Services – Support Tools	13%	20%	15%	21%	18%	24%
Local Emergency Services – Resources	13% ↓	26%	20%	24%	30%	30%
Medical Needs	12% ↓	22%	20%	17%	18%	20%
California Public Utility Commission designation of high wildfire threat areas	12%	20%	15%	21%	16%	23%
Notifications & Updating Customer Information	10% ↓	23%	23%	28%	31%	28%
Enhanced Wildfire Safety Settings	10%	16%	12%	17%	Added November 2022	
Community Resource Centers available for information and support	8%	14%	15%	19%	15%	18%
Weather Stations	5%	7%	9%	9%	6%	18%

Q3 What were the messages of the communications you saw or heard about wildfire preparedness? (n=104; Aware of Communication)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Information Channels for Wildfire Communications

- Email remains the most common channel for wildfire preparedness communication with just under four in ten mentioning it (38%), followed by bill inserts (24%), and TV news (22%); mentions of email as a communication channel decreased significantly since November 2023 (38% vs 54%)

Information Channels for Wildfire Preparedness Communications

(among those who recall communication)




Q4 Where did you see or hear the communications about wildfire preparedness? (n=168; Aware of Communication)

Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Information Usefulness and Clarity

- In terms of clarity, local organizations or community centers are rated the highest, along with other websites and the Liberty website
- In terms of usefulness, email is rated highest, followed by social media and bill inserts




Q4A How useful was the information about wildfire preparedness from each of these sources? (n=104; Aware of Communication)
Q4B How would you rate the clarity of the information about wildfire preparedness from each of these sources? (n=104; Aware of Communication)

*Small sample size (n<30)



Communication Frequency

- Just over half say they have seen at least six messages about wildfire preparedness on TV news (52%), followed by social media (43%), other websites (40%), and from family, friends, and co-workers (33%)




Q5A In the past 6 months, how often do you recall seeing, hearing or seeking messages about wildfire preparedness? (n=104; Aware of Communication) *Small sample size (n<30)




Effective and Helpful Communication

- Notifications via text are considered the most effective form of communication from Liberty (48%) followed by email (27%); larger font is the most helpful (9%) element that could be incorporated

Most Effective Communications



Helpful Elements



A6 What method of communication from Liberty do you find most effective? (n=220; Total)

A12 Regardless of how communications from Liberty are received, which, if any, of the following would be helpful for you? (n=220; Total)




Wildfire Preparedness Actions Taken



Awareness of Liberty's Efforts

- Consistent with previous results, just under half are aware of Liberty pruning vegetation around power lines in higher-risk areas (47%)
- Awareness off all efforts remains consistent with previous wave
- **Recallers** remain significantly more likely to mention the majority of Liberty’s efforts

Awareness of Liberty’s Efforts to Reduce Wildfire Risk



Q7 What efforts by Liberty are you aware of to reduce the risk of wildfire? (n=220; Total)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Awareness of Public Safety Power Shutoff



PSPS Awareness

- Just under half (45%) say they recall seeing, hearing or reading the phrase “Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS,” down significantly since last wave; **Recallers** remain significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to be aware of PSPS (64% vs 28%)
- TV news remains the leading source of PSPS communications (28%), followed by email (26%); **Recallers** are significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to mention email (33% vs 12%)


PSPS Recall



Q8 In the past year, do you recall seeing, hearing or reading the phrase ‘Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS?’ (n=220; Total)
Q8A Where do you recall seeing or hearing about Public Safety Power Shutoff information related to wildfire conditions? (n=100; Recall PSPS Communications)

Sources of PSPS Communications

(among those who recall PSPS)




Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



PSPS Information

- The Liberty website remains the most mentioned source for information about PSPS, followed by local TV or radio stations

Top 5 Sources of PSPS Information



Q9 Which one of the following would you most likely turn to first for information about Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=100; Recall PSPS)


↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Understanding PSPS

- Over nine in ten (94%) of those who recall the term PSPS are aware Liberty could proactively shut off power to prevent the ignition of a catastrophic wildfire
- Roughly three quarters understand PSPS is a last resort (73%) and that the likelihood of PSPS is reduced when Liberty takes steps to harden its infrastructure (77%)


Awareness of Potential Proactive Shutoff



Awareness PSPS is Measure of Last Resort



Awareness PSPS Risk Reduced by Infrastructure Hardening




QP10A Are you aware that the utility could proactively shut off power to prevent the ignition of a catastrophic wildfire? (n=100; Recall PSPS)
QP10B Are you aware that a proactive PSPS is a measure of last resort? (n=100; Recall PSPS)
QP10C Are you aware that the likelihood of a PSPS is reduced when the utility takes steps to harden its infrastructure? (n=100; Recall PSPS)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



PSPS Preparedness

- Six in ten (60%) have taken actions to prevent or prepare their home or business in the event of a PSPS
- Generator purchases are the most common action taken, mentioned by 43% of respondents who have taken action; trimming vegetation is the second most common action taken, mentioned by 18% of respondents




QP6. In the past year, have you taken any actions to prevent or prepare your home or business in the event of a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=100; Recall PSPS)
QP6A. What actions have you taken in your home or business to prevent or prepare in the event of a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=60; Took actions)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave

Contact Information for PSPS


- Just over half (51%) are aware they can update their contact information with Liberty; awareness among Recallers is significantly higher than among Non-Recallers (63% vs 41%)
- Over two thirds (69%) of those aware they can update their information have done so

Awareness of Ability to Update Contact Information for PSPS



Have Updated Contact Information

(among those aware they can update contact info)



Q11 Are you aware you can update your contact information with Liberty to receive proactive notification prior to a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=220; Total)
Q11A Have you updated your contact information with Liberty to receive notifications prior to a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=112; Aware of Information Update)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Concerns about Extended Outage

- The largest concerns and perceived challenges in the event of an extended power outage include food replacement (56%), heating/cooling (54%), and communication (45%)
- Mentions of heating/cooling decreased significantly from last wave (70% vs 54%)

Concerns or Challenges of an Extended Power Outage		Nov 2023 (n=320)	June 2023 (n=282)	Nov 2022 (n=218)
Food replacement	56%	53%	51%	54%
Heating/cooling	54% ↓	70%	56%	62%
Communication	45%	40%	45%	39%
Shelter	13%	12%	17%	14%
Powering medical equipment	11%	12%	12%	11%
Transportation	10%	12%	12%	11%
Utility pumps (well water)	8%	12%	6%	13%
Cold storage of medication	8%	7%	9%	8%
Mobility equipment	3%	2%	3%	2%
Food storage/refrigeration	<1%	1%	-	1%

A5 In the event of an extended power outage, what are your most significant concerns or challenges? (n=220; Total)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Medical Needs and Language Preferences

Just over one in seven (15%) responded that they rely on electricity for medical needs

Among **critical customers** the percentage is significantly higher than randomly selected customers (**100%** vs 13%)

Just over one in four (26%) of those relying on electricity for medical needs are aware Liberty provides additional notices prior to a PSPS event

Just over one in seven (15%), indicate that another language other than English is primarily spoken; English remains preferred for communications for nearly all respondents (97%)

- Two percent mentioned Spanish as their preferred language

All but three respondents (99%) stated it would not be helpful for them or somebody in their household to receive communications in another language

Q14 Does anyone in your home or business rely on electricity for medical needs/equipment? (n=220; Total)

Q14A Are you aware that Liberty provides additional notices prior to a Public Safety Power Shutoff to households that have medical needs/equipment? (n=34; Rely on electricity for medical needs)

Q15 Is your primary language other than English? (n=220; Total)


Q16 Would it be helpful for you or anyone else in your household to receive communications in another language? (n=220; Total)

Q16B What is your preferred language to receive communications? (n=220; Total)



Medical Support Certificate Usage

- Just under one in five (18%) are currently enrolled in Liberty's Medical Baseline Allowance Program, consistent with the previous wave
- **Critical** customers are significantly more likely than Random customers to be enrolled (**67%** vs 7%)



Q14E Are you enrolled in Liberty's Medical Baseline Allowance Program? (n=34; Rely on electricity for medical needs)




Post-PSPS



Outreach and Engagement Satisfaction

- Customers remain generally satisfied with most of the outreach and engagement they receive; satisfaction across all metrics remain consistent with November 2023
- Recallers** are significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to be satisfied with all outreach and engagement



QSAT1 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not at all satisfied and 10 being very satisfied, how satisfied are you with the outreach and engagement you receive? (n=220; Total)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



PSPS Notifications

- Almost half (47%) say that notifications should be sent if there is any possibility of a PSPS; another 42% feel that notifications should only be sent if there is a high likelihood of a PSPS

PSPS Notifications Perception	June 2024 (n=220)	Nov 2023 (n=320)	June 2023 (n=282)	Nov 2022 (n=325)	June 2022 (n=324)	Nov 2021 (n=218)
Notifications should be sent if there is any possibility of a PSPS	47%	48%	51%	44%	54%	49%
Notifications should only be sent if there is a high likelihood of a PSPS	42%	42%	37%	45%	35%	39%
Notifications should only be sent if a PSPS is certain to occur	11%	11%	12%	11%	12%	12%

QOSAT4. Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) notifications? (n=220; Total)




Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave

Awareness and Familiarity of Resources

- Of the resources available to the public, half indicated they were aware of the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (50%), followed by Special Payment Arrangements (47%), Residential Energy Audit (35%), and California Alternate Rates for Energy (35%); **Recallers** are significantly more likely than non-recallers to be aware of most resources
- Just over half report they either have no need (30%) or have not investigated the resources (22%)

Awareness



Familiarity



A7 Liberty supports a number of resources that are available to the public. Before today, which of the following resources have you heard of? (n=220; Total)


A8 What statement best describes your familiarity with the resources you just reviewed? (n=220; Total)



Resources Used

- Of those who are aware of the resources available, CARE California Alternate Rates for Energy, Residential Energy Audit, and calling 211 are the most frequently used

Resources used
(among those who are aware)




A9 Which, if any, of these resources have you used in the past? (n varies; Aware of Communication)



Satisfaction with Resources Used

- Customers using Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program are highly satisfied, followed closely by those using the ESA Energy Savings Assistance program

Resource Satisfaction



A10 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not at all satisfied and 10 being very satisfied, how satisfied are you with the resources you've used in the past?



Access and Functional Needs Resources


- Among customers who indicated they have access and functional needs, 21% are aware of additional notifications and communications available
- 32% of Critical or AFN customers have received communication from Liberty about programs available and 14% indicate they engage with Community Based Organizations, outside of a PSPS context

Access and Functional Needs

	June 2024 (n=220)
Adults age 62+ in household	49%
Low-income household	12%
Chronic conditions or injuries	12%
Children in household	10%
Physical, developmental, or intellectual disability	9%
Limited access to transportation in case of emergency	5%
Limited English proficiency	3%
Individual living in institutionalized setting	1%
None of these apply	32%

Awareness of Additional Notifications


(among AFN customers)



June 2024
(n=147)

Received Information about Liberty Programs


(among AFN/Critical customers)



June 2024
(n=147)

Engage with Community Based Organizations

(among AFN/Critical customers)



June 2024
(n=147)

QA11 Do any of the following apply to you or anyone in your household? (n=220; Total)

QL2 Are you aware that Liberty looks to identify households with access and functional needs to provide targeted communication and earlier notification of PSPS? (n=147; A11=Yes)

QL3 Do you recall receiving direct communication regarding available Liberty customer programs and/or preparedness? (n=147; A11=Yes / Critical Customer / Rely on electricity for medical needs)

QL4 Do you or members of your household engage with Community Based Organizations or local Health and Human Services agencies within your community outside of the "during PSPS" context covered earlier in the survey? (n=147; A11=Yes / Critical Customer / Rely on electricity for medical needs)



Critical Customers Summary



Key Metrics: AFN vs. Non-AFN

	AFN Customer (n=177)	Non-AFN Customer (n=43)
Aware of Wildfire Safety Communications	47%	49%
Aware of Communications from Liberty (among those aware)	29%	14%
Recall PSPS	46%	42%
Would Turn to Liberty Website for PSPS Info	38%	33%
Aware of Ability to Update Contact Info for PSPS	51%	49%
Satisfied with Availability of Resources in Community for Wildfire Safety Info	30%	28%
Aware of Additional PSPS Notices for Those with Medical Need (among those with medical need)	26%	--
Aware of AFN Self-Identification	5%	--

*Caution small sample size

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between AFN and non-AFN Customers



Demographic Profiles: AFN vs. Non-AFN

	AFN Customer (n=177)	Non-AFN Customer (n=44)
Gender	Male – 52% Female – 39%	Male – 37% Female – 47%
Age	18-54 – 20% 55-64 – 19% 65+ – 54%	18-54 – 53% 55-64 – 26% 65+ – --
Median Income	\$98K	\$116K
Home Ownership	Own – 84% Rent – 9%	Own – 65% Rent – 21%
Reside in Liberty Service Territory	Year round – 64% Under 6 months – 29% 6 to 11 months – 7%	Year round – 60% Under 6 months – 30% 6 to 11 months – 9%
Primary Language is not English	19%	--
Responded they Rely on Electricity for Medical Needs	19%	--

Bold denotes statistically significant difference
between AFN and non-AFN Customers




CBO Interviews



CBO Interviews

Four in-depth interviews were conducted with community-based organizations (CBOs) in the Liberty territory in June 2024.

- Interviews lasted 30 minutes and were conducted using Microsoft Teams
- Participants were offered \$100 as a “thank you” for their time and feedback
- All interviews were recorded
- Interviews were scheduled using a “warm handoff” from Liberty





CBO Interviews

Current Communications

- CBOs report limited communication from Liberty in general, and specifically about the response to recent winter outages; frustrations about price increases and long periods without power during the winter were raised unaided
- One agency did have personal contact with a Liberty rep and discussed billing support resources and wildfire risk and PSPS, and another recalls information about evacuation planning
- Personal contacts with Liberty are preferred in addition to email; CBOs see themselves as partners in the community and want more engagement directly with Liberty to help reach the more vulnerable members of the community they serve (e.g., homeless, food insecure, elderly, medical needs)
- Although not all are familiar with PSPS terminology, all are aware of the potential for proactive power outages to prevent wildfires
- The perceived lack of communications about the winter outages appears to have eroded the goodwill from seeing Liberty in the field maintaining and upgrading equipment, and there appears to be a loss of trust that Liberty is taking the steps necessary to prevent the need for PSPS outages
- Social media, printed handouts/flyers, emails, and in-person community events or meetings are the primary methods of communication between CBOs and the community

Spreading the Word

- CBOs are willing to help spread the word about wildfire preparedness, safety, and PSPS events, if provided the necessary resources
 - They are willing to help by inviting Liberty to events, handing out flyers, pointing clients to online resources, sharing information via social media, or handing out printed materials
 - Having printed materials on-hand, or links they can share, would make it easier for organizations to provide information to the community, and be able to answer questions as they arise (as opposed to a dedicated campaign)
- Multiple methods of communication are important; social media is common and local Facebook groups are widespread (particularly in areas with little or no traditional media), printed handouts will be important to reach those not online; newspaper and radio are cited as other ways to increase awareness
- Mailings are also cited as a good way to provide educational content and drive people to the website for more information, but it is important to ensure the mailers are differentiated from bills
- In-person presentations are encouraged; multiple agencies mentioned that Liberty attending or speaking at one of their events, or partnering with schools to talk to parents, would be helpful in reaching and educating the public
- English and Spanish are the primary languages required, with Filipino, Mandarin, and Ukrainian mentioned as secondary language needs



CBO Interviews

Useful Information/Resources

- The most effective ways Liberty can support CBOs in preparing the community include:
 - Sharing/creating content that can be shared on social media, either by linking to Liberty or providing content for CBOs to post
 - Educating the public about PSPS, including why PSPS events may be called, the conditions creating PSPS scenarios, and the efforts Liberty is taking to minimize the chances of an event
 - Providing educational resources about how to prepare for a wildfire/outage, including preventing food spoilage, supplies to have on hand such as food and water, etc., evacuation plans, and prepping a “go” bag; frame this information as useful tips for outages at any time of the year, including winter storms
 - Identifying those with medical needs and providing them information to ensure they are able to adequately prepare for a PSPS event or evacuation
 - Providing generator support resources, including help purchasing, education about how to properly use a generator, and safety information
 - Generators are especially important for those with medical needs, and current programs are only available for those with very low incomes; many who are in need of a generator do not qualify for support and cannot afford to buy one
 - Support local organizations with donations or supplies such as generators, so they are able to continue serving the community in the event of a fire or PSPS
- Educational communications and resources are most useful during spring and fall, between the higher risk summer and winter seasons

PSPS Events

- CBOs prefer communications about potential PSPS events as early as possible, to give them enough time to prepare and continue serving the community; one week notice is ideal if possible
 - Agencies are dependent on having electricity to operate, and need to plan in advance to function without power
 - Timely information is especially important for seniors and those with medical needs, who may require additional time to evacuate (if necessary) or make arrangements to go somewhere with a generator or resources
- Providing regular updates is critical; the community understands the weather is constantly changing and that an advance warning is subject to change, and updates about timing, outage duration, and fire danger are highly important
- Specific information about how to prepare for an outage/PSPS event is most useful/relevant
 - Details on how to prepare, including having access to water (especially for those on wells), emergency supplies, where to go in the event of an outage, how to take care of medical needs, charge phones, etc.
 - Information for emergency situations, including evacuation plans and how to evacuate without personal transportation
 - Special attention should be paid to those with medical needs, mobility issues, and those requiring access to a generator
- For communications specifically about PSPS, social media, email, phone calls, text alerts, and radio are the best ways to quickly inform the public; those most vulnerable may require in-person notification

Three wavy, horizontal lines in purple, teal, and pink colors, overlapping each other, spanning the width of the slide.

Demographic Profiles



Respondent Profiles

Gender	Total (n=220)	Recallers (n=104)	Non-Recallers (n=116)
Male	49%	53%	46%
Female	40%	37%	44%
Age			
18 to 24	<1%	--	1%
25 to 34	2%	2%	3%
35 to 44	10%	5%	16%
45 to 54	14%	14%	13%
55 to 64	20%	21%	20%
65 or over	43%	48%	39%
Prefer not to say	10%	10%	9%

Renter/Homeowner	Total (n=220)	Recallers (n=104)	Non-Recallers (n=116)
Own	80%	82%	79%
Rent	11%	11%	12%
Prefer not to say	8%	7%	9%
Reside in Liberty Service Territory			
Year round	63%	60%	66%
Under 6 months	29%	31%	28%
6 to 11 months	8%	10%	6%
Household Income			
Less than \$20,000	5%	6%	5%
\$20,000 to \$39,999	9%	9%	9%
\$40,000 to \$59,999	6%	9%	3%
\$60,000 to \$89,999	10%	9%	11%
\$90,000 to \$129,999	9%	7%	11%
\$130,000 to \$199,999	10%	13%	9%
\$200,000 or more	17%	21%	13%
Prefer not to say	34%	28%	39%

Q17 What is your gender? (n=220; Total)
Q18 What is your age category? (n=220; Total)
Q19 Do you own or rent your home? (n=220; Total)
Q20 Which of the following best describes your annual household income? (n=220; Total)

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between Recallers and Non-Recallers



Respondent Profiles – AFN Criteria

	Total (n=220)	Recallers (n=104)	Non-Recallers (n=116)
AFN (NET)	80%	80%	81%
Age 65+	43%	48%	39%
<\$40K income	14%	14%	14%
Chronic conditions or injuries	12%	13%	10%
Limited access to transportation	5%	3%	8%
Physical, developmental, or intellectual disability	9%	10%	8%
Non-English language needs	15%	14%	16%
Medical need	15%	16%	15%

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between Recallers and Non-Recallers

Attachment 3
Liberty's Survey Results, December 2024



Wildfire Messaging Awareness

Prepared by

MDC Research

Jakob Lahmers - Jakob.Lahmers@mdcresearch.com





Objectives & Methodology

The **overall objective** of this research was to measure the public's awareness of messaging related to wildfire preparedness and safety. Specific research objectives include:

- Measure awareness of Liberty Utilities (Liberty) messages related to wildfire preparedness
- Identify recall of specific message topics
- Identify recall of message channels
- Measure recall and understanding of Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS
- Evaluate sources customers are most likely to turn to for information about PSPS
- Explore actions taken by customers to prepare for wildfire season
- Measure awareness of Liberty's efforts to reduce the risk of wildfires
- Evaluate PSPS notifications perception

Target Audience

- Liberty residential and business customers in California
- Liberty critical customers

Methodology

- Customers were surveyed at random from Liberty customer records, targeted for either phone or web administration
- Surveys available to customers in English and Spanish
- A total of 460 surveys were completed between December 5 and December 22
 - 📞 Phone: 80 completed surveys from 13,510 records
 - 💻 Web: 380 completed surveys from 28,367 records



Key Findings

Communications

- **62% are aware of wildfire safety communications**, up significantly since June 2024 (47%).
- **Liberty** remains the primary source for wildfire preparedness information and saw a significant increase from June 2024 (40% vs 26%). **Public Safety Power Shutoff, Vegetation management** and **personal preparedness** are the most common messages recalled.
- **Email** remains the most cited channel for wildfire preparedness communication, consistent with June 2024; bill inserts, social media, direct mail, and TV news make up the next most common tier.
- **Bill inserts, local organizations, community meetings, direct mail, and the Liberty website** are considered the clearest; **other websites, community meetings, and the Liberty website** are seen as the most useful resources for information about wildfire preparedness.
- **73%** recall seeing, hearing or reading the phrase **"Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS,"** up significantly from last wave (45%). **Email (47%), TV news (27%), and social media (23%)** remain the most common sources of PSPS communication with mentions of email rising significantly since last wave (47% vs 26%).
- Among those recalling the phrase "PSPS" from the past year, **99% are aware of its possible implementation to prevent wildfire**, significantly higher than last wave (94%); just under three quarters **understand PSPS is a last resort (72%)** and the likelihood of **implementation becomes reduced when Liberty takes steps to harden its infrastructure (83%)**.
- **45%** say they would first turn to the **Liberty website** for information about a PSPS event, consistent with last wave (37%).
- Notifications via text and email are considered most effective forms of communication from Liberty. Larger font is considered the most helpful element of communications that could be incorporated.

Actions Taken

- **69% have taken some form of action to prevent wildfires or to prepare their home or business** for the event of a PSPS. Having a **generator** and **trimming vegetation around properties** are the most common actions taken.
- **56% are aware of Liberty's efforts to prune vegetation** around power lines in higher-risk areas, up significantly from June 2024 (47%). **Recallers** are significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to be aware of the majority of Liberty's efforts. **62%** are aware they can **update their contact information with Liberty**, significantly higher than in June 2024 (51%); 76% of those aware have done so, consistent with last wave.

AFN and Critical Customers

- **89% of customers can be considered AFN.**
- Of the resources available to the public, customers are most likely to be aware of **LIHEAP, special payment arrangements, and CARE California Alternate Rates for Energy**; 32% have not investigated any of the resources and 28% report no need.
- Only 6% of AFN customers have heard of AFN Self-Identification.
- Among those reporting that they rely on electricity for medical needs, 42% are aware of additional notices from Liberty, 18% are currently enrolled in the Medical Baseline Allowance program.
- 97% of respondents indicated it would not be helpful to receive communications in a language other than English; only 2% indicate Spanish as their preferred language.

PSPS Experience

- 42% of customers experienced a PSPS this year; of those, 58% said they received adequate notification and information to prepare, though 19% say the number one improvement to be made is additional timing to prepare. 24% say no PSPS notification improvements are necessary.



Recommendations

Ahead of the 2025 fire season, continue outreach efforts to educate the public on wildfire safety and knowledge of PSPS.

- The significant improvement in communication awareness in December 2024, and highest awareness indicated since November 2022, indicates outreach efforts may be paying off after a steady decline over recent years. However, this was likely boosted by PSPS notifications and events immediately before the survey was conducted.
- Similarly, recall of PSPS has steadily decreased since June 2021 (74%) to June 2024 (45%). The significant increase in December 2024 (73%) reinforces the notion that recent efforts may have been successful.
- Among those hearing or seeing communication about wildfire preparedness over the past year, 40% mention Liberty as the source of this information, up significantly from the 26% mentioning Liberty in June 2024. A number of wildfire preparedness messages saw significant increases when compared with June 2024, including messages around PSPS, personal preparedness, notifications and updating customer information, local emergency services – resources, medical needs, enhanced wildfire safety settings, and community resource centers available for information and support.

Continue to pursue opportunities to educate the public of actions taken by Liberty to mitigate the risk of wildfires and PSPS.

- Almost all (99%) customers who encountered the term PSPS over the past year are aware of a possible PSPS by Liberty, up significantly from 94% in June 2024. Significant improvements were also seen in the awareness of Liberty's efforts to reduce wildfire risk, including pruning vegetation (56%), enhancing utility corridor access and clearance (26%), and investing in covered conductors, wood pole alternatives, and additional control devices (19%).


Leverage email, TV news, social media, and bill inserts to drive customers to the Liberty website. Consider website improvements.

- More people indicate they would turn to the Liberty website than any other source for information about PSPS, though bill inserts, local organizations or community centers, community meetings or events, and direct mail are all seen having clearer information than the Liberty website.
- 73% say it the Liberty website is useful, though less useful than non-Liberty websites (83%) and community meeting or events (80%).
- Almost half (47%) of those who recall PSPS say email was the main source of communication, up significantly from 26% in June 2024. TV news, social media, the Liberty website, and bill inserts are mentioned as additional sources.
- Notifications via text is considered the most effective method of communication from Liberty (55%), followed by email (27%), although caution should be used if text is primarily reserved for emergency communications.



Wildfire Safety Communications Awareness

- Just over six in ten (62%) have seen or heard communications about wildfire safety in the past year, up significantly when compared with June 2024 (47%)



Q2 Have you seen or heard any communications about wildfire safety in the past year? (n=460; Total)

	Recallers (n=287)	Non-Recallers (n=107)
Gender	Male – 53% Female – 40%	Male – 49% Female – 47%
Age	18-54 – 19% 55-64 – 16% 65+ – 58%	18-54 – 30% 55-64 – 17% 65+ – 50%
Median Income	\$118K	\$101K
Home Ownership	Own – 84% Rent – 10%	Own – 79% Rent – 17%
Primary Language is not English	11%	17%
Responded they Rely on Electricity for Medical Needs	15%	18%



Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between Recallers and Non-Recallers



Communication Recall


(among those aware of communications)



Sources of Wildfire Preparedness Communications

- Of those aware of communications, four in ten (40%) mention Liberty as the source of wildfire preparedness communication, up significantly from June 2024 (26%)
- Just over one in ten (11%) are not aware of the source of communication, down significantly from the previous wave (24%)

Wildfire Preparedness Communications Sources
(among those who recall communication)



Q5 Who was the information about wildfire preparedness from? (n=287; Aware of Communication)

Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Unaided Message Recall

- Of those who recall communications, just over one in five cited creating a defensible space (21%) as the main takeaway from communications about wildfire safety over the past year, consistent with last wave
- Roughly one in nine (12%) recall the message of vegetation management, down significantly from June 2024 (26%)

Communications Main Takeaway

(among those who recall communication)



QB1 What was your main takeaway from the communications? (n=287; Aware of Communication)

Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Wildfire Preparedness Communications Messages

- Of those who recall communications, just under six in ten recall messages about PSPS (57%), followed by vegetation management (56%) and personal preparedness (56%)
- Compared to the previous wave, mentions of PSPS, personal preparedness, notifications & updating customer information, local emergency services – resources, medical needs, enhanced wildfire safety settings, and community resource centers available for information and support have increased significantly

Communications Messages Recalled (among those who recall communication)		June 2024 (n=104)	Nov 2023 (n=168)	June 2023 (n=158)	Nov 2022 (n=218)	June 2022 (n=213)
Public Safety Power Shutoff	57% ↑	19% ↓	32%	27% ↓	41%	37%
Vegetation Management	56%	57%	58%	56%	59%	56%
Personal Preparedness	56% ↑	43%	55%	61%	56%	55%
Liberty's Wildfire Mitigation Plan	28%	29%	38%	31%	40%	33%
Notifications & Updating Customer Information	28% ↑	10% ↓	23%	23%	28%	31%
Infrastructure Hardening	27%	21%	18% ↑	9% ↓	20%	10%
Local Emergency Services – Resources	26% ↑	13% ↓	26%	20%	24%	30%
Medical Needs	20% ↑	12% ↓	22%	20%	17%	18%
Local Emergency Services – Support Tools	19%	13%	20%	15%	21%	18%
Enhanced Wildfire Safety Settings	18% ↑	10%	16%	12%	17%	Added Nov '22
Community Resource Centers available for information and support	18% ↑	8%	14%	15%	19%	15%
California Public Utility Commission designation of high wildfire threat areas	17%	12%	20%	15%	21%	16%
Weather Stations	7%	5%	7%	9%	9%	6%

Q3 What were the messages of the information you saw or heard about wildfire preparedness from Liberty? (n=287; Aware of Communication)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Information Channels for Wildfire Communications

- Email remains the most common channel for wildfire preparedness communication with just under half (49%) mentioning it, followed by bill inserts (26%), social media (24%), and direct mail (22%)

Information Channels for Wildfire Preparedness Communications

(among those who recall communication)





Q4 Where did you see or hear the communications about wildfire preparedness? (n=287; Aware of Communication)

Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Information Usefulness and Clarity

- In terms of clarity, bill inserts (81%) and local organizations or community centers (81%) are rated the highest, along with other community meeting or events (80%), direct mail (80%), and the Liberty website (80%)
- In terms of usefulness, non-Liberty websites are rated highest (83%), followed by community meetings or events (80%)




Q4A How useful was the information about wildfire preparedness from each of these sources? (n=287; Aware of Communication)
Q4B How would you rate the clarity of the information about wildfire preparedness from each of these sources? (n=287; Aware of Communication)

*Small sample size (n<30)



Communication Frequency

- Just over half say they have seen at least six messages about wildfire preparedness on TV news (52%), followed by other websites (41%), social media (36%), and from local agencies (28%)



Q5A In the past 6 months, how often do you recall seeing, hearing or seeking messages about wildfire preparedness? (n=287; Aware of Communication)


*Small sample size (n<30)




Effective and Helpful Communication

- Notifications via text remain the most effective form of communication from Liberty (55%) followed by email (27%); larger font is the most helpful (11%) element that could be incorporated

Most Effective Communications



Helpful Elements



A6 What method of communication from Liberty do you find most effective? (n=460; Total)

A12 Regardless of how communications from Liberty are received, which, if any, of the following would be helpful for you? (n=460; Total)




Wildfire Preparedness Actions Taken



Awareness of Liberty's Efforts

- Consistent with previous results, pruning vegetation around power lines in higher-risk areas remains at the top of the list of efforts by Liberty to reduce the risk of wildfire (56%), up significantly from June 2024 (47%)
- Enhancing utility corridor access and clearance and investing in covered conductors, wood pole alternatives, and additional control devices also saw significant increases when compared with the previous wave
- Recallers remain significantly more likely to mention the majority of Liberty's efforts

Awareness of Liberty's Efforts to Reduce Wildfire Risk



Q7 What efforts by Liberty are you aware of to reduce the risk of wildfire? (n=460; Total)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




Awareness of Public Safety Power Shutoff



PSPS Awareness

- Just under three in four (73%) say they recall seeing, hearing or reading the phrase “Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS,” up significantly since last wave; **Recallers** remain significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to be aware of PSPS (85% vs 50%)
- Email is the leading source of PSPS communications (47%), up significantly from last wave (26%), followed by TV news (27%) and social media (23%); **Recallers** are significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to mention email (52% vs 25%), TV news (30% vs 17%), the Liberty website (18% vs 8%), bill inserts (16% vs 8%), newspapers (14% vs 4%), and radio (13% vs 4%)


PSPS Recall



Q8 In the past year, do you recall seeing, hearing or reading the phrase ‘Public Safety Power Shutoff or PSPS?’ (n=460; Total)
Q8A Where do you recall seeing or hearing about Public Safety Power Shutoff information related to wildfire conditions? (n=337; Recall PSPS Communications)

Sources of PSPS Communications

(among those who recall PSPS)




↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



PSPS Information

- The Liberty website remains the most mentioned source for information about PSPS, followed by local TV or radio stations

Top 5 Sources of PSPS Information



Q9 Which one of the following would you most likely turn to first for information about Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=337; Recall PSPS)


Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Understanding PSPS

- Almost all (99%) of those who recall the term PSPS are aware Liberty could proactively shut off power to prevent the ignition of a catastrophic wildfire, up significantly from June 2024 (94%)
- Just over seven in ten understand PSPS is a last resort (72%) and just over eight in ten understand that the likelihood of PSPS is reduced when Liberty takes steps to harden its infrastructure (83%)


Awareness of Potential Proactive Shutoff



June 2024 (n=100)

94%


Awareness PSPS is Measure of Last Resort



June 2024 (n=100)

73%

Awareness PSPS Risk Reduced by Infrastructure Hardening



June 2024 (n=100)

77%

QP10A Are you aware that the utility could proactively shut off power to prevent the ignition of a catastrophic wildfire? (n=337; Recall PSPS)
QP10B Are you aware that a proactive PSPS is a measure of last resort? (n=337; Recall PSPS)
QP10C Are you aware that the likelihood of a PSPS is reduced when the utility takes steps to harden its infrastructure? (n=337; Recall PSPS)




Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



PSPS Preparedness

- Just under seven in ten (69%) have taken actions to prevent or prepare their home or business in the event of a PSPS
- Generator purchases remain the most common action taken, mentioned by 35% of respondents who have taken action; trimming vegetation is the second most common action taken, mentioned by 24% of respondents



Actions Taken <i>(among those taking action)</i>	December 2024 (n=232)	June 2024 (n=60)
Generator (prep/purchase)	35%	43%
Trimmed vegetation	24%	18%
Prepared lanterns/flashlights	17%	--
Backup battery	11%	--
Switched to alternative energy source	7%	--
Created defensible space	6%	12%
Food & water storage	5%	3%
Prepared an emergency kit	3%	7%
Prepared an emergency readiness plan and contact information	1%	2%

QP6. In the past year, have you taken any actions to prevent or prepare your home or business in the event of a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=337; Recall PSPS)
QP6A. What actions have you taken in your home or business to prevent or prepare in the event of a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=232; Took actions)


↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Contact Information for PSPS


- Just over six in ten (62%) are aware they can update their contact information with Liberty, up significantly from June 2024 (51%); awareness among **Recallers** remains significantly higher than among Non-Recallers (71% vs 47%)
- Just over three quarters (76%) of those aware they can update their information have done so; **Recallers** are significantly more likely than Non-Recallers to have done so (80% vs 66%)

Awareness of Ability to Update Contact Information for PSPS



Have Updated Contact Information

(among those aware they can update contact info)



Q11 Are you aware you can update your contact information with Liberty to receive proactive notification prior to a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=460; Total)
Q11A Have you updated your contact information with Liberty to receive notifications prior to a Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=285; Aware of Information Update)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Concerns about Extended Outage

- The largest concerns and perceived challenges in the event of an extended power outage include heating/cooling (66%), food replacement (52%), and communication (37%)
- Mentions of heating/cooling increased significantly from last wave (66% vs 54%), while mentions of communication decreased significantly (37% vs 45%)

Concerns or Challenges of an Extended Power Outage		June 2024 (n=220)	Nov 2023 (n=320)	June 2023 (n=282)	Nov 2022 (n=218)
Heating/cooling	66% ↑	54% ↓	70% ↑	56%	62%
Food replacement	52%	56%	53%	51%	54%
Communication	37% ↓	45%	40%	45%	39%
Transportation	13%	10%	12%	12%	11%
Shelter	12%	13%	12%	17%	14%
Utility pumps (well water)	10%	8%	12% ↑	6% ↓	13%
Cold storage of medication	10%	8%	7%	9%	8%
Powering medical equipment	9%	11%	12%	12%	11%

A5 In the event of an extended power outage, what are your most significant concerns or challenges? (n=460; Total)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Medical Needs and Language Preferences

Just over one in seven (15%) responded that they rely on electricity for medical needs

Just over four in ten (42%) of those relying on electricity for medical needs are aware Liberty provides additional notices prior to a PSPS event

One in seven (14%), indicate that another language other than English is primarily spoken; English remains preferred for communications for nearly all respondents (97%)


- Two percent mentioned Spanish as their preferred language

The majority of respondents (97%) stated it would not be helpful for them or somebody in their household to receive communications in another language

Q14 Does anyone in your home or business rely on electricity for medical needs/equipment? (n=460; Total)
Q14A Are you aware that Liberty provides additional notices prior to a Public Safety Power Shutoff to households that have medical needs/equipment? (n=34; Rely on electricity for medical needs)
Q15 Is your primary language other than English? (n=460; Total)
Q16 Would it be helpful for you or anyone else in your household to receive communications in another language? (n=460; Total)
Q16B What is your preferred language to receive communications? (n=460; Total)

Medical Baseline Enrollment

- Just under one in five (18%) are currently enrolled in Liberty's Medical Baseline Allowance Program, consistent with the previous wave



Q14E Are you enrolled in Liberty's Medical Baseline Allowance Program? (n=34; Rely on electricity for medical needs)

↑ ↓ Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave




PSPS Experience



Experiencing PSPS

- Just over four in ten (42%) experienced a Public Safety Power Shutoff in 2024
- Among those who experienced a PSPS, just under six in ten (58%) said they received adequate notification and information to prepare and just over four in ten (42%) said they were aware of community resource centers set up during the PSPS




QPS1 Did you experience a Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) this year? (n=460; Total)
QPS1A Did you receive adequate notification and information to prepare for the Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=192; Experienced PSPS)
QPS1C Are you aware of Community Resource Centers set up during the Public Safety Power Shutoff? (n=192; Experienced PSPS)
QPS1D Did you visit a Community Resource Center? (n=80; Aware of Community Resource Centers)
QPS1E Did the Community Resource Center meet your needs with sufficient capacity and other functional requirements? (n=5; Visited a Community Resource Center)

*Small sample size (n<30)



Medical Equipment Use And CBO Engagement

Among those **experiencing PSPS**, one in five (21%) said **they were able to use the necessary medical equipment during the outage**, while one third (34%) indicated they were not able. Just under half (45%) said they did not need to use any medical equipment during the outage



Almost all (99%) who experienced a PSPS said they did not engage with any community-based organizations or resource networks to address food replacement, transportation, translation services, etc. Two people surveyed (1%) indicated they did engage with CBOs but, when asked to specify, simply said “none”


QA13 Were you able to use necessary medical equipment during the PSPS outage? (n=71; Experienced PSPS & Rely on electricity for medical needs)
QA1 During the power outage, did you engage with any community-based organizations (CBOs) or resource networks to assist in meeting your needs with food replacement, transportation, translation services, etc.? (n=192; Experienced PSPS)
QA2 What local Community Based Organizations (CBOs) or resource networks did you engage with? (n=2; Engaged with CBO)
QA3 How did you engage with the CBO or resource networks you mentioned? (n=2; Engaged with CBO)
QA4 At what point during the outage did you engage the CBOs or resource networks? (n=2; Engaged with CBO)



PSPS Notification Improvements

- Roughly one in five (19%) of those who experienced a PSPS say the number one notification improvement is timing/more time to prepare
- Three in ten (30%) are satisfied or have no recommendations for improvement

PSPS Notification Improvements




QPS1B What about the Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) notification and information could have been improved? (n=192; Experienced PSPS)




PSPS Notifications

- Half (51%) of customers received a PSPS notification while just under six in ten (58%) said they did not experience any PSPS events over the past year

Number of PSPS Notifications Received in Past Year



Number of PSPS Events Experienced in Past Year



Impact of PSPS "False Alarm"

Not specific to my area/location	8%
Nuisance	5%
Allowed for preparation	4%
Anxiety	2%
Other	20%
Don't know	6%
No effect	55%

QOSAT2 How many Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) notifications have you received in the past year? (n=460; Total)
QOSAT3 How many Public Safety Power Shutoffs have you experienced in the past year? (n=460; Total)
QOSAT5 In what ways did 'false alarm' Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) notifications, where you received a notification but did not have a PSPS, affect you, personally? (n=85; Received more notifications than PSPS events experienced)




Post-PSPS



Outreach and Engagement Satisfaction

- Customers remain generally satisfied with most of the outreach and engagement they receive
- Satisfaction with what the utility does to reduce wildfire risk and the amount of information and outreach received saw significant increases compared to June 2024 (36% vs 27% and 35% vs 27%, respectively)



QSAT1 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not at all satisfied and 10 being very satisfied, how satisfied are you with the outreach and engagement you receive? (n=460; Total)

Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



PSPS Notifications

- Almost half (45%) say that notifications should be sent if there is any possibility of a PSPS; another 41% feel that notifications should only be sent if there is a high likelihood of a PSPS

PSPS Notifications Perception	Dec 2024 (n=460)	June 2024 (n=220)	Nov 2023 (n=320)	June 2023 (n=282)	Nov 2022 (n=325)	June 2022 (n=324)
Notifications should be sent if there is any possibility of a PSPS	45%	47%	48%	51%	44% ↓	54%
Notifications should only be sent if there is a high likelihood of a PSPS	41%	42%	42%	37% ↓	45%	35%
Notifications should only be sent if a PSPS is certain to occur	14%	11%	11%	12%	11%	12%

QOSAT4. Which of the following statements best describes how you feel about Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) notifications? (n=460; Total)




Arrows signify statistical difference at the 95% confidence level compared to the previous wave



Awareness and Familiarity of Resources

- Of the resources available to the public, just over half (55%) indicated they were aware of the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program, followed by Special Payment Arrangements (47%), and California Alternate Rates for Energy (43%)
- Roughly three in ten report they have not investigated the resources (32%) or have no need of the resources (28%)




A7 Liberty supports a number of resources that are available to the public. Before today, which of the following resources have you heard of? (n=460; Total)
A8 What statement best describes your familiarity with the resources you just reviewed? (n=460; Total)



Resources Used

- Of those who are aware of the resources available, Residential Energy Audit, CARE California Alternate Rates for Energy, and Medical Baseline Allowance are the most frequently used



A9 Which, if any, of these resources have you used in the past? (n varies; Aware of Resource)


*Small sample size (n<30)



Satisfaction with Resources Used

- Satisfaction is highest with Medical Baseline Allowance (67%) and the ESA Energy Savings Assistance program (67%), and LIHEAP (58%)

Resource Satisfaction




A10 On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being not at all satisfied and 10 being very satisfied, how satisfied are you with the resources you've used in the past?



Access and Functional Needs Resources

- Among the 79% of customers who indicated they have access and functional needs, 20% are aware of additional notifications and communications available
- 37% of Critical or AFN customers have received communication from Liberty about programs available and 11% indicate they engage with Community Based Organizations, outside of a PSPS context



QA11 Do any of the following apply to you or anyone in your household? (n=460; Total)
QL2 Are you aware that Liberty looks to identify households with access and functional needs to provide targeted communication and earlier notification of PSPS? (n=362; A11=Yes)
QL3 Do you recall receiving direct communication regarding available Liberty customer programs and/or preparedness? (n=375; A11=Yes / Critical Customer / Rely on electricity for medical needs)
QL4 Do you or members of your household engage with Community Based Organizations or local Health and Human Services agencies within your community outside of the "during PSPS" context covered earlier in the survey? (n=375; A11=Yes / Critical Customer / Rely on electricity for medical needs)



AFN Summary



Key Metrics: AFN vs. Non-AFN

	AFN Customer (n=410)	Non-AFN Customer (n=50)
Aware of Wildfire Safety Communications	64%	46%
Aware of Communications from Liberty (among those aware)	40%	43%
Recall PSPS	74%	68%
Would Turn to Liberty Website for PSPS Info	44%	56%
Aware of Ability to Update Contact Info for PSPS	62%	62%
Satisfied with Availability of Resources in Community for Wildfire Safety Info	34%	26%
Aware of Additional PSPS Notices for Those with Medical Need (among those with medical need)	42%	--
Aware of AFN Self-Identification	6%	4%

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between AFN and non-AFN Customers



Demographic Profiles: AFN vs. Non-AFN

	AFN Customer (n=410)	Non-AFN Customer (n=50)
Gender	Male – 52% Female – 41%	Male – 40% Female – 44%
Age	18-54 – 21% 55-64 – 14% 65+ – 60%	18-54 – 50% 55-64 – 34% 65+ – --
Median Income	\$107K	\$180K
Home Ownership	Own – 83% Rent – 12%	Own – 78% Rent – 10%
Reside in Liberty Service Territory	Year round – 63% 6 to 11 months – 11% Under 6 months – 20%	Year round – 64% 6 to 11 months – 16% Under 6 months – 20%
Primary Language is not English	15%	--
Responded they Rely on Electricity for Medical Needs	17%	--

Bold denotes statistically significant difference
between AFN and non-AFN Customers



CBO Interviews



CBO Interviews

Four in-depth interviews were conducted with community-based organizations (CBOs) in the Liberty territory in December 2024.

- Interviews lasted 30 minutes and were conducted using Microsoft Teams
- Participants were offered \$100 as a “thank you” for their time and feedback
- All interviews were recorded
- Interviews were scheduled using a “warm handoff” from Liberty





CBO Interviews

PSPS Awareness and Messaging

- Participants are aware of PSPS and recall messages from Liberty, but the experience varies by county
 - The participant from Mono County reported strong communications and information from Liberty, with personal interactions with their rep
 - While those in Sierra and Nevada Counties do report communications and resources from Liberty, the frequency of communication and level of resources could be improved; however, they acknowledge that the engagement is complicated by other electric utilities throughout the counties either serving customers or providing power supply
- All CBOs and agencies interviewed work to help prepare the public about PSPS, either directly or through partnership with local organizations
 - They are typically involved in providing information to those they work with through their public health, supportive services, or disability services work
 - They are able to provide PSPS-related resources or point clients to resources provided by the utilities
- Community-facing education from Liberty about PSPS is important, including an explanation of PSPS, why events are called (including the specific criteria), how to prepare, and what Liberty is doing to mitigate the potential for PSPS
 - Social media, flyers/handouts, email communications, radio/print, community events, and text alerts/calls for emergencies are recommended
 - English and Spanish are the languages required to reach the community
 - Late spring or early summer is the ideal time for messaging

PSPS Awareness and Messaging (cont.)

- Several resources are mentioned that would help the community
 - Information about how to prepare (having food/water, gas in car, batteries charged, radio available, go bags, knowing evacuation routes, etc.)
 - Support with generators or backup power, either direct to public (particularly for those with medical needs) or supporting facilities such as senior centers, hospitals, CRCs, etc.
- Participants would welcome Liberty's participation in meetings (either agency or public-facing), community events, or events at their sites
 - Agencies very much view their relationship with Liberty as a partnership, and want to ensure they coordinate information and resources with Liberty, other utilities, and public safety organizations
 - Information from Liberty that can be shared through social media (e.g., reposts), or send via email that can be copy/pasted into public-facing messaging is helpful
- Advanced notice for PSPS events is important, particularly for public health and emergency preparedness organizations
 - Providing at least 24 hours notice is important for agencies to communicate with their teams, coordinate public outreach (or being prepared to answer questions), and making plans to operate without power
 - For the public, it is also important to give as much notice as possible, especially for those with medical needs or AFN customers that need extra time to prepare
 - Regular updates are appreciated as conditions change; this allows agencies to adjust their plans and answer questions from community members



CBO Interviews

CRC Awareness and Messaging

- Awareness of CRCs in the community is mixed, potentially based on where PSPS events were called prior to this research
 - In Mono County, CRCs are well known and established, and the public was notified through social media, the Ready Mono webpage, and text/phone alerts were sent to people with energy dependency
 - In Placer County, the CRCs are known and considered a great resource, but there is a need to increase awareness and partner with Tahoe Donner PUD to ensure the entire community is supported
 - In other counties, participants are less familiar with CRCs; while they are aware of the concept, they don't have the details and are vaguely aware of what other utilities have set up
- All agree that it is important to educate the public about CRCs, so they know where they are located, when they will be operational, and the resources provided
 - Similar messaging to PSPS is recommended, including social media outreach, radio/print, distributed flyers or mailers, and text/phone notification leading up to PSPS events
 - This is especially important for the elderly population, AFN, and those with medical needs
 - Consistent and frequent messaging is important, starting in late spring and early summer
- Support with resources, such as generators, transportation, and supplies is an area where participants feel Liberty could contribute

AFN Awareness and Messaging

- All participants are very familiar with AFN and actively work to support this community
 - Most participants maintain a list of AFN community members, and provide alerts and notifications related to PSPS and other emergencies
 - Outreach efforts to enroll potential AFN customers are done through health clinics (e.g., flu shots), meal delivery, senior and home supportive services, and word of mouth through trusted partners in the community (CBOs, schools, etc.)
 - Social media is also used to spread the word about signing up for additional notifications through AFN programs, particularly in areas with large local Facebook communities
- County public health agencies are interested in potentially sharing AFN data with Liberty (and vice versa), but privacy must be taken into account; while the information is generally not covered by HIPPA, it is important to collaborate in a manner that respects consumer privacy and confirms with government and regulatory requirements
- It is important to educate the public about the additional notifications and resources they can get through AFN self-identification, as well as providing information about how to prepare to be self sufficient during an outage
- One participant mentioned the importance of proactive preparations for this audience, as it reduces the likelihood of AFN customers turning to hospitals during emergencies and overwhelming the hospital systems



CBO Interviews

Additional Resources

- Participants are aware of support resources provided by Liberty, although with varying experience and knowledge of program details
 - CARE and other income support are recalled, and organizations commonly help connect community members to these resources
 - Public health agencies are well aware of Medical Baseline and actively refer clients to Liberty's program and help them enroll
 - 211 Resources was cited as way to provide information to clients about emergency resources
 - Liberty's support for Meals on Wheels was also mentioned, and the program is noted as a good opportunity to provide additional information and resources to the senior community
- Liberty has been helpful in disseminating information to those in need of resources
 - Flyers, attendance at events, meeting with staff, and funding for Meals and Wheels are all cited as ways in which Liberty has been helpful
 - Liberty's attendance at internal, partner-facing, and community-facing events is valued
- Messaging via social media, attending community events, partnering with senior centers/CBOs, direct mailings, and bill inserts are all recommended to reach community members who could benefit from these programs

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Demographic Profiles



Respondent Profiles

Gender	Total (n=460)	Recallers (n=287)	Non-Recallers (n=107)
Male	51%	53%	49%
Female	42%	40%	47%
Age			
18 to 24	--	--	--
25 to 34	2%	1%	3%
35 to 44	10%	8%	13%
45 to 54	12%	10%	14%
55 to 64	17%	16%	17%
65 or over	53%	58%	50%
Prefer not to say	6%	7%	4%

Renter/Homeowner	Total (n=460)	Recallers (n=287)	Non-Recallers (n=107)
Own	82%	84%	79%
Rent	12%	10%	17%
Prefer not to say	5%	5%	4%
Reside in Liberty Service Territory			
Year round	63%	60%	71%
6 to 11 months	12%	13%	7%
Under 6 months	25%	27%	21%
Household Income			
Less than \$20,000	3%	3%	6%
\$20,000 to \$39,999	6%	6%	6%
\$40,000 to \$59,999	8%	8%	6%
\$60,000 to \$89,999	10%	7%	15%
\$90,000 to \$129,999	12%	13%	12%
\$130,000 to \$199,999	13%	14%	12%
\$200,000 or more	16%	16%	14%
Prefer not to say	33%	34%	30%

Q17 What is your gender? (n=460; Total)

Q18 What is your age category? (n=460; Total)

Q19 Do you own or rent your home? (n=460; Total)

Q20 Which of the following best describes your annual household income? (n=460; Total)

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between Recallers and Non-Recallers



Respondent Profiles – AFN Criteria

	Total (n=460)	Recallers (n=287)	Non-Recallers (n=107)
AFN (NET)	79%	83%	69%
Age 65+	53%	58%	50%
<\$40K income	10%	9%	11%
Chronic conditions or injuries	13%	12%	12%
Limited access to transportation	3%	4%	3%
Physical, developmental, or intellectual disability	9%	9%	11%
Non-English language needs	3%	3%	5%
Medical need	15%	15%	18%

Bold denotes statistically significant difference between Recallers and Non-Recallers